THE

APHORISMS

OF THE

NYÁYA PHILOSOPHY,

BY

GAUTAMA,

WITH ILLUSTRATIVE EXTRACTS FROM THE COMMENTARY

BY

VIŚWANÁTHA.

IN SANSKRIT AND ENGLISH.

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PREFACE.

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The great body of the Hindú Philosophy is based upon six sets of very concise Aphorisms. Without a commentary the Aphorisms are scarcely intelligible, they being designed not so much to communicate the doctrine of the particular school as to aid, by the briefest possible suggestions, the memory of him to whom the doctrine shall have been already communicated. To this end they are admirably adapted; and, this being their end, the obscurity, which must needs attach to them in the eyes of the uninstructed, is not chargeable upon them as a fault.

For various reasons it is desirable that there should be an accurate translation of the Aphorisms with so much of gloss as may be required to render them intelligible. A class of pandits, in the Benares Sanskrit College, having been induced to learn English, it is contemplated that a version of the Aphorisms, brought out in successive portions, shall be submitted to the criticism of these men, and, through them, of other learned Bráhmans, so that any errors in the version may have the best chance of being discovered and rectified. The employment of such a version as a class-book is designed to subserve further the attempt to determine accurately the aspect of the philosophical terminology of the East as regards that of the West.

J. R. B.

Benares College,
5th January, 1851.

THE APHORISMS OF THE NYÁYA.

INTRODUCTION.

a. [The *Nyáya-sútra-vritti*, or "Explication of the Aphorisms of the Nyáya," commences with the following exordium.]

b. Salutation to the illustrious Gaṇeśa!

c. May he, the splendour of whose gracefulness of person surpasses ten million of Cupids;—who made the joy—and O how delightful it was!—of the bevies of the dames of Vraja;—whose body is dark as the teeming rain-cloud, and who haunts no temple save the mind;—may he, the some one [whom, as the well known Krishṇa, I need not name], promote the felicity of the inhabitants of the three worlds.*

d. In order to produce great good-luck, we meditate on the beauty of the toe-nails of Bhavání, which [beauty], taking an exquisite aspect as it was associated with the ruddy lustre of the newly applied lac-dye, seemed a sort of lovely ornament of Śiva's head—when his head was bowed down [at her feet] to deprecate her haughty displeasure—eclipsing [—as the beauty of the toe-nails

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* श्री गणेशाय नमः ॥ वपुर्लावण्यश्रीर्जितमदनकोटिर्व्रजवधूजनानामानन्दं कमपि कमनीयं विरचयन् । स कोऽपि प्रेमाणं प्रथयतु मनोमन्दिरचरस्त्रिलोकीलोकानां सजलजलदश्यामलतनुः ॥ १ ॥

then did—] the resplendent beauty of the twilight Moon* [which is the *usual* ornament of Śiva's head.]

e. I reverence him [—meaning GAUTAMA—], the resplendent, who has eyes in his feet [as well as in his head—though how, or to serve what purpose, does not seem to be known—], by means of the rays of whose dialectics [—meaning thereby the body of doctrine which he bequeathed to the world—] the virtuous get over the whole darkness that was within them.†

f. We reverence our father, VIDYÁNIVÁSA [the abode of learning], who is as it were a combination in one—of the two gods of wisdom and of justice, the ornament of the globe of the fair earth, a masculine form as it were of the goddess of eloquence, the producer of confident scholarship [in those enjoying the advantage of being his pupils], in liberality like another Karṇa incarnate, towards the wretched ingenious in his kindness, whose fair fame prevades the universe.‡

g. I make the dust of my preceptor's feet my pilot [in the voyage on which I am going to adventure—for I am] seeking to promote skill, and resolved in mind that even the dull-witted shall [be supplied at all events with the means to] understand—

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* संयुक्तां युक्तरूपामभिनवनिहितालक्तकारक्तभासा सन्ध्यापीयूषभानोरतिरुचिरतरां चूर्णयन्तीमभिख्यां। मानव्यामोकनम्रत्रिपुरहरशिरोरम्यभूषाविशेषं भूयो भव्यं विधातुं चरणनखरुचं भावयामो भवान्याः ॥ २ ॥

† यदीयतर्ककिरणैरान्तरध्वान्तसन्ततिं। सन्तस्तरन्ति भास्वन्तमक्षपादं नमामि तम् ॥ ३ ॥

‡ अद्वैतं गुरुधर्मयोरिव लसत्क्ष्मामण्डलीमण्डनं रूपं किञ्चन पौरुषं गिर इव प्रागल्भ्यसम्पादकं। दाने कर्णमिवावतीर्णमपरं दीने दयादक्षिणं तातं विश्वविसारिचारुयशसं विद्यानिवासं नुमः ॥ ४ ॥

without much effort, and the intelligent as mere play,—the wide [and all-embracing] system of the Nyáya.*

h. May this work of Viswanátha the son of Vidyánivása conduce to the gratification of the sage the fine-witted and the unenvious.†

i. Now the on-lookers do not engage [in any study offered to their attention] without having come to feel an interest in the *motive* [—i. e. in the end, to the attainment of which the study is calculated to lead]; therefore the end is to be mentioned first.‡ [The end proposed is the escaping from liability to transmigration, and the attainment of tranquil and eternally uninterrupted beatitude:—and, as the declaration of this end is requisite in order to gain attention at the outset—] therefore, for the declaration thereof, the venerable one who has eyes in his feet [—see *e.*—] aphorises in the first place as follows.§

SECTION I.

The end of the proposed enquiry.

Enunciation of the things, the right notion of which leads to Beatitude.

प्रमाणप्रमेयसंशयप्रयोजनदृष्टान्तसिद्धान्तावयवतर्कनिर्णयवादजल्पवितण्डाहेत्वाभासच्छलजातिनिग्रहस्थानानां तत्त्वज्ञानान्निःश्रेयसाधिगमः ॥१॥

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* अलसमतिरपीदं विस्तृतं न्यायशास्त्रं विरहितबहुयत्नो लीलया वेत्तु विज्ञः । इति विनिहितचेताः कौशलं कर्त्तुकामो गुरुचरणरजोऽहं कर्णधारीकरोमि ॥ ५ ॥

† विद्यानिवाससूनोः कृतिरेषा विश्वनाथस्य । विदुषामतिसूक्ष्मधियाममत्सराणां मुदे भविता ॥ ६ ॥

‡ प्रयोजनमनभिसन्धाय प्रेक्षावन्तो न प्रवर्त्तन्ते । अतः प्रथमं प्रयोजनमभिधानीयम् ॥

§ अतस्तत्प्रतिपादनाय भगवानक्षपादः प्रथमं सूत्रयति ॥

No. 1.—Proof [—i. e. the instrument of right notion—3. *a*.*—]; that which [—as having a proof—] is the object of right notion; doubt; motive; familiar fact; scholastic tenet; confutation; ascertainment; disquisition; controversy; cavil; semblance of a reason; perversion; futility; and unfitness to be argued with;——from knowing the truth in regard to these [sixteen things], there is the attainment of the summum bonum (*ni'śreyasa.*)

a. But then [—there is no denying—] the knowledge of truth is not the *immediate* cause of Beatitude. Beatitude—to consider it apart—is of two kinds through the distinction of the 'higher' [attainable only on quitting the body], and the 'lower.' Of these the 'lower,' in the shape of 'emancipation while yet in life' (*jívanmukti*), takes place immediately on the attainment of the knowledge of truth [—the sign of a man's having attained to which is his exhibiting a perfect indifference to all that passes around him]. This, moreover, is attained by him who has ascertained the truth in regard to Soul, whose false notions have been removed by incessant application, and who is yet experiencing [—in appearance at least—for, though apparently exposed to hardships, he is generally supposed to feel nothing—the fruit of] past deeds;—but the 'higher' [is attained by him] by certain *degrees*. To explain the order thereof is the purpose of the following aphorism.†

The order of the steps towards Beatitude.

दुःखजन्मप्रवृत्तिदोषमिथ्याज्ञानानामुत्तरोत्तरापाये तदनन्तरापायादपवर्गः ॥ २ ॥

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* प्रमायाः करणं प्रमाणम् ॥ वेद° परि° ॥

† ननु तत्त्वज्ञानस्य न साक्षादेव निःश्रेयसहेतुत्वं। निःश्रेयसं तावद् द्विविधं परापरभेदात्। तत्रापरं जीवन्मुक्तिलक्षणं तत्त्वज्ञानानन्तरमेव। तदप्यवधारितात्मतत्त्वस्य नैरन्तर्याभ्यासापहृतमिथ्याज्ञानस्य प्रारब्धं कर्मोपभुञ्जानस्य। परन्तु क्रमेण। तत्र क्रमप्रतिपादनायेदं सूत्रमिति ॥

No. 2.—Pain (*du'kha*), birth (*janman*), activity (*pravritti*), fault (*dosha*), false notions (*mithyá-jnána*),—since, on the successive annihilation of these in turn, there is the annihilation of the one next [before] it, there is [on the annihilation of the last of them] Beatitude (*apavarga*).

a. [That is to say—] among Pain and the rest [in the foregoing list], whichever are subsequent in order [to others in the list], on the annihilation of these [subsequent ones], since there is the annihilation of the next one—i. e. of the one immediately next it and preceding it—, there is [—in the end—when Pain, the last in the list thus read backwards, has been annihilated,] Beatitude.*

b. Although [—as some one may object—] Beatitude does not come *from* the absence of Pain, but *is* it—still [there is no fault in the form of expression employed in the aphorism, for] the sense of the 5th case here is that of *indifference*† [—i. e. the absence of any difference between the *what* and the *whence*].

c. So much—in the 'Explication of the Aphorisms'—for the topic denominated 'that relating to the *motive*'‡ [for pursuing the enquiry proposed].

d. [The remembering of the order of the steps, in § 2., may be facilitated, to some readers, by availing one's self of the distributively cumulative form of exposition employed in the nursery tale of "The House that Jack built." Thus—

1. *Du'kha.*—This is the '*pain*' that the man had.

2. *Janman.*—This is the '*birth*' [again renewed] that gave room for the 'pain' that the man had.

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* दुःखादीनां मध्ये यदुत्तरोत्तरं तेषामपाये तदनन्तरस्य तत्पूर्व्वस्थितस्य पूर्व्वपूर्व्वस्यापायादपवर्गः ॥

† यद्यपि दुःखापायान्नापवर्गः किन्तु स एव सः तथाप्यभेद एव तत्र पञ्चम्यर्थः ॥

‡ इति सूत्रवृत्तौ सप्रयोजनाभिधेयप्रकरणम् ॥

Pravritti.—This is '*activity*' (—requiring reward—) that led to the 'birth' (again renewed) that gave room for the 'pain' that the man had.

4. *Dosha.*—This is the '*fault*' (—of 'desire' or 'dislike'—alike to be shunned—or 'stupidity'—) which (—in the man who, if wise, had done nothing at all,—) begot the 'activity' (requiring reward) that led to the 'birth' (again renewed) that gave room for the 'pain' that the man had.

5. *Mithyá-jnána.*—This means the '*wrong-notions*' (of that man unversed in the truth-teaching Nyáya Philosophy) which (—since the man knew no better—) gave rise to the 'fault' (of 'desire' or 'dislike' or 'stupidity') which (—in the man who, if wise, had done nothing at all—) begot the 'activity' (requiring reward) that led to the 'birth' (again renewed) that gave room for the 'pain' that the man had.

6. *Apavarga.*—This last is '*beatitude*'—promised as fruit of the truth-teaching Nyáya Philosophy, which gives us *right* ones instead of the '*wrong* notions,' which gave rise to what GAUTAMA styles a '*fault,*' inasmuch as it mischievously begot the 'activity' carefully shunned by the wise—for 'activity,'—shaping itself in acts that are good or bad, and require reward of a like description,—occasions a man to be born again,—and 'twas this same 'birth' that gave room for the 'pain' that the man had.]*

*Mr. Colebrooke, in his celebrated essay on the Nyáya, (see Essays, vol. 1) stating concisely the Nyáya view of the attainment of beatitude, describes (at p. 290) soul as "not earning fresh merit or demerit by deeds done with desire." Here he makes, as GAUTAMA does, the 'desire' (which is one of the three meant by the technical word *dosha* 'fault'—see the Essay, p. 290. l. 1.—and the present work §18. *a.*—) to be the producer of acts, from which acts, in turn, arise merit or demerit. But, at p. 289, when he says "From acts proceed faults (*dósha*); "including under this designation, passion or extreme desire; aversion or loath-"ing; and error or delusion (*móha*)," he adopts an order the reverse of that enjoined in §18.—see Note on §18. *b.* If the passage in the Essay be correctly edited, it would seem as if Mr. Colebrooke, when giving to his Essay a final revision after having laid it aside for a time, had been struck with the oddness of the expression that "from faults proceed acts," and had reversed it without adverting to the technical definition of 'faults,' in the same sentence, as the *passions* which give *rise* to action. GAUTAMA, the votary of Quietism, gives to

d. Now, since a definition will be looked for [of each of the things enunciated in the aphorism §1] in the order of enunciation, he defines, and divides, Proof—the first enounced.*

SECTION II.

The instruments available in prosecuting the enquiry.

प्रत्यक्षानुमानोपमानशब्दाः प्रमाणानि ॥ ३ ॥

What are the instruments of right notion.

No. 3.—Proofs [—i. e.—see §1—instruments of right notion—] are (1) the deliverances of sense; (2) the recognition of signs; (3) the recognition of likeness; and (4) words.

What is meant by 'right notion' or *knowledge* κατ᾽ ἐξοχήν.

a. There, by the root *má* 'to measure,' peculiarised by the emphatic prefix *pra* [—and thus giving the word *pramá*—scilicet 'what takes the *very* measure of its object'—] there is signified a notion [—not dubious, or erroneous,—for notions may be both of these;—but the '*right* notion' denoted by *pramá* is a *knowledge*] in the veriest manner determined [—or distinguished from the bare knowledge that 'this is *something*'—] by the determinate nature of that which [— being the object of the knowledge—] possesses such and such† [determinate nature.—It is,

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the passions the name of 'faults' with a significance akin to that which the word bore in the remark of Talleyrand on the murder of the Duc D'Enghien—"ce n'était pas une crime—c'était une *faute*;"—it was an absolute *blunder*. The wise man, according to Gautama, is he who avoids the three *mistakes* of having a liking for a thing, and acting accordingly; or of having a dislike for a thing, and acting accordingly; or of being *stupidly* indifferent, and thereupon acting; instead of being *intelligently* indifferent, and not acting at all.

* अथ यथोद्देशं लक्षणस्यापेक्षितत्वात् प्रथमोद्दिष्टं प्रमाणं लक्षयति विभजते च ॥

† अत्र तद्वति तत्प्रकारकत्वरूपप्रकर्षविशिष्टज्ञानं प्रशब्दविशिष्टेन माधातुना प्रत्याय्यते ॥

in short, the knowledge of a thing *as it is*,—or, in the words of Butler,

"To know *what's what*;—and that's as high
"As metaphysic wit can fly."]

b. That—in virtue of which any thing is the *instrument* of such [right notion as has been just defined]—is what constitutes any thing a *Proof** [or instrument of right notion.]

c. And the knowledge intended to be spoken of here is notion other than *memory*;—so that this [definition of 'Proof' just given] does not extend [where it ought not] to the instrument of *recollection*† [—which we may have to treat of hereafter.]

d. At this point the Explication of the [first] three Aphorisms is completed.‡

e. Now he begins to define, in their order, the [several kinds of 'Proof' which, in the preceding Aphorism, were] divided.§

f. [The four kinds of 'Proof' are usually spoken of as 'Perception,' 'Inference,' 'Comparison,' and 'Testimony.' We may have occasion in the sequel to explain why we think proper to depart from the accustomed from of rendering].

What is meant by a deliverance of sense.

इन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षोत्पन्नं ज्ञानमव्यपदेश्यमव्यभिचारि व्यवसायात्मकं प्रत्यक्षम् ॥ ४ ॥

No. 4.—By a deliverance of sense is meant knowledge which has arisen from the contact of a sense with its object,—[and this

* तत्करणत्वं प्रमाणत्वम् ॥

† ज्ञानञ्चात्रानुभवो विवक्षितस्तेन स्मृतिकरणे नातिव्याप्तिः ॥

‡ इति त्रिसूत्रीटीका समाप्ता ॥

§ अथ विभक्तानि यथाक्रमं लक्षयितुमारभते ॥

knowledge may be] indeterminate [—as when one in consequence perceives 'this is *something*'—we know not, or think not, what; —but] not erroneous [—for, if erroneous, it would be no 'instrument of right notion:'—or it may be] determinate [—such a degree of attention having been exerted as to determine that 'this is so and so' and not any thing else.]

a. [Now] he defines and divides the 'recognition of a sign.'*

What is meant by the recognition of a sign.

अथ तत्पूर्वकं त्रिविधमनुमानं पूर्ववच्छेषवत्सामान्यतो दृष्टञ्च ॥ ५ ॥

No. 5.—Now the recognition of a sign, which is preceded thereby [—i. e. is preceded by a deliverance of sense†—§4—else the recognition of the sign were impossible—] is of three kinds—(1) having [as the sign] the *prior*, or (2) having [as the sign] the *posterior*, or else (3) [consisting in] the *perception of homogeneousness*.

a. [By 'prior'—as explained in our Lecture on the Sánkhya Philosophy, §101, &c.—the author means a '*cause*,'—from which, when recognised, its effect may be inferred as about to follow. So again, by 'posterior' he means an '*effect*'—from which, when recognised, one can infer that such and such a cause has been at work. By the 'perception of homogeneousness' he means the recognition of the subject as being referable to some class, and as being thence liable to have predicated of it whatever may be predicable of the class. The three 'signs' belong to the three arguments 'à priori,' 'à posteriori,' and 'from analogy.']

b. He [now] defines the 'recognition of likeness.'‡

* अनुमानं लक्षयति विभजते च ॥

† तत्पूर्वकं प्रत्यक्षपूर्वकम् ॥

‡ प्रसिद्धस्य पूर्वप्रमितस्य गवादेः साधर्म्यात् सादृश्यात् तज्ज्ञानात् साध्यस्य गवयादिपदवाच्यत्वस्य साधनं सिद्धिरुपमानम् ॥

What is meant by the recognition of likeness.

प्रसिद्धसाधर्म्यात्साध्यसाधनमुपमानम् ॥ ६ ॥

No. 6.—The 'recognition of likeness' is the instrument [in the ascertaining] of that which is to be ascertained through its similarity to something [previously] well-known.

a. [That is to say] the 'recognition of likeness' is the instrument [in the ascertaining]—or [—for the Sanskrit term, not strictly defined, stands for either—] it is the ascertainment itself of the signification, which we wish to determine, of a word, such as *gavaya* for example—through the perception of likeness or similarity to something perfectly well known, i. e. of which we have previously obtained a right notion,—as a *cow* for example.

b. [A man is told that the *gavaya,* or 'bos gavaeus,' is an animal like a cow. Going to the forest, he sees an animal like a cow. By means of the instrumental knowledge above described, he arrives at the conviction that '*this* thing is what is meant by the word *gavaya.*']

c. [The term 'recognition of likeness'—*upamána*—is to be employed throughout to denote the *instrument;* and the commentator notices two etymological views, either of which will justify that employment:—thus] it may denote the instrument, if we suppose an ellipsis, and that it stands for 'that *from which* the recognition of likeness' is obtained; or it will be the name of the instrument, if we suppose the word to be formed by the affix of instrumentality—viz. *lyuṭ* [—Páṇini, III. 3, 117—*] which marks the instrument of something to be established or effected.†

What is meant by a 'word.'

d. [Now] he defines a 'word.'‡

आप्तोपदेशः शब्दः ॥ ७ ॥

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* करणाधिकरणयोश्च॥ अष्ट० ॥

† उपमितिर्येन इत्यध्याहारेण च करणलक्षणं। अथवा साध्यसाधनमिति करणल्युटा करणलक्षणमेवेदम् ॥

‡ शब्दं लक्षयति ॥

No. 7.—A 'word' [κατ' ἐξοχην] is the precept [or instructive assertion] of one worthy [to have his words implicitly accepted as an authority.]

a. By saying 'A word'—he mentions what is to be defined. It means [—as used here by Gautama—not a mere sound, &c. but] a word which is an *instrument of right notion.* 'The precept of one worthy'—such is the definition.*

b. Or the expression given as the definition may mean 'a right [or fitting] precept [or instructive assertion;]'—that from which [correct] knowledge 'verbally communicated' (*śábda*) arises.†

c. He now divides this:—

स द्विविधो दृष्टादृष्टार्थत्वात् ॥ ८ ॥

No. 8.—It is of two kinds, in respect that it may be that 'whereof the matter is seen,' or that 'whereof the matter is unseen.'

a. 'It'—i. e. a word that is an instrument of right notion.‡

b. By 'that whereof the matter is seen' he means that [word] the thing declared by which is accessible to instruments of knowledge other than words themselves or any instrument [—such as that spoken of under §6, *a.*—] dependent thereon§ [—i. e. dependent on words.]

c. By 'that whereof the matter is unseen' he means that [word]

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* शब्द इति लक्ष्यकथनं। तदर्थः प्रमाणशब्द इति। आप्तोपदेश इति लक्षणम् ॥

† अथवा। आप्तो यथार्थ उपदेशः। शाब्दबोधो यस्मात्तत् ॥

‡ स प्रमाणशब्दः ॥

§ शब्दतदुपजीविप्रमाणातिरिक्तप्रमाणगम्यार्थको दृष्टार्थकः ॥

the thing declared by which is accessible *only* to words or to instruments of investigation dependent thereon.*

d. And thus, through the distinction of 'the being that whereof the matter is seen' and 'the being that whereof the matter is unseen,' there is a twofold character of words that are instruments of right notion—such is the meaning† [which may be put into plain English thus;—Assertions are of two kinds—capable of verification, and incapable of verification.]

e. Here the topic of the definition of the instruments of right notion is concluded.‡

f. He next divides and defines the objects which are fitted to supply right notions.§

SECTION III.

THE OBJECTS ABOUT WHICH THE ENQUIRY IS CONCERNED.

What things furnish the objects of right notion.

आत्मशरीरेन्द्रियार्थबुद्धिमनःप्रवृत्तिदोषप्रेत्यभावफलदुःखापवर्गास्तु प्रमेयम् ॥ ९ ॥

No. 9.—But soul, body, sense, sense-object, knowledge, the mind, activity, fault, transmigration, fruit, pain, and beatitude, are what are fitted to supply right notions.

a. [And it is not to be objected that this enumeration is not exhaustive]—for the expression 'fitted to supply right notions,'

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* शब्दतदुपजीविप्रमाणमात्रगम्यार्थको ऽदृष्टार्थकः ॥

† तथाच दृष्टार्थकत्वादृष्टार्थकत्वभेदात्प्रमाणशब्दस्य द्वैविध्यमित्यर्थः ॥

‡ समाप्तं प्रमाणलक्षणप्रकरणम् ॥

§ प्रमेयं विभजते लक्षयति च ॥

—like the word 'disquisition' or the like, [see §1—which is employed in this work with a sense technically limited—] is specially appropriated, as a kind of technical term, to these twelve* [things enumerated in the aphorism.]

b. Among these [twelve things enumerated in the aphorism,] having named,—as these take the precedence,—the set of six which are in the shape of *causes;* the set of six, 'fitted to supply right notion,' which are in the shape of *effects,* are mentioned [after these.] On this point [—viz. the order of arrangement to be observed in enunciation—] they tell us that "the enunciation first of each one foremost [in respect of those that follow it] is regulated by its superior dignity† [in comparison with those that follow it."]

c. Among these [enounced in §9] he defines the one first enounced—viz. Soul.

Soul defined. इच्छाद्वेषप्रयत्नसुखदुःखज्ञानान्यात्मनो लिङ्गम् ॥ १० ॥

No. 10.—Desire, Aversion, Volition *(prayatna)*, Pleasure, Pain, and Knowledge, are the sign of the Soul.

a. Here [—some one may object—] your saying the 'sign' *(linga)* is incongruous, because the soul [is not *inferred* by means of a 'sign'—but] is intuitively recognised.‡ [This objection would be a sound one if the word 'sign' *were* here employed in its technical sense, of τεκμηριον,—the 'reason' in a syllogism;—

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* प्रमेयशब्दो हि वादादिशब्दवत् परिभाषाविशेषेण द्वादशसु प्रवर्त्तते ॥

† अत्र प्राधान्यात्कारणरूपषट्कमभिधाय कार्य्यरूपप्रमेयषट्कमभिहितं। तत्र पूर्व्वपूर्व्वस्य प्राधान्यात् प्रथममुद्देश इति वदन्ति ॥

‡ अत्रचात्मनः प्रत्यक्षत्वाल्लिङ्गकथनमसङ्गतम् ॥

but it is not so]—for the word 'sign' *(linga)* here means [nothing more than] a 'characteristic'* *(lakshaṇa.)*

b. He next defines 'body' [—the topic, among those enunciated in §9—] which presents itself next in order.†

Body defined. चेष्टेन्द्रियार्थाश्रयः शरीरम् ॥ ११ ॥

No. 11.—The body is the site of [muscular] action *(cheshṭá)*, of the organs of sensation *(indriya)*, and of the sentiments [of pain or pleasure experienced by the soul.]

a. And the nature of the [muscular] action (*cheshṭá*) is this—that it is a peculiar species [of action] the constitutive peculiarity of which is its being the result of volition *(prayatna)*.‡

b. The word *artha* [which has been rendered by 'sentiment'] in the expression "the site of the sentiments of pain or pleasure," is not intended [—as it is in §9—] to denote *colours* and the like [objects of sense], for then the fact of being the site *thereof* [—instead of its being what we intend to speak of—viz. a distinctive characteristic of the body—] would extend, beyond where it ought, to *jars*, &c.;—but it is intended to denote pleasure or pain alternatively. Therefore the *Bháshya* [or commentary by *Vátsyáyana*] tells us "In what tabernacle there prevails the consciousness of pleasure and of pain, that is [what we mean by] the *site* of these—and *that* is the body."§

* लिङ्गपदस्य लक्षणार्थत्वात् ॥

† क्रमप्राप्तं शरीरं लक्षयति ॥

‡ चेष्टात्वञ्च प्रयत्नजन्यतावच्छेदको जातिविशेषः ॥

§ अर्थाश्रयत्वमित्यत्रार्थशब्दो न रूपादिपरस्तदाश्रयत्वस्य घटादावतिव्याप्तेः किन्तु सुखदुःखान्यतरपरः । अत एव भाष्यं । यस्मिन्नायतने सुखदुःखयोः प्रतिसंवेदनं प्रवर्त्तते स एषामाश्रयस्तच्छरीरमिति ॥

c. He divides and defines the organs of sensation *(indriya).**

घ्राणरसनचक्षुस्त्वक्श्रोत्राणीन्द्रियाणि भूतेभ्यः ॥१२॥

What are the organs of sense.

No. 12.—The organs of sensation [originating, or not differing,] from the Elements [§13], are Smell, Taste, Sight, Touch, and Hearing.

a. Although the *Mind* also certainly is [as declared by the Sánkhyas—see *Tattwa-samása* §29—] an 'organ' *(indriya),* yet, since we employ the term not as being *exclusively* applicable to the Smell, &c., there is no fault [to be found with our employment of the term.] But, in reality, by 'organs' [in this place] we mean [exclusively] the *external* organs; and hence there is no incongruousness in [the addition of] the expression "from the Elements,"† [—which *would* be incongruous if we intended to include *Mind*].

b. Do the Smell, &c., originate [as held by the Sánkhyas—see *Tattwa-samása* §26 and §27—] from one of the 'producers'? As there may be an expectation [that this question should be resolved,] he says—"from the *Elements.*" Hence it is *not* to be held that the organs of sensation originate in that productive agency termed 'self-consciousness' [—see *Tattwa-samása* §54—]. And this will be explained in the 3rd Lecture.‡

c. What are the Elements? As there will naturally be an expectation [that he should explain what he means by the expres-

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* इन्द्रियं विभजते लक्षयति च ॥

† यद्यपि मनसोऽपीन्द्रियत्वमस्त्येव तथापि घ्राणेत्यादेरुपलक्षण-परत्वान्न दोषः। वस्तुतस्त्विन्द्रियाणीत्यस्य बहिरिन्द्रियाणीत्यर्थः। तेन भूतेभ्य इत्यस्य नासङ्गतिः॥

‡ घ्राणादीनि किं प्राकृतिकानीत्याकाङ्क्षायामाह भूतेभ्य इति। तेनेन्द्रियाणामहङ्कारप्राकृतिकत्वं नेति मन्तव्यं।

sion in question—employed as it is in the definition laid down in the aphorism §12,—therefore] he says—*

What are the Elements.

पृथिव्यापस्तेजोवायुराकाशमिति भूतानि ॥ १३ ॥

No. 13.—Earth, Water, Light *(tejas)*, Air, Ether,—these are the Elements *(bhúta)*.

a. He next divides and defines 'sense-object' [—the topic, among those enunciated in §9,—] which presents itself next in order.†

What are the objects of the senses.

गन्धरसरूपस्पर्शशब्दाः पृथिव्यादिगुणास्तदर्थाः ॥ १४ ॥

No. 14.—Their 'objects' *(artha)* are the qualities of Earth, &c. [see §13,] viz., odour, savour, colour, tangibility, and sound.

a. By the word 'their,' the external organs of sensation [§12,] are referred to.‡

b. To define 'understanding' *(buddhi)*, he says—§

Understanding or knowledge.

बुद्धिरुपलब्धिर्ज्ञानमित्यनर्थान्तरम् ॥ १५ ॥

No. 15.—Understanding *(buddhi)*, apprehension *(upalabdhi)*, knowledge *(jnána)*—these are not different in meaning.

a. 'Not different in meaning'—i. e. synonymous.||

b. He next defines the Mind—¶

* भूतान्येव कानीत्याकाङ्क्षायामाह ॥

† क्रमप्राप्तमर्थं विभजते लक्षयति च ॥

‡ तच्छब्देन वहिरिन्द्रियाणि परामृश्यन्ते ॥

§ बुद्धिं लक्षयितुमाह ॥

|| अनर्थान्तरं समानार्थकम् ॥

¶ मनो लक्षयति ॥

What is the Mind.

युगपत्ज्ञानानुत्पत्तिर्मनसो लिङ्गम् ॥ १६ ॥

No. 16.—The sign [—conf. §10, *a.*—] of the Mind *(manas)* is [that habit in virtue of which] it does not give rise simultaneously to notions [more than one].

a. 'Simultaneously'—i. e. at one time. [Of course] you must supply "in a single *soul*"* [—if you speak of the mind generically, and not of an individual mind].

b. The meaning [of the aphorism] is—that the sign—meaning the *characteristic*—of Mind is that property, viz., the *atomic* nature of the intellectual organ, from which it happens that there do not arise notions† [more than one at once in one and the same soul].

c. He next defines and divides Activity‡ *(pravritti)*.

प्रवृत्तिर्वाग्बुद्धिशरीरारम्भः ॥ १७ ॥

Energy defined.

No. 17.—Activity is that which originates the [utterances of the] voice *(vák)*, the [cognitions of the] understanding, and the [gestures of the] body.

a. Since the expression 'which originates,'—heard [in the aphorism] immediately after the Dwandwa compound,—is in construction with each term severally [in the compound], Activity is of three descriptions, according to the division into 'that originating the [utterances of the] voice,' &c.§

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* युगपत्। एककाले। एकात्मनीति पूरणीयम् ॥

† ज्ञानानामनुत्पत्तिर्यतः स एव धर्मो ज्ञानकरणाणुत्वं मनसो लिङ्गं लक्षणमित्यर्थः ॥

‡ प्रवृत्तिं लक्षयति विभजते च ॥

§ द्वन्द्वानन्तरश्रुतारम्भपदस्य प्रत्येकमन्वयाद्वागारम्भादिभेदेन त्रिविधा प्रवृत्तिः ॥

b. By the word 'understanding' *(buddhi)* here, the Mind *(manas)* is meant;—and the word 'body' *(śarira)* is common to the *hands* and other members [as indicative of each and all of these] in so far as these have the power of muscular action* [—see §11, *a.*].

c. Thus [—to explain—] an effort tending to utterance is [what we mean by] 'that which originates the voice':—an effort the site of which is the body, or [more properly] which tends to gesture [or bodily movement] is [what we mean by] 'that which originates the [gesture of the] body';—an effort distinct from both of these is [what we mean by] 'that which originates the [cognitions of the] understanding.' And this [last one], tending to [the act of] vision, &c., is accomplished in the mere dawning of attention† [—attention alone being required in order that the revelations of the external world may flow into the understanding through the appropriate channels of the senses].

d. He now defines [the failings or weaknesses to which he gives the name of] Fault *(dosha)*.‡

प्रवर्त्तनालक्षणा दोषाः ॥ १८ ॥

The passions what.

No. 18.—Faults [or failings] have the characteristic that they cause Activity.

a. The employment of the plural, in the expression 'Faults,' is intended to make one aware of [not a single species, but of] a

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* बुद्धिशब्देनात्र मन ऽभिप्रेतमिति । शरीरशब्दश्च चेष्टाश्रयत्वेन हस्तादिसाधारणः ॥

† तथा वचनानुकूलयत्नो वागारम्भः । शरीरगोचरो यत्नश्चेष्टानुकूलयत्नो वा शरीरारम्भः । एतद्द्वयभिन्नो यत्नो बुद्ध्यारम्भः । स च ध्यानोदयादेव दर्शनाद्यनुकूलः पर्य्यवस्यति ॥

‡ दोषं लक्षयति ॥

triad of things to be defined [as faults or failings]—in the shape of Affection *(rága)*, Aversion *(dwesha)*, and Stolidity *(moha)**—[each of which is regarded as a fault or defect, inasmuch as—see §20—it leads to actions, the recompense of which, whether good or evil, must be received in some birth or state of mundane existence—to the postponement of the great end of entire emancipation—see §2].

b. The word *pravarttaná* means the being a producer of Activity. Those of which just this is the characteristic† [are what we mean by Faults].

c. He now defines [our mortal life or the state of] transmigration‡ *(pretyabháva)*.

पुनरुत्पत्तिः प्रेत्यभावः ॥ १९ ॥

Mortal life.

No. 19.—Transmigration means the being produced again [and again].

a. The word *pretyabháva* is formed out of *pretya* 'having died' and *bháva* 'the becoming [born into the world again']. As, by the expression "again," here habitualness is meant to be implied—there is first a birth, then death, then a birth—thus [the state of] transmigration, commencing with [one's first] birth,

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* दोषा इति बहुवचनं रागद्वेषमोहात्मकलक्ष्यत्रयज्ञापनाय ॥

† प्रवर्त्तना प्रवृत्तिजनकत्वं । तदेव लक्षणं येषाम् ॥

Mr. Colebrooke appears to have viewed the term here rendered 'the being a *producer* of Activity' as signifying 'the being a *product* of Activity,'—for, with reference to this, GAUTAMA's definition of 'fault' *(dosha)*, he says (—see Essays, vol. I. p. 289.—) "From acts proceed faults *(dosha)*: including under this designation, passion," &c. The word 'fault' *(dosha)*, as technically employed by GAUTAMA in the sense assigned to it in §18. *a.*, is not to be confounded with *adharmma* 'demerit' which latter *does* proceed from acts. See further in our note on §2. *d.*

‡ प्रेत्यभावं लक्षयति ॥

ends [only] with [final] emancipation. And this knowledge is conducive to the 'relinquishment of all passions' *(vairágya)*,—therefore it was not needless [—as some persons may think, on reading the aphorism and reflecting that the condition called *pretyabháva* is just the condition of us men, and might as well have been called *bháva* 'condition' simply;—it was not needless, we say,] to add the word *pretya* 'having died'* [—a word suggestive of the fleeting character of this mortal life, and which, combined with the word *bháva*, 'state,' gives the compound term *pretyabháva* to denote our mundane existence].

b. He next defines Fruits *(phala)*†—

प्रवृत्तिदोषजनितार्थः फलम् ॥ २० ॥

Retribution. No. 20.—Fruit is that thing which is produced by Activity and by [the originaters of Activity—viz. our constitutional faults or] Failings—[see §18].

a. And amongst these [fruits] the fruit that is denoted by the word primarily is the fruition of pleasure or of pain; and so the *Bháshya* tells us "Fruit is the consciousness of pleasure or of pain." And since one's [unwise] Activity in engaging either in duties or offences is the causer thereof, and the *Failing* again [—whether of passion or mere folly—see §18—] is the cause of *that*, therefore he says "produced by Activity and by [the origi-

* प्रेत्य मृत्वा भावो जननं प्रेत्यभावः। तत्र पुनरित्यनेनाभ्यासकथनात् प्रागुत्पत्तिस्ततो मरणं तत उत्पत्तिरिति प्रेत्यभावो जननादिरपवर्गान्तः। एतत् ज्ञानञ्च वैराग्य उपयुज्यत इति प्रेत्येति न व्यर्थम् ॥

Hence Mr. Colebrooke's definition of *pretyabháva* as "the condition of the soul after death" (—see Essays, vol. I. p. 290—) while it is literally correct, may mislead the reader if he does not bear it in mind that this, according to Hindú notions, is the condition of every man *now alive*—for, as we are all supposed to have lived and died no one knows how often, we are each of us always in the condition "*after death.*"

† फलं लक्षयति ॥

naters of Activity—viz. our] Failings." But the definition, [—if we regard the nature instead of the origin of Fruits] is 'the experiencing of pleasure or pain—one or other.' But by 'fruit' in a *secondary* application of the term, we mean every thing [mundane] beginning with the body.*

b. He next defines Pain *(du'kha)*†—

बाधनालक्षणं दुःखम् ॥ २१ ॥

Pain defined.

No. 21.—Pain is that which is in the shape of Vexation.

a. The word 'pain,' in the 'secondary application'‡ of the term, is employed to denote the body, the senses, and their objects, since these are the instruments of pain, and to denote *pleasure*, because of its being ever closely connected with pain. And only therefore [i. e. since the one term 'pain' implies the *whole* of these] is 'pain' referred to, in the aphorism following, by the term 'that.'§

b. He now defines emancipation|| *(apavarga)*.

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* अत्रच मुख्यं फलं सुखदुःखोपभोगः। तथाच भाष्यं। सुखदुःखसंवेदनं फलं। तत्रच धर्म्माधर्म्मप्रवृत्तेः प्रयोजकत्वात्तत्रच दोषस्य हेतुत्वात् प्रवृत्तिदोषजनितेत्युक्तं। लक्षणन्तु सुखदुःखान्यतरसाक्षात्कार इति। गौणं फलन्तु शरीरादिकं सर्व्वमेव॥

† दुःखं लक्षयति॥

‡ This is what is to be understood by the varieties of evil which Mr. Colebrooke (Essays vol. 1. p. 290) mentions as "primary or secondary." It is not *degrees* of evil that are to be understood as thus referred to; but, the author, we are told, chooses to employ the word 'pain' *technically*—in a 'transferred sense'—to denote the *causes* of pain also, as well as pain itself.

§ शरीरेन्द्रियार्थेषु दुःखसाधनत्वात्सुखेच दुःखानुषङ्गात् दुःखव्यवहारो गौण इति। अत एवाग्रिमसूत्रे तत्पदेन दुःखपरामर्शः॥

|| अपवर्गं लक्षयति॥

तद्त्यन्तविमोक्षो ऽपवर्गः ॥ २२ ॥

Beatitude what.

No. 22.—Absolute deliverance from that is Emancipation.

a. 'That'—i. e. pain [—as understood in its widest acceptation—see §21. *a.*]

b. 'Absolute deliverance'—i. e. the annihilation of the pain which has the same locus as one's self, [i. e. one's *own* pain], and [an annihilation thereof] not synchronous [with the pain that belongs to each moment of our mundane state;—for each moment, as it passess, sees the extinction of its own quantum of pain; but what is so "devoutly to be wished" is the absolute annihilation of one's troubles once for all].*

c. Here is completed the topic of the Definition of the things that furnish the objects of right notion† [§9].

d. He now defines 'doubt' *(sanśaya)* which presents itself next in order‡ [in the list given in §1].

SECTION IV.

Completing the topic of the pre-requisites of reasoning.

समानानेकधर्म्मोपपत्तेर्विप्रतिपत्तेरुपलब्ध्यनुपलब्ध्यव्यवस्थातश्च विशेषापेक्षो विमर्शः संशयः ॥ २३ ॥

Doubt defined.

No. 23.—Doubt is a conflicting judgment [in regard to one and the same object] respecting its distinction [or precise character;—this conflicting judgment arising] from unsteadiness in the recognition [of some mark which, if we could

* अत्यन्तविमोक्षः स्वसमानाधिकरणदुःखासमानकालीनो ध्वंसः ॥

† समाप्तं प्रमेयलक्षणप्रकरणम् ॥

‡ क्रमप्राप्तं संशयं लक्षयति ॥

make sure of it, would determine the object to be so and so] or [from unsteadiness] in the non-recognition [of some mark which, were we sure of its absence, would determine the object to be *not* so and so;—this state of things, moreover, resulting] from the recognition [in the object] of [only such] properties [as are] common [to a variety of things, and therefore not distinctive,] or of several properties [such as cannot really belong to one and the same thing,] or from conflicting testimony.

a. "Doubt:"—here is the statement of what is to be defined.*

b. "A conflicting judgment"—*(vimarsha)*:—here the prefix *vi* signifies 'confliction,' and the root *mriś* signifies 'knowing.' "In regard to a single object"—is to be supplied. So that Doubt means, in regard to any single object, Knowledge distinguished, contradictoriwise, by the [simultaneous] presence and the absence† [of some given nature].

c. [The commentators are not unanimous in their interpretation of this aphorism, some holding that there are five kinds of doubt referred to, and others that there are only three. We have preferred the latter view. Of the first kind of doubt an example is furnished by the case of an object, in the twilight, of which we can discern nothing more than that its size is that of a man, —a property which may belong to a post as well as to a man.‡ We have an example of the second kind in the dubious and disputed question whether Sound is a substance or a quality or an action.§ It cannot be more than one of these, yet it presents

* संशय इति लक्ष्यनिर्देशः ॥

† विमर्श इत्यत्र विशब्दो विरोधार्थः । मृशिर्ज्ञानार्थः । एकस्मिन् धर्मिणीति पूरणीयं । तेन । एकधर्मिणि विरोधेन भावाभावप्रकारकं ज्ञानं संशयः ॥

‡ स्थाणुर्वा पुरुषो वा ॥

§ शब्दो द्रव्यं गुणः कर्म्म वेति ॥

characters which furnish plausible grounds for contending that it is each of the three. The third kind of doubt is, of course, such as arises when, of two witnesses (presumed equally trust-worthy) the one asserts what the other denies.}

d. He now defines [the fourth in the list §1—viz.] 'Motive' *(prayojana),* which next presents itself.*

यमर्थमधिकृत्य प्रवर्त्तते तत्प्रयोजनम् ॥ २४ ॥

No. 24.—What thing having set before one, one proceeds to act—*that* [thing] is the 'Motive' [of the action.]

a. 'Having set before one,'—i. e. having proposed [to one's self—as something to be gained or avoided.] And so what constitutes any thing a Motive is its being the object of desire, which [desire either of attaining or escaping] is the cause of one's acting.†

b. He now defines [the fifth in the list §1.—viz.] 'familiar case of a fact' *(drishṭánta)* which next presents itself.‡

लौकिकपरीक्षकाणां यस्मिन्नर्थे बुद्धिसाम्यं स दृष्टान्तः ॥ २५ ॥

No. 25.—In regard to [some fact respecting] what thing both the ordinary man and the acute investigator entertain a sameness of opinion, that [thing] is called a 'familiar case' [of the fact in question.]

a. The 'Ordinary man,'—i. e. one to be informed—who has *not* attained that superiority of intellect which is the result of conversancy with books;—such is the sense of the term [—among the

* क्रमप्राप्तं प्रयोजनं लक्षयति ॥

† अधिकृत्य उद्दिश्य । तथाच प्रवृत्तिहेत्विच्छाविषयत्वं प्रयोजनत्वम् ।

‡ क्रमप्राप्तं दृष्टान्तं लक्षयति ॥

various senses that might be given to it—] that will be found of use.*

b. The 'acute investigator'—i. e. the informer [of the ordinary man §25. *a.*]—one who *has* attained superiority of intellect through conversancy with books;—such is the sense of the term that will be found of use.†

c. Here closes the topic of the pre-requisites of Reasoning.‡

d. He now defines [the sixth in the list §1—viz.] 'Tenet' *(siddhánta)*, which next presents itself.§

SECTION V.

OF POSITIONS, NOT FAMILIAR, THAT MAY BE EMPLOYED IN REASONING WITHOUT REQUIRING TO BE EACH TIME DEMONSTRATED.

तन्त्राधिकरणाभ्युपगमसंस्थितिःसिद्धान्तः ॥ २६ ॥

No. 26.—A 'Tenet' *(siddhánta)* is that, the steadfastness of the acceptance of which rests on a treatise [of weight and authority.]

a. He next divides|| [the 'tenets' thus characterised generally.]

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* लौकिको ऽप्राप्तशास्त्रपरिशीलनजन्यबुद्धिप्रकर्षः प्रतिपाद्य इति फलितार्थः ॥

† परीक्षकः शास्त्रपरिशीलनप्राप्तबुद्धिप्रकर्षः प्रतिपादक इति फलितार्थः ॥

‡ समाप्तं न्यायपूर्वाङ्गप्रकरणम् ॥

§ क्रमप्राप्तं सिद्धान्तं लक्षयति ॥

|| विभजते ॥

सर्व्वतन्त्रप्रतितन्त्राधिकरणाभ्युपगमसंस्थित्यर्थान्तरभा-
वात् ॥ २७ ॥

No. 27.—['Tenets' are divided into the species that are described in the succeeding aphorisms] through the difference between a 'Dogma of all the schools,' a 'Dogma peculiar to some school,' a 'Hypothetical Dogma,' and a 'Dogmatic corollary.'

a. It is of four kinds—such is the remainder [required to supply the ellipsis in the aphorism]. The meaning is this that it is so through the difference of its owing its steadfastness to *all* the schools [or to only one,] &c.*

b. He now defines a 'Dogma of all the schools' *(sarvvatantra-siddhánta.)*†

सर्व्वतन्त्राविरुद्धस्तन्त्रे ऽधिकृतः सर्व्वतन्त्रसिद्धान्तः ॥ २८ ॥

No. 28.—That [position or tenet] which is not in opposition to any of the schools, and which is claimed [as a tenet] by [at least] some one school, is [what we mean by] a 'Dogma of all the schools.'

a. He next defines a 'Dogma peculiar to some school' *(prati-tantra-siddhánta.)*‡

समानतन्त्रसिद्धः परतन्त्रसिद्धः प्रतितन्त्रसिद्धान्तः ॥ २९ ॥

No. 29.—That [position] which is [held] established in the same school, and which in another school is [regarded as] not established, is [what we mean by] a 'Dogma peculiar to some school.'

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* स चतुर्विध इति शेषः। सर्वतन्त्रादिसंस्थितीनामर्थान्तरभावात्। भेदादित्यर्थः ॥

† सर्व्वतन्त्रसिद्धान्तं लक्षयति ॥

‡ प्रतितन्त्रसिद्धान्तं लक्षयति ॥

a. The word 'same' [in the expression 'established in the same school'] means 'one.' So the sense is 'established in *one* school.' The complete sense is 'established in its *own* school.' So the sense in which we shall find it useful to employ the term [—since, in a controversy, we may imagine each school to be represented by a single partisan—] is this, that whatever is assented to by only one or other of two disputants is the peculiar dogma of that one of the two,—as, for example, the eternity of sound is [a peculiar dogma] of the followers of the *Mímánsá* school.*

b. [Thus the *pratitantra-siddhánta* is what supplies the material for the *argumentum ad hominem* in the disputations of the schools.]

c. He next defines a 'Hypothetical Dogma' (*adhikaraṇa-siddhánta.*)†

यत्सिद्धावन्यप्रकरणसिद्धिः सेाऽधिकरणसिद्धान्तः ॥ ३० ॥

No. 30.—That, if which be [held] established, there is the establishing of another point, is [what we mean by] a 'Hypothetical Dogma.'

a. The meaning is this—that, that position [—for which no evidence is offered in the first instance—] is a hypothetical dogma [or a hypothesis] only on the establishment of which taking place [—by being conceded—] does the establishment take place of another proposition under consideration.‡

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* समानशब्द एकार्थस्तन्नैकतन्त्रसिद्ध इत्यर्थः । स्वतन्त्रसिद्ध इति पर्य्यवसितेा ऽर्थः । तथा वादिप्रतिवाद्येकतरमात्राभ्युपगतस्तदेकतरस्य प्रतितन्त्रसिद्धान्त इति फलितार्थः । यथा मीमांसकानां शब्दनित्यत्वम् ॥

† अधिकरणसिद्धान्तं लक्षयति ॥

‡ यस्यार्थस्य सिद्धेा जायमानायामेवान्यस्य प्रकरणस्य प्रस्तुतस्य सिद्धिर्भवति सेा ऽधिकरणसिद्धान्त इत्यर्थः ॥

b. He next defines a 'Dogmatic corollary.'

अपरीक्षिताभ्युपगमात्तद्विशेषपरीक्षणमभ्युपगमसिद्धान्तः ॥ ३१ ॥

No. 31.—A 'Dogmatic corollary' is the mention of a particular fact in regard to any thing, not expressly declared in an aphorism, [our knowledge of the fact coming so immediately] from what *is* recognised, [by the maker of the aphorisms, as to render a demonstration superfluous—the fact being thus entitled to rank not as a deduction but as a dogma.]

a. "Not expressly declared in an aphorism"—such is here the meaning of the term *aparíkshita*.*

b. "The mention of a particular fact"—such is here the meaning of the expression *viśesha-paríkshaṇa*.†

c. And thus a 'Dogmatic corollary' [or an implied dogma] is what is received as a tenet [or first principle] without being expressly laid down in an aphorism,—as, for example, [the tenet] that the Mind is an organ‡ [of the Soul,—which is recognised as one of the tenets of the Nyáya, although nowhere expressly asserted by Gautama.]

Here ends the topic of the definition of the scholastic tenets that take their place in argumentation.§

He next divides, with a view to defining, the members [of a demonstration] which present themselves next in order|| [among the topics—see §1—].

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* अपरीक्षितस्य साक्षादसूत्रितस्य ॥

† विशेषपरीक्षणं विशेषधर्म्मकथनम् ॥

‡ तथाच साक्षादसूत्रिताभ्युपगमो ऽभ्युपगमसिद्धान्तः । यथा मनस इन्द्रियत्वमिति ॥

§ समाप्तं न्यायाश्रयसिद्धान्तलक्षणप्रकरणम् ॥

|| क्रमप्राप्तानवयवांल्लक्षयितुं विभजते ॥

SECTION VI.

The method of argumentative exposition.

प्रतिज्ञाहेतूदाहरणोपनयनिगमनान्यवयवाः ॥ ३२ ॥

No. 32.—The members [of a demonstration] are (1) the Proposition, (2) the Reason, (3) the Example, (4) the Application, and (5) the Conclusion.

a. He defines the Proposition* [to be proved.]

साध्यनिर्देशः प्रतिज्ञा ॥ ३३ ॥

No. 33.—The Proposition is the declaration of what is to be established.

a. Of what is to be established—the declaration—*this* is the Proposition:—and "what is to be established" is this, that such a thing as a hill is possessed, for instance, of *fire.*†

b. He defines, and then, by two subsequent Aphorisms divides, the Reason, which presents itself next in order‡ [—of those enumerated in § 32].

उदाहरणसाधर्म्यात्साध्यसाधनं हेतुः तथा वैधर्म्यात् ॥ ३४ ॥

No. 34.—The Reason is the means for the establishing of what is to be established; [and this it is] through the Example's having the nature, or in like manner through its having the reverse of the nature, [implied in the Reason:—in other words—

* प्रतिज्ञां लक्षयति ॥

† साधनीयस्यार्थस्य यो निर्देशः स प्रतिज्ञा । साधनीयश्च वह्निमत्त्वादिना पर्वतादिः ॥

‡ क्रमप्राप्तं हेतुं लक्षयति विभजते च सूत्राभ्याम् ॥

through the Reason's being distributed, affirmatively or negatively, in the Major Premiss].

a. Here the generic definition is this—that "The Reason is the means for the establishing of what is to be established." By "the means for [the establishing of] what is to be established," is meant [not exclusively the assigned Reason itself but] that [second member out of the five—see §32—] which informs us [by its use of the 5th case-affix] that such and such has the power of giving information leading to the establishing of what is to be established.* [For example, when we say, 'The hill is fiery—because there is smoke',—the 'smoke' is the Reason of our knowing that the hill is fiery, but the whole clause 'because there is smoke' is also technically called the Reason].

b. He declares that it is of two sorts when he says "through the example's having the nature, or in like manner through its having the reverse of the nature [implied in the Reason]." By the possession of the same nature is meant [what is elsewhere spoken of as] 'agreement' *(anwaya),* and by the possession of the reverse of the nature is meant [what is elsewhere spoken of as] 'contrariety' *(vyatireka).* The meaning that will prove serviceable [when we speak of this agreement and contrariety] is that of 'invariable attendedness' *(vyápti)* of the one or the other description.† [Thus when we speak of the 'agreement' of *fire* with *smoke*—the smoke being adduced as the Reason for holding that there is fire, we mean to speak of the invariableness of smoke's being attended by fire:—and when we speak of the contrariety of *fire* and a *lake*—the lake being adduced as the Reason for holding that the vapour rising from the place is *not* smoke, we

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* अत्र साध्यसाधनं हेतुरिति सामान्यलक्षणं। साध्यसाधनं साध्यसिद्ध्यनुकूलज्ञापकत्वबोधकं इत्यर्थः॥

† तस्य द्वैविध्यमाह। उदाहरणसाधर्म्यात्तथा वैधर्म्यादिति। साधर्म्यमन्वयः। वैधर्म्यं व्यतिरेकः। तादृशव्याप्तिरिति फलितार्थः।

mean to speak of the invariableness of a lake's being *devoid* of fire.]

c. He now defines the Example, which presents itself next in order* [—of those enumerated in §32—].

साध्यसाधर्म्यात्तद्धर्मभावी दृष्टान्त उदाहरणम् ॥ ३५ ॥

No. 35.—The Example is some 'familiar case of the fact'—[see §25—], which, through the [suggestion of the reason's] invariable attendedness by what is to be established, causes that nature [or property] to be [admitted to belong to the subject] which is to be established [as belonging to the subject].

a. The definition [—expressed generally—] is this—viz. "The Example is some familiar case of the fact." Here the [elliptical] expression 'familiar case of the fact' means that Member [of the five-membered exposition—see §32—] which is appropriated to the *mention* of the familiar case of the fact:—hence there is no harm if, seeing that some familiar case of a fact is only temporarily so [—i. e. employed as an Example—], it is not invariably so† [—the terms not being co-extensive in their application, for a fact remains a fact even when not cited as an Example—].

b. [But the Example is of two kinds—see §34 *b.*—so,] to complete this [definition in §35] we must add that it is the Example where we have a case of invariable attendedness* [that we are here speaking of].

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* क्रमप्राप्तमुदाहरणं लक्षयति ॥

† दृष्टान्त उदाहरणमिति लक्षणं। दृष्टान्तवचनं दृष्टान्तकथन-योग्यावयव इत्यर्थः। तेन दृष्टान्तस्य सामयिकत्वेनासार्वत्रिकत्वे ऽपि न क्षतिः ॥

‡ अन्वय्युदाहरणमिति शेषः ॥

c. He next defines the Example where we have a case of invariable abandonedness.*

तद्विपर्य्ययाद्वा विपरीतं व्यतिरेक्युदाहरणम् ॥ ३६ ॥

No. 36.—Or inversely [—as regards the 'invariable attendedness' spoken of in §35—] the Example, on the contrary, may be one where we have a case of invariable abandonedness.

a. [As when we argue—see §34, *b.*—that the vapour seen rising from a lake is *not* smoke, because a lake is invariably devoid of fire.]

b. He next defines the Application, which presents itself next in order† [—of those enumerated in §32—.]

उदाहरणापेक्षस्तथेत्युपसंहारो न तथेति वा साध्यस्योपनयः ॥ ३७ ॥

No. 37.—The Application is the collecting [or bringing under simultaneous view] with respect to the Example, what is to be established as being *so*, or *not* so.

a. And the Application is of two kinds, through the distinction of (1) that where we have [in the Example—] a case of invariable attendedness, and (2) that where we have a case of invariable abandonedness. "So" [—or "in like manner"—] such is the expression when the Application involves a case of invariable attendedness. "Not so" is the expression when the Application involves a case of invariable abandonedness.‡ [In other words—"and so is this" *(tathá-cháyam)* is the form of expression when

* व्यतिरेक्युदाहरणं लक्षयति ॥

† क्रमप्राप्तमुपनयं लक्षयति ॥

‡ सचोपनयो द्विविधो ऽन्वयिव्यतिरेकिभेदात् । तथेति साध्यस्योपसंहारो ऽन्वय्युपनयः । न तथेति साध्यस्योपसंहारो व्यतिरेक्युपनयः ।

the Minor Premiss is affirmative; while "and not so is this" *(na-cháyan tathá)* is the form of expression when the Minor Premiss is negative.]

b. He next defines the conclusion.*

The conclusion defined.

हेत्वपदेशात्प्रतिज्ञायाः पुनर्वचनं निगमनम् ॥ ३८ ॥

No. 38.—The conclusion is the re-stating of the Proposition because of the mention of the Reason [which now authorizes us to prefix the illative 'Therefore'].

a. Here concludes the topic of the form of demonstration.†

b. He now defines Confutation, which presents itself next in order.‡

SECTION VII.

Concluding the topic of demonstration.

अविज्ञाततत्त्वेऽर्थे कारणोपपत्तितस्तत्त्वज्ञानार्थमूहस्तर्कः ॥ ३९ ॥

Confutation, or reductio ad absurdum.

No. 39.—Confutation—[which is intended] for the assertaining of the truth in regard to a question, the truth in regard to which is not accurately apprehended—is reasoning from the supposition of [the cessation of] the cause [to the cessation of the effect—for, on the admitted cessation of the cause, the observed resulting phenomenon ought of course to cease also].

a. [In other words, confutation consists in our directing a person, who does not apprehend the force of the argument as first

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* निगमनं लक्षयति ॥

† समाप्तं न्यायस्वरूपप्रकरणम् ॥

‡ क्रमप्राप्तं तर्कं लक्षयति ॥

presented to him, to look at it from an opposite point of view. For example—to take a simple case, which, simple as it is, correctly represents the generic form to which all the logical errors of man are reducible—suppose a person admits that there is smoke in the hill, but denies that there is fire,—having previously granted that where there is smoke there is fire, we confute him—and put him in the way of coming to a 'right notion'—by remarking of the hill that] if it were without fire, it would be without smoke.*

b. He now defines Ascertainment, which presents itself next in order.†

विमृश्य पक्षप्रतिपक्षाभ्यामर्थावधारणं निर्णयः ॥ ४० ॥

Certainty arrived at by hearing both sides.

No. 40.—Ascertainment is the determination of a question by [hearing] both what is to be said for and against it, after having been in doubt.

a. Here closes the topic [—see § 25. *c.*—] of the latter division of Reasoning.‡

b. So much for the first diurnal portion of the first Lecture of the commentary composed on the Aphorisms of the Nyáya, by the venerable VIŚWANÁTHA BHAṬṬÁCHÁRYYA.§

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* निर्वह्निः स्यान्निर्धूमः स्यादिति ॥

† क्रमप्राप्तं निर्णयं लक्षयति ॥

‡ समाप्तं न्यायोत्तराङ्गप्रकरणम् ॥

§ इति श्री विश्वनाथभट्टाचार्यकृतायां न्यायसूत्रवृत्तौ प्रथमाध्यायस्य प्रथममाह्निकम् ॥

THE SECOND DIURNAL PORTION.

SECTION VIII.

THE TOPIC OF CONTROVERSY.

c. He now defines Discussion.*

Definition of a fair discussion.

प्रमाणतर्कसाधनोपालम्भः सिद्धान्ताविरुद्धः पञ्चावयवोपपन्नः पक्षप्रतिपक्षपरिग्रहो वादः ॥ ४१ ॥

No. 41. Discussion is the undertaking [—by two parties respectively—] of the one side and the other in regard to what [conclusion] has been arrived at by means of the five-membered [process of demonstration already explained—see §32—; this procedure] consisting in the defending [of the proposition] by proofs [on the part of the one disputant] and the assailing it by objections [on the part of the other,—the discussion being conducted on both sides] without discordance in respect of the tenets [or principles on which the conclusion is to depend].

a. [Such is the discussion that takes place between a preceptor and his pupil, when the latter brings forward objections, which the other, having a clearer view of the matter, is able to remove —there being no dispute between the two in regard to the *data*].

The prime requisite in an honest disputant.

b. The persons competent for [this honest style of] discussion are those who are really desirous to get at the truth;†—and it is not necessary that there should be a Moderator in such a discussion, because the debate is here conducted without passion‡ [or shabby ambition of victory].

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* तत्र वादं लक्षयति ॥

† वादाधिकारिणस्तु तत्त्वबुभुत्सवः ॥

‡ सा च वादे नावश्यकी वीतरागकथात्वादिति ॥

c. He defines wrangling.*

यथोक्तोपपन्नः छलजातिनिग्रहस्थानसाधनोपालम्भो जल्पः ॥ ४२ ॥

Definition of wrangling.

No. 42.—Wrangling, consisting in the defence or attack [of a proposition] by means of frauds [see §50], futilities [see §58], and what procedures deserve [nothing but an indignant] rebuke [see §59], is what takes place after the procedure aforesaid [—that is to say, after a fair course of argumentation,—supposing this to have failed to bring the disputants to an agreement].

The aim of the wrangler.

a. By the expression "frauds," &c. it is intimated that this kind of talk [viz. wrangling] is that of the person who is desirous of victory, for it is the man desirous of victory [instead of being desirous of truth], that makes use of frauds, &c. And so the meaning is this, that Wrangling is the discourse of him who aims only at victory, [he being quite indifferent] whether this [discourse of his] establishes either side of the question† [provided only he can make out a pretext for bragging that he has said something to the point].

b. He now defines Cavilling, which next presents itself.‡

स प्रतिपक्षस्थापनाहीनो वितण्डा ॥ ४३ ॥

Definition of Cavilling.

No. 43.—That [—viz. Wrangling, §42,—], when devoid of [any attempt made for] the establishing of the opposite side of the question, is Cavilling.

a. [The man shabbily eager for the semblance of a victory, sometimes, see §42, *a.*, attempts to prove something by disinge-

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* जल्पं लक्षयति ॥

† छलेत्यादिना विजिगीषुकथात्वं बोध्यते विजिगीषुर्हि छलादिकं करोति । तथाचोभयपक्षस्थापनावती विजिगीषुकथा जल्प इत्यर्थः ॥

‡ वितण्डां क्रमप्राप्तां लक्षयति ॥

nuous artifices. He is then said to wrangle. If he attempts to establish nothing, but confines himself to carping disingenuously at the arguments of the other party, he is said to cavil].

b. Here the topic of controversy is concluded.*

c. He now defines and divides the Semblances of a reason, which next present themselves.†

SECTION IX.

OF FALLACIES, OR WHAT ONLY LOOK LIKE REASONS, BY MEANS OF WHICH A MAN MAY DECEIVE HIMSELF OR ANOTHER.

सव्यभिचारविरुद्धप्रकरणसमसाध्यसमातीतकाला हेत्वाभासाः ॥ ४४ ॥

Enumeration of the Fallacies.

No. 44.—The Semblances of a reason are (1) the Erratic, (2) the Contradictory, (3) the Equally available on both sides, (4) that which is In the same case with what is to be proved, and (5) the Mistimed.

a. He now defines the Erratic‡ [semblance of a reason.]

अनैकान्तिकः सव्यभिचारः ॥ ४५ ॥

The argument that proves too much.

No. 45.—That [semblance of a reason] is Erratic which arrives at more ends than the one [required.]

a. For example [suppose one were to argue that] Sound is eternal, for it is not the object of touch§—[—the reason alleged would bring us to more conclusions than we want; because the

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* समाप्तं कथाप्रकरणम् ॥

† क्रमप्राप्तान् हेत्वाभासांल्लक्षयति विभजतेच ॥

‡ सव्यभिचारं लक्षयति ॥

§ यथा शब्दो नित्यः । निःस्पर्शत्वात् ॥

quality of Conjunction or of Disjunction for example, is not the object of touch, yet no one argues for its eternity.]

b. He now defines the Contradictory [semblance of a reason] which presents itself next in order.*

सिद्धान्तमभ्युपेत्य तद्विरोधी विरुद्धः ॥ ४६ ॥

The argument that proves the reverse.

No. 46.—That [semblance of a reason] is the Contradictory which is repugnant to what is proposed as that which is to be established.

a. 'Which is to be established,'—such is the meaning here of the term *siddhánta.*†

b. And so the meaning, as it may be most profitably regarded, is this, viz.—after having proposed, or stated, that which is to be established, [a Contradictory reason is] one employed which is opposed thereto, or invariably attended by the *negation* of what is to be established; as, for instance, [if one were to argue], 'This is fiery, because it is a body of water.'‡

c. He now defines that [semblance of a reason] which is Equally available on both sides—this next presenting itself.§

यस्मात्प्रकरणचिन्ता स निर्णयार्थमपदिष्टः प्रकरणसमः ॥ ४७ ॥

The argument that tells equally both ways.

No. 47. That from which a question may arise as to whether the case stands this way or the other way, if employed with the view of determining the state of the case, is [a mere semblance

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* क्रमप्राप्तं विरुद्धं लक्षयति ॥

† अत्रच सिद्धान्तं साध्यम् ॥

‡ तथाच साध्यमभ्युपेत्य उद्दिश्य प्रयुक्तस्तद्विरोधी साध्याभावव्याप्त इति फलितार्थः। यथा वह्निमान् ह्रदत्वादिति ॥

§ क्रमप्राप्तं प्रकरणसमं लक्षयति ॥

of a reason—being] equally available for both sides [of the dispute].

a. [According to the commentator]—That reason employed, or adduced, for the ascertainment of one's own proposition or the negation of the other's proposition, is called 'the same for both sides:'—but *which* reason?—with regard to this he says—'from which a question'; i. e. from which two opposite views may arise; —such is the account given in the *Bháshya.**

b. [For example—suppose a man argues that Sound is eternal because it is audible, the reason here alleged will just provoke the question whether audibleness is any proof of eternity, and the opponent may with equal propriety argue that Sound, because it is audible, is *not* eternal].

c. He now defines that [semblance of a reason] which is in the same case with what is to be proved,—this presenting itself next in order.†

साध्याविशिष्टश्च साध्यत्वात्साध्यसमः ॥ ४८ ॥

The argument that stands itself in need of proof.

No. 48.—And it [the alleged reason] is in the same case with what is to be proved, if, in standing itself in need of proof, it does not differ from that which is to be proved.

a. [As the commentator remarks]—for if the reason stands in need of being proved too, just as the proposition stands in need of being proved, then it is said to be 'in the same case with what is to be proved;' and therefore the expression 'unestablished'

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* स हेतुः स्वसाध्यस्य परसाध्याभावस्य वा निर्णयार्थमपदिष्टः प्रयुक्तः प्रकरणसम उच्यते। स क इत्याकांक्षायामाह यस्मात्प्रकरणं पक्षप्रतिपक्षाविति भाष्यम् ॥

† क्रमप्राप्तं साध्यसमं लक्षयति ॥

(asiddha) is employed [in speaking of such a reason]; and this ['unestablishedness' or unreality] is of three sorts, through the distinction of the unreality of the locality [or subject of the alleged property], the unreality of the character [as regards the subject whereof it is assumed to be predicable], and the unreality of the universality* [assumed in the major premiss. Examples of these are given in our Lecture on the *Tarka-sangraha*].

b. He now defines the Mistimed [semblance of a reason] which next presents itsslf.†

कालात्ययापदिष्टः कालातीतः ॥ ४९ ॥

The argument that is opposed by the evidence of the Senses.

No. 49.—That [semblance of a reason] is Mistimed which is adduced when the time is not [that when it might have availed.]

a. [For example,—suppose one argues that] Fire does not contain heat, because it is factitious,‡ [his argument is mistimed if we have already ascertained, by the superior evidence of the senses, that fire does contain heat].

b. Here concludes the topic of the Semblance of a reason.§

c. He now defines Fraud [or unfairness] which next presents itself.||

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* यथाहि साध्यं साधनीयं तथा हेतुरपि चेत्साध्यसम इत्युच्यते। अत एवचासिद्ध इति व्यवह्रियते। अयञ्चाश्रयासिद्धिस्वरूपासिद्धिव्याप्यत्वासिद्धिभेदात्त्रिविधः॥

† क्रमप्राप्तमतीतकालं लक्षयति॥

‡ वह्निरनुष्णः कृतकत्वादिति॥

§ समाप्तं हेत्वाभासप्रकरणम्॥

|| क्रमप्राप्तं छलं लक्षयति॥

SECTION X.

OF THE TRICKS EMPLOYED BY THE DISHONEST DISPUTANT TO THWART THE OTHER PARTY.

वचनविघातो ऽर्थविकल्पोपपत्त्याच्छलम् ॥ ५० ॥

Wilfully unfair objections.

No. 50.—Unfairness [in disputation] is the opposing of what is propounded by means of assuming a different sense [from that which the objector well knows the propounder intended his terms to convey].

a. For example—in such a case of argument as this, that 'The man has come from Nepaul, because he has a new *(nava)* blanket [such as the country of Nepaul supplies],'—the declaring that this is not established, on the assumption that the meaning was *nine** [blankets, instead of a *new* blanket,—the word *nava* meaning both *new* and *nine*,—is unfair].

b. He now divides Fraud, which he has just defined.†

तत्त्रिविधं वाक्छलं सामान्यच्छलमुपचारच्छलञ्च ॥ ५१ ॥

No. 51.—It is of three kinds, (1) Fraud in respect of a term, (2) Fraud in respect of a genus, and (3) Fraud in respect of a trope.

a. Of these he now defines the 'Fraud in respect of a term.'‡

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* यथा नेपालादागतो ऽयं नवकम्बलवत्त्वादित्यत्र नवसंख्यापरत्वकल्पनयासिद्ध्यभिधानम् ॥

† लक्षितं छलं विभजते ॥

‡ तत्र वाक्छलं लक्षयति ॥

अविशेषाभिहिते ऽर्थे वक्तुरभिप्रायादर्थान्तरकल्पना वाक्छलम् ॥ ५२ ॥

The fraudulent misunderstanding of a term.

No. 52.—'Fraud in respect of a term' is the assuming a meaning other than [the objector well knows] was intended by the speaker when he named the thing by a term that happened to be ambiguous.

a. [An example of this has been given under §50. *a.*].

b. He next defines 'Fraud in respect of a genus.'*

सम्भवतो ऽर्थस्यातिसामान्ययोगादसम्भूतार्थकल्पना सामान्यच्छलम् ॥ ५३ ॥

The fraudulent over-straining of an assertion which was obviously not meant of the whole genus.

No. 53.—'Fraud in respect of a genus' is the assuming that something is spoken of in respect whereof the thing asserted is impossible, because [forsooth] this happens to be the same in kind with that of which the thing asserted *is* possible.

a. For example, on some one's saying, 'This is a Bráhman,—he must be possessed of learning and conduct';—the other, assuming that he here deduces the possession of learning and conduct from the fact of being a Bráhman, says—'How can that be?—for, the possession of learning and conduct, if deducible from the fact of being a Bráhman, would be found, where it cannot, in his *childhood.*'† [The other, of course, meant, as the objector very well knows, to speak of a Bráhman who has lived

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* सामन्यच्छलं लक्षयति ॥

† यथा ब्राह्मणो ऽयं विद्याचरणसम्पन्न इत्युक्ते ब्राह्मणत्वेन विद्याचरणसम्पदं साधयतीति कल्पयित्वा परो वदति कुतो ब्राह्मणत्वेन विद्याचरणसम्पद्व्रात्ये व्यभिचारात् ॥

long enough in the world to render it possible for him to study, in which case the probability is that he will have studied].

b. He now defines 'Fraud in respect of a trope.'*

धर्म्मविकल्पनिर्द्देशेऽर्थसद्भावप्रतिषेध उपचारच्छलम् ॥ ५४ ॥

The fraudulent acceptance of the metaphorical literally, and vice versa.

No. 54.—'Frand in respect of a trope' is the denial of the truth of the matter, when the assertion was made in one or other of the modes, [viz. literal or metaphorical,—which it suits the purpose of the objector to invert].

a. For example, in the case of such an assertion as 'The scaffolds cry out' [—somewhat analogous to the English phraseology 'The pit and gallery applauded'—]; or 'The jar is blue'; [a dishonest opponent will say,] 'It is only *those standing* on the scaffolds that cry out, but not the *scaffolds*';—and, in like manner, [he will say,] 'How can a *jar* be the same thing as *blue*—which is [not a substance but] a colour?'† [In these cases the objector knows perfectly well that the assertion was not meant literally of the scaffolds, and that the jar was not asserted to be the colour blue, but a blue substance].

b. So too [conversely] it is a fraud in respect of a trope, when the assertion 'I am eternal' has been employed literally, to object 'How canst *thou* be eternal that was born of so and so?'‡

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* उपचारच्छलं लक्षयति ॥

† यथा मञ्चाः क्रोशन्ति नीलो घट इत्यादौ मञ्चस्था एव क्रोशन्ति नतु मञ्चाः । एवं घटस्य कथं नीलरूपाभेदः ॥

‡ एवं अहं नित्य इति शक्त्या प्रयुक्ते अमुकस्मादुत्पन्नस्त्वं कथं नित्य इति प्रतिषेधोऽप्युपचारच्छलम् ॥

[Here the objector is supposed to know very well that the speaker employed the term 'I' to denote, what is regarded as the direct object of its denotation, the eternal spirit within him, and not his *body*, which he can only metaphorically call himself, and which, as the temporary prison-house of his soul, very possibly *was* born of so and so].

c. [If you ask why it is exactly that] a Fraud [such as has been described in §51, &c.] is not a valid reply, [it is] because it does not assail what the speaker meant to say.* [In the phraseology of European logic, it is a wilful *ignoratio elenchi* or misconception of what it is that is to be opposed].

d. And it must not be said that it is the *speaker* who is to blame for employing terms with a double meaning or with a metaphorical application; because the speaker is *not* to blame in employing a term that is notoriously understood as expressive of this or that meaning; else there would be an end put to every thing like reasoning by such objections as the following—viz., when a man says 'The mountain is fiery,' [the opponent, choosing to suppose that the term employed was not *vahnimán* 'fiery,' but *a-vahnimán* '*not* fiery'—the form, by the rules of euphonic combination in Sanskrit, being here the same in either case, might say] 'How is it that [you say] this mountain is *not* fiery?'†

e. He next takes a *primà facie* or incorrect view of Fraud

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* वाद्यभिप्रेतार्थस्यादूषणेन छलस्यासदुत्तरत्वम्॥

† नच श्लिष्टलाक्षणिके प्रयोगाद्वादिन एवापराधः स्यादिति वाच्यं तत्तदर्थबोधकतया प्रसिद्धस्य शब्दस्य प्रयोगे वादिनो ऽनपराधात्। अन्यथा पर्व्वतो वह्निमानित्युक्ते पर्व्वतो ऽयं कथमवह्निमानित्यादिदूषणेनानुमानाद्युच्छेदः स्यात्॥

[—as it is one that is likely to occur to some readers, and one that may as well be disposed of] whilst we are on the subject.*

वाक्छलमेवोपचारच्छलं तदविशेषात् ॥ ५५ ॥

The varieties of Fraud not to be confounded because they partially agree.

No. 55.—Fraud in respect of a trope [§54—some one may fancy at first sight—] is just Fraud in respect of a term [§52], for it does not differ therefrom.

a. The meaning of this doubt is, that Fraud is only of two kinds, but not of three kinds; for Fraud in respect of a trope is just Fraud in respect of a term, seeing that these do not differ in being the assumption of a word's being used in another sense† [than that in which it was well enough known that the speaker did use it].

b. [This doubt] he clears up‡ [as follows].

न तदर्थान्तरभावात् ॥ ५६ ॥

Things, though partially agreeing, may yet differ.

No. 56.—It is not so [—as supposed in §55—] because they do differ [although, it may be, agreeing in the respect just mentioned].

a. Since they may agree in some respect or other, even while they differ through the characters abovementioned [in §52—54] which have led to their being treated as separate, there would be no distinction anywhere [if we were to adopt the principle which would remove the distinction here], because there is everywhere

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* प्रसङ्गाच्छलं पूर्व्वपक्षयति ॥

† शब्दस्यार्थान्तरकल्पनाऽविशेषाद्वाक्छलमेवोपचारच्छलं स्यादिति छलस्य द्वित्वमेव न तु त्रित्वमिति शङ्कार्थः ॥

‡ समाधत्ते ॥

no difference so far as regards a character common to the things severally* [—a man and a monkey, for example, or a jar and a web, being alike in so far as regards their being *substances*, but still requiring to be distinguished in respect of that in which they differ].

b. So, with the intention of showing that the opposite view involves an absurdity [such as has been noticed in §56. *a.*], he says† [as follows].

अविशेषे वा किञ्चित्साधर्म्यादेकच्छलप्रसङ्गः ॥ ५७ ॥

No. 57.—Or if there were no distinction where there is *any* similarity of character, we should have but *one* kind of Fraud.

a. That is to say—if no distinction is to result from any property whatever provided there be *some* similarity of nature, then Fraud, inasmuch as each variety thereof has a common character so far forth as each *is* a Fraud &c., would not be even of *two* sorts as you imagine [—see §55 *a.*], but of only *one*.‡

b. Here concludes the topic of Fraud [in disputation.]§

c. He now defines Futility, which next presents itself.||

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* पूर्व्वोक्तभेदकधर्म्मेण भेदसम्भवेऽपि यत्किञ्चिद्धर्म्मेणाभेदे सामान्यधर्म्मेणाभेदस्य सर्व्वत्र सम्भवाद्विभागः कुत्रापि न स्यादिति ॥

† विपक्षे बाधकमभिप्रेत्याह ॥

‡ यत्किञ्चिद्धर्म्मादविशेषे किञ्चित्साधर्म्याच्छलत्वादिरूपाच्छलस्यैक्यं स्यान्न तु त्वदभिमतं द्वित्वमपीति भावः ॥

§ समाप्तं छलप्रकरणम् ॥

|| क्रमप्राप्तां जातिं लक्षयति ॥

SECTION XI.

OF FUTILE OBJECTIONS AND HOPELESS STUPIDITY.

साधर्म्यवैधर्म्याभ्यां प्रत्यवस्थानं जातिः ॥ ५८ ॥

Futility, in an objection, what.

No. 58.—Futility consists in the offering of objections founded on [some mere] similarity or difference of character [—without regard to the question whether the fact asserted bears any invariable relation to that character].

a. The expression 'founded on similarity or difference of character' is a definite one [—intended to convey just so much, and to exclude everything beyond—]; therefore the meaning is this, that Futility consists in objecting, or taking exception, on the ground of a similarity or difference of character *without respect to invariableness of association or dissociation** [between the character and that whereof it is taken as a sign of the presence or the absence. For example, if it were propounded that 'The man is unfit to travel, because he has a fever,' it would be futile to object that 'The man *is* fit to travel, because he is a soldier'—there being no invariableness of connection between the being a soldier and the being fit to travel].

b. [As a syllogism with the Major premiss not universal but particular has no force at all]—so, [in consideration of the want of universality referred to in §58. *a.*,] it is implied that the futile reply—differing from a Fraud [§50]—is one that is powerless as an objection, [—whereas the objection, in the case of *ignoratio elenchi*, *has* power against the 'man of straw' which is fraudulent-

* साधर्म्यवैधर्म्याभ्यामिति सावधारणो निर्देशस्तेन व्याप्तिनिरपेक्षाभ्यां साधर्म्यवैधर्माभ्यां प्रत्यवस्थानं दूषणाभिधानं जातिरित्यर्थः ॥

ly substituted for the argument of the opposite party—], or it is a reply that is self-destructive.*

c. He now defines Unfitness to be argued with—the topic which presents itself next in order.†

विप्रतिपत्तिरप्रतिपत्तिश्च निग्रहस्थानम् ॥ ५९ ॥

The limit at which it becomes useless to argue further.

No. 59.—Unfitness to be argued with consists in one's [stupidly] misunderstanding, or *not* understanding at all.

a. The term here rendered 'Unfitness to be argued with' signifies literally the place, i. e. the suggester, of censure or rebuke;‡ [—for if a man stupidly misunderstands you or does not understand you at all, and yet still persists in trying to make a show of opposition, then the matter has come to that point where there is nothing left for it but to rebuke him as a blockhead, and to turn him out or quit his company].

b. In order to prevent the mistake, [into which some might fall, of supposing] that there is no subdivision of Futility and Unfitness to be reasoned with, [—the subdivisions of which will be stated in their proper place—] he says,§ [as follows].

तद्विकल्पाज्जातिनिग्रहस्थानबहुत्वम् ॥ ६० ॥

No. 60.—Since they are of various kinds, there are many

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* छलादिभिन्नदूषणासमर्थमुत्तरं स्वव्याघातकमुत्तरं वा जातिरिति सूचितम् ॥

† क्रमप्राप्तं निग्रहस्थानं लक्षयति ॥

‡ निग्रहस्य खलीकारस्य स्थानं ज्ञापकं निग्रहस्थानम् ॥

§ जातिनिग्रहस्थानयोर्विभागो नास्तीति भ्रमो मा भूदित्यत आह ॥

sorts of Futility and Unfitness to be reasoned with [—see §59. *b*.].

a. [But as other questions are more pressing] their subdivision is not made at present;—such is the import *[of the aphorism].

b. [Here ends the First Book of the commented Aphorisms of the Nyáya.]

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* नेदानीं तद्विभागः क्रियत इति भावः ॥

APPENDIX

TO THE

FIRST LECTURE.

Review of Gautama's 1st Lecture.

a. Before going further, let us bestow a restrospective glance on this Lecture in which Gautama lays down the plan of the whole Nyáya system; and let us enquire whether Gautama's exposition is obnoxious to such a charge as is brought against it, for example, by Dr. Ritter, who says, (at p. 366, Vol. IV. of the English version of his History of Philosophy), "In its exposition the Nyáya is tedious, loose, and unmethodical. Indeed the whole form of this Philosophy is a proof of the incapacity of its expositors to enter into the intrinsic development of ideas, whatever knowledge they may have possessed of the external laws of composition." Setting aside the latter of these sentences, which has possibly been mistranslated, we venture to say that the Nyáya—up to the point that we have here reached in Gautama's exposition of it—can be tedious only to him who does not understand it or who has no taste for philosophical enquiries; that it can appear loose to any one only as the chain cable heaped upon the deck of a man of war appears loose in the eyes of the landsman who never saw it stretched; and that it can appear unmethodical only to him who has failed to discern its method. We blame no one for having failed to discern its method, but we do blame those, including Dr. Ritter,

The method of the Nyáya libelled in Europe.

Reasons why it is libelled.

who, having failed to discern it, take upon them to deny its existence. The method in GAUTAMA'S exposition is, one might think, sufficiently clear. Let us try to make it if possible clearer. Aiming at this, we shall now give our Synopsis of GAUTAMA'S method, noting, as we go along, the Aphorism to which our statements have reference.

Attempt to show why it ought not to be so libelled.

Estimate of Gautama's order of procedure.

b. GAUTAMA starts with the grand question of all questions—the enquiry as to how we shall attain the *summum bonum,*—the 'chief end of man,' as the Westminster Catechism literally represents the Sanskrit *paramapurushártha.* The general answer to this he states in his first aphorism—where he lays down further the position that deliverance from evil can be reached only through knowledge of the truth, [see §1].

c. Few are likely to dispute this first position [—those few being such as are to be remitted to the category noticed under §59], and the next question is,—have we *instruments* adapted to the acquisition of a knowledge of the truth? According to GAUTAMA we are furnished with four instruments adapted to this purpose. [These he enumerates in §3, and describes severally in §4—8].

d. But, if we have instruments, let us know what are the *objects,* in regard to which it is worth while obtaining a correct knowledge by means of the appropriate instruments. [These he enumerates in §9, and he defines them severally in §10—22].

e. But the bare enunciation and definiton of these Objects does not ensure a correct and believing knowledge of them. [The state intermediate between hearing and believing, viz. Doubt, he defines in §23].

f. But how is a man to get out of doubt? He will be content to remain in doubt if there be no *motive* for enquiring further.

[Here—§24—he takes occasion to explain what constitutes a Motive].

g. But, in every enquiry, to reach the unknown we must start from the *known*;—there must be *data*. The knowledge which, in any enquiry, we may treat as requiring no demonstration, is either popular—being that on which the unlearned and the learned are at one—the only ground available in dealing with the unlearned, [see §25]; or it is scientific—belonging to the schools, [see §26]. This latter, again, is divisible into four—viz., tenets received in every school [§ 27]; tenets peculiar to particular schools, and furnishing the grounds of *argumenta ad hominem* only [§29]; tenets postulated, and available only where the hypothesis is conceded [§30]; and tenets which, though not expressly laid down by the founders of the schools, are yet so clearly implied as to require no special demonstration, being inevitable Corollaries [§31].

h. The data being determined, it is proper to determine the order of procedure in demonstrating thereby something not granted. [This order of procedure is intimated in §32 and explicated in §33—38].

i. But, thus far, we have been shown an arrangement for hearing only one side of the question,* and how can we be sure that the opposite side is not the right one? [Before making up our minds we must hear both sides—§39—40].

j. But an honest enquirer may have heard both sides and still be in perplexity. Is he to be turned adrift? Not at all. Honest discussion, with one who holds the same first principles, is open to him [§41].

k. There are yet others, besides honest enquirers, that are not utterly to be rejected. A person, not hopelessly irreclaimable,

* Prov. XVIII, 17.

may shabbily *wrangle* for the sake of a seeming victory. [Here, therefore, he defines wrangling, §42].

l. A person, not perhaps hopelessly irreclaimable, may descend to even a lower depth of shabbiness than the wrangler, and may carp at others without undertaking to settle any thing himself. [Here, therefore, he defines cavilling, §43].

m. Wranglers and cavillers, in default of good reasons, must take up with bad ones—with what *look* like reasons; and even an honest enquirer may mislead himself by taking the semblance of a reason for a real one. [The various possible semblances of a reason he, therefore, defines and divides §44—19].

n. But, whilst there are fallacies by which a man may deceive himself as well as others, there are other frauds which are employed only dishonestly for the deception of others. [These frauds he defines and divides, §50—57].

o. Descending a stage lower, an opponent may employ objections so futile as to be capable of deceiving no one. It is well to know in what consists the futility of such objections. [This he shows—§ 58.]

p. Finally, an opponent, sinking even below the former one, (who *knew* what he was opposing though he could make none but a futile opposition), may be unable to understand the proposition [§59—60]. Here Gautama's patience is exhausted, *but not before.* Against everything but that invincible combination of the spirit of contradiction with stupidity, he seeks to arm himself at all points. An objection the most frivolous—or even futile—provided it be tendered by one who understands the proposition—he does not refuse to deal with. The objection might perplex some honest enquirer, and therefore Gautama, or the follower who has imbibed his spirit, does not consider himself entitled to consult his own ease by scouting it, though he himself

How it happens that very frivolous objections are gravely treated in the Nyáya.

may see its futility plainly enough. It is fair to remember this when we meet with ludicrously frivolous objections gravely treated in a Nyáya work. The author is not to be supposed to have *invented* the objection. It was offered to him—offered very possibly for the purpose of vexatiously puzzling and perplexing,—and the Naiyáyika will not allow himself to be puzzled and perplexed. The most cavilling opponent is not to be allowed the semblance of a victory; he shall not be allowed to boast even of having put the philosopher out of temper. This single triumph—such as it is—is reserved for the absolute blockhead.

The undervaluers of the Nyáya invited to state where the order of procedure is misarranged, or what important matter there is for which the system provides no place.

q. Now, we should like to learn from the undervaluers of the *method* of the Nyáya, how could that method be much improved? You are not to imagine that you have answered this question when you have shown that there are some important matters not here noticed by Gautama. You must be able to show either that there are important matters for which his system provides no place, or that he misarranges the order of procedure. We have explained his order of procedure, according to our own view of it. The enquiry whether there is any thing within the range of conception, for which his system does not furnish its appropriate place, we reserve for a separate essay.

THE APHORISMS

OF THE

NYÁYA PHILOSOPHY

OF

GAUTAMA

WITH ILLUSTRATIVE EXTRACTS FROM THE COMMENTARY.

BOOK II.

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CORRIGENDA.

In Aph. 71, read "because of its proving too much;" and so throughout the section, where the term so rendered recurs.

In page 36, l. 19, delete the "that," and also the clause "As, by the".

THE

APHORISMS OF THE NYÁYA.

BOOK II.

INTRODUCTION.

a. I devote myself to the brilliant Second Book of the Nyáya, [and I worship] Hari, with [his four] arms tried in contests, [and —if you apply my remarks to the Institute itself, which suggested this comparison,] with its [four] Proofs [—the conquerors in all logical contests—] which every one knows.*

b. Now the Proofs, &c. [B. I. §1], that have been defined, having to be submitted to ordeal [with the view of determining the pertinency of the several definitions], since there is no room for trial without [there be] *Doubt,* in the first place Doubt itself must be put on trial.†

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* प्रमाणैः प्रथितैर्दोर्भिर्विवादेषु परीक्षितैः । हरिं द्वितीयमध्यायं भासमानमहं भजे ॥

† अथ प्रमाणादिषु लक्षितेषु परीक्षणीयेषु संशयं विना परीक्षाया असम्भवादादौ संशय एव परीक्षणीयः ॥

c. Some say that the purpose of the [Second] Book is only the trial of the *Proofs* [—the first in Gautama's enumeration of topics—], because [—they argue—] this is in accordance with the pupil's desire of knowledge [—he wishing to know first the whole truth respecting what is enunciated first—], and according to the rule of the needle and the frying-pan [—the smith, to whom the two are brought simultaneously for repair, polishing off the simpler first—], and since thus the trial of [the definition of] Doubt is subservient to the trial of the Proofs, &c.*

d. But in reality, since [the definition of] Fraud *has* been put on trial [in Book I. §§55—57], and since 'That which is the object of right notion' [—the second in Gautama's list of topics —] is to be put on trial in the Third and Fourth Books, and Futility in the Fifth, the purpose of the [present] Book is the examination of such of the topics as are *other* than these;—for [although Motive, &c., is not examined expressly, yet] the examination of Motive, &c., also will be made here by *substitution*† [—i. e. by saying—as in Aph. 7—"Now substitute Motive for Proof, and the same rule will apply"].

e. Here the aim of the first Diurnal Portion [or half of Book Second] is the examination of just such topics as aforesaid, exclusive of the examination of Proof with reference to the *divi-*

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* शिष्यजिज्ञासानुसारात् सूचीकटाहन्यायाच्चातः संशयपरीक्षायाः प्रमाणादिपरीक्षोपयोगित्वात् प्रमाणपरीक्षैवाध्यायार्थ इति वदन्ति ॥

† वस्तुतस्तु छलस्य परीक्षितत्वात् तृतीयचतुर्थयोः प्रमेयस्य पञ्चमे जातेः परीक्ष्यमाणत्वात्तदतिरिक्तयावत्पदार्थपरीक्षैवाध्यायार्थः प्रयोजनादिपरीक्षाया अप्यत्रैवातिदेशेन करिष्यमाणत्वात् ॥

sion thereof* [—Proof itself being put on trial, with other things, in the first Diurnal Portion, and the question of the propriety of its fourfold division being remitted to the second].

f. Among these, for the trial of [the pertinency of the definition of] Doubt [assigned in B. I. §23], there is an Aphorism stating the primâ facie view† [as follows]—

THE FIRST DIURNAL PORTION.

SECTION I.

The account given of Doubt examined.

समानानेकधर्माध्यवसायादन्यतरधर्माध्यवसायाद्वा न संशयः ॥ १ ॥

The assigned origin of Doubt.

Aph. 1.—Doubt does not arise—[perhaps some one will say—] from the consideration of characters common [to more than one] or several [such as cannot really belong to one and the same thing], nor [again] from the consideration of [mutually exclusive] characters under the aspect of an alternative.

a. Some explain the intention of the maker of the aphorism to be as follows,—that here, for fear of a *regressus in infinitum,* Doubt is not an element in the examination of [the pertinency of the definition of] Doubt, because *no* doubt is entertained by the maker of the aphorisms. But this [account of the import of the aphorism] is not correct, for it is not the [definition

* तत्र विभागसापेक्षप्रमाणपरीक्षातिरिक्तोक्तयावत्पदार्थपरीक्षा प्रथमाह्निकार्थः ॥

† तत्र संशयपरीक्षणाय पूर्वपक्षसूत्रम् ॥

of] the *nature* of Doubt that is put on trial, from which there would be a *regressus in infinitum* [—whereas Doubt is the primordial source of *all* enquiry—] but it is the *cause* of Doubt, as set forth in the aphorism defining it [B. I. §23]:—and thus the doubt—"*is* Doubt produced from the beholding of similar characters, &c., or not?"—is quite feasible.*

b. But, since there belongs to the maker of the aphorisms certainty [in respect of everything that is set forth in his institute], Doubt is not exhibited with a view merely to the refutation of primâ facie views, [—as if these had ever had any weight with the author,—but for the purpose of explaining what are the *sources* of doubt in the minds of other men;—] and so too in the examination of [the pertinency of the definitions of] Proof, &c. It is this that is declared in the *Bháshya* where it is said—"In an institute, and in discussion [between a teacher and a pupil,—see Book I. § 41] there is no Doubt." Such is the fact.†

c. Doubt does not arise [—says the supposed objector in the aphorism—] from the beholding of 'characters common,' &c., because these [two alleged causes of Doubt] severally wander

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* अत्र सूत्रकृता संशयस्यादर्शनात्संशयपरीक्षायां संशयो नाङ्गमनवस्थाभयादित्याशयं सूत्रकृतो वर्णयन्ति। तदसत्। न ह्यत्र संशयस्वरूपं परीक्ष्यते येनानवस्था स्यात् अपितु लक्षणसूत्रोक्तं संशयकारणं। तथाच संशयः समानधर्मदर्शनादिजन्यो नवेति संशयः सम्भवत्येव॥

† परन्तु सूत्रकृतो निर्णयसत्त्वात् पूर्वपक्षनिरासमात्रस्यापेक्षणात् संशयो न दर्शित एवमेव प्रमाणादिपरीक्षायामपि। तदेवाभिहितं भाष्ये शास्त्रे वादेच विमर्शवर्जमिति तत्त्वम्॥

away [—so that if the first be present, when there is Doubt, the other is absent, and if the other be present, the first is absent; and how can that be the *cause* of a given phenomenon, which is *absent* when the phenomenon presents itself?] Moreover, Doubt does not arise from the beholding of these [two] combined under the relation of an alternative. For, when taking cognizance that "This [object] has the same character as a post," or "This has the same character as a man," one does not *doubt* whether it be a post or not,—because, since resemblance *implies* difference, it is quite competent to one to apprehend the difference [—and not to doubt whether the object be the one or the other —] so soon as one takes cognizance of its possessing the character of something different from it.* [In short, when we say "This is *like* a post," it is implied that it is *not* a post, but e. g., a man; and again, when we say "This is *like* a man," it is implied that it is *not* a man, but, e. g., a post;—things not being said to be "like" *themselves*, but only "like" to something *other* than themselves].

d. [Having enunciated an objection to two out of the five causes of Doubt assigned in B. I.§ 23,] he objects to the three [remaining alleged kinds of] Doubts arising from 'conflict of opinion,' &c.†

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* समानादिधर्मदर्शनान्न संशयः प्रत्येकं व्यभिचारात्। अन्यतरत्वेनानुगतीकृततद्दर्शनादपि न संशयः। न हि स्थाणुधर्मसमानधर्मायं पुरुषधर्मसमानधर्मायमिति वा जानन् स्थाणुर्नवेति सन्दिग्धे समानत्वस्य भेदगर्भत्वाद्भिन्नधर्मत्वेन ज्ञाते तद्भेदग्रहस्यैव सम्भवात्॥

† विप्रतिपत्त्यादिजन्यसंशयत्रयं प्रतिक्षिपति॥

विप्रतिपत्त्यव्यवस्थायाश्च ॥ २ ॥

The objection further. *Aph.* 2.—Nor [—perhaps some one will say—does Doubt arise] from conflict of opinion, nor from unsteadiness [in the recognition of criteria as present or absent].

a. 'Nor does Doubt arise,'—so much is to be supplied* [from §1].

b. The meaning is, that the production of Doubt does not depend upon 'conflicting opinion,' or 'unsteadiness' in the recognition [of some mark which, if we could make sure of it, would determine the object to be so and so], or unsteadiness in the non-recognition [of some mark which, were we sure of its absence, would determine the object to be *not* so and so], because these severally wander away, [and every one of them in turn may be absent while Doubt is present].†

c. There is another aphorism to convey an objection to Doubt as the result, exclusively of other causes, of 'conflict of opinion'.‡

विप्रतिपत्तौच सम्प्रतिपत्तेः ॥ ३ ॥

The objection further. *Aph.* 3.—And [the origin of Doubt is not to be found—some one may say—] in 'conflict of opinion,' because there is [in the minds of the disputants and the hearers, *no* Doubt, but rather dogged] conviction.

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* न संशय इत्यनुवर्त्तते ॥

† विप्रतिपत्तेरुपलब्ध्यव्यवस्थाया अनुपलब्ध्यव्यवस्थायाश्च न संशयजनकत्वं प्रत्येकं व्यभिचारादित्यर्थः ॥

‡ विप्रतिपत्तिजसंशयमात्रप्रतिक्षेपाय सूत्रान्तरम् ॥

a. The import is,—that the cause of Doubt is not to be found in the 'conflict of opinion,' because there is *no* conflict of opinion;—there is *assurance*,—assurance both in the case of the two disputants and of the umpire:—and since assurance *is*, there is no room for Doubt.*

b. Here follows an aphorism intended to demur to the two kinds of Doubt—from (1) unsteadiness in regard to recognition, and (2) in regard to non-recognition† [B. I. § 23].

अव्यवस्थात्मनि व्यवस्थितत्वाच्चाव्यवस्थायाः ॥ ४ ॥

The objection further. *Aph.* 4.—And [—some one may say—Doubt is not the result] of 'unsteadiness,' because in 'unsteadiness' itself there is steadiness, [—just as, when you are really mistaken, there is no *mistake* about your mistake].

a. The power of generating Doubt might then belong to 'unsteadiness in recognition' and to 'unsteadiness in non-recognition,' if there were unsteadiness also in [that unsteadiness,] itself, [for there can be nothing in the product that did not pre-exist in the cause;] but this is not the case; and so how can that [unsteadiness] which is steady in respect of itself, have the character of unsteadiness in respect of something else? Such is the meaning.‡

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* विप्रतिपत्तौ न संशयहेतुत्वं सम्प्रतिपत्तेः। निश्चयात्। वादिनोर्मध्यस्थस्य च निश्चयसत्त्वात्। सति च निश्चये संशयायोगादिति भावः॥

† उपलब्ध्यनुपलब्ध्यव्यवस्थातः संशयद्वयनिरासाय सूत्रम्॥

‡ उपलब्ध्यव्यवस्थाया अनुपलब्ध्यव्यवस्थायाश्च संशय-

b. He states another objection.*

तथात्यन्तसंशयस्तद्धर्मसातत्योपपत्तेः ॥ ५ ॥

Further objection. *Aph.* 5.—[And some one may perhaps say that Doubt cannot arise from 'unsteadiness,'] because, if so, there would be endless Doubt, because of the suitableness of its producer to be continual.

a. 'If so,'—i. e., if it were so,—if 'unsteadiness' [in the recognising of criteria,] were the cause [of Doubt]. Some say that this expression 'if so' does not belong to the aphorism, but is a part of the *Bháshya*† [incorporated with the aphorism by mistake].

b. 'Endless doubt,'—i. e. there would be no cessation of doubt,—'because of the suitableness to be continual,'—i. e., because of the continual possibility,—'of its producer,'—i. e., of its generator,—viz., the beholding of cognizability and other characters common‡ [to *all* things whatsoever].

c. He states the tenet§ [of the Nyáya system, in regard to this question].

जनकत्वं तदा स्यात् यदि स्वस्मिन्नप्यव्यवस्थितत्वं स्यात्। नत्वेवं तथाच स्वात्मनि व्यवस्थितायास्तस्याः कथमन्यत्राव्यवस्थात्वमित्यर्थः॥

* दूषणान्तरमाह॥

† तथा तथा सति। अव्यवस्थाया हेतुत्वे सति। तथाशब्दोऽयं न सूत्रान्तर्गतोऽपितु भाष्यस्य इत्यन्ये॥

‡ अत्यन्तसंशयः संशयानुच्छेदः स्यात्। तद्धर्मस्य तज्जनकस्य ज्ञानत्वादिसाधारणधर्मदर्शनस्य सातत्योपपत्तेः सर्वदा सम्भवात्॥

§ सिद्धान्तमाह॥

यथोक्ताध्यवसायादेव तद्विशेषापेक्षात्संशये नासंशयो नात्यन्तसंशयो वा ॥ ६ ॥

The fact as regards Doubt.

Aph. 6.—Just from consideration as aforesaid,—from one's not discerning the differences of this or that,—there being Doubt, neither is there *no* Doubt, nor is there endless Doubt.

a. 'From consideration as aforesaid,'—i. e., from the beholding of common characters, &c.;—'of this or that,'—i. e., of the fact of being a man or something else;—'the differences,'—i. e., the character which distinguishes a thing from other things;—the 'discerning', or beholding, of that being absent [—such is the analysis of the word *apekshá* here]; from that non-discerning of the differences, [Doubt arises;] such is the meaning.*

b. And so, since it is agreed that Doubt may arise from such sources as the recognition of characters common [to several things] accompanied by the non-recognition of any differences, it is neither the case that there is *no* Doubt, because [forsooth —as has been contended in §1—4—] there is *no* cause of it,—nor that there is *endless* Doubt, because [forsooth—as pretended in Aph. 5—] anything whatever may be the cause of it;—such is the meaning.†

c. And, since the recognition, for example, of characters common [to different things] may produce some separate instance

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* यथोक्ताध्यवसायात् साधारणादिधर्मदर्शनात् तस्य पुरुषत्वादेर्यो विशेष इतरव्यावर्त्तको धर्मस्तस्यापगत ईक्षा ईक्षणं ततः विशेषादर्शनादित्यर्थः ॥

† तथाच विशेषादर्शनसहितसाधारणधर्मदर्शनादितः संशये स्वीकृते न कारणाभावादसंशयो नवा यत्किञ्चित्कारणत्वादत्यन्तसंशय इत्यर्थः ॥

of Doubt, there is no harm though this *should* [—as alleged by the objectors—] wander away [and not be found in every instance present] as regards Doubt *simpliciter*;* [—there being nothing absurd in a "Plurality of causes". A man may die of a gunshot wound, though we do not find a gunshot wound wherever we find death].

d. And [Doubt *may* arise] in a 'conflict of opinions,' because we understand the doubt, raised by the speeches of the disputants, to belong only to the umpire.†

e. And as for your saying [at § 1.—] "How can Doubt arise from the recognising of characters common [to different things], seeing that *likeness* implies differences?"—this also is not [a right account of the matter]; for the cause [of Doubt] is not the cognizing this or that as having a character similar [to what something else has], but the perceiving that it has a character which belongs to both [of the things of which we doubt whether this be the one or the other]; so that there is no such fault [in our definition] as you allege.‡

f. Now, by means of this same examination of [the pertinency of the definition of] Doubt, suggesting by substitution [—see

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* साधारणधर्मदर्शनादेश्च संशयविशेषे जनकत्वात् संशयत्वावच्छिन्नं प्रति व्यभिचारेऽपि न क्षतिः ॥

† विप्रतिपत्तौ च वादिवाक्याभ्यां मध्यस्थस्यैव संशयोपगमात् ॥

‡ यच्चोक्तं समानधर्मदर्शनात् कथं संशयः समानत्वस्य भेदगर्भत्वादिति तदपि न। न हि समानधर्मत्वेन तज्ज्ञानं हेतुरपितु उभयसहचरितधर्मवत्त्वज्ञानं तथेत्युक्तदोषाभावात् ॥

Intro:—*d.*], the examination of the other topics [enunciated by Gautama in his opening aphorism], he says* :—

यत्र संशयस्तत्रैवमुत्तरोत्तरप्रसङ्गः ॥ ७ ॥

The same rule to be applied throughout.

Aph. 7.—Where there *is* [room for] Doubt, *thus* you are to deal in respect of each [case of it] in succession.

a. 'Thus,'—i. e., in the manner aforesaid;—'in respect of each in succession,'—i. e., in respect of the [several] applications [of the present rule to the matters to which it is applicable], 'you are to deal with,' i. e., your are particularly to meddle with, —i. e., you are thus to understand the relation of examination† [to the definition of this or that, the pertinency of which may call for examination].

b. What, then,—is *Motive* also to be put on trial? He replies —nay,—'when there *is* [room for) Doubt,' [and here there is none]. If there *were* any doubt as to the definition of that, then that also would be put on trial,‡ [—but this is not the case].

c. Or [—to give another explanation of one portion of the aphorism—] the meaning may be, that, *dialogwise,* i. e., in the form of speech and reply, you are to deal with each, i. e.,

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* सम्प्रति संशयपरीक्षयैव परेषां पदार्थानां परीक्षामतिदिशन्नाह ॥

† एवमुक्तरीत्या उत्तरोत्तरेषु प्रयोगेषु प्रसङ्गः प्रकृष्टः सङ्गः परीक्षायाः सम्बन्धो बोद्धव्यः ॥

‡ तत्किं प्रयोजनमपि परीक्षणीयं। नेत्याह। यत्र संशय इति यदि तल्लक्षणार्थसंशयस्तदा तदपि परीक्षणीयम् ॥

you are to make, in respect of the thing doubted, the examination which [ought to be made] in respect of it.*

d. Here ends the section on the examination of Doubt.†

SECTION II.

The examination of proof in general.

e. Now, since there is room for it, he states a primâ facie view, in order to the examination of Proof in general‡.

प्रत्यक्षादीनामप्रामाण्यं त्रैकाल्यासिद्धेः ॥ ८ ॥

A denial that Sense, &c., are Proofs.

Aph. 8.—[Perhaps some one will say] the nature of a Proof does not belong to Sense, &c., for it cannot be so at any of the three times [into which Time is divided].

a. That is to say,—the nature of Proof does not belong to Sense, &c., because it cannot be said that, even at any of the three times [past, present, or future], is 'correct knowledge' *(pramá)* established by [that to which the Nyáya gives the name of Proof—or] 'the instrumental cause of correct knowledge' *(pramáṇa)*§.

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* अथवा उत्तरोत्तरं उक्तिप्रत्युक्तिरूपं तत्प्रसङ्गः तत्र या परीक्षा संशयिते ऽर्थे कर्त्तव्येत्यर्थः ॥

† समाप्तं संशयपरीक्षाप्रकरणम् ॥

‡ इदानीमवसरतः प्रमाणसामान्यपरीक्षणाय पूर्वपक्षयति ॥

§ कालत्रयेऽपि प्रमाणात्प्रमायाः सिद्धेर्वक्तुमशक्यत्वात् प्रत्यक्षादीनां न प्रामाण्यमित्यर्थः ॥

b. By a triad of aphorisms he explains how it cannot be so at any one of the three times.*

पूर्वं हि प्रमाणसिद्धौ नेन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षात् प्रत्यक्षसिद्धिः ॥ ९ ॥

The anteriority of Proof to knowledge denied.

Aph. 9.—For, if Proof existed anteriorly, Perception could not "arise from the contact of a Sense with its object."

a. The anteriority, in the first place, of Proof [to the knowledge which, you allege, results from it,] cannot be; 'for,' i. e., because,—'if Proof existed anteriorly to knowledge,' i. e., if Proof were an existing thing,—it would not be the case [as asserted in B. I. §4] that "Perception takes place from the contact of the Sense with the object,"—because [—on the hypothesis—] the Proof existed *anteriorly* to the Sense-knowledge. For, what is meant by being a 'Proof' is the being the instrumental cause of right knowledge,—and, anteriorly to our getting the right knowledge, how, moreover, can anything be called the *cause* of the right knowledge [which we have not even got] ? If its existence even anteriorly to the right knowledge must be acquiesced in, how is it "from the contact of the Sense with the object"?—[how is] the production of Perception—the production of Perception, &c.,—from contact of the Sense with the object, &c., ?† [—an

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* त्रिसूत्र्या त्रैकाल्यासिद्धत्वं व्युत्पादयति ॥

† प्रमाणस्य पूर्वत्वं तावन्न सम्भवति हि यतः प्रमायाः पूर्वं प्रमाणसिद्धौ प्रमाणसत्त्वे इन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षात् प्रत्यक्षं सिध्यतीति न स्यात् प्रत्यक्षप्रमातः पूर्वमेव प्रमाणस्य सत्त्वात्। प्रमाणत्वं हि प्रमाकरणत्वं। पूर्वं प्रमाया अलाभे प्रमाकरणत्वमपि कथं स्यात्। पूर्वमेव प्रमायाः सिद्धिरपे-

account of the matter apparently inconsistent with the anterior existence of the thing so spoken of].

पश्चात् सिद्धौ न प्रमाणेभ्यः प्रमेयसिद्धिः ॥ १० ॥

The posteriority of Proof to knowledge denied.

Aph. 10.—If the existence [of the alleged instruments of right knowledge] were subsequently, then the objects of knowledge would not be known through the instruments of knowledge.

a. If the existence of Proof were [not anterior but] subsequent to right knowledge, the fact of a thing's being rightly known would be settled anteriorly to the Proof,—so that the production of right knowledge, and the cognizance of a thing rightly known, would not come from [what you call] 'the instruments of right knowledge'*.

युगपत्सिद्धौ प्रत्यर्थनियतत्वात् क्रमवृत्तित्वाभावो बुद्धीनाम् ॥ ११ ॥

The simultaneousness of Proof and knowledge denied.

Aph. 11.—If the existence [of Proof] were simultaneous [with that of the corresponding knowledge], there would not be, in the cognitions, [—e. g., in the case of inference—] that order of succession which results from their being conversant about separate objects.

a. If Proof and the knowledge 'were simultaneous,'—were to arise simultaneously,—there would not be that 'order of suc-

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येति कथमिन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षादितः प्रत्यक्षोत्पत्तिः प्रत्यक्षाद्युत्पत्तिः ॥

* प्रमाणस्य प्रमातः पश्चात् सिद्धौ विषयस्य प्रमेयत्वं प्रमाणात्पूर्वमेव सिद्धमिति न प्रमाणतः प्रमाया उत्पत्तिः प्रमेयस्य च प्रमितिरिति ॥

cession' which there really is in consequence of the cognitions' being conversant about separate objects. For, the apperception of a word [e. g.,] has the *sound* for its object, being in the shape of an auricular intuition,—but the verbal knowledge [—the knowledge conveyed by the word—] has the *sense* of the word for its object, being in the shape of something unperceivable [by Sense], and generically different [from the other object];—so that these two cannot be simultaneous, because, since they have the relation of cause and effect [—which the Naiyáyika will not deny that they have—], they can really be in the order of succession*.

He states the tenet† [of the Nyáya, on the point].

त्रैकाल्यासिद्धेः प्रतिषेधानुपपत्तिः ॥ १२ ॥

The sceptic's argument retorted.

Aph. 12.—[If there be no such thing as Proof,] because [forsooth] nothing can be such at any of the three times, then the objection itself cannot be established.

a. If the establishment of matters rightly known, by means of Proof, is not to be admitted, because [forsooth] there can be no such thing at any of the three times, then, at that rate, thy objection also [to the possibility of Proof] cannot be established;—so that it is a futile objection:—such is the import‡.

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* प्रमाणप्रमेययोर्युगपत्त्वे युगपदुत्पत्तौ बुद्धीनामर्थविशेषनियतत्वाद्यत्क्रमवृत्तित्वं तन्न स्यात्। पदज्ञानं हि शब्दविषयकं श्रावणप्रत्यक्षरूपं शाब्दबोधस्य पदार्थविषयकः परोक्षरूपो विजातीय इत्यनयोर्न यौगपद्यं सम्भवति कार्यकारणभाववत्त्वात् क्रमिकत्वेनैव सिद्धेः ॥

† सिद्धान्तमाह ॥

‡ यदि त्रैकाल्यासिद्धा प्रमाणात् प्रमेयसिद्धिर्नापेयते

b. Again, hostile evidence, moreover, going to the denial *of all* evidence, cannot be admitted; and so how could the denial be substantiated? So he says* [as follows].

सर्वप्रमाणप्रतिषेधाच्च प्रतिषेधासिद्धिः ॥ १३ ॥

This shown further. *Aph.* 13.—And the denial itself cannot be established, because [by the denial] all evidence is denied.

a. And if a refutative Proof be admitted, how are *all* proofs disproved?—so he says† [as follows].

तत्प्रामाण्ये वा न सर्वप्रतिषेधः ॥ १४ ॥

And still further. *Aph.* 14.—Or if that one have the nature of a Proof, then *all* [Proof] is not excluded.

a. "But then [—the sceptic may rejoin—] according to my way of thinking, there is no use in establishing realities; since the Universe is a void, the relation of Evidence and [consequent] Knowledge is also unreal; and it has been shown that according to *thy* view it is impossible that this [character of being a Proof] should exist in any of the three times [—before the knowledge, with it, or after it—]:" therefore he solves this‡ [as follows].

तदा तद्रीत्या त्वदीयः प्रतिषेधोऽप्यनुपपन्न इति जात्युत्तरमेतदिति भावः ॥

* किञ्च सर्वप्रमाणप्रतिषेधे प्रतिषेधकं प्रमाणमपि नाभ्युपगन्तव्यं। तथाच कथं प्रतिषेधसिद्धिरित्याह ॥

† यदि च प्रतिषेधकं प्रमाणमुपेयते तदा कथं सर्वप्रमाणप्रतिषेध इत्याह ॥

‡ ननु मन्मते वस्तुसिद्धिर्नापेक्षिता विश्वस्य शून्यत्वात् प्रमाणप्रमेयभावो ऽपि न वास्तविकस्त्वन्मते च त्रैकाल्यासिद्धिरुक्तेत्यतस्तदुद्धरति ॥

त्रैकाल्याप्रतिषेधश्च शब्दादातोद्यसिद्धिवत् तत्सिद्धेः ॥ १५ ॥

The antecedent existence of Proof illustrated.

Aph. 15.—And this [fact, that there may be things entitled to the name of Proof] is *not* to be denied as regards all the three times, because, as [the antecedent existence of] a drum is proved by the sound, so is this proved.

a. The denial that this [character of a Proof] could belong to a thing during any of the three times, was asserted [by the sceptic, at §8];—but this [denial] is not competent;—Why?—so he replies, 'by the sound,' &c. As an antecedently existent musical instrument, a drum or the like, is proved, or known, [to exist,] by the sound which takes place subsequently [to the formation of the instrument]; or as, from the antecedently existent sun, the chronologically subsequent illumination of things [may be inferred]; or as the existence of fire follows from the smoke which is synchronous with the fire; so here also, from 'right knowledge,' which is, in every instance, posterior to the 'cause of right knowledge,' is really [demonstrated] the prior existence of a 'cause of right knowledge,' such as Sight or the like*.

b. It is not to be supposed, however, that this [—Proof—] has antecedently got the 'right knowledge' *associated* with it; for a thing may be entitled to the character of a Proof merely through its association, *from time to time*, with 'right knowledge,'; just

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* त्रैकाल्यप्रतिषेध उक्तः। स न सम्भवति। कुत इत्यत आह शब्दादिति। यथा शब्दात् पश्चाद्भाविनः पूर्वसिद्धस्यातोद्यस्य मुरजादेः सिद्धिर्ज्ञप्तिःर्यथा वा पूर्वसिद्धात् सूर्यादुत्तरकालीनवस्तुप्रकाशनं यथा वा वह्निसमकालीनाद्धूमाद्वह्निसिद्धिस्तथात्रापि प्रमातः सर्वत्र प्रमाणादुत्तरभाविन्या एव प्रमाणस्य चक्षुरादेः पूर्वभावित्वमस्त्येव ॥

as, for example, one may [without inaccuracy] say, "Bring the cook," [—giving to some man, though perhaps not cooking at the time, that name—] just because of his being from time to time engaged in the act of cooking:—such in the import.*

c. In the *Tattwáloka* it is here asserted that that [portion of the aphorism] which ends with *cha* does not belong to the aphorism; but, in reality, from the tenour of his own comment, among the rest, [it is clear that] it *does* belong to the aphorism.†

d. But then [—some one may say—] the dealing with 'Proof' and 'Object of right knowledge,' just since this [relation] is not a fixed thing, is not an absolutely correct procedure; just as, in the case of a rope, the dealing with it [—under a mistaken impression—] as if it were a serpent, for instance:—so, in regard to this doubt, he says‡:—

प्रमेयताच तुलाप्रामाण्यवत् ॥ १६ ॥

Proofs, by being objects of knowledge, are not debarred from being causes of knowledge.

Aph. 16.—And the fact of being an object of right knowledge [does not destroy the character of a proof], as the judicial character of a balance [is not disproved by the fact that you can weigh the balance itself in another pair of scales].

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* पूर्वं प्रमावैशिष्ट्यन्तु तस्य नोपेयते। यदाकदाचित् प्रमासम्बन्धेनैव प्रमाणत्वसम्भवाद्यदाकदाचित् पाकसम्बन्धेनैव पाचकमानयेत्यादिवदिति भावः॥

† अत्र चकारान्तं न सूत्रान्तर्गतमिति तत्त्वालोके। वस्तुतस्तट्टीकादिस्वरसात् सूत्रान्तर्गतमेव॥

‡ नन्वनियतत्वादेव प्रमाणप्रमेयव्यवहारो न पारमार्थिको रज्जौ सर्पादिव्यवहारवदित्याशङ्कायामाह॥

a. As a balance is dealt with as an 'instrumental cause of right knowledge,' because it is what decides the weight of gold, or the like,—and is dealt with as an *object* of knowledge when we decide, by means of another balance, the amount of its own weight;—so also, by reason of the entrance of two causes [for our taking two separate views of the same thing], the Senses &c. are dealt with both as causes of knowledge and as objects of knowledge*.

b. Here is an aphorism, with a primâ facie view, intended to oppose [the possibility of any thing's being a Proof], on the ground of the regressus in infinitum.†

प्रमाणतः सिद्धेः प्रमाणानां प्रमाणान्तरसिद्धिप्रसङ्गः ॥ १७ ॥

Another sceptical objection to Proof.

Aph. 17.—Since it is by Proofs that the existence of Proofs is established, the existence of *other* Proofs presents itself [for demonstration].

a. Since it is agreed that it is by Proof that the Proofs are established [as being Proofs], you must agree that there are other Proofs [in addition to any number that can be assigned]. To explain;—a Proof, in the first place, is not self-established, for then we should have a case of a thing's supporting *itself*, [—and, as remarked elsewhere, a man—"however clever"—cannot sit upon his own shoulder, and thus convey himself dry-shod across a river,—] therefore another Proof must be admitted;—and since these two, if they were to be the establishers mutually of one

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* यथाहि तुलायाः सुवर्णादिगुरुत्वपरिच्छेदकत्वात् प्रमाणव्यवहारस्तुलान्तरेण च तदीयगुरुत्वेयत्तापरिच्छेदे च प्रमेयव्यवहारस्तथा निमित्तद्वयसमावेशादिन्द्रियादेरपि प्रमाणप्रमेयव्यवहार इति ॥

† अनवस्थया प्रत्यवस्थानपरं पूर्वपक्षसूत्रम् ।

another, would present a case of reasoning in a circle [—or, literally, of 'resting on one another mutually,'—as when two boats, by laying hold of one another, vainly expect to avoid being drifted out to sea], therefore there also *another* Proof [of the Proof of the Proof] must be admitted,—and so on without coming to any stand-still:—such is the import.*

b. But then [—the sceptic may rejoin—] a Proof may be established, as such, *without* a Proof:—so he states this† [objection in the following aphorism].

तद्विनिवृत्तेर्वा प्रमाणसिद्धिवत् तत्सिद्धिः ॥ १८ ॥

If Proof need no cause, may not knowledge need no cause?

Aph. 18.—Or in the absence thereof, [—i. e., of Proof,—since Proof may, in virtue of itself, *be* Proof,] then, just as Proof is established [independently], so may this [—viz., right knowledge, independently of any cause of it,] be established.

a. And if 'in the absence' of Proof,—i. e., without Proof,—it be agreed that Proof *is*,—then, just in the same way let it be agreed that *that* [—viz., 'right knowledge'—] may exist. What is the use of acknowledging a *cause* of right knowledge? And thus the whole world is an unsettled question, so that we end in the void [of absolute scepticism]:—such is the import.‡

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* प्रमाणानां प्रमाणतः सिद्धेः स्वीकारे प्रमाणान्तरस्वीकारः स्यात्। तथाहि प्रमाणस्य तावन्न स्वतस्सिद्धिरात्माश्रयापत्तेरतः प्रमाणान्तरं स्वीकार्यं। तयोश्च परस्परसाधकत्वेऽन्योन्याश्रयापत्तिरतस्तत्रापि प्रमाणान्तरमङ्गीकार्यमित्येवमनवस्थेति भावः ॥

† ननु प्रमाणसिद्धिः प्रमाणं विनैव स्यादित्यत्राह ॥

‡ यदि च प्रमाणविनिवृत्तितः प्रमाणव्यतिरेकात् प्रमाण-

b. He states the tenet* [of the Nyáya system, on this point].

न प्रदीपप्रकाशसिद्धिवत् तत्सिद्धेः ॥ १९ ॥

Proof illuminates without requiring to be illuminated.

Aph. 19.—It is not so [—that an endless series of Proofs of Proofs are required—], because it [viz., Proof,] really is, just as the light of a lamp is.

a. For, as, by the light of a lamp, a jar, or the like, is illuminated, so are the 'causes of right knowledge' the illuminators of what things are rightly known. Otherwise, then even the lamp would not be the illuminator of the jar, for fear [forsooth] of the regressus in infinitum,—viz., that the lamp is [in the first place,] the illuminator [or revealer] of the jar, and the Sight [in the second place,] is the revealer of the lamp,—and something else makes us aware of *it*, and so on.†

b. Here ends the section regarding the examination of Proof in general.‡

सिद्धिः स्वीक्रियते तदा तद्वदेव तत्सिद्धिः स्वीक्रियतां किं प्रमाणाङ्गीकारेण । तथाचाव्यवस्थितमेव जगत् स्यादिति शून्यतायां पर्यवसानमिति भावः ॥

* सिद्धान्तमाह ॥

† यथाहि प्रदीपालोकाद्घटादिप्रकाशस्तथा प्रमाणानां प्रमेयप्रकाशकत्वमन्यथा प्रदीपस्य घटप्रकाशकत्वं प्रदीपप्रकाशकं चक्षुस्तज्ज्ञापकमन्यदित्यनवस्थाभयात् प्रदीपोऽपि न घटप्रकाशकः स्यात् ॥

‡ समाप्तं प्रमाणसामान्यपरीक्षाप्रकरणम् ॥

SECTION III.

THE EXAMINATION OF THE DEFINITION OF SENSE.

c. After the examination of Proof in general, the separate *kinds* of Proof having to be examined, the one first enumerated, viz., Sense, falls to be [first] examined. And, in respect of this one, the definition given before [—at B. I. §4—] was through its *fruit* [and not in respect of *itself*]:—so one objects *to* that definition of the fruit, as laid down.*

प्रत्यक्षलक्षणानुपपत्तिरसमग्रवचनात् ॥ २० ॥

Objection to the definition of Perception.

Aph. 20.—The definition of Perception [—says the Bauddha—] is untenable, because not of the whole [that ought to have been stated] is there a statement.

a. That which has been given as the definition of Perception, —viz., its being what results from the conjunction of a Sense with its object,—is untenable, 'because it does not state the whole.' The meaning is this:—of [the species of knowledge called] Perception, a definition, made up of its *cause* [—viz., the conjunction of a Sense with its object,—] has been laid down: in this case the insertion [in the definition,] of the totality made up of the assemblage of causes would prevent the undue extension [of the definition, to things not intended by it], and this [enumeration of the whole assemblage of causes] has *not* been set down. For, 'not the whole'— i. e., only the fact of being produced by the conjunction of a Sense with its object, is set down [in the definition];—but the conjunction of Soul with

* प्रमाणसामान्यपरीक्षानन्तरं प्रमाणविशेषेषु परीक्षणीयेषु प्रथमोद्दिष्टं प्रत्यक्षं परीक्षणीयं। तच्च फलद्वारकमेव लक्षणं पूर्वमुक्तमतः फललक्षणं यथाश्रुतमाक्षिपति ॥

Mind, [and of the Senses with the Mind,] and so on, has *not* been set down;—and so it [—the definition of Sense—] extends unduly to Inference &c., seeing that these [also] result from the conjunction of a Sense-organ [—viz., the Mind—] and an Object [—viz., the Soul—] in the shape of that conjunction of Soul and Mind [—which is the 'non-intimate cause' of all knowledge whatsoever]:—such is the meaning.*

b. But then, since there may be a doubt that the conjunction of Soul with Mind is not really a cause [of Perception,—in which case the foregoing objection of the sceptic would go for nothing], he [the sceptic,] says† [as follows].

नात्ममनसोः सन्निकर्षाभावे प्रत्यक्षोत्पत्तिः ॥ २१ ॥

As indispensable to Perception.

Aph. 21.—There is no Perception produced in the absence of the conjunction of the Soul with the Mind.

a. The conjunction, which takes place with the Mind, of Soul divided off [from the universal Soul] by a body,—in the absence of that [conjunction] since there is no Perception produced,—therefore [—says the sceptic—on the Naiyáyika's own principles—] it

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* प्रत्यक्षस्य यल्लक्षणमिन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षोत्पन्नत्वं तन्नोपपद्यतेऽसमग्रवचनात् । अयमर्थः । प्रत्यक्षस्य कारणघटितं लक्षणमभिहितं । तत्र कारणकलापघटितायाः सामग्र्या विनिवेशनमतिव्याप्तिनिरासकं तच्च नाभिहितं । असमग्रं इन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षजन्यत्वमात्रं ह्यभिहितं । आत्ममनस्संयोगादिकन्तु नाभिहितं । तथाचात्ममनस्संयोगरूपेन्द्रियार्थसंयोगजन्यतयानुमित्यादावतिव्याप्तिरित्यर्थः ॥

† नन्वात्ममनोयोगादेः कारणत्वमेव नास्तीत्याशङ्कायामाह ॥

is indispensable that the conjunction of Soul and Mind should be one [element in the] cause of Perception [—and so it ought to have been recorded in the definition]. 'The production of *Perception*' is what is here specified; but it is the production of [right] knowledge [in *any* shape] that is meant* [to be impugned by the sceptic].

b. But then [—some one may object to the sceptic—if the definition is bound to specify everything which is a condition of the production of Perception, or of knowledge in general, then] *Space* &c. must be causes of it:—so he propounds this doubt† [as follows].

दिग्देशकालाकाशेष्वप्येवं प्रसङ्गः ॥ २२ ॥

Whether Space &c. are causes of Perception.

Aph. 22.—And were it so, then also in the case of Direction, Space, Time, the Ether, &c., we should find this to be the case, [viz., that these should be enumerated among the causes of Perception].

a. Since there really is, in the case of these also, in a manner, the relation of priority and posteriority [—these being necessarily antecedent to any cognition, and therefore to be reckoned among its causes or conditions—], if [you say that] these are inoperative, then the same is the case with the thing in question‡ [—viz., the conjunction of Soul and Mind, which, however, the Naiyáyika cannot regard as inoperative in the matter].

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* शरीरावच्छिन्नस्यात्मनो मनसा यः सन्निकर्षस्तदभावे न प्रत्यक्षोत्पत्तिर्यतोऽत आत्ममनस्संयोगस्य कारणत्वमावश्यकं। प्रत्यक्षोत्पत्तिरिति प्रकृतं। ज्ञानोत्पत्तिरिति विवक्षितम् ॥

† नन्वेवं दिगादीनामपि कारणत्वं स्यादित्याशङ्कते ॥

‡ यथाकथञ्चित् पौर्वापर्य्यस्य तत्रापि सत्त्वात् तेषामन्यथासिद्धिश्चेत् प्रकृतेऽप्येवम् ॥

b. In order to declare the answer in regard to this point, he says* [as follows].

ज्ञानलिङ्गत्वादात्मनो नानवरोधः ॥ २३ ॥

Knowledge implies Soul.

Aph. 23.—The Soul is *not* excluded [—in our definition of Perception, or any other kind of knowledge—], because knowledge is the Sign thereof.

a. 'The Soul is not excluded,'—i. e., is not omitted to be taken in as one of the causes. How?—'because knowledge is the Sign thereof.' That of which knowledge is the Sign, is so [—i. e., is implied as one of the causes in the production of knowledge, in the shape of Perception or otherwise]; for Knowledge, being a positive product, establishes [the existence of] a subject of inherence,—and this [subject of inherence], in the ultimate resort [—when nothing else remains to which we can assign the character], is Soul alone; and there is no proof that Space and the rest are causes [of knowledge]:—such is the import. And thus it is established, also, by the sense of the terms, that the conjunction of Mind, with Soul, the Intimate Cause, is the non-intimate cause† [of knowledge in general].

b. Since it may be asked why the non-intimate cause [of

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* अत्रोत्तरमभिधातुमाह ॥

† आत्मनो नानवरोधोऽसङ्ग्रहः कारणत्वेनेति न । कुतः । ज्ञानलिङ्गत्वात् । ज्ञानं लिङ्गं यस्य तत् तथा । ज्ञानं हि भावकार्यं समवायिकारणं साधयति । तच्च परिशेषादात्मैव । दिगादीनाञ्च कारणत्वे न मानमिति भावः । इत्थञ्च समवायिकारणस्यात्मनो मनसा संयोगोऽसमवायिकारणमित्यर्थात् सिद्धम् ॥

knowledge] is not the conjunction of Soul and *Body*, or the like, —therefore he states an argument for the preeminence of the Mind* [among the joint causes with Soul].

तदयौगपद्यलिङ्गत्वान्मनसः । २४ ।

The function of the Mind in subservience to Soul.

Aph. 24.—The Mind [is not excluded, in our estimate of the causes of knowledge], because that by which we recognise it [—the Mind—in the case of our cognitions—] is the fact that these [cognitions] are not simultaneous.

a. The expression 'is not excluded' is supplied [from the preceding aphorism].†

b. It is indispensable that the Mind also be reckoned one of the causes, because, through the conjunction of the Senses and the Mind, this [Mind] regulates the non-simultaneousness of cognitions [—acting, in short, the part of *Attention*, which is conversant about only one thought at a time—]; and it is not by the conjunction of *Body* with Soul, or the like, that this is regulated:—such is the import. And thus it is fitting that the conjunction of the Soul with the Mind should be the non-intimate cause‡ [of knowledge].

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* आत्मशरीरादिसंयोगस्य कुतो नासमवायिकारणत्वमित्यतो मनसः प्राधान्ययुक्तिमाह ।

† नानवरोध इत्यनुवर्त्तते ।

‡ इन्द्रियमनोयोगद्वारा ज्ञानायौगपद्यनियामकत्वान्मनसोऽपि हेतुत्वमावश्यकमिति । शरीरात्मयोगादेश्च न तन्नियामकत्वमिति भावः । इत्थञ्चात्ममनस्संयोगस्यासमवायिकारणत्वं युक्तम् ।

c. The aphorism conveying the tenet. *

प्रत्यक्षनिमित्तत्वाच्चेन्द्रियार्थयोः सन्निकर्षस्य पृथग्वचनम् ॥ २५ ॥

Justification of the definition.

Aph. 25.—And, because of its being *the* cause of Perception, is there separate mention of the conjunction of the Sense and the Object.

a. 'Because of its being *the* cause of Perception,'—i. e., because of its being a cause peculiar to Perception.†

b. The meaning is as follows. In the aphorism regarding Perception [B. I. §4], the mention of the conjunction of a Sense with its Object is not indeed with the view of mentioning the cause [in all its completeness], in which case the not mentioning the conjunction of Mind with Soul &c. would have been a deficiency; but it was for the purpose of marking it [by a character peculiar to itself]: and since, in such a case, it is as proper to mention a characteristic consisting of the peculiar cause as one consisting of the whole set [of causes], and since the peculiar cause [in the case of Perception,] is the conjunction of a Sense with its Object, it was mentioned separately. The mention was proper, seeing that it constitutes a characteristic, without reference to such things as the conjunction of the Mind with the Soul, which are causes common‡ [to all kinds of knowledge as well as Perception].

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* सिद्धान्तसूत्रम् ॥

† प्रत्यक्षनिमित्तत्वात् प्रत्यक्षासाधारणकारणत्वात् ॥

‡ अयमर्थः। प्रत्यक्षसूत्रे इन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षाभिधानं हि न कारणाभिधित्सया येनात्ममनोयोगाद्यनभिधानेन न्यूनत्वं अपितु लक्षणाभिप्रायेण। तत्रच सामग्रीघटितस्येवासा-

c. He mentions another way of settling the dispute.*

सुप्तव्यासक्तमनसाञ्चेन्द्रियार्थयोः सन्निकर्षनिमित्त-
त्वात्॥ २६ ॥

Another defence of the definition.

Aph. 26.—And [the conjunction of the Sense and the Object is the principal peculiarity in Perception,] because the conjunction of a Sense with its Object is the cause [of knowledge] in the case [even] of those who are asleep, or whose minds are not attending.

a. 'Of knowledge'—is to be supplied.†

b. The fact that the conjunction of a Sense with its Object is the main thing [in producing Perception], is proved by the production of knowledge, quite instantaneously, in the case [even] of those sleeping and those whose minds were not attending, by the conjunction of the organ of Hearing with the thundering of a cloud, for instance; or by the conjunction of the organ of Touch with fire, for example.‡

c. He mentions another argument.§

धारणकारणघटितस्यापि लक्षणस्य सुवचत्वादिन्द्रियार्थसन्नि-कर्षस्य चासाधारणत्वात् पृथग्वचनं। आत्ममनःसंयोगादि-साधारणकारणाद्यवच्छिद्य लक्षणघटकतया वचनं युक्तम्॥

* समाध्यन्तरमाह॥

† ज्ञानस्येति शेषः॥

‡ सुप्तानां व्यासक्तमनसाञ्च घनगर्जितादिना श्रोत्रस-न्निकर्षाद्वह्न्यादिना त्वक्सन्निकर्षाच्च द्रागेव ज्ञानोत्पत्तेरि-न्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षस्य प्राधान्यम्॥

§ युक्त्यन्तरमाह॥

तस्याप्रदेशो ज्ञानविशेषाणाम् ॥ २७ ॥

Another reason. *Aph.* 27.—And by these [conjunctions of Sense and object] are excluded the [other] kinds of knowledge.

a. The kinds of knowledge [other than Perception] are 'excluded,'—i. e., distinguished,—set aside,—by 'these,'—i. e., the conjunctions of Sense and Object. For the conjunction of Soul and Mind, or the like, does not exclude;—for the fact of being produced thereby is common to the other kinds of knowledge [as well as Perception]. In like manner, the fact also of its resulting from conjunction of a Sense-organ with the *Mind* would not serve as the characteristic, because this would not extend to the mental* [i. e., to internal intuition, in which case the Sense-organ, so called, is the Mind itself;—and the definition of *pratyaksha* must extend to internal as well as external Perception].

b. He ponders a doubt, with reference to whether the conjunction of a Sense and its Object is *not* the cause [of Perception], because this may be present unattended† [by any resultant Perception].

व्याहतत्वादहेतुः ॥ २८ ॥

Sensation unattended by Perception. *Aph.* 28.—This is not the cause [of Perception—some one may perhaps say—],

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* ज्ञानविशेषाणां तैरिन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षैरपदेशो विशेषणं व्यावृत्तिः । आत्ममनोयोगादिकं हि न व्यावर्त्तकं तज्जन्यत्वस्य ज्ञानान्तरसाधारणत्वात् । एवमिन्द्रियमनोयोगजत्वमपि न लक्षणं मानसे ऽव्याप्तेः ॥

† इन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षो न हेतुरन्वयव्यभिचारादित्याशयेन शङ्कते

because this [Perception] is debarred [in instances where the conjunction of a Sense with its Object was present].

a. The meaning is, that [some one may perhaps say that] the conjunction of a Sense with its Object is not the cause [of Perception], because, at the time, e. g., of listening to a song, though there really be the conjunction, e. g., of the Sight and a jar, the visual perception of it, e. g., is debarred.*

b. He clears up this doubt.†

नार्थविशेषप्राधान्यात् ॥ २९ ॥

Solution of the puzzle. *Aph.* 29.—Nay,—it is from the preeminence of the particular Object.

a. The song, e. g., is heard, because of the engrossingness,—the desire to attend to it, of some particular object, e. g., the song; and because thus the desire of hearing the song is an obstacle, e. g., to [our taking note of] sensations of Sight, and because it is the absence of obstacles that brings about the effect; and the fact of being the cause belongs to the conjunction of a Sense with its Object in cooperation therewith† [—i. e., in cooperation with the absence of obstacles];—therefore the primâ facie view [here referred to] is not right.‡

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* गीतश्रवणादिकाले चक्षुर्घटसंयोगादौ विद्यमानेऽपि चाक्षुषादेर्व्याहतत्व इन्द्रियार्थसंयोगो न हेतुरित्यर्थः ॥

† समाधत्ते ॥

‡ अर्थविशेषस्य गीतादेः प्राबल्यात् बुभुत्सितत्वाद् गीतादिश्रवणं। तथाच गीतशुश्रूषादेश्चाक्षुषादिप्रतिबन्धकत्वात् प्रतिबन्धकाभावस्य च कार्यार्जकत्वात् तत्सहकारेणचेन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षस्य हेतुत्वमतः पूर्वपक्षो न युक्त इति ॥

b. But then [the objector, taking another line of objection, may say—] if Perception were a different kind of Evidence [from the others], the investigation of its definition would be fitting,—but it is really no such thing:—which doubt he next ponders.*

प्रत्यक्षमनुमानमेकदेशग्रहणादुपलब्धेः ॥ ३० ॥

Whether Perception be not a case of Inference.

Aph.—30. Perception [some one may say—] is [none other than] Inference, because the apprehension [to which we give the name,] is through the apprehending of a part, [which is to us a Sign of the whole].

a. What we regard as a Perception, e. g., the cognition of a jar, is an 'inference,' i. e., a conclusion;—because we apprehend it after apprehending 'a part,' viz., the part in front; and thus the cognition, e. g., of a tree, is an inference, because it results from the cognition of a Sign—[this Sign] consisting in the apprehension of a part [of the tree]:—such is the meaning.†

b. He clears up this doubt.‡

न प्रत्यक्षेण यावत्तावदुपलम्भात् ॥ ३१ ॥

Perception not a case of Inference.

Aph. 31.—Nay,—because by Perception is apprehended so much as is so.

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* ननु सति प्रत्यक्षस्य प्रमाणान्तरत्वे तल्लक्षणस्य परीक्षा सङ्गच्छते तदेव तु नास्तीत्याशङ्कते ॥

† प्रत्यक्षत्वेनाभिमतं घटादिज्ञानमनुमानमनुमितिरेकदेशस्य पुरोभागस्य ग्रहणानन्तरमुपलब्धेस्तथाचैकदेशग्रहणात्मकलिङ्गज्ञानजन्यत्वाद्वृक्षादिज्ञानमनुमितिरित्यर्थः ।

‡ समाधत्ते ॥

a. That Perception is Inference is not the case,—that is to say, so far forth as it is a Perception, it is not a Conclusion.*

b. 'Because *so* much is apprehended [through Perception] as is so,'—i. e., because, even by *thee* it is admitted that there is [really such an] apprehension; since 'so much as is so,'—i. e., *some* portion or other,—is apprehended by Perception,—i. e., by Sense.†

c. It is to be understood, moreover, that this is but low ground —[that we have taken up;—for we might have argued that] Perception simply is not excluded [by your argument to prove its being a case of Inference], because it [—your argument—] does not exclude Sounds, Odours, &c.,‡ [—which are apprehended, by Sense, in their totality,—though the objects of Sight might, at first sight, seem to afford a handle to the objector, by being apprehended through the apprehension of a *part*].

d. He censures, moreover, [as follows,] even the assertion that the cognition of a tree or the like, is a case of Inference.§

नचैकदेशोपलब्धिरवयविसद्भावात् ॥ ३२ ॥

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* प्रत्यक्षमनुमानमिति न। प्रत्यक्षत्वावच्छेदेनानुमितित्वं नेत्यर्थः॥

† यावत्तावदुपलम्भात्। यावत्तावतोऽपि यस्य कस्यचिद्भागस्य प्रत्यक्षेणेन्द्रियेणोपलम्भादुपलम्भस्य त्वयाप्यभ्युपगमात्॥

‡ इदमुपलक्षणं शब्दगन्धादिप्रत्यक्षस्यावारणात् न प्रत्यक्षमात्रनिषेध इत्यपि बोध्यम्॥

§ यदपि वृक्षादिज्ञानस्यानुमितित्वमिति तदपि दूषयति॥

A thing is perceived, when a part of it is perceived.

Aph. 32.—And there is not [—in the case, e. g., of the cognition of a tree, —] the apprehension [merely] of a part,—because that which is made up of the parts [—i. e., the whole—] is a reality.

a. 'And not,'—i. e., neither.*

b. Neither is it proper, moreover, to say that there is the apprehension of a part only [—in the case, e. g., of a tree's being apprehended by vision—],—'because that which is made up of the parts is a reality'—i. e., because what is made up of the parts *is* [there]; so that, at the time of the perception of the part, the perception of that also which is made up of the parts is not excluded,—inasmuch as there is the conjunction of the Sight with *it* also [—that which is in conjunction with a part, being, even thereby, in conjunction with that to which the part pertains—]: —such is the import.† [See the *Tarka-sangraha*, §47.]

c. Here ends the Section on the Examination of Perception.‡

SECTION IV.

As to what is meant by a whole.

d. He begins a section on the subject of [a whole, or] 'what is made up of parts' *(avayavin)*,—for there is pertinency in his

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* नच नवेत्यर्थः ॥

† नचैकदेशस्यैवोपलब्धिरित्यपि युक्तं । अवयविसद्भावात् । यतोहि अवयव्यस्ति अतस्तदवयवप्रत्यक्षकाले ऽवयविनोऽपि प्रत्यक्षं न व्याहतं तेनापि सह चक्षुःसंयोगादिसत्त्वादिति भावः ॥

‡ समाप्तं प्रत्यक्षपरीक्षाप्रकरणम् ॥

analysing this [conception] with a view to establishing the reason [to be no fiction, which was assigned in §32, viz.], 'because what is made up of parts is a reality.'*

साध्यत्वादवयविनि सन्देहः ॥ ३३ ॥

Whether there be any wholes.

Aph. 33.—[Perhaps some one will say] there is a doubt as regards 'what is made up of parts,' because it requires to be proved [that there is anything to which the name of 'a whole' is appropriate].

a. The meaning is this:—there is a doubt in regard to 'what is made up of parts,'—'because it requires to be proved,'—i. e., because that is not a reality;—that is to say, the reason alleged, viz., 'because what is made up of parts is a reality,' is incompetent because doubtful.†

b. And, as regards this, it is impossible that 'what is made up of parts' should be *one,*—because there may belong to it contradictory characters, in the shape, for instance, of shaking and not shaking, redness and not redness, hiddenness and unhiddenness. To explain:—as far as regards the branches, a shaking, and again, as far as regards the trunk, the absence thereof, is beheld [in a tree]; and it is impossible that there should exist simultaneously, in one and the same thing, a couple of contradictory characters. Therefore *parts* alone are such [—i. e., are realities—], and not any other thing 'made up of the parts,'—for there is no evidence‡ [in support of the latter].

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* अवयविसद्भावादिति हेतुसाधनायोपोद्घातसङ्गत्यावयविप्रकरणमारभते ॥

† अयमर्थः । अवयविनि साध्यत्वादसिद्धत्वात् सन्देहोऽवयविसद्भावादित्युक्तहेतुः सन्दिग्धासिद्ध इत्यर्थः ॥

‡ तत्रच सकम्पत्वाकम्पत्वरक्तत्वारक्तत्वावृतत्वानावृतत्वा-

c. In like manner is this to be gathered from observing that a cloth, of which a part a reddened by safflower, is not red as regards the ends [which were not dipped into the dye],—and so too from observing that, as far as regards the surface [presented to us], &c., a thing is not hidden [—while it *is* hidden as regards its other parts] :—such is the primâ facie view of the Bauddhas. And here the primâ facie aphorisms of the Bauddhas, and the things penned by the author of the *Vártika*, are not written, for fear of prolixity.*

d. The aphorism containing the tenet.†

सर्वाग्रहणमवयव्यसिद्धेः॥ ३४॥

Proof that there are wholes.

Aph. 34.—Were wholes unreal, everything would be imperceptible.

a. If the whole ['made up of parts'] were not a reality, all its qualities, actions, &c., would be imperceptible; and thus

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दिलक्षणविरुद्धधर्माध्यासादेको ऽवयवी न सम्भवति। तथाहि। शाखावच्छेदेन कम्पो मूलावच्छेदेन तदभावो ऽप्युपलभ्यते नचैकस्मिन्नेव द्रव्ये एकदैव विरुद्धधर्मद्वयसमावेशः सम्भवति। तस्मादवयवा एव तथाभूता न त्वन्यो ऽवयवी मानाभावात्॥

* एवं महारजनरक्तैकदेशस्यांशुकस्य दशावच्छेदेनारक्तत्वोपलम्भादेवं यावत्पृष्ठादेरनावृतत्वोपलम्भादवसेयं। इति बौद्धानां पूर्वपक्षः। अत्रच बौद्धानां पूर्वपक्षसूत्राणि वार्त्तिककृता लिखितानिच विस्तरभयान्न लिख्यन्ते॥

† सिद्धान्तसूत्रम्॥

even a thing's being shaking or not shaking, red or not red, would not be perceptible,—because these [characters,—according to the objector,—] belong to the Atoms [or absolutely small 'parts' of things], and the [indispensable] condition of perception is bulk,* [—which does not belong to Atoms].

b. He states another reason.†

धारणाकर्षणोपपत्तेश्च ॥ ३५ ॥

Another proof. *Aph.* 35.—And [there must be 'wholes,'] because holding and pulling are [—only on that supposition—] reasonable.

a. A whole is something other than the parts [of which the whole is made up], because, it being so, the holding and pulling [of masses] involves no absurdity;—while, were it the fact, on the other hand, that only heaps of Atoms exist [—constituting no wholes—], then it would not be the case [—as, however, it *is*—] that, by holding a part, we hold the whole, and, by pulling a part, we pull the whole:—such is the meaning.‡

b. You must not say this, [—with well-intentioned but misdirected zeal—] that that, "As, by the ['There are such things

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* अवयविनोऽसिद्धौ तद्गुणकर्मादीनां सर्वेषामग्रहणं तथाच सकम्पाकम्पत्वरक्तारक्तत्वादिकमपि न सुग्रहं परमाणुगतत्वात् प्रत्यक्षे महत्त्वस्य हेतुत्वात् ॥

† हेत्वन्तरमाह ॥

‡ अवयवेभ्योऽवयव्यतिरिच्यते तथा सति धारणाकर्षणयोरुपपत्तेरन्यथा परमाणुपुञ्जत्वे चैकदेशधारणेन सकलधारणमेकदेशाकर्षणेन सकलाकर्षणञ्च न स्यादित्यर्थः ॥

as wholes] because then this [pulling, &c.] is reasonable,' as, by the pulling of the boat, the person standing in the boat is pulled, —and as, by the holding of the pitcher, the curds in the pitcher is held;"—[you must not say this,] because it is altogether in virtue of a peculiar conjunction [—quite different from that of a boat and the person standing in it—] that the relation of parts and whole, or its absence, comes to exist. Therefore, holding that only the previously assigned argument [in §35,] is the proper one, he [the author], pondering the solution in respect of this matter offered by some one else, condemns it* [as follows].

सेनावनादिवदिति चेन्नातीन्द्रियत्वादणूनाम् ॥ ३६ ॥

A plausible argument disowned. *Aph.* 36.—If [any one should say] it is like the case of an army, or a forest, [we reply that] it is not so,—because Atoms are supersensual.

a. If [any one says], though a very distant man, or single tree, or the like, is imperceptible, yet, as an army, or a forest, or the like [aggregate of things separately imperceptible], *is* perceived, —so too, though a single Atom be imperceptible, a collection of them, in the shape of a jar for example, *may* be perceptible,— [we reply, that] this too is not so,—'because Atoms are supersensual.' What is meant is this, that, since *bulk* is the [indispensable] condition of Perception, the perception of an army, or a forest, or the like, is fitting [—inasmuch as the constituents of the aggregate have bulk themselves—]; but not [so is it] in the case of Atoms, because these have *no* bulk.†

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* इदमवद्यं नौकाकर्षणेन नौकास्थाकर्षणवत् कुण्डधारणेन कुण्डस्थदधिधारणवच्चोपपत्तेर्विजातीयसंयोगबलेनैवावयवावयविभावाभावेऽप्युपपत्तेरतः पूर्वोक्तां युक्तिमेव साधीयसीं मन्यमानस्तत्र परोक्तं समाधानमाशङ्क्य दूषयति ॥

† अतिदूरस्थैकमनुष्यैकवृक्षादेरप्रत्यक्षत्वेऽपि सेनावनादि-

b. Here ends the section on the examination of 'wholes'.*

SECTION V.

The Definition of Inference examined.

c. Since this is the proper place for it, in order to test [the definition of] Inference, whose turn has arrived, he states a primâ facie view.†

रोधोपघातसादृश्येभ्यो व्यभिचारादनुमानमप्रमाणम् ॥ ३७ ॥

The evidence of Inference impugned.

Aph. 37.—[Some one may say that] Inference is no Proof, because it wanders away in the case of (1) the embankment, (2) the damage, and (3) the likeness.

a. That Inference is of three kinds, has been stated already [B. I. §5]. If the [whole] three kinds of this be proved not to be the causes of right knowledge, it will be settled, by the sense of the terms, that Inference is no Proof;—in reliance upon which, this‡ [is propounded which is propounded in the aphorism].

प्रत्यक्षवदेकपरमाणोरप्रत्यक्षत्वे ऽपि तत्समूहरूपघटादेः प्रत्यक्षं स्यादितिचेन्न तदपि अणूनामतीन्द्रियत्वात्। प्रत्यक्षे महत्त्वस्य हेतुत्वात् सेनावनादिप्रत्यक्षं युज्यते नत्वणूनां महत्त्वाभावादिति भावः॥

* समाप्तमवयविपरीक्षाप्रकरणम्॥

† अवसरेण क्रमप्राप्तमनुमानं परीक्षितुं पूर्वपक्षयति॥

‡ अनुमानस्य त्रैविध्यं पूर्वमुक्तं। तत्र त्रिविधस्याप्रामाण्ये साधिते ऽनुमानमप्रमाणमर्थात् सिद्धमित्याशयेनेदम्।

b. Inference,—admitted to *have* the character of inference,—is no 'Proof',—i. e. no cause of right knowledge,—because of the fact that the reason [assigned in any case of inference] is one that wanders away,* [and presents itself where what it ought to certify is not found to accompany it].

c. Among these three kinds [of Inference, thus all alike impugned,] he exhibits the wandering away [of the Sign from the thing signified] by saying 'through the damming up,' &c.†

d. [According to the objector,] the inference of rain, as tripartitely exemplified,—from the swelling of the river, the carrying off of their eggs by the ants, and the screaming of the peacocks,—cannot be, [—i. e.' cannot be an absolutely certain means of right knowledge,—] because there may be a disjunction [between the Sign and the thing signified], inasmuch as the swelling of the river may have depended on the damming up of the river,—and the ants' carrying away their eggs may have resulted from their nest's having been damaged,—and the sound like the voice of a peacock may have been uttered by a man.‡

e. He clears up this doubt.§

नैकदेशत्राससादृश्येभ्यो ऽर्थान्तरभावात्॥ ३८ ॥

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* अनुमानं अनुमानत्वेनाभिमतं न प्रमाणं प्रमितिकरणं व्यभिचारिहेतुकत्वात्।

† तत्र त्रिविधे व्यभिचारं दर्शयति रोधेत्यादिना।

‡ नदीवृद्ध्या पिपीलिकाण्डसञ्चारेण मयूररुतेन च वृष्ट्यनुमानं त्रिविधमुदाहरणं न सम्भवति। नदीरोधाधीननदीवृद्ध्या आश्रयोपघाताधीनपिपीलिकाण्डसञ्चारेण मनुष्यकर्तृकमयूररुतसदृशरुतेन व्यभिचारात्।

§ समाधत्ते।

Inference really a means of right knowledge.

Aph. 38.—Nay [—it is not to be denied that the recognition of a Sign is a cause of right knowledge—], because that [which we mean by a Sign,] is something else than the part, and the fear, and the likeness, [referred to by the objector].

a. That the recognition of a Sign is not a means of right knowledge is not the case. There is no fault [—in the Signs, the recognition of which we say leads to right knowledge—], because the swelling of the river, and the rest, which *are* Signs, are something other than that swelling of a river which results from the damming up a part of it, and that carrying off of their eggs by the ants which results from fear [—when their nest has been disturbed], and that scream which was [only] *like* the scream of the peacock. And there is not, in *every* instance, the doubt of the wandering away [of the Sign unaccompanied by the thing signified];—and where this [doubt] does occur, since it can be removed by redargution [B. I. §39], there is no fault:—such is the import.*

b. Here ends the section on the examination of Inference.†

SECTION VI.

THE EXAMINATION OF TIME PRESENT.

c. [Perhaps some one will say—] that is not proper, which

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* अनुमानाप्रामाण्यं न युक्तमेकदेशरोधजनदीवृद्धेस्त्रासजपिपीलिकाण्डसञ्चारान्मयूररुतसदृशरुताच्च लिङ्गीभूतानां नदीवृद्ध्यादीनां भिन्नत्वान्न दोषः। नच सर्वत्र व्यभिचारशङ्का। सत्याञ्च तस्यान्तर्केण तदपनयनान्न दोष इत्याशयः॥

† समाप्तमनुमानपरीक्षाप्रकरणं॥

you imagine, that the recognition of a Sign has reference to the three times [—past, present, and future,—see B. I. §5], because, since there is *no* present,—because there is neither past nor future, the conception of which is dependent on that [—i. e., on the present, which is a nonentity], the receptivities—in the shape of the triad of times—do not exist;—so, with reference to this, commencing a section for the examination of time present, he [—in the character of the objector—] demurs to time present.*

वर्त्तमानाभावः पततः पतितपतितव्यकालोपपत्तेः ॥ ३९ ॥

The sceptic denies time present.

***Aph.* 39.—There is no present time [—says the sceptic—], because, of a thing falling, we can demonstrate [only] the time through which it has fallen and that through which it has to fall.**

***a.* 'There is no present time,'—i. e., there is no kind of time other than past and future. He explains this, saying 'of a thing falling,' &c. Of a thing falling, a fruit for instance, there is the distance fallen, a certain space, the limit of which is the tree; and there is a certain distance to be fallen through, the limit of which is the ground; but there is no concernment also with a *present*:—such is the import.†**

*** अनुमानस्य त्रिकालविषयत्वमभिमतं तन्न युक्तं वर्त्तमानाभावेन तदधीनज्ञानयोरतीतानागतयोरभावेन कालत्रयात्मकविषयाभावादित्याशयेन वर्त्तमानपरीक्षाप्रकरणमारभमाणो वर्त्तमानमाक्षिपति ।**

† वर्त्तमानाभावः अतीतानागतभिन्नकालत्वाभावः । व्युत्पादयति पततः इति । पततः फलादेर्वृक्षावधिकः कश्चन देशः पतिताध्वा भूम्यवधिकः कश्चन पतितव्याध्वा न तु वर्त्तमानस्य प्रसक्तोऽपीति भावः ।

F

b. He clears up this doubt.*

तयोरप्यभावो वर्त्तमानाभावे तदपेक्षत्वात् ॥ ४० ॥

Proof that there must be time present.

Aph. 40.—Those two also [viz., the past and future] would not be, if the present were not; because they are relative to it.

a. If the present were not, then 'those two,'—the past and the future, would also not be;—'because they are relative to it,'—i. e., because what is meant by being past is the being the counterpart to the destruction of the present; and because what is meant by being future is the being the counterpart to the antecedent non-existence of the present:—such is the import.†

b. But then [the sceptic may rejoin that], since those two are substantiated just by their mutual relation, they have no relation to a [needlessly postulated] present:—therefore he says:‡—

नातीतानागतयोरितरेतरापेक्षासिद्धिः ॥ ४१ ॥

Past and future not immediately related.

Aph. 41.—The past and future are not substantiated by mutual reference.

a. That is to say, because this would be a case of mutual dependency,§ [—or of reasoning in a circle].

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* समाधत्ते ।

† वर्त्तमानाभावे तयोरतीतानागतयोरप्यभावः स्यात् तयोस्तदपेक्षत्वात् । वर्त्तमानध्वंसप्रतियोगित्वं ह्यतीतत्वं वर्त्तमानप्रागभावप्रतियोगित्वं ह्यनागतत्वमिति भावः ॥

‡ ननु तयोः परस्परापेक्षयैव सिद्धेर्न वर्त्तमानापेक्षेत्यत आह ॥

§ अन्योन्याश्रयत्वादिति भावः ॥

b. What were the loss [—enquires the sceptic—] if these two also [—past time and future—] did not exist? Therefore he states another argument.*

वर्त्तमानाभावे सर्वाग्रहणं प्रत्यक्षानुपपत्तेः ॥ ४२ ॥

Proof that there is a present.

Aph.. 42.—Were there no present, there would be no cognition of anything, because perception would be impossible.

a. If there were no present, perception could not take place, because time present is the receptivity of perception. For this reason he [Udayanáchárya] says, "By the sight, &c. is apprehended what is adapted [to the sense], and present [in time]." And if there were no perception, there would be no 'cognition,' —or knowledge,—of anything; because the other kinds of knowledge have their root in perception:—such is the import.†

b. But then [the sceptic may say], if what is meant by being past is the being the counterpart of the destruction of the present [—see §40, *a*—], and what is meant by the being future, the being the counterpart of the antecedent non-existence of the present, then, in the case of a jar which exists only in the present, how comes the notion "It *was* black, and [—after baking in the kiln—] it *will be* red?" To this he replies.‡

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* तयोरप्यभावे का क्षतिरतो युक्त्यन्तरमाह ।

† वर्त्तमानाभावे प्रत्यक्षं नोपपद्यते प्रत्यक्षस्य वर्त्तमानवि-षयत्वात् । अत एवाह सम्बद्धं वर्त्तमानञ्च गृह्यते चक्षुरा-दिनेति । प्रत्यक्षाभावे च सर्वमेव ग्रहणं ज्ञानं न स्यात् प्रत्य-क्षमूलकत्वादितरज्ञानानामिति भावः ।

‡ ननु यदि वर्त्तमानध्वंसप्रतियोगित्वमतीतत्वं वर्त्तमान-

कृतताकर्त्तव्यतोपपत्तेरुभयथा ग्रहणम् ॥ ४३ ॥

How a thing present may be spoken of in the past or future tense.

Aph. 43.—It [—the jar—] may be conceived in both ways [—i. e., both as past and future,—] because the facts of having been made and of having to be made, are conceivable [in respect of its past and future qualities].

a. That is to say,—since, of the black and red colours, for example, of a jar or the like, though this exist only in the present, the facts of having been made and of having to be made, i. e., the facts of their being past and future, are conceivable, therefore the jar or the like also may be spoken of as past or future, through its being connected mediately* [—with the past and the future, through its past and future qualities].

b. Here ends the section on the examination of time present.†

SECTION VII.

The Examination of the Proof drawn from Likeness.

c. Now, as the occasion presents itself, in order to test [the

प्रागभावप्रतियोगित्वञ्च भविष्यत्त्वं तदा वर्त्तमान एव घटे कथं श्याम आसीद्रक्तो भविष्यतीति धीरत आह ॥

* वर्त्तमानस्यापि घटादेः श्यामरक्तरूपादीनां कृतता-कर्त्तव्यतयोरतीतताभविष्यत्तयोरुपपत्तेर्घटादेरप्यतीतानागतत्वेन व्यवहारः परम्परासम्बन्धादित्यर्थः ॥

† समाप्तं वर्त्तमानपरीक्षाप्रकरणम् ॥

pertinency of the definition of] the 'Proof drawn from Likeness' *(upamána)*, he sets forth a primâ facie view, as follows.*

अत्यन्तप्रायैकदेशसाधर्म्यादुपमानासिद्धिः ॥ ४४ ॥

The Proof from likeness objected to.

Aph. 44.—An argument from Likeness is not substantiated either through complete, considerable, or partial similarity.

a. It was stated [at B. I. §6], that [the proof called] Comparison *(upamána)* arises from a previously known similarity. This [according to the sceptic] is not right, because [as regards the matter in question] similarity will not suit, whether it be complete, considerable, or slight. For, on the ground of complete similarity, it is never argued that "A cow is like a cow;" nor, on the ground of considerable similarity, that "A buffalo is like a cow;" nor, on the ground of there being *some* similarity, that "A mustard-seed is like mount Meru." And the comparative proof drawn from *dissimilarity* is in like manner to be refused admission, because *similarity* implies this in addition.†

b. He clears up this doubt.‡

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* यथावसरेण क्रमप्राप्तोपमानं परीक्षितुं पूर्वपक्षयति ॥

† प्रसिद्धसाधर्म्यादुपमानमुक्तं । तन्न युक्तं यतः साधर्म्यमात्यन्तिकं प्रायिकमैकदेशिकं वा न सम्भवति । न ह्यात्यन्तिकसाधर्म्येण गौरिव गौरित्युपमानं प्रवर्त्तते न वा प्रायिकसाधर्म्येण गौरिव महिष इति न च यत्किञ्चित्साधर्म्येण मेरुरिव सर्षप इति । साधर्म्यस्योपलक्षणत्वाद्वैधर्म्योपमानमप्येवं वर्जनीयम् ॥

‡ समाधत्ते ॥

प्रसिद्धसाधर्म्यादुपमानसिद्धेर्यथोक्तदोषानुपपत्तिः ॥ ४५ ॥

Reply to the objection.

***Aph.* 45.—Since an argument from Likeness *is* substantiated through previously known similarity, the aforesaid objection fails.**

a. 'Previously known'—[or, as it may be explained, differently from the way in which it is explained under B. I. §6—] that similarity which is known, *in a high degree* [—as likeness to a cow exists, in the Bos Gavaeus, in a high degree] as contradistinguished from a buffalo or the like,—since the knowledge of this *is* the instrumental cause of a 'conclusion from resemblance' *(upamiti)*, there is no fault, [such as the sceptic objects to us]. And the similarity consists in this or that [—e. g., shape colour, size, &c., &c.], according as the case may be, &c.*

b. He states, as a doubt, the opinion of the *Vaiśeshikas* [—apparently, therefore, anterior to himself—] that there is no other kind of Proof, such as the 'argument from resemblance,' since the end is attained by 'Inference,'† [of which this is only a case].

प्रत्यक्षेणाप्रत्यक्षसिद्धेः ॥ ४६ ॥

Kaṇáda's opinion.

***Aph.* 46.—[The case is not different from ordinary Inference,] because it is [—like any**

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* प्रसिद्धं प्रकर्षेण महिषादिव्यावृत्त्या सिद्धं ज्ञातं यत् साधर्म्यं तज्ज्ञानस्योपमितिकरणत्वान्न दोषः। साधर्म्यञ्च प्रकरणाद्यनुसारात् किञ्चित्किञ्चिदिति ॥

† अनुमानेन चरितार्थं नोपमानं प्रमाणान्तरमिति वैशेषिकमतमाशङ्कते ॥

other case of Inference—] an establishing of the unperceived by means of the perceived.

a. 'By means of the perceived,'—i. e., by the species of resemblance to a cow,—since there is [nothing else than] an inference of what unperceived [animal] is meant by the word Bos Gavaeus,—there is no other proof such as Comparison.*

b. He replies to this.†

नाप्रत्यक्षे गवये प्रमाणार्थमुपमानस्य पश्यामः ॥ ४७ ॥

How Comparison differs from Inference.

Aph. 47.—It is not in respect of a Bos Gavaeus *unperceived*—that we see the need of 'the recognition of Likeness' *(upamána)* as the instrument of right knowledge.

a. That is to say,—it is not in respect of what is 'unperceived,' —i. e., not perceived inasmuch as it is [in relation to us only as] something possessed of a Sign *(vyápya)*—[which Sign, say, *is* perceived],—since *that* [we grant you] would be a case of Inference,—that we see 'the need of *this* as the instrument of right knowledge,'—i. e., the subserviency of 'the recognition of Likeness' to right knowledge.‡

b. Or the meaning is,—we do not regard as a case of Inference the object of the evidence called Comparison,—that right knowledge,—viz., the right knowledge due to Comparison,—'in

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* प्रत्यक्षेण गोसादृश्यविशेषेण अप्रत्यक्षस्य गवयपदवाच्यस्यानुमितेर्नोपमानं मानान्तरमिति ।

† अत्रोत्तरयति ।

‡ अप्रत्यक्षे व्याप्यवत्तया ऽप्रत्यक्षे अनुमानत्वेन प्रमाणार्थं प्रमाप्रयोजनमुपमानस्य न पश्याम इत्यर्थः ।

respect of the Bos Gavaeus,'—i. e., in respect of what belongs to the Bos Gavaeus,—viz., that 'unperceived thing,'—i. e., the fact of being what is *meant* by the word Bos Gavaeus. The import is, [that this is not a case of Inference,] because there is not the knowledge of 'constant attendedness,'* [—which,—see the *Tarka-sangraha*,—is what constitutes anything a Sign from which alone something else can be said to be *inferred*].

e. But then [it may be objected]—let it be granted that the knowledge of 'constant attendedness' is indispensable [to Inference:—have we not it here also?]—so, with reference to this, he states another argument.†

तथेत्युपसंहारादुपमानसिद्धेर्नाविशेषः ॥ ४८ ॥

This shown further. *Aph.* 48.—It is not the case that it is not different [from Inference], because, through the compendious expression "So," it is settled that there *is* [a special kind of evidence called] the 'Argument of Likeness'.

a. It is not the case that the 'recognition of Likeness' is not different from the 'recognition of a Sign;'—because, 'through the compendious expression '*So*,'—i. e., from the information that "*As* is a cow, *so* is a Bos Gavaeus,"—it is settled by the 'Argument of Likeness,'—i. e., the 'conclusion from Likeness' *(upamiti)* is settled, in dependence on the 'Argument of Likeness' *(upamána)*. And in like manner it is settled by conscious-

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* अथवा गवये गवयदृष्टौ अप्रत्यक्षे गवयपदवाच्यत्वे उपमानस्य प्रमाणार्थं प्रमां उपमानजन्यां प्रमां अनुमानत्वेन न पश्याम इत्यर्थः । व्याप्तिज्ञानाभावादिति भावः ॥

† ननु व्याप्तिज्ञाननियमः कल्प्यतामित्यनुशयेन युक्त्यन्तरमाह ॥

ness that the 'conclusion from likeness' is dependent on a knowledge of likeness, without reference to any knowledge of 'constant attendedness.' Moreover, we do not say [—in the case of the recognition of the Bos Gavaeus—] "I infer" *(anuminomi)*, but "I conclude from its likeness [to a cow]" *(upaminomi)*:—and so it is impossible that the 'conclusion from likeness,' thus rigorously ascertained [to be a specifically separate species of evidence], should be redargued:—such is the import.*

f. Here ends the section on the examination as to whether the 'Argument of Likeness' be a [separate] kind of evidence.†

SECTION VIII.

Examination of Verbal Evidence in general.

e. With a view to testing [the pertinency of the definition of] verbal evidence, which presents itself next in order, he states a primâ facie view, as follows.‡

शब्दो ऽनुमानमर्थस्यानुपलब्धेरनुमेयत्वात् ॥ ४९ ॥

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* अनुमानादुपमानस्य नाविशेषः। तथेत्युपसंहारात्। यथा गौस्तथा गवय इति ज्ञानादुपमानसिद्धेरुपमानाधीनसिद्धेरुपमितेः। तथाच व्याप्तिज्ञानानपेक्षसादृश्यज्ञानाधीनोपमितिरित्यनुभवसिद्धं। किञ्च नानुमिनोमि किन्तूपमिनोमीत्यनुव्यवसायसिद्धोपमितिर्नापलपितुं शक्यत इत्याशयः।

† समाप्तमुपमानप्रामाण्यपरीक्षाप्रकरणम्॥

‡ क्रमप्राप्तं शब्दं परीक्षितुं पूर्वपक्षयति॥

A doubt whether testimony be other evidence than Inference.

Aph. 49.—Verbal evidence [—perhaps some one will say—] is a case of inference, because the thing, inasmuch as it is not perceived, must [—if known at all—] be *inferred.*

a. The complete sense is,—that verbal evidence consists in the 'recognition of a Sign,' so that its consequent 'knowledge derived from verbal evidence' *(śábda-bodha)* is an inference. And thus verbal evidence is, as a species of Sign, the instrumental cause of inferences,—because 'the thing' revealed by verbal evidence, as it is not 'perceived,—i. e., is not an object of perception,—must be one inferred. And so the import here is, that 'knowledge derived from verbal evidence' is an inference,—either because its object is unperceived, or because it is different from what is perceived.*

b. He mentions another reason,† [in support of the primâ facie view].

उपलब्धेरद्विप्रवृत्तित्वात् ॥ ५० ॥

Another reason.

Aph. 50.—[Knowledge derived from verbal evidence is not other than an inference,] because the apprehension [in the two cases] is not of two kinds.

a. 'The apprehension,'—whether regarded under the character of verbal evidence, or regarded as an inference. 'Because it

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* शब्दोऽनुमानमित्यस्य शाब्दबोधोऽनुमितिरिति पर्यवसितार्थस्तथाच शब्दो लिङ्गविधयानुमितिकरणं अर्थस्य शब्दप्रतिपाद्यस्य अनुपलब्धेरप्रत्यक्षत्वात् अनुमेयत्वादिति। तथाच शाब्दज्ञानमनुमितिरप्रत्यक्षविषयत्वात् प्रत्यक्षभिन्नत्वाद्वेत्यत्र तात्पर्यम् ॥

† हेत्वन्तरमाह ॥

is not of two kinds,'—or is not engaged in two ways. [Hence] to be an inference, and to be the result of verbal evidence, is not to be two [separate] kinds of things;—because, inasmuch as it is as a species of Sign, that a word conveys knowledge, it [—viz., knowledge resulting from verbal evidence—], being like knowledge resulting from any other Sign, is not generically different.*

b. He states another reason† [in support of the primâ facie view.]

सम्बन्धाच्च ॥ ५१ ॥

Another reason. *Aph.* 51.—And [knowledge derived from verbal evidence is not other than an inference] because of the connection [between the Sign and the thing signified, which is the same in the case of words and in that of other Signs].

a. 'Because of the connection,'—i. e., supplying the ellipsis,—because of the invariable concomitancy recognised. For a word conveys information inasmuch as it has reference to an apperception of invariable concomitancy [between word and meaning, just such as exists, in the case of inference, between Sign and thing signified]. Hence knowledge derived from verbal evidence is an inference:—such is the import.‡

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* उपलब्धेः शाब्दत्वेनाभिमताया अनुमितित्वेनाभिमतायाश्च अद्विप्रवृत्तित्वात् अद्विप्रकारत्वात् अनुमितत्वं शाब्दत्वञ्च न जातिद्वयं शब्दस्य लिङ्गविधया बोधकत्वाल्लिङ्गान्तरजज्ञानवद्विजातीयत्वाभावात् ॥

† हेत्वन्तरमाह ॥

‡ सम्बन्धान्नियतसम्बन्धात् ज्ञायमानादिति शेषः । शब्दो हि व्याप्तिग्रहसापेक्षो बोधयति । तेन शाब्दबोधोऽनुमितिरिति भावः ॥

b. The aphorism conveying the tenet [of the Nyáya, on this point, here follows].*

आप्तोपदेशसामर्थ्याच्छब्दार्थे सम्प्रत्ययः ॥ ५२ ॥

Reply to the objection.

Aph. 52.—There is reliance on the matter evidenced by words, through the virtue of the enunciation of one worthy [to be trusted.]

a. 'Of one worthy,'—i. e., of one devoid of error, &c.;—what 'enunciation,'—i. e., verbal evidence;—what 'virtue' there is in that,—viz., the fact of being qualified by 'grammatical coherency' *(ákánkshá)*, 'adaptation of means to ends' *(yogyatá)*, &c. [—see the *Tarka-sangraha*; §70]—from this† [it is, that we mean that certainty may be arrived at].

b. "By verbal evidence I *know* this,"—such is the phrase,—but not "I *infer*."‡

c. He declares further, that a word and its meaning are not connected§ [as in the *physically* established relation of Sign and thing signified].

पूरणप्रदाहपाटनानुपलब्धेश्च सम्बन्धाभावः ॥ ५३ ॥

The sense not necessarily associated with the sound.

Aph. 53.—And there is no [invariable] connection [between the sound and the thing meant], because we do not find filling, burning, and splitting, [to accompany the words food, fire, and hatchet].

* सिद्धान्तसूत्रम् ॥

† आप्तस्य भ्रमादिशून्यस्य य उपदेशः शब्दस्तत्र यत् सामर्थ्यं आकाङ्क्षायोग्यतादिमत्त्वं ततः ॥

‡ शब्दादमुमर्थं प्रत्येमि नत्वनुमिनोमीति ॥

§ शब्दार्थयोः सम्बन्धाभाव इत्यप्याह ॥

a. The thing is not connected with the word;—i. e., there is no constant attendedness [of the word by the thing]. He states the reason, saying, 'filling,' &c. If a word were constantly attended by what is meant by it, then by the words 'food,' 'fire,' and 'hatchet,' there should be a filling of the mouth,—a burning of the mouth, and a splitting of the mouth,—because, since [—on the hypothesis—] the word, viz., the thing constantly accompanied, is present, the thing also, viz., the food, &c., must be there also.*

b. How then,—does a word acquaint us even with a thing *not* connected with it? Were it so, then more things than enough would present themselves:—so he ponders this doubt.†

शब्दार्थव्यवस्थानादप्रतिषेधः ॥ ५४ ॥

Relation between sound and sense mooted.

Aph. 54.—Since there is a special allocation of words to meanings, [some one may suppose that] there is no negation [of their being mutually connected; just as, in physics, are the Sign and the thing signified].

a. 'There is no negation,'—i. e., it is not to be denied that there is a relation between sound and sense;—'since there is a special allocation of words to meanings;'—for only some one word denotes some one thing,—not every one everything. And since it is agreed that in this way there *is* a connection, constant

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* शब्देन सहार्थस्य सम्बन्धाभावः व्याप्त्यभावः। हेतुमाह। पूरणेति। यदि शब्दस्यार्थेन व्याप्तिः स्यात् तदान्नाग्निवासीशब्दे मुखपूरणमुखदाहमुखपाटनानि स्युः शब्दस्य व्याप्यस्य सत्त्वेनान्नादेरर्थस्यापि सत्त्वात् ॥

† तत् किं शब्दोऽसम्बद्धमेवार्थं प्रत्याययति। तथा सत्यतिप्रसङ्ग इत्याशङ्कते ॥

attendedness also is necessary through that connection;—and that connection does not [—nevertheless—] necessitate the filling of the mouth [when the word 'food' is uttered], &c:—such is the import* [of the doubt].

b. He replies.†

न सामयिकत्वाच्छब्दार्थसम्प्रत्ययस्य ॥ ५५ ॥

This point determined. *Aph.* 55.—Nay,—for it is through its being conventionally qualified that the meaning of a word is understood.

a. In my opinion also words and meanings are not without their allocation [each to each]; for they have a relation in the shape of *power*, since the word is conventionally qualified to call up the meaning which belongs to it,—i. e., it is dependent on our apprehension of the power [—else the word calls up nothing]. And this is not [a case of] constant attendedness, because *that* is dependent on the relation which [—not conventionally but physically—] determines the [actual] conditions [of things] Such is the import.‡

जातिविशेषेचानियमात् ॥ ५६ ॥

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* अप्रतिषेधः शब्दार्थयोः सम्बन्धप्रतिषेधो न शब्दार्थयोर्व्यवस्थितत्वात् कश्चिदेव हि शब्दः कञ्चिदेवार्थं बोधयति न सर्वः सर्वमिति । इत्थञ्च सम्बन्धे स्वीकृते तेन सम्बन्धेन व्याप्तिरप्यावश्यकी स च सम्बन्धो न मुखपूरणादिनियामक इति भावः ॥

† उत्तरयति ॥

‡ मन्मतेऽपि शब्दार्थयोरव्यवस्था न शब्दस्याधीनस्यार्थसम्प्रत्ययस्य सामयिकत्वात् शक्तिग्रहाधीनत्वात् शक्तिरूप-

No essential connection between sound and sense.

Aph. 56.—And [a word is not *naturally* connected with its sense], because it is not restricted to [the denotation of] any particular species.

a. There is no natural connection of any sound with any sense, 'because it is not restricted to any particular species,'—i. e., because we see that a word has not [—in the mouth of every one—] one [and the same] determinate sense.*

b. For, by the word *yava*, the Hindús understand a kind of long-awned [grain], but the barbarians panic-seed. But if there were a restriction [of each word to one and the same meaning], every one would understand every one [in the same sense as his neighbour]. But this is a matter of chance [—that two persons, of different countries, should use a word in the same sense]; because, even in the case of there being several powers [assigned to a word in a given language] in whichever of the senses each one understands it, that is the meaning of it which presents itself to him.†

c. Here ends the section on the examination of [the pertinency of the definition of] verbal evidence in general.‡

सम्बन्धेन । नच व्याप्तिस्तथा वृत्तिनियामकसम्बन्धाधीनत्वादिति भावः ॥

* शब्दस्यार्थेन सह न स्वाभाविकः सम्बन्धः जातिविशेषेऽनियमात् । शब्दस्यानियतार्थकत्वदर्शनात् ॥

† आर्या हि यवशब्दाद्दीर्घशूकविशेषं प्रतियन्ति म्लेच्छाश्च कङ्गुमिति । नियमे तु सर्वः सर्वं प्रतीयात् । आपाततश्चेदं नानाशक्तावपि यत्र यस्य शक्तिग्रहस्तस्य तदर्थोपस्थितेः ॥

‡ समाप्तं शब्दसामान्यपरीक्षाप्रकरणम् ॥

SECTION IX.

EXAMINATION OF THE VARIETIES OF VERBAL EVIDENCE.

d. It was stated [—B. I. §8—] that verbal evidence is of two sorts, accordingly as it has reference to the seen or to the unseen; and, of these, with a view to try [the pertinency of the definition of] that verbal evidence, viz., the *Veda*, which has reference to the unseen, he states the primâ facie view.*

तदप्रामाण्यमनृतव्याघातपुनरुक्तदोषेभ्यः ॥ ५७ ॥

Authority of the Veda questioned.

Aph. 57.—That [—viz., the *Veda*—] is no instrument of right knowledge, because of its faults of untruth, self-destructiveness, and tautology.

a. That verbal evidence, which is other than what has reference to the seen, viz., the *Veda*, is no instrument of right knowledge. Why? Because it has the faults of untruth, &c.†

b. And among these [faults of the *Veda*], there is untruth; because when the sacrifice for the sake of a son, or the like, has been made, we sometimes see that the fruit is not produced.‡

c. 'Self-destructiveness' is a contradiction between a prior and a subsequent [enunciation]. For example,—"Let him sacrifice

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* शब्दस्य दृष्टादृष्टार्थकत्वेन द्वैविध्यमुक्तं तत्रादृष्टार्थकशब्दस्य वेदस्य प्रामाण्यं परीक्षितुं पूर्वपक्षयति ॥

† तस्य दृष्टार्थकव्यतिरिक्तशब्दस्य वेदस्य अप्रामाण्यं। कुतः। अनृतत्वादिदोषात् ॥

‡ तत्र च पुत्रेष्टिकार्यादौ क्वचित् फलानुत्पत्तिदर्शनादनृतत्वम् ॥

when it is risen;" [and again] "Let him sacrifice when it has not risen."*

d. The aphorism conveying the tenet.†

न कर्मकर्तृसाधनवैगुण्यात् ॥ ५८ ॥

How the promises of the Veda fail to be fulfilled.

Aph. 58.—Nay,— [the default of the fruit is not in consequence of the untruthfulness of the *Veda*, but it comes] from some disqualification in the performance, in the operator, or in the instruments.

a. It is not the case that the *Veda* is no instrument of right knowledge, because the absence of the fruit arises 'from some disqualification in the performance, in the operator, or in the instruments.' Disqualification 'in the performance,' i. e., in the [sacrificial] act, consists in its not being according to rule, &c. Disqualification 'in the operator,' consists in his not being a learned man, &c. Disqualification 'in the instruments,' i. e., in the butter, &c., consists in their not being [duly] sprinkled, &c. For if the fruit were awanting when the thing was done as directed, then [indeed] there would be a case of untruthfulness; —but it is not so:—such is the import.‡

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* व्याघातः पूर्वापरविरोधः। यथा। उदिते जुहोति। अनुदिते जुहोति॥

† सिद्धान्तसूत्रम्॥

‡ न वेदाप्रामाण्यं कर्मकर्तृसाधनवैगुण्यात् फलाभावोपपत्तेः। कर्मणः क्रियाया वैगुण्यमयथाविधित्वादि। कर्तुर्वैगुण्यमविद्वत्त्वादि। साधनस्य हविरादेर्वैगुण्यमप्रोक्षितत्वादि। यथोक्तकर्मणः फलाभावे ह्यनृतत्वं नचैवमस्तीति भावः॥

b. He repels [the charge] of Self-destructiveness.*

अभ्युपेत्य कालभेदे दोषवचनात् ॥ ५९ ॥

Consistency of the Veda asserted.

Aph. 59.—[There is no inconsistency,] though you might allege the charge in respect of a different time from that which was intended.

a. Supply—"there is no self-destructiveness."†

b. There is no self-destructiveness [implied in the two apparently contradictory injunctions], though you might allege the charge aforesaid if, at the time of taking the fire, having intended, i. e., having agreed upon, the sacrifice after sunrise, for example, one were to perform the sacrifice before sunrise, or the like:—such is the meaning.‡

c. He repels [the charge of] tautology.§

अनुवादोपपत्तेश्च ॥ ६० ॥

The Veda denied to be tautological.

Aph. 60.—And [—the *Veda* is not chargeable with tautology, though things are reiterated in it—] since re-inculcation is suitable.

a. The "and" here has the sense of "again." 'Since re-inculcation is suitable,' again, there is no tautology. For it is when there is no motive [for the reiteration] that reiteration is a fault.||

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* व्याघातं परिहरति ॥

† न व्याघात इति शेषः ॥

‡ अग्न्याधानकाले उदितहोमादिकमभ्युपेत्य स्वीकृत्यानुदितहोमादिकरणे पूर्वोक्तदोषकथनाच्च व्याघात इत्यर्थः ॥

§ पौनरुक्त्यं परिहरति ॥

|| चः पुनरर्थे । अनुवादोपपत्तेः पुनर्न पौनरुक्त्यं । निष्प्रयोजनत्वे हि पौनरुक्त्यं दोषः ॥

b. He declares that the utility of re-inculcation is a settled point in the world.*

वाक्यविभागस्य चार्थग्रहणात् ॥ ६१ ॥

Re-inculcation not needless. *Aph.* 61.—And because the utility is admitted of this division of discourse.

a. 'Because the utility is admitted,' i. e., because it is agreed, —supply "by the learned,"—that there is a motive,—'of this division of discourse,' i. e., of discourse divided [from the other species of discourse] by the character of re-inculcation. For the learned, having divided discourse according to the distinctions of enactive, re-inculcative, &c., hold that the re-inculcative also has its reasons. So is it in the case of the *Veda*:—such is the import.†

b. He shows the division of discourse in the case of the *Veda*.‡

विध्यर्थवादानुवादवचनविनियोगात् ॥ ६२ ॥

Discourse divided. *Aph.* 62.—Because speech is distributed into injunction, persuasion, and re-inculcation.

a. Through the distinction of hymn *(mantra)* and ritual *(bráhmaṇa)* the *veda* is of two sorts. Of these, this division [—viz.,

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* अनुवादस्य सार्थकत्वं लोकसिद्धमित्याह ॥

† वाक्यविभागस्य अनुवादत्वेन विभक्तवाक्यस्यार्थग्रहणात् प्रयोजनस्वीकारात्। शिष्टैरिति शेषः। शिष्टा हि विधायकानुवादकादिभेदेन वाक्यं विभज्यानुवादकस्यापि सप्रयोजनत्वं मन्यन्ते। वेदेऽप्येवमिति भावः॥

‡ वेदे वाक्यविभागं दर्शयति ॥

that stated in the aphorism—] belongs to the ritual portion. Because the *Veda* is 'distributed,' i. e., divided, accordingly as the speech is an injunction, or as the speech is one of persuasion, or as the speech is one of re-inculcation. Or,—'because it is distributed,'—i. e., because of the distinction;—and so, through the distinction of injunction, &c.,—supply "the ritual-portion is tripartitely divided."*

b. Among these he states the characteristic of an injunction *(vidhi)*.†

विधिर्विधायकः ॥ ६३ ॥

An injunction what. *Aph.* 63.—An injunction is that which enjoins.

a. An injunction is a speech in which there is articulated an affix indicative that something is the means of good:—e. g., "Let him that desires Paradise perform the fire-sacrifice."‡

b. 'Persuasion' *(arthaváda)* is the setting forth of the end, i. e., of the motive;—that is to say, it is a speech intended to commend the object of an injunction. For a persuasive speech, by means of laudation, &c., commends the object of an injunction

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* मन्त्रब्राह्मणभेदाद्द्विधा वेदस्तत्र ब्राह्मणस्यायं विभागः। विधिवचनत्वेनार्थवादवचनत्वेनानुवादवचनत्वेनच वेदस्य विनियोगात् विभजनात्। अथवा विनियोगात् भेदात्। तथाच विध्यादिभेदाद्ब्राह्मणभागस्त्रिधेति शेषः॥

† तत्र विधिलक्षणमाह॥

‡ इष्टसाधनताबोधकप्रत्ययसमभिव्याहृतवाक्यं विधिः। अग्निहोत्रं जुहुयात् स्वर्गकाम इत्यादि॥

with a view to our quickly engaging* [in the performance of the ceremony enjoined].

c. With reference to this, he divides Persuasion according to the distinction of Laudation, &c.†

स्तुतिर्निन्दा परकृतिः पुराकल्प इत्यर्थवादः॥ ६४ ॥

Topics of persuasion.

Aph. 64.—Laudation, Blame, Warning, and Prescription,—such are [the topics of] Persuasion.

a. Laudation *(stuti)* is speech directly calculated to commend the purpose of an injunction.‡

b. Blame *(nindá)* is that which urges the motive of the injunction by means of acquainting us with the undesirable§ [consequences of neglecting it].

c. Warning *(para-kṛiti)* is the mentioning of something mutually opposed to what belonged to some particular person,|| [—and which "act of that other," as having led to bad consequences, ought to serve as a warning].

d. Prescription *(purákalpa)* implies the mention of something

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* अर्थवादः अर्थस्य प्रयोजनस्य वदनं। विध्यर्थप्रशंसापरं वचनमित्यर्थः। अर्थवादो हि स्तुत्यादिद्वारा विध्यर्थं शीघ्रं प्रवृत्तये प्रशंसति।

† तत्र स्तुत्यादिभेदादर्थवादं विभजते॥

‡ स्तुतिः साक्षाद्विध्यर्थस्य प्रशंसार्थकं वाक्यं॥

§ अनिष्टबोधनद्वारा विध्यर्थप्रवर्त्तकं निन्दा॥

|| पुरुषविशेषनिष्ठमिथोविरुद्धकथनं परकृतिः॥

as having been handed down by tradition,* [and commended by this "conjecture of its antiquity"].

e. He states the characteristic of re-inculcation† *(anuváda).*

विधिविहितस्यानुवचनमनुवादः ॥ ६५ ॥

Re-inculcation what. *Aph.* 65.—Re-inculcation is the mentioning subsequently of what has been enjoined by an injunction.

a. The mentioning 'subsequently,' i. e. afterwards, of what has already presented itself, with a motive [for the reiteration], is Re-inculcation:—such is the generic character. Its peculiarity is [its being the reiteration] 'of what has been enjoined by an injunction;'—that is to say, there is the re-inculcation of the injunction, and the re-inculcation of what was enjoined.‡

b. And this division of Persuasion and of Re-inculcation belongs to passages which are enounced as *injunctions*;—therefore, though it does not include theological passages, which are in the shape of *statements of fact*, there is no defect.§

c. He ponders a doubt.||

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* ऐतिह्यसमाचरिततया कीर्त्तनं पुराकल्पः ॥

† अनुवादलक्षणमाह ॥

‡ प्राप्तस्य अनु पश्चात् कथनं सप्रयोजनमनुवाद इति सामान्यलक्षणम्। तद्विशेषो विधिविहितस्येति विध्यनुवादो विहितानुवादश्चेत्यर्थः ॥

§ अयञ्चार्थवादानुवादविभागो विधिसमभिव्याहृतवाक्यानां तेन भूतार्थवादरूपाणां वेदान्तवाक्यानामपरिग्रहाच्च न्यूनता ॥

|| शङ्कते ॥

नानुवादपुनरुक्तयोर्विशेषः शब्दाभ्यासोपपत्तेः ॥ ६६ ॥

Whether Re-inculcation differ from Tautology.

Aph. 66.—[Perhaps some one will say,] there is no difference between Re-inculcation and Tautology, because what presents itself [in either case] is a repetition of some expression.

a. That is to say, Re-inculcation is not different from Tautology; because 'what presents itself,' i. e. what there really is [in the one case as in the other] is a 'repetition of some expression,' i. e., a repetition, or employment over again, of an expression, the sense of which has been already communicated.*

b. He clears up this doubt.†

शीघ्रतरगमनोपदेशवदभ्यासाद् विशेषः ॥ ६७ ॥

Re-inculcation not tautological.

Aph. 67.—Since there is a re-employment, like the instruction to go faster, it [—viz., re-inculcation—] does differ [from mere reiteration].

a. It is not the case that Re-inculcation does not differ from reiteration; 'since there is a re-employment,' i. e., since there is a motive for the re-employment. He states an illustration of this,—saying 'faster,' &c. As in the world, after having said "go on," one says over again "go on, go on," &c., for the purpose of signifying that there should be no delay in the action, or the like,—so is it in the case in question.‡

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* शब्दाभ्यासस्य बोधितार्थकशब्दस्य यो ऽभ्यासः पुनः प्रयोगस्तस्योपपत्तेः सत्त्वात् अनुवादः पुनरुक्तान्न भिद्यत इत्यर्थः ॥

† समाधत्ते ॥

‡ अनुवादस्य पुनरुक्तान्नाविशेषः। अभ्यासात्। अभ्यासस्य सप्रयोजनत्वात्। तत्र दृष्टान्तमाह शीघ्रेति। यथा लोके

b. Having thus repelled what would go to prove that it [—viz, the *Veda*—] is no instrument of right knowledge, he demonstrates that it *is* an instrument of right knowledge.*

मन्त्रायुर्वेदवच्च तत्प्रामाण्यमाप्तप्रामाण्यात् । ६८ ।

Argument for the authority of the Veda.

Aph. 68.—And the fact of its being a cause of right knowledge, like the hymns and the medical science, follows from the fact that the fit one [who gave the *Veda*] was a source of right knowledge.

a. Since a fit person, a maker of *Veda* [—i. e., of knowledge —], is a cause of right knowledge,—i. e., is a teacher of what is true, it may be gathered from the sense of the terms that the *Veda* was delivered by such a one. By means of this reason it is to be inferred that the *Veda* is a cause of right knowledge. He states an example in respect of this—'like the hymns and the medical science.' A hymn [or spell] counteracts poison, &c., and a portion of the medical science exists in the *Veda*. Since these, by universal consent, are held to be causes of right knowledge, by means of this example, in so far forth as anything is *Veda*, its being a cause of right knowledge is to be inferred.†

गम्यतामित्युक्त्वा पुनर्गम्यतां गम्यतामित्यादि कर्माविलम्बादिबोधार्थमुच्यते तथा प्रकृतेऽपीति ।

* एवमप्रामाण्यसाधकं निरस्य प्रामाण्यं साधयति ।

† आप्तस्य वेदकर्त्तुः प्रामाण्यात् यथार्थोपदेशकत्वात् वेदस्य तदुक्तत्वमर्थाल्लब्धं । तेन हेतुना वेदस्य प्रामाण्यमनुमेयं । तत्र दृष्टान्तमाह मन्त्रायुर्वेदवदिति । मन्त्रो विषादिनाशकः आयुर्वेदभागश्च वेदस्थ एव । तत्र संवादेन प्रामाण्यग्रहात् तद्दृष्टान्तेन वेदत्वावच्छेदेन प्रामाण्यमनुमेयम् ।

b. Some [explain it otherwise, and these] say :—that is [—in accordance with the etymology called] *Veda* where the fact of being a cause of right knowledge is found, or admitted ;—and by its having such character of *Veda*, the fact of its being a cause of right knowledge is to be inferred.*

c. Here ends the section on the examination of the varieties of verbal evidence.†

d. So much for the first daily portion, entitled "The Examination of Proof and its Subservients, without reference to the examination of its division," in the commentary, on the Aphorisms of the Nyáya, composed by the venerable Viśwanátha Bhaṭṭácharya.‡

THE SECOND DIURNAL PORTION.

e. Now the examination of Proof with reference to its division ; and this it is that is the matter of this Diurnal Portion. And in this there are four sections. Among these there is, in the first place, the section of the enquiry whether they be four ; and the others will be mentioned in their several places. On this point [—of the kinds of evidence being four—] we have an aphorism of objection.§

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* आप्तं गृहीतं प्रामाण्यं यत्र स वेदस्तादृशेन वेदत्वेन प्रामाण्यमनुमेयमिति केचित् ।

† समाप्तं शब्दविशेषपरीक्षाप्रकरणम् ।

‡ इति श्रीविश्वनाथभट्टाचार्यकृतायां न्यायसूत्रवृत्तौ विभागपरीक्षानिरपेक्षसाङ्गप्रमाणपरीक्षणं नाम द्वितीयस्याद्यमाह्निकम् ।

§ अथ विभागसापेक्षप्रमाणपरीक्षणं तदेवाह्निकार्थः ।

SECTION X.

On the question whether the kinds of evidence are four in number.

न चतुष्ट्वमैतिह्यार्थापत्तिसम्भवाभावप्रामाण्यात्॥ ६९॥

Whether the kinds of evidence be four.

Aph. 69.—[The Mímánsaka will say—] they are not four [only], because Rumour, Conjecture, Probability, and Non-existence, are [also] causes of right knowledge.

a. The kinds of evidence 'are not four,'—i. e., the fact of being a cause of right knowledge is not invariably attended by the fact of being one or other of the set of four aforesaid [—see B. I. §3—]; because it belongs to others than those stated.*

b. In regard to this, he explains how it belongs to others, saying 'Rumour' &c. A rumour *(aitihya)* is what is expressed in this way—"thus indeed people say," &c. For it is an assertion which has come from one to another, without any first assertor being indicated:—for example, "In every Bengal fig-tree there is a goblin," and the like. And this is not included under verbal evidence, because there is no certainty of its having been declared [in the first instance,] by one worthy [of credit]:—such is the import.†

चत्वारि चात्र प्रकरणानि। तत्रादौ चतुष्ट्वपरीक्षाप्रकरणं। अन्यानि च तत्र तत्र वक्ष्यन्ते। तत्राक्षेपसूत्रम्॥

* प्रमाणानां न चतुष्ट्वं। प्रमाणत्वं नोक्तचतुष्कान्यतमत्वव्याप्यं। उक्तान्यवृत्तित्वात्॥

† तत्रान्यवृत्तित्वं व्युत्पादयति ऐतिह्येत्यादि। ऐतिह्यं इति होचुरित्यनेन प्रकारेण यदुच्यते। तद्धि अनिर्दिष्टप्रव-

c. Conjecture *(arthápatti)* is, from a thing unaccounted for, the imagining the producer of it; for example, from rain, the knowledge of [there having been] clouds. Since the cloud is not in the same place with the rain, this is not an instance of constant attendedness; and therefore the case does not fall under the head of Inference.*

d. Probability *(sambhava)* is knowledge dependent on frequent concomitancy. For example:—"it is probable that there is learning in a Bráhmaṇ,"—"it is probable that among a thousand there are a hundred." And here there is no reference to constant attendedness [—which would bring the case under the head of Inference—];—such is the import.†

e. But [the proof from] Non-existence is, in dependence on the knowledge of the absence of one opposite, [out of two], the conjecturing of the other opposite:—for example, on our knowing that the ichneumon is absent, the conjecturing of the ichneumon's adversary, the snake. Here also there is no reference to constant attendedness:—such is the import.‡

क्तृकं परम्परागतं वाक्यं यथा वटे वटे यक्ष इत्यादि। तस्य चाप्तोक्तत्वानिश्चयान्न शब्दे ऽन्तर्भाव इति भावः॥

* अर्थापत्तिरनुपपद्यमानेनार्थेनोपपादककल्पनं यथा वृष्ट्या मेघज्ञानं। वृष्ट्या सह मेघस्य वैयधिकरण्यान्न व्याप्तिरिति नानुमाने ऽन्तर्भावः।

† सम्भवो भूयस्सहचाराधीनज्ञानं। यथा। सम्भवति ब्राह्मणे विद्या। सम्भवति सहस्रे शतं। अत्र च व्याप्तिर्नापेक्षितेत्याशयः॥

‡ अभावस्तु विरोध्यभावज्ञानाधीनविरोध्यन्तरकल्पनं।

f. Or the import may be, that [the proof from] Non-existence is, from the knowledge of the *absence* of the cause &c., the [consequent] knowledge of the absence of the effect &c.; for it is only constant attendedness belonging to something *positive* that is subservient to *Inference.**

g. The aphorism conveying the tenet.†

शब्द ऐतिह्यानर्थान्तरभावादनुमानेऽर्थापत्तिसम्भवा-
भावानामनर्थान्तरभावाच्चाप्रतिषेधः ॥ ७० ॥

The kinds of evidence not more than four.

Aph. 70.—Since Rumour is nothing else than verbal evidence, and since Conjecture, Probability, and [the argument from] Non-existence, are nothing else than Inference, there is no opposing [our division into four].

a. There is no opposing the quaternion of Proofs, since Rumour is nothing else than verbal evidence, i. e., is included under it. Although generally there may be the knowledge whether the assertion were that of one worthy, yet in reality the knowledge of the assertion's being that of one worthy is not a cause in respect of what [knowledge in general] is derived from verbal evidence, but [the cause is] the knowledge of the interdependence &c. [of the words,—see *Tarka-Sangraha*, §70]; and *right* knowledge derived from verbal evidence is dependent on

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यथा। नकुलाभावज्ञाने नकुलविरोधिनो व्यालस्य कल्पनं। अत्रापि व्याप्तिर्नापेक्षितेत्याशयः ॥

* अथवा कारणाभावादिना कार्याभावादिज्ञानं अभावः भावनिष्ठव्याप्तिरेवानुमानाङ्गमित्याशयः ॥

† सिद्धान्तसूत्रम् ॥

right knowledge of the 'fitness'* [of the things spoken of, to produce the fact asserted:—see, further, *Tarka-Sangraha*, §73].

b. Conjecture &c. are included under Inference; because, without an idea of constant attendedness, the supposition of a producer is impossible. Moreover, in the [fact of a portion of water's] being rain, for instance, there really is constant attendedness, by the fact of being produced from a cloud.†

c. Probability also, as it has its root in constant attendedness, is Inference; and if it have *no* reference to constant attendedness, then it has not the character of evidence, because it may stray away‡ [where the thing which it vouches for is not present].

d. In like manner, Non-existence [—as furnishing evidence—], having respect to constant attendedness, is Inference. And, since constant attendedness *does* belong to a negative [—as well as to things positive,—notwithstanding what is alleged under §69, *f*—], there is no inconsistency in its being one member [in the subdivision] of Inference:—such is the import.§

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* न प्रमाणचतुष्टयस्य प्रतिषेधः शाब्दे ऐतिह्यस्यानर्थान्तरभावादन्तर्भावात् सामान्यत आप्तोक्तत्वज्ञानसम्भवाद्वस्तुत आप्तोक्तत्वज्ञानं न शाब्दे कारणं किन्त्वाकांक्षादिज्ञानं योग्यताप्रमाधीनाच शाब्दप्रमेति ॥

† अर्थापत्त्यादेरनुमानेऽन्तर्भावः । उपपादककल्पनं हि विना व्याप्तिज्ञानं न सम्भवति । वृष्टित्वादावपि मेघजन्यत्वव्याप्तिरस्त्येव ॥

‡ सम्भवोऽपि व्याप्तिमूलकत्वादनुमानं । व्याप्त्यनपेक्षित्वे च व्यभिचारादप्रामाण्यम् ॥

§ एवमभावो व्याप्तिसापेक्षो ऽनुमानं । अभावनिष्ठव्याप्तेश्चानुमानाङ्गत्वे न विरोध इति भावः ॥

e. An indifferent person [—neither a follower of the Nyáya nor of the Mímánsá—] propounds the following doubt,—that there might be a question whether it [viz., Conjecture,] were not included, or were included [under Inference], if Conjecture *were* any cause of right knowledge,—but that it really is not so.*

अर्थापत्तिरप्रमाणमनैकान्तिकत्वात् ॥ ७१ ॥

A doubt whether Conjecture be any cause of right knowledge.

Aph. 71.—Conjecture [—says some one—] is no cause of right knowledge, because of its indeterminateness.

a. A case of Conjecture *(arthápatti)* is this, that, since there is no rain when there is no cloud, where there *is* a cloud there is rain :—and here [—says the objector—] there is not the character of producing right knowledge, because of indeterminateness; because, even when there *is* a cloud, there is [frequently] no rain.†

b. He clears up this doubt.‡

अनर्थापत्तावर्थापत्त्यभिमानात् ॥ ७२ ॥

Conjecture defended.

Aph. 72.—[Indeterminateness does not necessarily belong to Conjecture,] because [when you allege this fault,] you suppose that to be a [legitimate] Conjecture which is no [legitimate] Conjecture.

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* सत्यर्थापत्तेः प्रामाण्ये बहिर्भावान्तर्भावचिन्ता तदेव तु नास्तीति तटस्थः शङ्कते ॥

† असति मेघे वृष्टिर्न भवतीत्यनेन सति मेघे वृष्टिर्भवतीत्यर्थापत्तिविषयस्तत्र च न प्रामाण्यं सत्यपि मेघे वृष्ट्यभावादनैकान्तिकत्वात् ॥

‡ समाधत्ते ॥

a. Indeterminateness does not [necessarily] belong to Conjecture :—so much is awanting* [to complete the aphorism].

b. And, in regard to the example [§71, *a*] "Where there is a cloud there is rain, because there is no rain where there are no clouds,"—we agree that the knowledge of [the existence of] a cloud [may be gained] by rain;—but where the notion of [the existence of] rain [is deduced] from [the existence of] a cloud, there we have the mistake of [supposing that there is what we here render] a Conjecture when it is no [legitimate] Conjecture.†

c. And this is not inconsistent with its [viz., Conjecture's] character of being a cause of right notion, because [if this were enough to debar anything's being a cause of right notion, then] we should find that even *Inference* is no cause of right notion.—for we see that there are also *erroneous* inferences through error in regard to the constant attendedness [—leading to the formal error of Non-distribution of the Middle Term—], &c.‡

d. Some write, at the commencement of this aphorism, the expression "Indeterminateness does not belong to Conjecture," [which is, in truth,] the introduction [of the aphorism] in the *Bháshya.*§

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* अर्थापत्तेर्नानैकान्तिकत्वमिति शेषः ॥

† असत्सु मेघेषु न वृष्टिरित्यनेन सति मेघे वृष्टिरिति तत्र च वृष्ट्या मेघज्ञानमभिमतं। यत्र च मेघेन वृष्टिज्ञानं तत्रानर्था-पत्तावर्थापत्तिभ्रमः ॥

‡ न च प्रामाण्यविरोधः व्याप्त्यादिभ्रमाद्भ्रमानुमितिदर्श-नादनुमानस्याप्यप्रामाण्यापत्तेः ॥

§ नानैकान्तिकत्वमर्थापत्तेरिति भाष्यस्यावतारिकां सूत्रादौ केचिल्लिखन्ति ॥

e. He states also a bar* [to the objection].

प्रतिषेधाप्रामाण्यञ्चानैकान्तिकत्वात् ॥ ७३ ॥

The objector's argument retorted.

Aph. 73.—And [if the argument alleged at §71 were valid,] the *objection* would be invalid, through its indeterminateness.

a. According to your showing, your objection also would be invalid, through indeterminateness;—because nowhere can we manage to set aside the charge of indeterminateness, since there is [on *your* showing, in respect of every argument that could be made use of, for that or any other purpose, the fault of] indeterminateness.†

b. Now, if you [—the objector,—in reply to this retort,—] say, the fact of indeterminateness is not *everywhere* a fault, but in respect of itself [it is a valid mode of argumentation], then [by parity of reasoning] Conjecture also is not invalid:—so he says as follows:—‡

तत्प्रामाण्ये वा नार्थापत्त्यप्रामाण्यम् ॥ ७४ ॥

Another retort.

Aph 74.—Or, if that be valid, then Conjecture is not invalid.

a. If you hold that your own argument is valid, because what is indeterminate is sufficient in respect of itself [—i. e., is a

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* प्रतिबन्धिनमप्याह ॥

† त्वदुक्तरीत्या त्वदीयप्रतिषेधस्याप्यप्रामाण्यं स्यादनैकान्तिकत्वात्। यत्र क्वचिदनैकान्तिकत्वस्य प्रतिषेधासाधकत्वादनैकान्तिकत्वात् ॥

‡ अथ यत्र क्वचिदनैकान्तिकत्वं न दोषाय किन्तु स्वविषये इति यदि तदार्थापत्तेरपि नाप्रामाण्यमित्याह ॥

sufficiently good form of argument where that particular form of argument is under trial—], then Conjecture also is valid in respect of itself,* [—and an argument from Conjecture may as fairly be employed to establish the validity of arguing from Conjecture, as an argument that proves indeterminately can be employed to invalidate forms of argument alleged to prove indeterminately].

b. An indifferent person propounds the doubt that Non-existence is not included among the causes of right notion.†

नाभावप्रामाण्यं प्रमेयासिद्धेः ॥ ७५ ॥

A doubt whether Non-existence be any cause of right knowledge.

Aph. 75.—Non-existence [says some one,] is no cause of right notion, since no object of such knowledge exists.

a. There might then be a cause of right knowledge called Non-existence, if there really existed, in respect thereof, any object of right knowledge; but there is really none such:—that is to say, since Nonentity is mere emptiness, we cannot deal with it as if there were here a cause of right knowledge.‡

b. The aphorism conveying the tenet.§

लक्षितेष्वलक्षणलक्षितत्वादलक्षितानां तत्प्रमेयसिद्धिः ॥ ७६ ॥

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* अनैकान्तिकत्वस्य स्वविषये साधकत्वाद्यदि स्वहेतोः प्रामाण्यं मन्यसे तदार्थापत्तेरपि स्वविषये प्रामाण्यमिति ॥

† अभावस्य न प्रमाणेऽन्तर्भाव इति तटस्थः शङ्कते ॥

‡ अभावनामकं प्रमाणं तदा स्याद्यदि तस्य प्रमेयं सिद्ध्येत् तदेव तु नास्ति। अभावस्य तुच्छत्वान्न तत्र प्रमाणप्रवृत्तिरिति भावः ॥

§ सिद्धान्तसूत्रम् ॥

How Non-existence serves to mark out.

Aph. 76.—By their not being marked by the mark [that is found] in things [thereby] marked, it [viz., Non-existence,] has, as its objects of right knowledge, the things *not* [thereby] marked.

a. Although Non-existence cannot be marked by a Quality, an Action, &c., still it is marked by the *absence* of a mark;—for, when we say "Bring the one which is *not* blue," the absence of blueness, by excluding others [which *are* blue], is a mark:—therefore Non-existence is not invalid evidence:—such is the import.*

b. Hinting an objection, he clears it up.†

असत्यर्थे नाभाव इति चेन्नान्यलक्षणोपपत्तेः॥ ७७॥

An objection to Non-existence disposed of.

Aph. 77.—If you say that where the thing exists not, its Non-existence is not,—it is not so; because the mark is possible elsewhere.

a. You cannot [—says an objector—] talk of a Non-existence *(abhâva)* where there is no counter-entity *(pratiyogi)*; and where there *is* the counter-entity, how can there be its Non-existence? If any one says this, it is not so,—because 'it is possible,' i. e., the Non-existence is possible through there being *elsewhere* the 'mark,' that is to say, the actual existence of the counter-entity. For it is not looked for that the counter-entity should actually be in that very place‡ [where its Non-existence is].

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* यद्यप्यभावस्य गुणकर्मादिभिर्लक्षणं न सम्भवति तथाप्यलक्षणेनैव तल्लक्षितं भवति। अनीलमानयेत्युक्ते नीलाभावो हि इतरव्यावर्त्तकतया लक्षणं। अतोऽभावो नाप्रामाणिक इति भावः॥

† आक्षिप्य समाधत्ते॥

‡ असति प्रतियोगिन्यभावो वक्तुं न शक्यते सति च प्रति-

b. He ponders a doubt.*

तल्लिङ्गेरलक्षितेष्वहेतुः ॥ ७८ ॥

Whether the absence of a mark can mark.

Aph. 78.—Though it effect that, [where it, viz., some mark, is *present*,] yet [some one may object,] in what things are *not* marked, it [viz., the Non-existence of the mark,] is no cause [of precision].

a. Though some mark, in things that *are* marked, 'effect that,'—i. e., effect discrimination, yet, in what things are *not* marked, 'it is no cause,' i. e., non-existence [of the mark] is no cause, is excluded as a cause ;—that is to say, what has no essence, for there is the *absence* of the mark, cannot define.†

b. He clears up this.‡

न लक्षणावस्थितापेक्षासिद्धेः ॥ ७९ ॥

This doubt disposed of.

Aph. 79.—Nay,—[a Non-existence is not ineffectual as a mark,] because it does exist in relation to the presence of the [positive] mark [of which it is the absence].

a. The primâ facie view [taken in §78,] is not right, because such a thing [as the Non-existence that we speak of,] does exist

योगिनि कथं तदभाव इति चेन्न। अन्यत्र लक्षणेन सत्त्वेना-थ्यात् प्रतियोगिनः। उपपत्तेरभावोपपत्तेः। न हि तत्रैव प्रतियोगिनः सत्त्वमपेक्षितम् ॥

* शङ्कते ॥

† लक्षितेषु लक्षणस्य तत्सिद्धेः व्यावर्त्तकत्वसिद्धेरलक्षि-तेषु अहेतुः अहेतुत्वं व्यावृत्तहेतुत्वं अभावस्य लक्षणाभावा-त्रिःस्वरूपस्य न व्यावर्त्त्यत्वमिति भावः ॥

‡ समाधत्ते ॥

in relation to the presence, i. e., the existence, of the character which is its counter-entity. The meaning is this. Since it is only through the knowledge of the nature of some counter-entity that it is possible to describe the nature of any Non-existence, we are not to expect any mark of the Non-existence [itself]:—such is the import.*

प्रागुत्पत्तेरभावोपपत्तेश्च ॥ ८० ॥

Non-existence when discernible.

Aph. 80.—And [there really is what may be rightly known thereby,—i. e., by means of a Non-existence as a mark,] because we find the Non-existence antecedently to the production [of its counter-entity].

a. 'There really is what may be rightly known,'—so much is supplied, by a frog-leap† [—not from the aphorism immediately preceding, but from §76].

b. Because every one has a preception the object of which is such an antecedent Non-existence as [is implied in the expression] "There *will* be a jar" [which as yet is Non-existent in the halves which are destined to compose it]; because 'we find,' i. e., we perceive, the Non-existence 'antecedently to the production'—viz.,—of the counter-entity:—such is the import.‡

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* पूर्वपक्षो न युक्तः प्रतियोगिनो लक्षणस्य यदवस्थितमवस्थानं तस्यापेक्षया तादृशसिद्धेः। अयमर्थः। प्रतियोगिस्वरूपज्ञानादेवाभावस्वरूपनिरूपणसम्भवान्नाभावलक्षणापेक्षेति भावः॥

† प्रमेयसिद्धिरिति मण्डूकप्लुत्यानुवर्त्तते॥

‡ प्रतियोगिन उत्पत्तेः प्राक् अभावस्य उपपत्तेः उपलम्भात् घटो भविष्यतीत्यादिप्रागभावविषयकप्रत्ययस्य सार्वलौकिकत्वादिति भावः॥

c. By the 'and,' it is included that also Emergent Non-existence and the others are established by perception,* [—the fact that the jar, on being broken, has ceased to exist, being a matter of ocular cognizance].

d. [Since *gestures* also may communicate right knowledge, it may be remarked that,] if Gesture had no modus operandi [—as a Sign, e. g., produces knowledge through the special operation of syllogizing—*parámarśa*—], then it would be no species of evidence :—but, in reality, since, like alphabetical characters, &c., it is a conventional thing, it also is included under Inference or under Verbal Evidence.†

e. Here ends the section on the question whether there be a quaternion of kinds of evidence.‡

SECTION XI.

Respecting the non-eternity of sound.

f. There being the doubt, that the authority of the Veda is established by the authority of one worthy [of credit], and that this is inconsistent, since the Veda is eternal,—he [therefore,] commences the subject of the *non-eternity* of Sound, on the ground that, since *letters* are not eternal, how can the Veda, which is in the shape of an aggregate of these, be eternal? In regard to this, the aphorism conveying the tenet§ [here follows].

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* चकारेण ध्वंसादेरपि प्रत्यक्षसिद्धत्वं समुच्चीयते॥

† चेष्टाया निर्व्यापारत्वेन न प्रामाण्यं वस्तुतो लिप्यादिवत् साङ्केतिकत्वात् तस्या अप्यनुमाने शब्दे वान्तर्भाव इति॥

‡ समाप्तं प्रमाणचतुष्ट्वप्रकरणम्॥

§ वेदस्य प्रामाण्यमाप्तप्रामाण्यात् सिद्धं नचेदं युज्यते वेदस्य नित्यत्वादित्याशङ्कायां वर्णानामनित्यत्वात् कथं तस्य-

आदिमत्त्वादैन्द्रियकत्वात् कृतकादुपचाराच्च ॥ ८१ ॥

The eternity of Sound denied.

Aph. 81.—From its having an origin, from its being cognizable by sense, and from its being spoken of as factitious, [Sound is not eternal].

a. Sound is not eternal, &c., 'from its having an origin,' i. e., from its having a cause. But then [—some may argue—] it has *not* a cause, because it may be accounted for, [not only by causal origination, but,] moreover, by *manifestation*, [—see the Mímánsá Aphorisms, B. I.—] through the impact &c. of the throat, palate, &c.: so he adds 'from its being cognizable by sense.' 'From its being perishable,' i. e., from its being destructible, like anything artificial.*

b. He considers the doubt whether there be not a fallacy in the arguments in the preceding† [aphorism].

न घटाभावसामान्यनित्यत्वान्नित्येष्वप्यनित्यवदुपचाराच्च ॥ ८२ ॥

The preceding arguments questioned.

Aph. 82.—Nay, because the Non-existence of a jar, and its genus, are eternal, [though the arguments in the preceding aphorism, if valid, would

मुदायरूपस्य वेदस्य नित्यत्वमित्याशयेन शब्दानित्यत्वप्रकरणमारभते। तत्र सिद्धान्तसूत्रम् ॥

* शब्दोऽनित्य इत्यादिः आदिमत्त्वात् सकारणकत्वात्। ननु न सकारणकत्वं कण्ठताल्वाद्यभिघातादेर्व्यञ्जकत्वेनाप्युपपत्तेरत आह ऐन्द्रियकत्वादिति। कृतकेति। कृतके घटादौ ॥

† यथाश्रुते हेतूनां व्यभिचारमाशङ्कते ॥

apply to them,] and eternal things also are spoken of as if uneternal.

a. The aforesaid are not [valid] reasons. The fact of having a beginning strays away [from things uneternal, of which you imagine it to be exclusively characteristic],—because 'the non-existence of a jar,' i. e., the destruction of a jar [—which had a beginning when the jar was broken—], is 'eternal,' i. e., indestructible. The fact of being cognizable by sense belongs unduly [—so far as your argument is concerned—] to Genus, [—for, when a jar is seen, its Genus, i. e., the fact of its being a jar, is visible also;—yet Genus is eternal]. 'Because eternal things also are spoken of as if uneternal,'—as when it is said, "The jar's space is produced" [—whereas only a certain portion of eternal space is now divided off and occupied by the newly produced jar—],—"I have become happy" [—though the "happy I" has not just come into existence, having existed always], &c.*

b. He repels the [charge of] fallacy.†

तत्त्वभाक्तयोर्नानात्वस्य विभागादव्यभिचारः ॥ ८३ ॥

The first objection repelled.

Aph. 83.—Through the distinction of the diversity between the real and the dependent, there is not the fallacy [alleged in §82].

a. Through the 'distinction,' i. e., the difference, of the 'diversity,' i. e., the severalty of 'the real,' i. e., the absolutely existent, and the 'dependent' [or not substantially existent], there is no straying away [of the alleged character of things uneternal

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† नोक्ता हेतवः घटाभावस्य घटध्वंसस्य नित्यत्वादविनाशित्वादादिमत्त्वं व्यभिचारि । ऐन्द्रियकत्वं सामान्ये व्यभिचारि । नित्येष्वप्यनित्यवदुपचारात् यथा घटाकाशमुत्पन्नं अहं सुखी जात इत्यादि ॥

* व्यभिचारं परिहरति ॥

to things eternal]. For, in the case of destruction [on emergent non-existence], its being produced [certainly] implies its having a beginning;—but, the fact of not having that eternalness which consists in the fact of belonging to the three times [—past and present as well as future—], is really to be *not* eternal. That a thing is eternal because indestructible [—while not having existed *from* eternity—] is a figure of speech. Therefore there is no straying away* [as alleged].

b. Or the meaning is, that, by 'having a beginning' is meant the fact of being an *entity*, this being specialized by the fact of having previously not existed;—and a Non-existence is not [such a thing as] this.†

c. He refutes [the charge of] fallacy in respect of the second‡ [reason].

सन्तानानुमानविशेषणात् ॥ ८४ ॥

The second objection repelled. *Aph.* 84.—Because, in the inference of a son, [it is] through a distinction.

a. 'In the inference of a son,' i. e., in the making the conclusion [that "This is such a one's son"], it is through the distinction of some token [and not through our directly perceiving in him the generic character of sonship,] that the son is regarded

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* तत्त्वस्य पारमार्थिकस्य भाक्तस्य च नानात्वस्य भेदस्य विभागात् विवेकान्न व्यभिचारः। ध्वंसे हि उत्पत्तिमत्त्वं आदिमत्त्वं त्रैकालिकत्वरूपनित्यत्वाभावरूपञ्चानित्यत्वमस्त्येव। अविनाशित्वान्नित्यत्वमौपचारिकमतो न व्यभिचारः॥

† आदिमत्त्वं प्रागभावावच्छिन्नसत्त्वं नचैतदभाव इति वार्थः॥

‡ द्वितीये व्यभिचारमुद्धरति॥

as a son,—recognised as peculiarized by that single character. Therefore, according to the maxim "Since there is the possession of the genus," &c., there requires to be a distinction,* [—and this is not the case with the perception of Sound, which is direct and simple].

b. He sets aside the [charge of] fallacy in respect of the third† [reason].

कारणद्रव्यस्य प्रदेशशब्देनाभिधानात् ॥ ८५ ॥

The third objection repelled.

Aph. 85.—It is through a causal [ungenerated] substance's being designated by the term Position, [that it comes to be spoken of as a thing produced].

a. There is really no cause of [the Ether or] Space; but the treating of Space as if made up of positions is figurative;—because, by the word Position, a thing that is [only] a cause gets the name of a thing that *has* a cause;—and Space is not such a thing.‡

b. So in the example "I have become happy," &c., it is only the production of the happiness, &c., [and not of the percipient soul,] that is the matter [of the proposition]:—such is the import.§

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* सन्तानानुमानेऽनुमितिकरणे लिङ्गविशेषणात् सन्तानः सन्तन्यमानः एकधर्मावच्छिन्नत्वेन ज्ञायमानः । तेन सामान्यवत्त्वे सतीति विशेषणीयमिति ॥

† तृतीये व्यभिचारं वारयति ॥

‡ आकाशे हेतुर्नास्त्येव आकाशे प्रादेशिकत्वव्यवहारस्तु गौणः प्रदेशशब्देन कारणद्रव्यस्य कारणवतो द्रव्यस्याभिधानात् । नचाकाशं तादृशम् ॥

§ एवं सुखी जात इत्यादौ सुखाद्युत्पत्तिरेव विषय इति भावः ॥

c. And it is not the case that there was nothing to call for [the enunciation of] the aforesaid reasons, because they are refuters of the opposite opinion, as he declares as follows.*

प्रागुच्चारणादनुपलब्धेरावरणाद्यनुपलब्धेः ॥ ८६ ॥

Application of the previous arguments.

Aph. 86.—[Sound is not eternal,] because it is not perceived antecedently to pronunciation, and because we do not perceive any veil, &c., [so that it might exist unperceived].

a. If sound were eternal, then it would be perceived before pronunciation, because [being admitted to be a quality of the all-pervading Ether,] it is actually in contact with the organ of hearing. And there is here no obstacle [to its being heard, if it existed]; so he says 'any veil,' &c.:—because 'we do not perceive,' i. e., we are certain of the non-existence of, any 'veil' &c., as an obstruction,†

b. But since Sound has no limits, its going [from one place] to another place is not possible;‡ [—so that its not being perceived, while yet existing, is not to be explained on such a supposition].

c. The hypothesis that Sound is not eternal is decidedly simple in comparison with the hypothesis of there being innumerable imperceptible hinderers [of its being perceived at all times]:—such is the import.§

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* न चोक्तहेतूनामप्रयोजकत्वं विपक्षबाधकसत्त्वादित्याह ॥

† शब्दो यदि नित्यः स्यादुच्चारणात् प्रागुपलभ्येत श्रोत्रसन्निकर्षसत्त्वात् न चात्र प्रतिबन्धकमस्तीत्याह आवरणेति । आवरणादेः प्रतिबन्धकस्यानुपलब्ध्या ऽभावनिर्णयात् ॥

‡ देशान्तरगमनन्तु शब्दस्यामूर्त्तत्वान्न सम्भाव्यते ॥

§ अतीन्द्रियानन्तप्रतिबन्धकत्वकल्पनामपेक्ष्य शब्दानित्यत्वकल्पनैव लघीयसीति भावः ॥

d. A couple of aphorisms, having reference to the primâ facie view of some mistaken person.*

तदनुपलब्धेरनुपलम्भादावरणोपलब्धिः ॥ ८७ ॥

A futile suggestion.

Aph. 87.—[Perhaps some one will say,] we *do* perceive the veil [by which Sound is hidden], because we do *not* perceive the *non*-perception thereof [spoken of in §86].

a. It is not made out, by the non-perception thereof, that there is no veil, just as non-perception actually exists notwithstanding the non-perception [of that non-perception]. Just as you allege that, because of the non-perception of the veil, it [the veil,] does not exist; so, since that non-perception of the veil is not perceived, there must be the absence of that—[i. e., there must be the absence of the non-perception of the veil, or, in other words, there must be] just the perception of the veil. Or if [you say that,] notwithstanding the non-perception of the non-perception of the veil, the non-perception of the veil does not cease to exist, then also, by the veil's not being perceived, it is not made out that the veil does not exist:—such is the meaning.†

b. The aphorism conveying the tenet ‡

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* भ्रान्तस्य पूर्वपक्षपरं सूत्रद्वयम् ॥

† अनुपलम्भादनुपलब्धिसद्भाववदावरणानुपपत्तिरनुपलम्भात् । यथा त्वया आवरणस्यानुपलब्ध्या अभाव उच्यते तथा आवरणानुपलब्धेरनुपलम्भात् तदभाव आवरणोपलब्धिरेव स्यात् । यदि वा आवरणानुपलब्धेरनुपलम्भेऽपि नावरणानुपलब्धेरभावस्तदा आवरणस्यानुपलम्भादपि नावरणस्यानुपपत्तिरित्यर्थः ॥

‡ सिद्धान्तसूत्रम् ॥

अनुपलम्भात्मकत्वादनुपलब्धेरहेतुः ॥ ८८ ॥

Its refutation.

Aph. 88.—This is no reason, because the non-perception *consists* of non-perception.

a. To say that the veil is perceived, because the non-perception of the veil is not perceived, is a futile answer,—'no reason,' —i. e., no means of setting aside my opinion;—because 'the non-perception,' i. e., the non-perception of any veil, '*consists* of non-perception,' i. e., consists of the absence of perception;—and since this [want of perception of anything] is readily apprehended by the mind itself, the non-perception thereof [—i. e., the non-perception of the want of perception—] is nothing real:—such is the import.*

b. He ponders the doubt whether it be not a case of equally balanced arguments.†

अस्पर्शत्वात् ॥ ८९ ॥

Another doubt, in favour of the eternity of Sound.

Aph. 89.—Because it is intangible.

a. That is to say [—suggests some one—], Sound is eternal, because it is intangible, like the Ether‡ [or Space].

b. It is not a case of equally balanced arguments, because your argument is indeterminate;—so he says.§—

* आवरणानुपलब्धेरनुपलम्भादावरणोपलब्धिरिति जात्युत्तरं अहेतुः। न मन्मतप्रतिषेधसाधनं। अनुपलब्धेरावरणानुपलब्धेरनुपलम्भात्मकत्वादुपलम्भाभावात्मकत्वात् तस्य च मनसैव सुग्रहत्वात् तदनुपलब्धिरसिद्धेति भावः॥

† सत्प्रतिपक्षमाशङ्कते॥

‡ शब्दो नित्यः अस्पर्शत्वाद्गगनवदिति भावः॥

§ न सत्प्रतिपक्षस्त्वदीयहेतोरनैकान्तिकत्वादित्याह॥

न कर्मानित्यत्वात् ॥ ९० ॥

Its refutation.

Aph. 90.—Nay, because Action is not eternal [—although intangible].

a. Intangibility does not establish the eternity of Sound, because, in the case of Action, it [viz. intangibility,] presents itself straying away* [unaccompanied by eternalness].

b. [But some one perhaps may say,] even what is indeterminate may still prove [the point]; so in regard to this he says.†

नाणुनित्यत्वात् ॥ ९१ ॥

A plea in demur rejected.

Aph. 91.—Nay, because an Atom is eternal, [but might be proved otherwise if we were to admit this].

a. Were what is indeterminate allowed to prove anything, then an Atom, i. e., an indivisible part, would not be eternal;—because we should then find arguments, for its uneternalness, in its possessing Colour, &c., [which stand in the same category with Intangibility]:—such is the meaning.‡

b. He ponders a doubt.§

सम्प्रदानात् ॥ ९२ ॥

Another doubt, in favour of the eternity of Sound.

Aph. 92.—By reason of traditionary teaching, [suggests some one, Sound must be eternal].

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* अस्पर्शत्वं न शब्दनित्यत्वसाधकं कर्मणि व्यभिचारात् ॥

† अनैकान्तिकमपि साधकं स्यादत आह ॥

‡ अनैकान्तिकस्य साधकत्वेऽणोः परमाणोर्नित्यत्वं न स्याद् रूपवत्त्वादिना तत्रानित्यत्वानुमानापत्तेरित्यर्थः ॥

§ शङ्कते ॥

a. By reason, i. e., of the handing down of knowledge by the preceptor to the disciple;—and thus the antecedent existence of Sound [—or of the words in which the knowledge is conveyed—] is proved;—and so its eternity is proved by the sense of the terms [or self-evidently], according to the maxim "The thing has been permanent for so long,—and who, afterwards, will not acknowledge this [as having been eternally thus]?" Such is the import.*

b. An aphorism conveying a tenet.†

तदन्तरालानुपलब्धेरहेतुः । ९३ ।

Its refutation. *Aph.* 93.—This is no reason, because it is not perceived in the interval.

a. The disciple being seated near him, the preceptor lectures him; and, if Sound were eternal, then, immediately on the arrival of the disciple, even before the lecture, sound would be perceived;—so, as it is not perceived, there is no sound [antecedently to utterance]: hence what you have alleged [in §92,] is no reason.‡

b. An aphorism conveying a primâ facie view.§

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* गुरुणा शिष्याय विद्यायाः सम्प्रदानात् तथाच शब्दस्य प्राक् सत्त्वं सिद्धं तथाच तावत्कालं स्थिरं चैनं कः पश्चान्नाभ्यसिष्यतीति न्यायान्नित्यत्वमर्थसिद्धमिति भावः ॥

† सिद्धान्तसूत्रम् ॥

‡ शिष्ये उपसन्ने गुरुरध्यापयति यदि च शब्दो नित्यः स्यात् तदा शिष्यागमनानन्तरमध्यापनात् पूर्वमपि शब्द उपलभ्येतेत्यनुपलब्ध्या च नास्ति शब्द इत्यतस्त्वदुक्तो न हेतुः ॥

§ पूर्वपक्षसूत्रम् ॥

अध्यापनादप्रतिषेधः ॥ ९४ ॥

The objection reiterated.

Aph. 94.—You are not to set aside [my argument, —says the objector—], because there is the lecture.

a. That is to say,—the setting aside of my argument is not right;—why?—'because there is the lecture':—if, during the intermediate time, sound [or the words to be employed in the lecture,] did not exist, how could the lecture take place? But the non-perception of sound is accounted for by the absence of its manifesters, in the shape of the concussions of the throat, the palate, &c.,* [as the non-perception of a jar is accounted for by the absence of a lamp or other light to reveal it].

b. An aphorism conveying a tenet.†

उभयोः पक्षयोरन्यतरस्याध्यापनादप्रतिषेधः ॥ ९५ ॥

Its further refutation.

Aph. 95.—One or other of the two alternatives is not set aside by [that argument of] the lecture.

a. Supply as follows:—the objection, against one or other alternative demonstrating the non-eternity of Sound, which is drawn from the 'lecture,' does not hold;—because the fact of the 'lecture' is common to both alternatives, [which are the contradictories of one another;—so that, being no peculiarity of either, it must needs be irrespective of what is to be proved by either the one or the other]. For a lecture consists in pronouncing after the pronunciation of the preceptor, or in pronunci-

* मदीयहेतोः प्रतिषेधो न युक्तः। कुतः। अध्यापनात्। यद्यन्तरालकाले शब्दो न स्यात् कथमध्यापनं घटेत। अनुपलब्धिस्तु शब्दस्य कण्ठताल्वाद्यभिघातरूपव्यञ्जकाभावादुपपद्यते इति भावः॥

† सिद्धान्तसूत्रम्॥

ation conducive to the pupil's pronunciation;—and this, which is the case alike on the alternative of the permanency or the non-permanency [of Sound], can furnish no corroboration of the eternity of Sound. For a lecture is not a *bestowal* [of the language employed], so that, with an eye to the relinquishment of one's own property in it, and the making over of it to another, its *permanency* need be contemplated:—nor is the thing *possible*,—for it is a contradiction that a thing should simultaneously be the property of many, and one cannot make over the property of another;—but it is just a case of *direction*, as in the case, e. g., of teaching to dance, [—where you will scarcely contend that the pirouettes, taught to the pupil, had a persistent previous existence]:—such is the import.*

b. An aphorism conveying a primâ facie view.†

अभ्यासात् ॥ ९६ ॥

Another objection, in favour of the eternity of Sound.

Aph. 96.—[Sound must be permanent, says some one,] because it is dwelt upon.

a. For that which is permanent is perceptively dwelt upon: for

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* अन्यतरस्य पक्षस्यानित्यत्वसाधकस्याध्यापनात् यः प्रतिषेधः स न सम्भवति उभयोः पक्षयोरध्यापनस्य समानत्वादिति शेषः। अध्यापनं हि गुरूच्चारणानूच्चारणं शिष्योच्चारणानुकूलोच्चारणं वा। तच्च स्थैर्यास्थैर्यपक्षयोस्तुल्यं न शब्दनित्यतायाः सहायकं विधातुमलं। न ह्यध्यापनं दानं येन स्वस्वत्वध्वंसपरस्वत्वापादनार्थं तस्य स्थैर्यमाशङ्कनीयं। न वा सम्भवति बहूनामेकदा स्वत्वविरोधात् परस्वत्वापादनासम्भवाच्च। अपितु नृत्याध्यापनादाविवोपदेशमात्रमिति भावः॥

† पूर्वपक्षसूत्रम्॥

example, one looks ten times at some colour [which is a persistent thing];—in like manner, one recites a chapter [of the Veda] a hundred times;—so that, 'because it is dwelt upon,' Sound is permanent:—such is the import.*

b. He replies.†

अन्यत्वेऽप्यभ्यासस्योपचारात् ॥ ९७ ॥

Its refutation. *Aph.* 97.—[Nay,] because even were they other [or numerically different], the dwelling upon them might take place.

a. The primâ facie view is not right:—why?;—because 'even were they other,' i. e., even were the words [numerically] different, the dwelling upon the lecture 'might take place,' i. e., were possible. For a 'dwelling upon' [or repetition] does not establish persistency,—for we see a 'dwelling upon' the thing [or a *practice* of it,] even where there is a [numerical] difference, in such cases as "He sacrifices twice," "He dances thrice", &c.:—such is the import.‡

b. An indifferent person here proposes the doubt how there

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* यद्धि स्थिरं तदभ्यस्यमानं दृष्टं। यथा दशकृत्वो रूपं पश्यति। एवं शतकृत्वोऽनुवाकमधीत इत्यभ्यासात् स्थैर्यं शब्दस्येति भावः॥

† उत्तरयति॥

‡ पूर्वपक्षो न युक्तः। कुतः। अन्यत्वे भेदेऽपि शब्दानां अध्यापनाभ्यासस्य उपचारात् सम्भवात्। न ह्यभ्यासः स्थैर्यं साधयति द्विर्जुहोति त्रिर्नृत्यतीत्यादौ भेदेऽप्यभ्यासदर्शनादिति भावः॥

can be 'practice *even when there is difference,*' seeing that there is really no such thing as difference [or 'otherness'] in the world.*

अन्यदन्यस्मादनन्यत्वादनन्यदित्यन्यताभावः ॥ ९८ ॥

Whether there be such a thing as 'otherness.'

Aph 98.—There is no such thing [says some one,] as 'otherness,' because what is [called] other than some other, is *not* other, because of its not being other [than itself].

a. That which is *called* other than something else, is *not* other than *itself*;—so how is it *other*,—since it is a contradiction to be both other and not other? Such is the import. The heart [or essential point in this argument,] is this, that it is impossible for a thing to be *other than itself*;† [and if it can, with truth, be said that a thing is 'not other,' how can it be said, with truth, that it is 'other'?]

b. He clears up this.‡

तदभावे नास्त्यनन्यता तयोरितरेतरापेक्षसिद्धेः ॥ ९९ ॥

'Otherness' is relative.

Aph. 99.—Though this [—viz., otherness,] may be absent [in the relation of a thing to itself], it is not the case that there is no [such thing as] otherness, because these two [—viz., otherness and identity,] exist with reference to one another.

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* अन्यतैव जगति नास्तीति कथमन्यत्वेऽप्यभ्यासोपपत्तिरिति तटस्थ आशङ्कते ॥

† यदन्यस्मादन्यदुच्यते तत् स्वस्मादनन्यदभिन्नं । तत् कथमन्यद्भेदाभेदयोर्विरोधादिति भावः । स्वाभेदस्यावश्यकत्वमिति हृदयम् ॥

‡ समाधत्ते ॥

a. 'Though this may be absent,' i. e., though otherness may be absent, it is not further the case that there is *no* otherness; because 'these two,' i. e., otherness and identity, exist through mutual reference to one another; because, in reality, either, i. e., any one of two,—e. g., identity,—exists in respect of the other [e. g., in respect of otherness], because it [viz., identity,] is such that it exists with reference to the knowledge of otherness, i. e., of [numerical] difference [—the word *same* having no meaning to him who does not understand the word *other*]:—such is the meaning.*

b. He ponders a doubt.†

विनाशकारणानुपलब्धेः ॥ १०० ॥

Another objection in favour of the eternity of Sound.

Aph. 100.—[Sound, says some one, must be eternal,] because we discern no cause why it should perish.

a. [For the reason alleged,] sound is eternal, &c. Non-discernment means either absence of perception, or absence of knowledge,‡ [such, e. g., as might come by inference;—see §102, *a*].

b. In the first place he states what debars this.§

अश्रवणकारणानुपलब्धेः सततश्रवणप्रसङ्गः ॥ १०१ ॥

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* तदभावे ऽन्यत्वस्याभावे ऽनन्यतापि नास्ति तयोर्भेदाभेदयोः सिद्धेः परस्परसापेक्षत्वात् । वस्तुतस्तु तयोर्मध्य इतरस्य एकतरस्य अनन्यत्वस्य इतरापेक्षसिद्धेः इतरत्वस्य भेदस्य ज्ञानापेक्षा सिद्धिर्यस्य तादृशत्वादित्यर्थः ॥

† शङ्कते ॥

‡ शब्दो नित्य इत्यादिः । अनुपलब्धिरप्रत्यक्षमज्ञानं वा ॥

§ आद्ये प्रतिबन्धिमाह ॥

The argument proves too much.

Aph. 101.—[Were non-perception sufficient to prove non-existence,] we should have constant audition, because of our not perceiving any cause why we should not hear.

a. If non-existence were established by non-perception, then, as we perceive no cause of our not hearing, we should not cease to hear;—that is to say, we should find that there is hearing constantly.*

b. But, in the second place, he says.†

उपलभ्यमाने चानुपलब्धेरसत्त्वादनपदेशः ॥ १०२ ॥

The argument refuted otherwise.

Aph. 102.—And, since the non-perception is not a fact, inasmuch as it [*viz.*, the cause of the cessation of hearing,] *is* discerned, this [argument of yours] proves nothing.

a. The cause of the cessation being gathered by inference, &c., since there is *not* non-perception of it, your reason 'proves nothing,'—i. e., does not establish,—because it is itself unsound. The fact is, that we conjecture the perishableness [of Sound] from the fact of its being a product.‡

b. Another aphorism of the author of the tenets.§

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* यद्यप्रत्यक्षत्वादभावसिद्धिस्तदा श्रवणकारणस्याप्रत्यक्षत्वादश्रवणं न स्यादिति सततश्रवणप्रसङ्ग इत्यर्थः ॥

† द्वितीये त्वाह ॥

‡ अनुमानादिना उपलभ्यमाने विनाशकारणे अनुपलब्धेरभावात् त्वदीयो हेतुरनपदेशः असाधकः असिद्धत्वात्। जन्यभावत्वेन विनाशकल्पनमिति भावः ॥

§ सिद्धान्तिनः सूत्रान्तरम् ॥

पाणिनिमित्तप्रश्लेषाच्छब्दाभावे नानुपलब्धिः ॥ १०३ ॥

One cause of the cessation of Sound.

Aph. 103.—There is not non-perception [of the cause of the cessation of Sound], sound ceasing on the application of such a cause as the hand.

a. When a gong, or the like, is sounding, since the cessation of sound is perceived 'on the application,' i. e., on the contact, of a cause—in the shape of the hand, there is *not* a non-perception of any cause of the cessation of Sound.*

b. But then, since the contact of the hand with a bell or the like, stops the sound, [some one may say] the sound must really reside in the bell, or the like, [and not in that imaginary substratum of Sound, the Ether]; so, in reference to this doubt, he says :†—

अस्पर्शत्वादप्रतिषेधः ॥ १०४ ॥

The substratum of Sound intangible.

Aph. 104.—This objection will not hold, because it [the ethereal substratum of Sound,] is intangible.

a. Complete thus:—the alleged objection does not hold, because the substratum of Sound is intangible [and cannot therefore be the tangible bell, or the like]. For Sound is not a distinguishing quality of what things possess tangibility,—for it is not a product following from any such quality in its [substantial

* शब्दायमाने कांस्यादौ पाणिरूपनिमित्तस्य प्रश्लेषात् संयोगाच्छब्दाभावे उपलभ्यमाने शब्दाभावकारणस्य नानुपलब्धिरिति ॥

† ननु घण्टादिपाणिसंयोगस्य शब्दनिवर्त्तकत्वे घण्टाद्याश्रय एव शब्दः स्यादित्याशङ्कायामाह ॥

cause], not being the result [e. g.,] of contact with fire as the non substantial cause:—such is the drift.* [To explain;—if we suppose the tangible bell to be the substantial cause of Sound, then the non-substantial cause is that contact of something with the bell, which elicits the Sound:—but then *fire* is tangible, no less than a bell; yet contact with fire does not produce Sound.]

b. In order to explain this same point, he says:†—

विभक्त्यन्तरोपपत्तेश्च समासे ॥ १०५ ॥

A peculiarity of Sound.

Aph. 105.—And [Sound is not one] in an assemblage [of qualities belonging to some tangible substratum], because there really are various divisions [of Sound apparently belonging to the same object].

a. It is not proper to say, that, 'in an assemblage,' i. e., in a compound of tangibility and other [properties], Sound exists in combination,—'because there really are various divisions', i. e., several varieties of acute and grave, &c. The meaning is this;—in one single conch-shell, or the like, various sounds, acute, grave, &c., are produced; but [we do not observe anything of this kind in the case of what are really qualities of the shell, or the like; for] Odours &c. do not alter without contact with fire, [whereas the Sound alters without any alteration of the shell]:—such is the import.‡

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* उक्तः प्रतिषेधो न सम्भवति अस्पर्शत्वात् शब्दाश्रयस्येति शेषः। शब्दो हि न स्पर्शवद्विशेषगुणः अग्निसंयोगासमवायिकारणकत्वाभाववदकारणगुणपूर्वककार्यत्वादित्याशयः॥

† एतदेव व्युत्पादयितुमाह॥

‡ समासे स्पर्शादिसमुदाये साहित्येन शब्दो वर्त्तत इति

b. Here ends the section on the non-eternity of Sound.*

c. Since this is its appropriate place, in order to censure the opinion that Sound changes, he displays a doubt.†

SECTION XII.

On the changes of sounds.

विकारापदेशोपदेशात् संशयः ॥ १०६ ॥

Whether letters change.

Aph. 106.—From the injunction under the character of a change, there arises a doubt.

a. Some explain, that, by the rule [P. VI., 1, 77,] "Instead of the vowel *i*, &c., when a vowel follows, let there be a semivowel," &c., it is meant that the letter *y*, &c., is a modification of the letter *i*, &c. But others explain the direction thus, that, whereas an *i* was to be employed, a *y* is to be employed [instead]. And hence arises the doubt whether letters are changeable or not.‡

न युक्तं विभक्त्यन्तरस्य विभागान्तरस्य तारमन्द्रादेरुपपत्तेः। अयमर्थः। एकस्मिन्नेव शङ्खादौ तारमन्द्रादिनानाशब्दा जायन्ते गन्धादयस्तु विनाग्निसंयोगं न परावर्त्तन्त इति भावः॥

* समाप्तं शब्दानित्यत्वप्रकरणम्।

† प्रसङ्गाच्छब्दपरिणामवादं दूषयितुं संशयं प्रदर्शयति॥

‡ इको यणचीत्यादिना इकारादेर्विकारो यकारादिरिति केचित् व्याचक्षते। परे तु इकारे प्रयोक्तव्ये यकारः

b. And by change is meant the origination of another substance, whether with destruction or without destruction of nature [in that from which it originates], as the origination of curds, &c. from milk, &c. and the origination of a tree, &c. from a seed, &c. Moreover, even when there has been the destruction of a mass, e. g., of gold, through the destruction of the union of its parts by the blows of a hammer, there originates a bracelet; while a jar, or the like, originates *without* the destruction of the nature of the bowl-shaped halves &c.,* [which are put together to form it].

c. An aphorism to set aside [the theory of] a change in this case.†

प्रकृतिविवृद्धौ विकारविवृद्धेश्च ॥ १०७ ॥

An argument against change of letters. *Aph.* 107.—And, by reason of increased bulk in the original, there would be increased bulk in the modification.

a. Letters are not changeable; for, were such the case, we should find increased bulk in the modification, in accordance with increase of bulk in its original, i. e., in that which is re-

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प्रयोक्तव्य इत्यादेशमादिशन्ति। अतश्च वर्णा विकारिणो न वेति संशयः ॥

* विकारश्च स्वरूपस्य विनाशेऽविनाशे वा द्रव्यान्तरारम्भकत्वं यथा दुग्धादेर्दध्याद्यारम्भकत्वं बीजादेर्वृक्षाद्यारम्भकत्वञ्च। सुवर्णादेरपि लौहाघातजन्यावयवसंयोगनाशादवयविनो नाशे सत्येव कुण्डलारम्भः कपालादेश्च स्वरूपाविनाशेन घटाद्यारम्भकत्वम् ॥

† तत्र विकारनिराकरणाय सूत्रम् ॥

garded as its material,—just as largeness or smallness belongs to that mass which originates from [aliquot] parts, large or small. That is to say,—in comparison with the letter *y* which originated from a short letter *i*, the letter *y* which originated from a long letter *í* should be greater:—therefore the side [of the argument which advocates the theory] of substitution is the better:—such is the import.*

b. Some one objects.†

न्यूनसमाधिकोपपत्तेर्विकाराणामहेतुः ॥ १०८ ॥

Objection to the foregoing argument.

Aph. 108.—This [says some one,] is no reason, for we find modifications less than, equal to, and greater than [the original material].

a. The alleged argument is not right, because 'we find,' i. e., we see, that modifications are smaller, equal, and greater, in comparison of the original material;—as, in comparison with the bulk of the cotton, the thread formed of it is of small bulk; or as, from a cocoa-nut, which is larger than the seed of a Banian-tree [or Ficus Indica], a cocoa-nut-tree, smaller than a Banian-tree, is produced,—and a bracelet or the like, equal in bulk to the gold or the like; or as, from two cocoanuts, smaller and larger, two equal trees; or from two seeds of the Banian-tree,

* न वर्णा विकारिणस्तथा सति तत्प्रकृतेरुपादानत्वाभिमतस्य विवृद्धौ विकारस्यापि विवृद्ध्यापत्तेः महदल्पावयवारब्धावयविनो महदल्पत्ववत्। ह्रस्वेकारारब्धयकारापेक्षया दीर्घेकारारब्धयकारस्य विवृद्धिः स्यादित्यर्थः। तस्मादादेशपक्षः श्रेयानिति भावः॥

† आक्षिपति॥

smaller and larger, two equal trees; and, from the seed of a Banian-tree, small in bulk, a large Banian-tree.*

b. He clears up this.†

नातुल्यप्रकृतीनां विकारविकल्पात् ॥ १०९ ॥

The objection disposed of. *Aph.* 109.—Nay,—because it was the difference of the products whose original material is unequal [that *I* spoke of].

a. The foregoing decision is not right, because what I spoke of was the 'difference,' i. e., the discrepance of those products 'whose original material is unequal,' i. e., whose original material is different. For the smallness or greatness, &c., of a tree or the like, does not proceed from the smallness or greatness, &c., of the seed or the like; but, moreover, there is, in this case, an entire difference from that which *I* spoke of [—which was not a seminal principle, but a mass to be operated upon—]; and so thy remark is a fallacy through a figure of speech:—such is the import.‡

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* उक्तो हेतुर्न युक्तः विकाराणां प्रकृत्यपेक्षया न्यूनत्वस्य समत्वस्याधिकत्वस्य चोपपत्तेर्दर्शनात्। यथा तूलकपरिमाणापेक्षया तद्विकारतन्तुरल्पपरिमाणः। यथा वा न्यग्रोधबीजादुत्कृष्टेन नारिकेलीबीजेन न्यग्रोधादल्पो नारिकेलीतरुर्जन्यते कनकादिसमपरिमाणं कटकादिच। यथा वा न्यूनाधिकनारिकेलीबीजाभ्यां समौ वृक्षौ न्यूनाधिकपरिमाणवटबीजाभ्यां समौ वृक्षौ न्यूनपरिमाणाच्च वटबीजात् महान् वटतरुरिति ॥

† समाधत्ते ॥

‡ नोक्तं समाधानं युक्तं। अतुल्यप्रकृतीनां भिन्नप्रकृती-

b. He ponders a doubt.*

द्रव्यविकारवैषम्यवद्वर्णविकाराविकल्पः ॥ ११० ॥

Whether the changes of different letters may not be the same.

Aph. 110.—There may be no difference in the modifications of [different] letters, just as [conversely,] there may be difference in the modifications of substances.

a. As there is an inequality in the products, though, so far forth as it is substance, there be equality in the original material, of Banian-fig-trees &c.; just so [conversely,] there is nothing unaccountable in there being 'no difference,' i. e., an identity of form, in the letter *Y*, which is the modification whether of a long or of a short [vowel]:—such is the meaning.†

b. He clears this up.‡

न विकारधर्मानुपपत्तेः ॥ १११ ॥

The foregoing suggestion not in point.

Aph. 111.—Nay, for the character of a modification does not exist [in this case].

नां हि विकाराणां विकल्पः वैलक्षण्यं मयाभिहितं। न हि बीजादेर्ह्रासवृद्ध्यादिना वृक्षादेर्ह्रासवृद्ध्यादिकं प्रकान्तं मदुक्तवैलक्षण्यन्तु तत्राप्यस्ति तथाच त्वदुक्तमुपचारच्छलमिति भावः ॥

* शङ्कते ॥

† द्रव्यत्वेन न्यग्रोधादिप्रकृतीनां तुल्यत्वेऽपि विकारवैषम्यं यथा एवमेव वर्णत्वेन तुल्ययोरपि ह्रस्वदीर्घयोर्यो विकारो यकारस्तस्य अविकल्प ऐकरूप्यं नानुपपन्नमित्यर्थः ॥

‡ समाधत्ते ॥

a. There is not, in this case, a resemblance to the modifications of substances; for this is the character of [what are really] modifications, viz., that they follow their original; so that, where this is different, they are different: and this does not present itself in the present instance,—seeing that there is no difference in the result, [viz., the semivowel,] although the original [vowel] differed in being long or short, &c.*

b. And hence it is not a change [of one letter into another]:—so he says.†

विकारप्राप्तानामपुनरावृत्तेः ॥ ११२ ॥

How it cannot be that letters change.

Aph. 112.—Because what things have undergone a change do not again return [to their original form].

a. The original form of what has undergone a change is not seen again. Curds, verily, do not attain again the state of milk; but the letter *i*, having reached the condition of the letter *y*, *does* again reach the condition of the letter *i*:—for, when one has said "curds here" (*dadhyatra*), still again one *does* say [—with a return to the original unchanged vowel—] "curds here" (*dadhi+atra*):—such is the import.‡

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* नात्र द्रव्यविकारतुल्यता। विकाराणां हि ग्रयं धर्मो यत्प्रकृत्यनुविधानं तद्भेदे भेद इति प्रकृते तदनुपपत्तिः। ह्रस्वत्वदीर्घत्वादिना प्रकृतिभेदेऽपि कार्यभेदाभावात्॥

† इतश्च न विकार इत्याह॥

‡ विकारप्राप्तस्य न पुनः प्रकृतिरूपता दृष्टा। न खलु दधि क्षीरतां पुनरापद्यते। इकारस्तु यकारतां प्राप्तः पुनरिकारतामापद्यते दध्यत्रेत्युक्त्वापुनरपि दधि अत्रेत्युच्यत एवेति भावः॥

b. Some one throws out an objection.*

सुवर्णादीनां पुनरापत्तेरहेतुः ॥ ११३ ॥

An objection to the preceding argument.

Aph. 113.—This [says some one,] is no reason, because [ornaments of] gold &c. *do* appear again [as before].

a. The foregoing argument [says some one,] is not right; because gold or the like, having left the condition of a bracelet, and having assumed that of a ring, again *does* assume the condition of a bracelet:—such is the import.†

b. He repels‡ [this objection].

न तद्विकाराणां सुवर्णभावाव्यतिरेकात् ॥ ११४ ॥

The objection repelled.

Aph. 114.—Nay, because its modifications do not relinquish the nature of gold.

a. For, in the case of the modifications of gold, it is through its nature as *gold* &c., that it serves as a material, but not through its nature as a *bracelet* or the like. In that instance, [of the golden bracelet's becoming a ring, and that again becoming a bracelet,] neither of them relinquishes the nature of gold. For if, having relinquished the nature of gold, it had attained the nature of a bracelet, and the nature of gold had come back again, *then* [but not otherwise,] there might have been a fallacy [in my argument, such as you charge upon it]. And it is not the same with the case in hand:—that which, having relinquished the character of the letter *i*, had even attained the character

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* आक्षिपति ॥

† उक्तो हेतुर्न युक्तः सुवर्णादिकं हि कटकीभावं विहाय कुण्डलतामापन्नं पुनः कटकतामापद्यत एवेति भावः ॥

‡ निराकरोति ॥

of the letter *y*, really does resume the character of the letter *i*; —which is an objection [to the appositeness of your instance,] that you will hardly get over :—such is the import.*

b. He states the fundamental argument for there being no change† [of letters].

नित्यत्वे ऽविकारादनित्यत्वे चानवस्थानात् ॥ ११५ ॥

The theory, that letters change, reduced to a dilemma.

Aph. 115.—Because, if it [viz., an alphabetical sound,] be eternal, it cannot change; and, if it be not eternal, then it does not abide [long enough to furnish the material for a change].

a. Since letters, if eternal, are incapable of change, and since, if they be not eternal, immediately after the perception of the letter *i*, from its abiding for no length of time, the letter *i* perishes, there can be no such thing as a change [of the *i* to *y*] :—such is the meaning.‡

b. To this the assertor of change, founding on the opinion of the eternity [of letters], objects.§

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* सुवर्णविकारस्थले हि सुवर्णत्वादिना प्रकृतिता न तु कटकत्वादिना। तत्रोभयमपि सुवर्णभावं न जहाति। यदि हि सुवर्णतामपहाय कटकतामापन्नं पुनः सुवर्णता तदा व्यभिचारः शक्येत। नचैवं प्रकृते। इकारतां हित्वा यकारतां प्राप्तस्यापीकारतापत्तिरस्त्येवेति दोषो दुःपरिहर इति भावः॥

† अविकारे मूलयुक्तिमाह॥

‡ वर्णानां नित्यत्वे विकारासम्भवादनित्यत्वे चाचिरस्थायित्वेनेकारप्रत्यक्षानन्तरमिकारनाशाद्विकारानुपपत्तिरित्यर्थः॥

§ अत्र विकारवादी नित्यत्वमतमालम्ब्य परिहरति॥

नित्यानामतीन्द्रियत्वाद्धर्मविकल्पाच्च वर्णविकाराणामप्रतिषेधः ॥ ११६ ॥

An attempt to meet one horn of the dilemma.

Aph. 116.—Since [some] eternal things are beyond the grasp of the senses, and since there is a difference of character, [in others,] the changes of letters [—argues some one—] are not to be denied.

a. The denial of the changes is not proper; because eternal things have a 'difference of character,' i. e., the characters are of several sorts; because some are 'beyond the grasp of the senses.' By the "and" the fact that some *are* cognizable by sense is included. For, as, although such eternal things as the Ether are beyond the grasp of sense, the nature of a cow &c. is eternal [and perceptible]; so, too, though other eternal things be unchangeable, *letters* may be susceptible of change.*

b. Founding on the non-eternity [of letters], he [the same objector,] says :—†

अनवस्थायित्वेच वर्णोपलब्धिवत्तदुपपत्तिः ॥ ११७ ॥

An attempt to face the second horn of the dilemma.

Aph. 117.—And, though they be unpermanent, yet, as there is the perception of letters, this [change of them also] is possible.

a. Though letters be unpermanent, yet, as the perception of

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* विकाराणां प्रतिषेधो न युक्तः नित्यानां धर्मविकल्पाद्धर्मस्य नानाविधत्वादतीन्द्रियत्वात् चकारेणैन्द्रियकत्वं समुच्चीयते । यथा हि नित्यानामाकाशादीनामतीन्द्रियत्वेऽपि गोत्वादीनां नित्यत्वमेवमन्येषां नित्यानामविकारित्वेऽपि वर्णानां विकारित्वं स्यादिति ॥

† अनित्यत्वमालम्ब्य स आह ॥

them takes place, so also a change of them [—as from *i* to *y*—] may take place:—such is the import.*

b. He replies to both† [of these attempts to save the credit of the objection].

विकारधर्मित्वे नित्यत्वाभावात् कालान्तरे विकारोपपत्तेश्चाप्रतिषेधः ॥ ११८ ॥

The reply. *Aph.* 118.—The objection will not do, because eternalness is not where there is that which has the character of a modification, and because the modification [—if we are to call it so—] presents itself at a subsequent time [to the destruction of the alleged material].

a. The alleged objection is not proper, because it is impossible that there should be eternalness where the case is one of what has the character of a modification;—for modification here means the assumption of another nature, with abandonment of one's own nature;—and because, when such is the state of things, there is the reverse of being eternal. For, in the instance in question, it cannot be as when bowl-shaped halves or the like constitute the materials of a jar or the like;—because, during the time of the letter *y*, there is no perception of the letter *i*, [—whereas, during the existence of the jar, its constitutive bowl-shaped halves are equally patent]. On the alternative also of non-eternity, [in alphabetic sounds,] the objection is not proper; for the perception of the letter, at the second instant, [—the antecedent first instant being that of its presentation to the sense —] is feasible, but its modification, belonging to a subsequent time, is not feasible;—because, immediately after the sound of *dadhi* ('milk'), it is [on the hypothesis,] annihilated by, e. g., the

* अनवस्थायित्वे ऽपि वर्णानां यथा प्रत्यक्षं भवत्येवं विकारो ऽपि स्यादिति भावः ॥

† उभयत्रोत्तरयति ॥

sound of *atra* ('here');—such is the import,* [—so that *dadhyatra* cannot be a modification of *dadhi* + *atra*].

b. And he states how there cannot be a change [in the case of letters,] for the following reason.†

प्रकृत्यनियमात्॥ ११९॥

An argument against there being change of letters.

Aph. 119.—Because there is no fixed rule as regards the original material.

a. For, in the case of [what really are] modifications, there is a fixed rule as regards the original material. For example, milk and curd have the fixed relation of material and modification, but not conversely; but, in the instance in question, the letter *i* is the original of the letter *y* in *dadhyatra* ('curd here'), &c.; but in *vidhyati* ('he wounds,') &c., the letter *y* (e. g., of the root *vyadh*,) is the original of the letter *i*:—such is the import.‡

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* उक्तः प्रतिषेधो न युक्तः विकारधर्मित्वे नित्यत्वासम्भवात्। विकारो ह्यत्र स्वरूपपरित्यागेन रूपान्तरापत्तिः तथात्वेच नित्यत्वविरोधात्। न हि घटादेः कपालाद्युपादेयत्ववत् प्रकृते सम्भवति यकारकाले इकारानुपलब्धेः। अनित्यत्वपक्षेऽपि प्रतिषेधो न युक्तः प्रत्यक्षं हि वर्णस्य द्वितीयक्षणे युज्यते विकारस्तु कालान्तरीयो न युज्यते दधीति शब्दानन्तरमत्रेत्यादिशब्देन तस्य नाशादिति भावः॥

† इतश्च विकारानुपपत्तिरित्याह॥

‡ विकाराणां हि प्रकृतिनियमो यथा क्षीरदध्नोः प्रकृतिविकारभावो न तु वैपरीत्यं। प्रकृते तु दध्यत्रेत्यादाविकारो यकारप्रकृतिर्विध्यतीत्यादौ तु यकार इकारप्रकृतिरिति भावः॥

b. In respect to this, a sophist expresses a doubt.*

अनियमे नियमान्नानियमः ॥ १२० ॥

A quibble.

Aph. 120.—There is no want [says some one,] of a fixed rule, because the fixed rule consists in there being no fixed rule.

a. That is to say, that absence of a fixed rule, which is alleged [in §119], is not right;—why?;—because it is fixed that there shall be nothing fixed.†

b. He clears up this.‡

नियमानियमविरोधादनियमे नियमाच्चाप्रतिषेधः ॥ १२१ ॥

The quibble disposed of.

Aph. 121.—And this is not to be set aside by saying that the fixed rule consists in there being no fixed rule; because a fixed rule and the absence of a fixed rule are contradictories.

a. The objection made by thee to the absence of a fixed rule where there is no fixed rule, is not right;—'because a fixed rule and the absence of a fixed rule are contradictories';—for the absence of a fixed rule is the non-existence of a fixed rule, and when there is this, it is impossible there should *be* a fixed rule:—such is the import.§

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* अत्रच्छलवादी शङ्कते ॥

† अनियमो य उक्तः स न युक्तः। कुतः। अनियतत्वस्य नियमादित्यर्थः ॥

‡ समाधत्ते ॥

§ अनियमे यस्त्वयानियमप्रतिषेधः कृतः स न युक्तः।

b. Having thus, then, rejected the opinion that letters stand in the relation of original material and modification, he justifies the employment, on his own side, of [the term] change* [as applied to letters].

गुणान्तरापत्त्युपमर्दह्रासवृद्धिलेशश्लेषेभ्यस्तु वर्णविका-
रोपपत्तेर्वर्णविकारः ॥ १२२ ॥

Senses in which the term change of letters may be employed.

Aph. 122.—But there is [what may allowably be called] change of letters, because such change of letters does occur through the attainment of another quality, substitution, abbreviation, prolongation, contraction, and augmentation.

a. The word 'but' here means 'again.' For these [reasons], again, 'since change of letters does occur,' i. e., since there does occur 'a change,' i. e., by the employment of one letter the force of another letter,—the term 'change' is employed† [allowably].

b. He states these same [reasons,]—'other quality,' &c. The 'attainment of another quality,' is the arrival of a different character while the subject really remains,—as when the grave accentuation befalls what was acutely accented. 'Substitution' is the employment of another subject, the [previous] subject

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कृतः । नियमानियमयोर्विरोधात् । अनियमो हि नियमाभावस्तस्मिन् सति नियमासम्भवादिति भावः ॥

* तदेवं वर्णानां प्रकृतिविकारभावं निरस्य स्वपक्षे विकारव्यवहारमुपपादयति ॥

† तुशब्दः पुनरर्थे । एतेभ्यः पुनर्वर्णविकारोपपत्तेर्वर्णविकारस्य एकवर्णप्रयोगेण वर्णान्तरप्रयोगस्य उपपत्तेर्वर्णविकार इति व्यवह्रियते ॥

having been set aside,—as *bhû* ('be') for *as* ('be'). 'Abbreviation' is the shortening of a long. 'Prolongation' is the lengthening of a short. 'Contraction' is diminution, as the omission of the letter *a* of *as* ('be'). An 'augment' is an addition. For these reasons the term 'change' [of letters] is employed* [by those who do not allow that one letter turns into another].

c. Here ends the section on the changes of sounds.†

d. Since, of knowledge due to verbal evidence, the cause is the advent of the word-meanings produced by the words, and since, in order to demonstrate this, we must explain in what consists the meaning of a word, he in the first place describes a word.‡

SECTION XIII.

THE INVESTIGATION OF THE FORCE OF A WORD.

ते विभक्त्यन्ताः पदम्॥ १२३॥

A word what. *Aph.* 123.—These, having an affix at the end, form a word.

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* तानेवाह। गुणान्तरेति। गुणान्तरापत्तिर्धर्मिणि सत्येव धर्मान्तरापत्तिः यथोदात्ते ऽनुदात्तत्वं। उपमर्दो धर्मिनिवृत्तौ धर्म्यन्तरप्रयोगः यथास्तेर्भूः। ह्रासो दीर्घस्य ह्रस्वत्वं। वृद्धिः ह्रस्वस्य दीर्घत्वं। लेशः अल्पत्वं यथा अस्तेरकारलोपः। श्लेष आगमः। एतैः कारणैर्विकारव्यवहार इति॥

† समाप्तं शब्दपरिणामप्रकरणम्॥

‡ शाब्दबोधे पदजन्यपदार्थोपस्थितेर्हेतुत्वात् तदुपपादनाय पदार्थे निरूपणीये पदमादौ निरूपयति॥

a. 'These,' viz., letters, 'having an affix at the end, form a word.' We do not mean to say that there must be a plurality [of letters,—for a word may consist of a duality, or of only one]. And the actual presence of an affix is not [necessarily,] to be looked for, [—a word, logically, if not grammatically, being a word, independently of inflection]. And an affix is an inflection of case or tense, [—see the *Laghu Kaumudí*, §144]. But, in reality, it is not this [bare] word that is conducive to the knowledge due to verbal evidence, but it is this with the nature of 'expectancy,' [i. e., so qualified as to keep the sense in suspense until combined with other words in a sentence:—see *Tarka-Sangraha*, §71]. Or [—to explain the expression, in the aphorism, *vibhaktyantah*, differently—], the word rendered 'affix' may mean 'function,' and the word rendered 'ending' may mean 'relation;' so that what is meant by being a word will be the 'possession of a function,'* [—which does not belong to mere arbitrary or accidental aggregates of letters].

b. Having described a word, what its meaning consists in, i. e., what the sense of a word consists in, has been explained [in our commentary]. Moreover, since among these [meanings of words,] there is no dispute as to what is meant by a verbal root, &c., in order to explain the meaning of such a word as "cow," he says.†

तदर्थे व्यक्त्याकृतिजातिसन्निधावुपचारात् संशयः ॥ १२४ ॥

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* ते वर्णा विभक्त्यन्ताः पदं। बहुत्वमविवक्षितं। विभक्तेश्च सत्त्वमनपेक्षितं। विभक्तिश्च सुप्तिङ्रूपा। वस्तुतस्तु नेदं पदं शाब्दबोधोपयोगि किन्त्विदमाकाङ्क्षास्वरूपमथवा विभक्तिर्वृत्तिरन्तः सम्बन्धस्तेन वृत्तिमत्त्वं पदत्वमिति ॥

† तत्र पदे निरूपिते तद्वाच्यत्वं पदार्थत्वं निरूपितं। तत्रापि धात्वाद्यर्थस्य निर्विवादत्वाद्गवादिपदार्थं निरूपयितुमाह ॥

The question what a substantive directly denotes.

Aph. 124.—As to what is meant by it,—since we recognize this in company with individual, form, and genus,—there is doubt.

a. 'Individual,' viz , cow, or the like; 'genus,' viz., cowhood, or the like; 'form;' i. e., any particular collocation of parts;—the 'company' of these, i. e., their vicinity, their association where this [association] is; 'because we recognize,' i. e., we take note of [the import of this or that word]. And so, since we perceive the three simultaneously, there is the doubt,—pray, are these severally what is meant by the word, or these aggregatively?—such is the meaning.*

b. Some say that this [aphorism] is [a part of the *Bháshya*]; but, in reality, from its difficult style, &c., it is decidedly an aphorism. Yet the portion "As to what is meant by it" seems to have been supplied by the author of the *Bháshya*.†

c. In regard to this [doubt as to what is directly designated by a substantive], he states the opinion of him who alleges that the 'individual' is what is meant.‡

याशब्दसमूहत्यागपरिग्रहसंख्यावृद्ध्यपचयवर्णसमासा-
नुबन्धानां व्यक्तावुपचाराद्व्यक्तिः ॥ १२५ ॥

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* व्यक्तिर्गवादिः जातिर्गोत्वादिराकृतिरवयवसंस्थानविशेषः। तेषां सन्निधिः सामीप्यं मेलनं। तत्र सति। उपचारात् ज्ञानात्। तथाच त्रयाणां युगपत् प्रत्ययात् किमेतेषां प्रत्येकं पदार्थ उत समस्तमिति संशय इत्यर्थः॥

† इदं भाष्यमिति केचित्। वस्तुतस्तु दुर्बोधादिस्वरसात् सूत्रमेव। तदर्थ इत्यंशस्तु भाष्यकृतः पूरणमिति प्रतिभाति॥

‡ तत्र व्यक्तिशक्तिवादिनो मतमाह॥

Erroneous opinion that an appellative denotes the individual.

Aph. 125.—[The meaning of the word, says some one, is] the individual, because [only] in respect of an individual can be understood the term "go," or a collection, or the giving, taking, number, waxing, waning, colour, [grammatical] composition, or birth.

a. Supply 'is the meaning of the word.' Because the said things 'can be understood,' i. e., can be employed. The word *anubandha* here means birth. 'Go,' i. e., such an expression as "The cow goes." Only 'in respect of an individual,'—because genus and form are insubstantial,—because thus it is only in respect of an individual that such expressions can be employed as "A collection of cows," "He gives the cow," "He accepts the cow," "Ten cows," "The cow waxes," "A lean cow," "A red cow," "Cow's blood," "The bull born," &c.*

b. If the word *samása* be held to mean "abiding properly," or "relation," then the [penultimate] exemplification should be "The cow abides," or "The cow's face."†

c. He condemns this.‡

तदनवस्थानात् ॥ १२६ ॥

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* पदार्थ इति शेषः। उक्तानां उपचारात् व्यवहारात्। अनुबन्धः प्रजननं। या गौर्गच्छतीत्यादिव्यवहारः। व्यक्तावेव जात्याकृत्योरमूर्त्तत्वात्। एवं गवां समूहः गां ददाति गां प्रतिगृह्णाति दश गावः गौर्वर्द्धते कृशा गौः कपिला गौः गोर्लोहितं गौः प्रसूत इत्यादिव्यवहाराणां व्यक्तावेव सम्भवात् ॥

† समासः सम्यगासनं सम्बन्धो वेत्यर्थे गौरास्ते गोमुखमित्युदाहरणीयम् ॥

‡ तद्दूषयति ॥

The opinion refuted.

Aph. 126.—[An appellative does not denote an individual,] because there is no fixation thereof.

a. The meaning does not pertain to the individual, because there is no 'fixation' of an individual simply,—it is indeterminate.*

b. For, if it were an individual simply [—without reference to the *kind* of individual—] that is meant, then, in consequence of the word "cow," or the like, any individual [of any kind] whatsoever might present itself;—therefore what is meant [by the word "cow"] is [not an individual simply, but] an individual distinguished by cowhood. And so, [some one may ask,] agreeably to the maxim "Cognition which does not apprehend the distinction, cannot infer [the exact nature of] what is to be distinguished," let the meaning apply only to the genus:—how, then, does it acquaint us with an individual? To this the following aphorism† [replies].

सहचरणस्थानतादर्थ्यवृत्तमानधारणसामीप्ययोगसाधनाधिपत्येभ्यो ब्राह्मणमञ्चकटराजसक्तुचन्दनगङ्गाशकटान्नपुरुषेष्वतद्भावेऽपि तदुपचारः ॥ १२७ ॥

Indirect employment of speech.

Aph. 127.—Though its meaning be not so and so, it is figuratively so employed, in the case of (1) a Bráhman, (2) a scaffold, (3) a

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* न व्यक्तौ शक्तिर्व्यक्तिमात्रस्यानवस्थानात् अव्यवस्थानात् ॥

† व्यक्तिमात्रस्य शक्यत्वे हि गवादिपदाद्यत्किञ्चिद्व्यक्तेरुपस्थितिः स्यादतो गोत्वविशिष्टा व्यक्तिर्वाच्या । तथाच नागृहीतविशेषणान्यायात् जातावेव शक्तिरस्तु कथं तर्हि व्यक्तिबोध इत्यग्रिमसूत्रम् ॥

mat, (4) a king, (5) meal, (6) sandal-wood, (7) the Ganges, (8) a cart, (9) food, and (10) a man,—in consideration of (1) association, (2) place, (3) design, (4) function, (5) measure, (6) containing, (7) vicinity, (8) conjunction, (9) sustenance, and (10) supremacy.

a. 'Though it be not so and so,' i. e., though such be not the direct meaning of the word; 'it is figuratively employed,' i. e., the word is used indirectly; for example, the word "staff" &c. is employed for a Bráhman &c., because of association &c. In consequence of 'association,' which is a species of conjunction, in this example "Feed the staff," the word staff is employed in the sense of the Bráhman who bears a staff.*

b. In like manner, from the 'place,' "The scaffolds shout" means the man standing on the scaffold. From the 'design,' "He makes a mat" implies his aiming after a mat; for the mat, inasmuch as it is a thing non-existent [*until* made], can have [—at the time when one is spoken of as making it—] no maker. Because his 'function' is that of Yama, [the judge of the dead], viz., chastising &c., the word Yama is used to mean a king. By reason of the 'measure,' meal measured by a bushel is called a bushel of meal. By reason of the 'containing,' sandal-wood placed in a vessel is called a vessel of sandal-wood. Because of 'vicinity,' they say "The cows are feeding on the Ganges." Because of the conjunction of some black substance [in the shape of paint,] with the cart, the expression "A black cart" may be instanced. Because it is the 'sustenance' of life, food is called life. In the expression "Of course his family is a king," we un-

* अतद्भावे ऽपि तत्पदाशक्यत्वेऽपि तदुपचारः तच्छब्दव्यपदेशो यथा सहचरणादितो ब्राह्मणादौ यष्ट्यादिपदप्रयोगः। सहचरणात् संयोगविशेषाद्यष्टिं भोजयेत्यत्र यष्टिधरब्राह्मणे यष्टिशब्दप्रयोगः॥

derstand [by family,] the head of the family,—because of the headship* [implied in this elliptical expression].

c. And thus, as, from the word Ganges &c., we understand the bank of the Ganges &c., so, from the word cow &c., we understand that to be indicated which possesses the nature of a cow.†

d. He lays down the opinion that the form alone is what is meant‡ [by an appellative].

आकृतिस्तदपेक्षत्वात् सत्त्वव्यवस्थानसिद्धेः ॥ १२८ ॥

Erroneous opinion that the form is what is denoted by an appellative.

Aph. 128.—The form [—says some one, is what is meant by the word], because it is with reference thereto that the determination of the entity is settled.

a. The form is what is meant by the word;—why?—because,—'of the entity,' e. g., of an animal, as a cow, 'the determina-

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* एवं स्थानान्मञ्चाः क्रोशन्तीति मञ्चस्थपुरुषे । तादर्थ्यात् कटं करोतीति कटार्थैकवीरणे कटस्यासिद्धत्वेन कारकत्वायोगात् । यमस्य वृत्तादनुशासनादितो राजनि यम इति । मानात् आढकेन मिताः सक्तव आढकसक्तव इति । धारणात् तुलया धृतं चन्दनं तुलाचन्दनमिति । सामीप्याद्गङ्गायां गावश्चरन्तीति । कृष्णद्रव्ययोगात् शकटे कृष्णः शकट इत्युदाहरणीयं । प्राणसाधनादन्नं प्राण इति । आधिपत्याद्राजैवास्य कुलमिति कुलाधिपतिः प्रतीयते ॥

† तथाच यथा गङ्गादिपदाद्गङ्गातीरत्वादिना बोधस्तथा गोपदादितो गोत्वविशिष्टस्य लक्षणया बोधः ॥

‡ आकृतिरेव शक्येति मतमुपन्यस्यति ॥

tion is settled,' i. e., there is the settlement of its being such and such a determinate thing,—' with reference thereto,' i. e., with reference to the form:—that is to say, the form alone is what is meant, because it is with reference to the form that the expression "This is a horse," "This is a cow," is employed.*

b. He censures this, by means of its fruit,† [i. e., by showing the absurd consequence to which it leads].

व्यक्त्याकृतियुक्तेऽप्यप्रसङ्गात् प्रोक्षणादीनां मृद्गवके जातिः ॥ १२९ ॥

Absurd consequence of the opinion.

Aph. 129.—[Were this so, then,] in an earthenware cow, where, though it possess individuality and the form, we do not find immolation &c., we should find the genus.

a. Since, in an earthenware cow, though it possess individuality and the form [of a cow], we do not meet with its being immolated &c., [as happens to real cattle], the genus of this or that is [at least necessarily included in] the meaning of a word:—otherwise, we should find the earthenware cow also, inasmuch as it is an individual and it has the form of a cow, getting ceremonially immolated:—such is the import.‡

---

* आकृतिः पदार्थः । कुतः । सत्त्वस्य प्राणिनो गवादेर्व्यवस्थानसिद्धेर्व्यवस्थितत्वसिद्धेस्तदपेक्षत्वादाकृत्यपेक्षत्वादयमश्वो गौरयमित्यादिव्यवहारस्याकृत्यपेक्षत्वादाकृतिरेव प-क्येत्यर्थः ॥

† फलतस्तद्दूषयति ॥

‡ मृद्गवके व्यक्त्याकृतियुक्तेऽपि प्रोक्षणादीनामप्रसङ्गात् तज्जातिः पदार्थ इतरथा मृद्गवकस्यापि व्यक्तित्वाद्गवाकृतिसत्त्वाच्च तेष प्रोक्षणादिप्रसङ्गादिति भावः ॥

b. Having set aside the opinion that the meaning [of a word] is only the individual or the form, he sets aside the opinion that what is meant is the genus alone.*

नाकृतिव्यक्त्यपेक्षत्वाज्जात्यभिव्यक्तेः ॥ १३० ॥

The genus alone is not what is conveyed by an appellative.

Aph. 130.—Nay [—it is not the genus alone that is meant directly by an appellative—] because it is in reference to the form and to the individual that there is the manifestation of the genus.

a. It is not the genus alone that is meant by the word. Since the 'manifestation of the genus,' i. e., the knowledge, communicated verbally, of the genus, has 'reference to the form and to the individual,' i. e., is determined by its having some form and individual as its object,—these two also are necessarily expressed [directly by the word], because it is impossible that they could be recognised except by the direct meaning,† [seeing that they could not be conveyed by 'Indication' or 'Suggestion,' if not directly denoted. See *Sáhitya-Darpaṇa*, §II., 13 and 23].

b. And thus it is settled that all three are expressed directly:—so he says.‡

जात्याकृतिव्यक्तयस्तु पदार्थः ॥ १३१ ॥

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* केवलव्यक्त्याकृतिशक्तिपक्षं निराकृत्य केवलजातिशक्तिपक्षं निराकरोति ॥

† न जातिमात्रं पदार्थः। जात्यभिव्यक्तेर्जातिशाब्दबोधस्य आकृतिव्यक्त्यपेक्षत्वादाकृतिव्यक्तिविषयकत्वनियमात् तयोरपि वाच्यत्वमावश्यकं शक्तिं विना तज्ज्ञानासम्भवात् ॥

‡ इत्थञ्च त्रयाणामपि वाच्यत्वं सिद्धमित्याह ॥

What is really meant by an appellative.

Aph. 131.—But the meaning of a word is the genus and the form and the individual.

a. By the word 'but,' that only one of these is what is meant by a word, is excluded. But the expression 'the meaning of a word' is in the singular, to acquaint us that, though there are three, the power [or direct significance of a word,] is but one.*

b. Though the power [or direct significance of a word,] be indivisible, sometimes one or other [of the three things signified] may [more prominently] present itself. Though the meaning be equal, [in its reference to each of the three,] the pre-eminence belongs to the individual, since it is the subject† [of which the others are the attributes;—so that the word, more strictly, *denotes* the individual and *connotes* its generic properties &c].

c. Since it may be asked, among these what are [what you call] the individual &c.,—he says.‡

व्यक्तिर्गुणविशेषाश्रयो मूर्त्तिः ॥ १३२ ॥

Definition of an individual.

Aph. 132.—An individual is something definite, the abode of particular qualities.

a. He defines form.§

आकृतिर्जातिलिङ्गाख्या ॥ १३३ ॥

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* तुशब्देनैकमात्रपदार्थत्वव्यवच्छेदः । पदार्थ इत्येकवचनन्तु त्रिष्वप्येकैव शक्तिरिति सूचनाय ॥

† विभिन्नशक्तौ कदाचित् कस्यचिदुपस्थितिः स्यात् । शक्तेस्तुल्यत्वेऽपि व्यक्तेर्विशेष्यत्वात् प्राधान्यम् ॥

‡ तत्र के व्यक्त्यादय इत्याकाङ्क्षायामाह ॥

§ आकृतिं लक्षयति ॥

Definition of form.

Aph. 133.—The form is what is called the token of the genus.

a. That of which the name is 'the token of the genus:'—for, of the genus cowhood, for example, the token is a certain collocation of dewlap &c.,* [whereby the cow is recognised].

b. He defines genus.†

समानप्रसवात्मिका जातिः ॥ १३४ ॥

Definition of genus.

Aph. 134.—Genus is that whose nature is to produce the same [conception].

a. That of which the 'nature,' i. e., the essence, is 'to produce,' viz., to produce knowledge,—'the same,' i. e., of the same form, [—knowledge, illustratively, being regarded as taking the form of the object known,—as water takes the form of the receptacle into which it flows] :—and so the meaning is—a fitness to produce knowledge of the same description.‡

b. Here ends the section on the Examination of the Meaning of a Word, and the second Diurnal Portion of the Second Book, namely the Examination of Evidence and its Subservients, by means of the examination of the division thereof.§

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* जातिलिङ्गमित्याख्या यस्या जातेर्गोत्वादेर्हि सास्नादिसंस्थानविशेषो लिङ्गम् ॥

† जातिं लक्षयति ॥

‡ समानः समानाकारकः प्रसवो बुद्धिजननं आत्मा स्वरूपं यस्याः सा। तथाच समानाकारबुद्धिजननयोग्यत्वमर्थः ॥

§ समाप्तं शब्दशक्तिपरीक्षाप्रकरणम्। द्वितीयाध्यायस्य

c. The commentary composed by the venerable Viśwanátha Bhaṭṭáchárya, on the Second Book of the Aphorisms of the Nyáya, is finished.*

द्वितीयमाह्निकञ्च विभागपरीक्षाद्वारकसाङ्गप्रमाणपरीक्षणं नाम ॥

* इति श्रीविश्वनाथभट्टाचार्यकृता न्यायसूत्रवृत्तौ द्वितीयाध्यायवृत्तिः समाप्ता ॥

End of Book II.

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मौल्य सहित पुस्तकों के नाम जो श्रीयुत बेलनटाइन साहिब से बनी हैं पाठशाला के उपकारार्थ।

पुस्तकनाम	रुपया	आना	पाई	भाषानाम
१ इङ्गलिश ग्रिमर	:	१		अंग्रेज़ी
२ इण्ट्रोडक्शन् टु लॉजिक	:	५		
३ लेक्चर्ज़ आन फ़िलासफ़ी	:	१२		तथा
४ इलस्ट्रेशन्स आफ़ मेटाफ़िज़िक्स	:	८		तथा
५ पेराफ़्रेज़ आफ़ मक्बेथ [शेक्सपीर्ज़]	१	८		
६ भाषापरिच्छेद और सिद्धान्तमुक्तावली पहला भाग	:	७	:	संस्कृत और अंग्रेज़ी
७ एलिमेण्ट्स आफ़ इङ्गलिश ग्रामर	:	१२		तथा
८ लघुकौमुदी पहला भाग १	:	८	:	तथा
९ भाग २	:	८	:	तथा
१० भाग ३	:	८	:	तथा
११ तर्क[illegible] भाग १	:	८	:	संस्कृत और हिन्दी
१२ लेक्चर्ज़ आन दि सब्डिविज़न्ज़ आफ़ नालेज वा विद्याचक्र भाग १ २ प्रत्येक	:	४	:	संस्कृत और अंग्रेज़ी

पुस्तकनाम	रुपया आना पाई	भाषानाम
१३ आउटलाइन्ज़ आफ़ संस्कृत ग्रामर [illegible] बालबोध	: ८ :	संस्कृत और हिन्दी
१४ टेक्स्ट बुक फार दि पण्डितस् भाग १	:	अङ्गरेज़ी
१५ भाग २	:	तथा
१६ भाग ३	: १	तथा
१७ भाग ४	: ८	तथा
१८ भाग ५	: ८	तथा
१९ लेक्चर्ज़ आन दि न्याय फिलासोफी वा तर्कसंग्रह	:	संस्कृत और अङ्गरेज़ी
२० लेक्चर्ज़ आन दि सांख्य फ़िलासोफ़ी वा तत्त्वसमास	:	संस्कृत अङ्गरेज़ी
२१ तथा वेदान्त	:	[illegible]
२२ फर्स्ट लेसंज़ इन् संस्कृत ग्रामर	: ४ :	तथा
२३ [illegible] भाग १	: १४	हिन्दी
२४ कटलाग आफ़ आपरेथंज़ इन् दि बनारस [illegible]	:	अङ्गरेज़ी
२५ [illegible]	:	संस्कृत अङ्गरेज़ी

पुस्तकनाम	रुपया	आना	पाई	[illegible]
२६ वैशेषिकसूत्र	:	७	:	संस्कृत
२७ मीमांसासूत्र	:	७	:	संस्कृत
२८ सांख्यसूत्र	:	१२	:	संस्कृत
२९ योगसूत्र भाग १ और २ प्रत्येक	:	८	:	संस्कृत
३० वेदान्तसूत्र	:	७	:	संस्कृत
३१ तर्कसंग्रह	:	८	:	संस्कृत अङ्गरेजी हिन्दी
३२ सिनाप्सिस् आफ़ बेलन्टैन्स् न्यायकौमुदी भाग १	१	:	:	संस्कृत अङ्गरेजी
३३ भाग २	:	१४	:	संस्कृत
३४ नका भाग १	:	८	:	हिन्दी और अङ्गरेजी
३५ बेकन् नोवम् आरगनम् बेकनीयसूत्रव्याख्यान	:	१२	:	संस्कृत और अङ्गरेजी
३६ पुनः शोधित और वर्द्धित तर्कसंग्रह	:	१०	:	संस्कृत
३७ एलिमेन्ट्स् आफ़् लाजिक	१	२	:	अङ्गरेजी

THE APHORISMS

OF THE

SÁNKHYA PHILOSOPHY,

OF

KAPILA

WITH

ILLUSTRATIVE EXTRACTS FROM THE COMMENTARIES.

PRINTED FOR THE USE OF THE BENARES COLLEGE
BY ORDER OF GOVT. N. W. P.

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PREFACE.

The great body of Hindú Philosophy is based upon six sets of very concise Aphorisms. Without a commentary the Aphorisms are scarcely intelligible, they being designed not so much to communicate the doctrine of the particular school, as to aid, by the briefest possible suggestions, the memory of him to whom the doctrine shall have been already communicated. To this end they are admirably adapted; and, this being their end, the obscurity, which must needs attach to them in the eyes of the uninstructed, is not chargeable upon them as a fault.

For various reasons it is desirable that there should be an accurate translation of the Aphorisms, with so much of gloss as may be required to render them intelligible. A class of pandits, in the Benares Sanskrit College, having been induced to learn English, it is contemplated that a version of the Aphorisms, brought out in successive portions, shall be submitted to the criticism of these men, and, through them, of other learned Bráhmans, so that any errors in the version may have the best chance of being discovered and rectified. The employment of such a version as a class-book is designed to subserve further the attempt to determine accurately the aspect of the philosophical terminology of the East as regards that of the West.

These pages, now submitted to the criticism of the pandits who read English, are to be regarded as proof-sheets awaiting correction. They invite discussion.

J. R. B.

Benares College,
5th January, 1852.

THE SÁNKHYA APHORISMS OF KAPILA

INTRODUCTION.

a. Salutation to the illustrious sage Kapila !*

b. Well, the great sage Kapila, desirous of raising the world [from the Slough of Despond in which he found it sunk], perceiving that the knowledge of the *excellence* of any fruit, through the desire [which this excites] for the fruit, is a cause of people's betaking themselves to the means [adapted to the attainment of the fruit], declares, as follows, the excellence of the fruit [which he would urge our striving to obtain].†

अथ त्रिविधदुःखात्यन्तनिवृत्तिरत्यन्तपुरुषार्थः ॥ १ ॥

The subject proposed. *Aph.* 1.—Well, the complete cessation of pain [which is] of three kinds is the complete end of man.

---

* श्री कपिलमुनये नमः ॥

† अथ जगदुद्दिधीर्षुर्महामुनिः कपिलः फलसौन्दर्य-ज्ञानस्य फलेच्छाद्वारा साधनप्रवृत्तौ कारणत्वं पश्यन् फल-सौन्दर्यमाह ॥

a. The word 'Well' serves as a benediction*[—the particle *atha* being regarded as an auspicious one].

b. By saying that the complete cessation of pain, which is of three kinds—viz. (1) due to one's self *(ádhyátmika)*, (2) due to products of the elements *(ádhibhautika)*, and (3) due to supernatural causes *(ádhidaivika)*—, is the *complete* end of man, he means to say that it is the *chief* end of man among the four human aims [—viz. merit, wealth, pleasure, and *liberation*,—see *Sáhitya Darpana* §2,—]† because the three are transitory, whereas liberation is *not* transitory :—such is the state of the case.

A question whether the end may not be attained by ordinary means.

c. But then, let it *be* that the above-mentioned cessation [of all the three kinds of pain] is the complete end of man, still, what reason is there for betaking oneself to a doctrinal system which is the cause of a knowledge of the truth in the shape of the knowledge of the difference between Nature and Soul, when there are *easy* remedies for bodily pains, viz. drugs, &c , and remedies for mental pains, viz. beautiful women and delicate food, &c., and remedies for pains due to products of the elements, viz. the residing in impregnable localities, &c., as is enjoined in the institutes of polity, and remedies for pains due to supernatural causes, viz. gems [such as possess marvellous prophylactic properties], and spells, and herbs of mighty power, &c.,—and when [on the other hand], since it is hard to get one to grapple with that very difficult knowledge of truth which can be perfected only by the toil

---

* अथ शब्दो मङ्गलार्थः ॥

† त्रिविधस्य आध्यात्मिकाधिभौतिकाधिदैविकरूपस्य दुःखस्य अत्यन्तनिवृत्तिरत्यन्तपुरुषार्थः चतुर्षु पुरुषार्थेषु मध्ये श्रेष्ठः पुरुषार्थ इत्यर्थः। त्रयाणां क्षयित्वान्मोक्षस्याक्षयित्वादिति भावः ॥

of successive births, it must be still *more* hard to get one to betake himself to the doctrinal system [which treats of the knowledge in question]?—therefore [—i. e. seeing that this may be asked—] he declares as follows* :—

न दृष्टात्तत्सिद्धिर्निवृत्तेरप्यनुवृत्तिदर्शनात्॥ २ ॥

The end is not to be attained by ordinary means.

Aph. 2.—The effectuation of this [complete cessation of pain] is not [to be expected] by means of the visible [—such as wealth, &c.—], for we see [—on the loss of wealth, &c.—] the restoration [of the evil] after its cessation.

a. 'The visible'—in the shape of the drugs, &c., above-mentioned† [§1. *c*].

b. 'The effectuation of this'—i. e. the effectuation of the complete cessation of pain.‡

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* नन्वस्तूक्तनिवृत्तिरत्यन्तपुरुषार्थस्तथापि सत्त्वपुरुषान्यताख्यातिरूपतत्त्वज्ञानहेतुशास्त्रप्रवृत्तौ को हेतुः शारीरदुःखनिवर्त्तकानामौषधादीनां मानसदुःखनिवर्त्तकानां वरस्त्रीमिष्टान्नादीनां आधिभौतिकदुःखनिवर्त्तकानां नीतिशास्त्रोपदिष्टनिरत्ययस्थानाध्यासनादीनां आधिदैविकदुःखनिवर्त्तकानां मणिमन्त्रमहौषधादीनां सुकराणां सत्त्वेनानेकजन्मपरम्परायाससाध्ये तत्त्वज्ञानेऽतिदुष्करे प्रवृत्तेर्दुर्लभत्वेन शास्त्रप्रवृत्तेर्दुर्लभतरत्वादत आह ॥

† दृष्टादुक्तौषधादिरूपात्॥

‡ तत्सिद्धिः दुःखात्यन्तनिवृत्तिसिद्धिः॥

c. *Why* is it not [to be thus effected]? Because, after the cessation,—the cessation of *pain* is understood,—we see its restoration,—the springing up again of pain in general* [—from whichever of its three sources—§1 *b*].

d. The state of the matter is this:—not by the expedients abovementioned is there such a removal of pain that no pain arises thereafter; for when, by this or that expedient, this or that pain has been destroyed, we see other pains springing up. Therefore, though it be *not* easy [§1. *c.*], the knowledge of truth [as a complete remedy] *is* to be desired.†

e. But then,—Grant that *future* pain is not debarred by drugs, &c., [employed to remove *present* pain], still, by again and again obviating it [as often as it presents itself], there may be the cessation of *future* pain also:—this doubt he states as follows:‡—

प्रात्यहिकक्षुत्प्रतीकारवत्तत्प्रतीकारचेष्टनात्पुरुषार्थत्वम् ॥ ३ ॥

The question whether the end may not be attained by the recurrent use of ordinary means.

Aph. 3.—[Let us consider the doubt] that the soul's desire [the cessation of pain—may result] from exertions for

* न भवति कुतः। निवृत्तेर्दुःखनिवृत्तेरनन्तरमिति शेषः अनुवृत्तिदर्शनात्। दुःखजातीयोत्पत्तिदर्शनात् ॥

† अयं भावः। नोक्तैरुपायैर्दुःखानुत्पत्तिविशिष्टा दुःखनिवृत्तिर्भवति तत्तदुपायैस्तत्तद्दुःखेषु नष्टेष्वपि दुःखान्तरोत्पत्तिदर्शनात् तस्मादसुकरत्वेऽपि तत्त्वज्ञानमेषितव्यमिति ॥

‡ ननु मा भूदौषधादिभिर्भाविदुःखनिवृत्तिः तथापि पुनः पुनः प्रतीकारकरणे तु भाविदुःखनिवृत्तिरपि स्यादिति शङ्कते।

the obviation [of pain], as is the case with the obviation of daily hunger.

a. When pain shall arise, [let us suppose one to argue] then it is to be obviated; and thus there is the soul's desire, the cessation of pain, just as one should eat when there is hunger, and thus there is the soul's desire of the eater, viz. the cessation of hunger. In regard to this [doubt] he states the recognised decision.*

सर्वासम्भवात्सम्भवेऽपि सत्त्वासम्भवाद्धेयः प्रमाणकुशलैः ॥ ४ ॥

This suggestion negatived.

Aph. 4.—This [method of palliatives, §3], is to be rejected by those who are versed in evidence, because it is not everywhere possible [to employ it at all], and because, even if this *were* possible, there would be an impossibility as regards [ensuring] the perfect fitness [of the agents employed].

a. For there are not physicians, &c., in every place and at all times; and [to rely on physicians &c., would not be advisable] even if there were the possibility,—i. e. even if these *were* [always at hand], since physicians are not *perfect* [in their art],—for pain cannot with certainty be got rid of by means of physicians, &c., with their drugs, &c.; moreover, when corporeal pain has departed, there may still be that which is *mental*, &c., so that there is not [under such circumstances] in every respect liberation from pain;—for these reasons *such* a soul's aim [as that which con-

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* यदा दुःखमुत्पत्स्यते तदा तत् प्रतिकर्त्तव्यं तथाच दुःखनिवृत्तिः पुरुषार्थः यथा यदा क्षुत्तदा भोक्तव्यं भुञ्जानस्य क्षुन्निवृत्तिः पुरुषार्थ इति सिद्धान्तयति ॥

tents itself with temporary palliatives] is to be rejected by those who are versed in evidences* [—i. e. who are acquainted with authoritative treatises].

b. He mentions another proof† [of his assertion].

उत्कर्षादपि मोक्षस्य सर्वोत्कर्षश्रुतेः ॥ ५ ॥

Scriptural evidence in favour of this view.

Aph. 5.—Also [an inferior method ought not to be adopted] because of the pre-eminence of Liberation [as proved] by the text [of scripture declaratory] of its pre-eminence above all else.

a. One ought not to endeavour after the removal of this or that pain by these and those expedients [§1. *c.*], since Liberation (*moksha*), by being eternal, is transcendant as a remover of all pains. Moreover one ought to endeavour only after the knowledge of truth, which is the means thereof [—i. e. of Liberation—] because the Scripture tells its pre-eminence above all [other objects of endeavour] in the text "There is nothing beyond the gaining of Soul‡ [—with the utter exclusion of pain]."

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* नहि सर्वस्मिन् देशे सर्वस्मिन् काले वैद्यादयः सन्ति। सम्भवे ऽपि सत्त्वे ऽपि वैद्यादीनां सत्त्वाभावात्। नहि वैद्यादिभिरपि अवश्यमोषधादिना दुःखं हातुं शक्यते। किञ्च शारीरदुःखापगमे मानसादेस्तस्य सम्भव इति न सर्वथा दुःखाद्विमोकः। तस्मात्प्रमाणकुशलैरीदृग्विधपुरुषार्थो हेय इति ॥

† युक्त्यन्तरमाह ॥

‡ न तैस्तैरुपायैस्तत्तद्दुःखोच्छेदे यतितव्यं मोक्षस्य नित्य-

b. But then, [it may be suggested]—when you say *liberation*, we understand you to mean from *bondage*; and is that bondage essential, or is it adventitious? In the former case, it is incapable of destruction; if it come under the latter head, it will perish of itself [like any other adventitious and therefore transitory thing]:—what have we to do with your 'knowledge of truth,' then? To this he replies as follows*.

अविशेषश्चोभयोः ॥ ६ ॥

An objection met.

Aph. 6.—And there is no difference between the two.

a. There is no difference in the applicability of liberation on either of the suppositions, that the bondage is essential or that it is adventitions, [—supposing it were either;—see §19. *b.*]. That is to say, we can tell both how the bondage takes place and how the liberation takes place.†

b. Now, with the view of demonstrating [the real nature of]

त्वेन सर्वदुःखोच्छेदरूपत्वेनोत्कर्षात्। आत्मलाभात्परं न विद्यत इति सर्वोत्कर्षश्रुतेरपि तत्साधने तत्त्वज्ञान एव यतितव्यम्॥

* ननु मोक्ष इत्युक्ते बन्धादिति प्रतीयते। स च बन्धः किं स्वाभाविक उतागन्तुकः। आद्ये नाशायोगः अन्त्ये चेत्स्वत एव नंक्ष्यति किं तत्त्वज्ञानेनेत्यत आह॥

† उभयोः बन्धस्य स्वाभाविकागन्तुकत्वयोर्मोक्षस्योपादेयत्वे अविशेषः। यथा बन्धस्योपपत्तिर्यथा च मोक्षस्य तथा वयं वक्तुं शक्नुम इत्यर्थः॥

Bondage and Liberation, he declares, exclusively, in the first place, the objections to Bondage's being *essential** [§5 *b*].

न स्वभावतो बद्धस्य मोक्षसाधनोपदेशविधिः ॥ ७ ॥

Liberation must be possible, else the means would not have been enjoined.

Aph. 7.—There would be no fitness in the enjoining of means for the liberation of him who is bound *essentially*.

a. Since Liberation has been stated [§1] to result from the complete cessation of pain, [it follows that] Bondage is the junction of pain :—and this is not *essential* in man ; for, if that were the case, then there would be no rule—i. e. no fitness—in the scriptural or legal injunction of means for liberation ;—such is what must be supplied [to complete the aphorism],—because—to explain our meaning [—by an illustration],—*fire* cannot be liberated from its *heat* which is essential to it,—since that which is *essential* exists as long as the substance exists.†

b. And it has been declared in the Divine Song [the *I'swara Gítá,*], "If the soul were essentially foul, or impure, or changeable,

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* अथ बन्धमोक्षयोरुपपत्त्यर्थं आदौ तावत्स्वाभाविकत्वे बन्धस्य दूषणान्याह ॥

† दुःखात्यन्तनिवृत्तेर्मोक्षत्वाद्बन्धो दुःखयोगः । स च पुरुषे न स्वाभाविकः तथा सति मोक्षाय साधनोपदेशस्य श्रौतस्य स्मार्त्तस्य च विधिरनुष्ठानं न घटत इति शेषः । नह्यग्नेः स्वाभाविकादौष्ण्यान्मोक्षस्सम्भवति स्वाभाविकस्य यावद्द्रव्यभावित्वादिति भावः ॥

then its liberation could not take place even through hundreds of successive births."*

c. [Since some one may be disposed to say] "*Grant* that there is no fitness [in the scriptural and legal injunctions—§7. *a.*],—what have we to do with *that?*"—therefore he declares as follows:—†

स्वभावस्यानपायित्वादननुष्ठानलक्षणमप्रामाण्यम् ॥ ८ ॥

Scripture would be nugatory if pain were inevitable.

Aph. 8.—Since an essential nature is imperishable, unauthoritativeness, betokened by inappropriateness, [would be chargeable against the scripture, if pain were essential to humanity].

a. That is to say,—since the essential nature of any thing is imperishable,—i. e. endures as long as the thing itself,—it would follow [—on the supposition that pain is essential to humanity—] that, since Liberation is *impossible*, the Scripture which enjoins the means for its attainment is a false authority, inasmuch as it is inappropriate‡ [in its injunctions. And this is out of the question,—Scripture being assumed here, as in all the others of the six systems, to be an exact measure of truth].

b. But then, [some one may say]—let it *be* an injunction [to use means for the attainment of an unattainable object] on the

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* उक्तञ्चेश्वरगीतायां । यद्यात्मा मलिनो ऽस्वच्छो विकारी स्यात्स्वभावतः । नहि तस्य भवेन्मुक्तिर्जन्मान्तरशतैरपीति ॥

† भवत्वननुष्ठानं किमेतावतेत्यत आह ॥

‡ स्वभावस्यानपायित्वाद्यावद्द्रव्यभावित्वान्मोक्षासम्भवेन तत्साधनोपदेशश्रुतेरननुष्ठानलक्षणमप्रामाण्यं स्यादित्यर्थः ॥

mere strength of Scripture :* [—and, since Scripture is an unquestionable authority, we may be excused from asking or answering the question *why* the injunction is given :—] to this he replies as follows :—

नाशक्योपदेशविधिरुपदिष्टे ऽप्यनुपदेशः ॥ ९ ॥

An impracticable injunction is no rule.

Aph. 9.—There is no rule where something impossible is enjoined; though it *be* enjoined, it is no injunction.

a. There can be no fitness or propriety in an injunction with a view to an impossible fruit, seeing that, though something be enjoined, or ordered, [to be effected] by means that are impracticable, this is no injunction at all, but only the *semblance* of an injunction ;—because it stands to reason that not even the *Veda* can make one see sense in an absurdity :—such is the meaning.†

b. Here he comes upon a doubt.‡

शुक्लपटवद्बीजवच्चेत् ॥ १० ॥

A doubt whether the essential be not removeable.

Aph. 10.—If [some one says]—as in the case of white cloth, or of a seed, [—something essential may be not irremoveable; then he will find his answer in the next aphorism].

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* ननु श्रुतिबलादेवानुष्ठानं स्यात्तत्राह ॥

† अशक्याय फलायोपदेशस्य विधिरनुष्ठानं न सम्भवति यत उपदिष्टे विहिते ऽपि अशक्योपायेन उपदेश एव न भवति किन्तूपदेशाभास एव । बाधितमर्थं वेदो ऽपि न बोधयतीति न्यायादित्यर्थः ॥

‡ अत्र शङ्कते ।

a. But then [the doubter is supposed to argue]—the destruction even of what is essential [—in spite of what is stated under § 7—] *is* seen; as for example, the essential whiteness of white cloth is removed by dyeing, and the essential power of germination in a seed is removed by fire. Therefore, according to the analogy of the white cloth and the seed, it is possible that there should be the removal of the bondage of the soul even though it *were* essential. So too there may be [without any impropriety] the enjoinment of the means thereof. Well—*if* [any one argues thus];—such is the meaning* [of the aphorism, to which he proceeds to reply.]

b. He declares† [the real state of the case with reference to the doubt just raised].

शक्त्युद्भवानुद्भवाभ्यां नाशक्योपदेशः ॥ ११ ॥

Decision that an essential property may be hidden but not removed.

Aph. 11.—Since both perceptibleness and [subsequent] non-perceptibleness may belong to some power [which is indestructible], it is not something *impracticable* that is enjoined [when one is directed to render some indestructible power imperceptible].

a. In regard even to the two examples abovementioned [§ 10] people do not give an injunction for [the positive destruction of]

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* ननु स्वाभाविकस्याप्यपायो दृश्यते यथा शुक्लपटस्य स्वाभाविकं शौक्ल्यं रागेणापनीयते यथाच बीजस्य स्वाभाविकमङ्कुरशक्तिरग्निनापनीयते । अतश्शुक्लपटवद्बीजवच्च स्वाभाविकस्यापि बन्धस्यापायः पुरुषे सम्भवतीति तद्वदेव तत्साधनोपदेशः स्यादिति चेदित्यर्थः ॥

† समाधत्ते ॥

something essential, which is indestructible [§ 8]. Why [do we say this]? Because in these two instances of the perceptibleness and non-perceptibleness of a power [—the powers, namely, of appearing white, and of germinating—see § 10. *a.*—] there are merely the manifestation and [afterwards] the *hiding* of the whiteness, &c., but not the *removal* of the whiteness or of the power of germination;—because—that is to say—the whiteness of the dyed cloth and the germinating power of the roasted seed can again be brought out by the processes of the bleacher, &c., [in the case of the dyed cloth,] and by the will of the *Yogí* [—the possessor of supernatural powers,—in the case of the roasted seed—] &c.*

b. Having thus disproved the notion that Bondage is *essential* [to man], wishing to disprove also the notion that it is the result of some [adherent] *cause,* he rejects the [various supposable] causes, viz., Time &c.†

न कालयोगतो व्यापिनो नित्यस्य सर्वसम्बन्धात् ॥ १२ ॥

Time, which applies to all, cannot be the cause of the bondage of a part.

Aph. 12.—Not from connection with *time* [does bondage befall the soul], because this, all-pervading and eternal, is eternally associated [with *all,* and not with those alone who are in bondage].

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* उक्तदृष्टान्तयोरपि अशक्याय स्वाभाविकायोपदेशो लोकानां न भवति। कुतः। शक्त्युद्भवानुद्भवाभ्यां दृष्टान्तद्वये शुक्लत्वादेराविर्भावतिरोभावावेव भवतः नतु शौक्ल्यस्याङ्कुरशक्तेश्चापायः। रजकादिव्यापारैर्योगिसङ्कल्पादिभिश्च रक्तपटभृष्टबीजयोः पुनश्शौक्ल्यस्याङ्कुरशक्तेश्चाविर्भावादिति भावः॥

† एवं बन्धस्य स्वाभाविकत्वं निराकृत्य नैमित्तिकत्वमपि निराकरिष्यन्निमित्तानि कालादीनि निराकरोति॥

a. The bondage of man is not caused by *time,* because [if that were the case] there could be no such separation as that of the *liberated* and *un-liberated,* because time, which applies to everything and is eternal, is at all times associated with all men* [—and must therefore bring *all* into bondage if any].

न देशयोगतोऽप्यस्मात्॥ १३ ॥

Place, for the same reason, cannot be the cause.

Aph. 13.—Nor [does bondage arise] from connection with *place* either, for the same reason.

a. That is to say,—bondage does not arise from connection with *place.* Why? 'For the same reason,'—i. e. for that stated in the preceding aphorism,—viz. that, since it [viz. place] is connected with *all* men, whether liberated or not liberated, bondage would [in *that* case] befal the *liberated* also.†

नावस्थातो देहधर्मत्वात्तस्याः ॥ १४ ॥

The soul is not kept in bondage by its being hampered among circumstances.

Aph. 14. Nor [does the bondage of the soul arise] from its being conditioned [by its standing among circumstances that clog it by surrounding it], because *that* is the habit [not of the soul but] of the *body.*

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* न कालनिमित्तकः पुरुषस्य बन्धः व्यापिनो नित्यस्य कालस्य सर्वैः पुरुषैस्सर्वकालावच्छेदेन सम्बन्धात् मुक्तामुक्तव्यवस्थानुपपत्तेः ॥

† देशयोगतोऽपि न बन्धः। कुतः। अस्मात्। पूर्वसूत्रोक्तात्। मुक्तामुक्तसर्वपुरुषसम्बन्धात् मुक्तस्यापि बन्धापत्तेरित्यर्थः॥

a. By 'condition' we mean the being in the shape of a sort of association. The bondage [of the soul] does not arise from *that*, because *that* is the property of the *body* [and not of the soul];—because—that is to say—bondage might befal even the liberated [—which is impossible—] if that which is the habit of another could occasion the bondage of one quite different.*

b. But then [some one might say,] *let* this conditioned state belong to the soul. On this point [to prevent mistakes] he declares:†—

असङ्गो ऽयम्पुरुष इति ॥ १५ ॥

The soul is altogether solitary.

Aph. 15. [It is not so] because this soul is unassociated [with any conditions or circumstances that could serve as its bonds].

a. The word *iti* here shows that it [i. e. the assertion conveyed in the aphorism] is a *reason*,—the construction, with the preceding aphorism, being this, that, *since* the soul is unassociated, it belongs only to the body to be [hampered] among circumstances.‡

न कर्मणान्यधर्मत्वादतिप्रसक्तेश्च ॥ १६ ॥

The fruit of works belongs not to the soul.

Aph. 16.—Nor [does the bondage of soul arise] from any work, because these

* अवस्था। संघातविशेषरूपता। ततो न बन्धः। तस्याः देहधर्मत्वात्। अन्यधर्मस्य साक्षादन्यबन्धकत्वे मुक्तस्यापि बन्धापत्तेरिति भावः॥

† ननु पुरुषस्यैवावस्था स्यात्तत्राह॥

‡ इतिर्हेतौ। पुरुषस्यासङ्गत्वादवस्थाया देहमात्रधर्मत्वमिति पूर्वसूत्रेणान्वयः॥

are the property of another, and because it would be eternal [if the case were as you imagine].

a. That is to say,—moreover the bondage of the soul does not arise from any work, whether enjoined or forbidden, because works are the property of another, i. e. not the property of the soul [but of the mind] ; and if, through a property of another, the bondage of one quite distinct could take place, then bondage might befal even the liberated* [through some acts of some one else].

b. But then [some one may say], this objection does not apply if we hold that bondage may arise from the acts of the *associate* [—viz. the mental organ];—so, with allusion to this, he states another reason,—'and because it would be eternal'—i. e. because bondage, in the shape of connection with pain, would occur [where it does not] even in such cases as the universal dissolution† [of the phenomenal universe, including the mental organ but *not* the soul].

A doubt whether the bondage also belong not to something else than the soul.

c. But then [some one may say], if that be the case then let the bondage too, in the shape of connection with pain, belong [not to the *soul* but] to the *mind* alone, in accordance with the principle that it have the same locus as the works [to which

* न विहितनिषिद्धकर्मणापि पुरुषस्य बन्धः कर्मणो ऽन्यधर्मत्वादनात्मधर्मत्वादित्यर्थः। अन्यधर्मेण साक्षादन्यस्य बन्धे च मुक्तस्यापि बन्धापत्तेः॥

† ननु स्वोपाधिकर्मणा बन्धाङ्गीकारे नायं दोष इत्याशयेन हेत्वन्तरमाहातिप्रसक्तेश्चेति। प्रलयादावपि दुःखयोगरूपबन्धापत्तेश्चेत्यर्थः॥

it is due]; and, since it is an established point that pain is an affection of the *mind*, why is bondage [i. e. connection with pain] assumed of the *soul* also? With reference to this doubt he declares as follows:—*

विचित्रभोगानुपपत्तिरन्यधर्मत्वे ॥ १७ ॥

Why it is to the soul that the bondage must belong.

Aph. 17.—If it were the property of any other, then there could not be diverse experience.

a. If bondage, in the shape of connection with pain, were the property of another, i. e. a property of the *mind*, there could be no such thing as diverse experience,—there could be no such different experience as one man's experiencing pain and another man's not [—for, it must be remembered, it is not in point of *mind* but of *soul* that men are held by Kapila to be numerically different—]; therefore it must be admitted that pain is connected with the soul also. And this [pain that belongs to the soul] is in the shape merely of a *reflection* of the pain [that attaches to its attendant organism], and this reflection is of its *own* attendant [organism] only, so that there is no undue result† [deducible from our theory.]

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* नन्वेवं दुःखयोगरूपोऽपि बन्धः कर्मसामानाधिकरण्यानुरोधेन चित्तस्यैवास्तु दुःखस्य चित्तधर्मतायासिद्धत्वाच्च किमर्थं पुरुषस्यापि कल्प्यते बन्ध इत्याशङ्कायामाह ॥

† दुःखयोगरूपबन्धस्य अन्यधर्मत्वे चित्तधर्मत्वे विचित्रभोगानुपपत्तिः कश्चिदेव दुःखभोक्ता कश्चिन्नेति विचित्रभोगानुपपत्तिः। अतः पुरुषेऽपि दुःखयोगः स्वीकार्यः। सच दुःखप्रतिबिम्बरूप एव प्रतिबिम्बश्च स्वोपाधेरेव भवतीति नातिप्रसङ्ग इति ॥

b. He rejects also the notion that Nature *(prakriti)* is *directly* the cause of bondage.*

प्रकृतिनिबन्धनाच्चेन्न तस्यापि पारतन्त्र्यम्॥ १८ ॥

Nature is not the immediate cause of the soul's bondage.

Aph. 18.—If [you say that the soul's bondage arises] from Nature as its cause, [then I say] no,—[because] that also is a dependant thing.

a. But then [some one may say] let bondage result from *Nature* as its cause:—if you say so, I say no,—because that also, i. e. Nature also, is dependent on the *conjunction* which is to be mentioned in the next aphorism,—because if it [Nature] were to occasion bondage even *without* that [conjunction which is next to be mentioned], then bondage would occur even in such cases as the universal dissolution† [when soul is altogether disconnected from the phenomenal].

b. If the reading [in the aphorism] be *nibandhaná* [in the 1st case and not in the 5th], then the construction will be as follows:—"If [you say that] the bondage is caused by Nature," &c.‡

c. Therefore, since Nature can be the cause of bondage only

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* साक्षात्प्रकृतिनिमित्तकत्वमपि बन्धस्यापाकरोति॥

† ननु प्रकृतिनिमित्ताद्बन्धो भवत्विति चेन्न यतस्तस्यापि प्रकृतेरपि उत्तरसूत्रे वक्ष्यमाणसंयोगपारतन्त्र्यं तेन विनापि बन्धकत्वे प्रलयादावपि बन्धप्रसङ्गात्॥

‡ निबन्धना चेदिति पाठे प्रकृतिनिबन्धना बद्धता चेदिति योज्यं॥

as depending on something else [—i. e. on the conjunction to be mentioned in the next aphorism], through this very sort of conjunction [it follows that] the bondage is *reflectional,*—like the heat of water due to the conjunction of fire,* [—water being held to be essentially cold, and only to *seem* hot while the heat continues in conjunction with it].

d. He establishes his own tenet, while engaged on this point, in the very middle† [of his criticisms on erroneous notions in regard to the matter,—for there are more to come].

न नित्यशुद्धबुद्धमुक्तस्वभावस्य तद्योगस्तद्योगादृते ॥ १९ ॥

What really is the relation of its bondage to the soul.

Aph. 19.—But not without the conjunction thereof [i. e. of Nature] is there the connection of that [i. e. of pain] with that [viz. the soul] which is ever essentially a pure and free intelligence.

a. Therefore, without the conjunction thereof,—i. e. without the conjunction of Nature,—there is not to the soul any connection with that,—i. e. any connection with bondage:—but, moreover, just through that [connection with Nature] does bondage take place.‡

b. In order to suggest the fact that the bondage [of the soul] is reflectional [—and not inherent in it either essentially or ad-

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* अतो यत्परतन्त्रा प्रकृतिर्बन्धकारणम्भवेत् तस्मादेव संयोगविशेषादौपाधिको बन्धो ऽग्निसंयोगाज्जलौष्ण्यवदिति ॥

† स्वसिद्धान्तममुनैव प्रसङ्गेनान्तराल एवावधारयति ॥

‡ तद्योगादृते प्रकृतिसंयोगं विना न पुरुषस्य तद्योगो बन्धसम्बन्धो ऽस्ति । अपितु तत एव बन्धः ॥

ventitiously—] he makes use of the indirect expression with a double negative [—"not without"]. For if bondage were produced by the conjunction [of the soul] with Nature, as colour is produced by heating [—in the case of a jar of black clay which becomes red in the baking—], then, just like that, it would continue even after disjunction therefrom [—as the red colour remains in the jar after the fire of the brick-kiln has been extinguished,—whereas the red colour occasioned in a crystal vase by a China-rose, while it occurs *not without* the China-rose, ceases on the removal thereof]. Hence, as bondage ceases on the disjunction [of the soul] from Nature, the bondage is merely reflectional, and neither essential [§5. *b.*] nor adventitious* [§11. *b*].

c. In order that there may not be such an error as that of the Vaiseshikas—viz. [the opinion that there is] an absolutely real conjunction [of the soul] with pain, he says 'which is ever,' &c. [§19]. That is to say,—as the connection of *colour* with essentially pure crystal does not take place without the conjunction of the China-rose [—the hue of which, seen athwart the crystal, seems to belong to the crystal—], just so the connection of *pain* with the soul, essentially pure, &c., could not take place without the conjunction of some accidental associate. That is to say, pain, &c., cannot arise *spontaneously*† [—any more than a red colour can arise spontaneously in the crystal which is essentially pure].

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* बन्धस्यौपाधिकत्वलाभाय नञ्द्वयेन वक्रोक्तिः। यदि हि बन्धः पाकजरूपवत्प्रकृतिसंयोगजन्यः स्यात्तदा तद्वदेव तद्वियोगे ऽप्यनुवर्त्तेत। अतः प्रकृतिवियोगे बन्धाभावादौपाधिक एव बन्धो नतु स्वाभाविको नैमित्तिको वेति॥

† वैशेषिकाणामिव पारमार्थिको दुःखयोग इति भ्रमो मा भूदित्येतदर्थं नित्येत्यादि। यथा स्वभावशुद्धस्फटिकस्य

d. This has been declared in the *Saura* as follows:—"As the pure crystal is regarded by people as red in consequence of the proximity of something [as a China-rose] that lends its colour, in like manner the supreme soul* [is regarded as being affected by pain]."

e. In that [aphorism 19] the perpetual purity means the being ever devoid of merit and demerit; the perpetual intelligence means the consisting of uninterrupted thought; and the perpetual liberatedness means the being ever dissociated from *real* pain:—that is to say, the connection with pain in the shape of a *reflection* is not a real bondage† [any more than the reflection of the China-rose is a real stain in the crystal].

f. And so the maker of the aphorism means that the cause of its bondage is just a particular *conjunction* [§19. *c.*],—and now enough as to that point.‡

रागो न जवायोगं विना घटते तथैव नित्यशुद्धादिस्वभावस्य पुरुषस्योपाधिसंयोगं विना दुःखसंयोगो न घटते। स्वतो दुःखाद्यसम्भवादित्यर्थः॥

* तदुक्तं सौरे। यथा हि केवलो रक्तः स्फटिको लक्ष्यते जनैः। रञ्जकाद्युपधानेन तद्वत्परमपूरुष इति॥

† तत्र नित्यशुद्धत्वं सदा पुण्यपापशून्यत्वं। नित्यबुद्धत्वं अलुप्तचिद्रूपत्वं। नित्यमुक्तत्वं सदा पारमार्थिकदुःखा-युक्तत्वं। प्रतिबिम्बरूपदुःखयोगस्त्वपारमार्थिको बन्ध इति भावः॥

‡ तथा च संयोगविशेष एवात्र बन्धहेतुतया सूत्रकृदभिप्रेत इत्यलम्॥

g. Now he rejects [§18. *d.*], certain causes of [the soul's] bondage preferred by others.*

नाविद्यातो ऽप्यवस्तुना बन्धायोगात् ॥ २० ॥

The Vedantic tenet on this point disputed.

Aph. 20.—Not from Ignorance, too, [does the soul's bondage arise], because that which is not a reality is not adapted to binding.

a. The word 'too' is used with reference to the previously mentioned 'Time,' &c.,† [—§12—which had been rejected, as causes of the bondage, antecedently to the statement, in §19, of the received cause].

b. Neither, too, does [the soul's] union with bondage result directly from 'Ignorance,' as is the opinion of those who assert non-duality [or the existence of no reality save one,—see *Vedánta-Sára* §20. *b*], because, since their 'Ignorance' is not a real thing, it is not fit to bind;—because, that is to say—the binding of any one with a rope merely *dreamt* of was never witnessed.‡

c. But if 'Ignorance' *be* a reality [as some assert], then he declares as follows.§

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* इदानीमन्याभिप्रेतान् बन्धहेतून् निरस्यति ॥

† अपिशब्दः पूर्वोक्तकालाद्यपेक्षया ॥

‡ अविद्यातो ऽपि न साक्षाद्बन्धयोगो ऽद्वैतवादिनां तेषामविद्याया अप्यवस्तुत्वेन तया बन्धानौचित्यात्। नहि स्वप्नरज्ज्वा बन्धनं दृष्टमित्यर्थः ॥

§ अविद्याया वस्तुत्वे त्वाह ॥

वस्तुत्वे सिद्धान्तहानिः ॥ २१ ॥

The Vedánti cannot evade the objection without stultifying himself.

Aph. 21. If it ['Ignorance'] *be* [asserted by you to be] a reality, then there is an abandonment of the [Vedántic] tenet [by you who profess to follow the Vedánta].

a. That is to say;—and if you agree that 'Ignorance' *is* a reality, then you abandon your own implied dogma [see Nyáya Aphorisms §31—] of the un-reality of 'Ignorance',* [—and so you stultify yourself].

b. He states another objection.†

विजातीयद्वैतापत्तिश्च ॥ २२ ॥

The Vedánti cannot evade the objection without conceding a duality.

Aph. 22. And [if you assume 'Ignorance' to be a reality, then] there would be a *duality* through [there being] something of a different kind [from soul,—which you asserters of *non-duality* cannot contemplate allowing].

a. That is to say,—if 'Ignorance' is real and without a begining, then it is eternal and coordinate with Soul:—if [therefore] it be *not* soul, then there is a duality through [there being] something of a different kind [from soul; and this the Vedántis cannot intend to establish] because these followers of the *Vedánta*, asserting *non-duality*, hold that there is neither a duality through

* यदि चाविद्याया वस्तुत्वं स्वीक्रियते तदा स्वाभ्युपगतस्याविद्यावस्तुत्वस्य हानिरित्यर्थः ॥

† दूषणान्तरमाह ॥

there being something of the same kind [with soul] nor through there being something of a different kind.*

b. He ponders a doubt.†

विरुद्धोभयरूपा चेत्॥ २३ ॥

The Vedántí must not allege that 'Ignorance' is at once real and unreal.

Aph. 23. If [the Vedántí alleges, regarding 'Ignorance,' that] it is in the shape of both these opposites, [—then we shall say Nay, for the reason to be assigned in the next aphorism].

a. The meaning is,—if [the Vedántí says that] 'Ignorance' is not *real,* else there would be a duality through [there being] something of a different kind [from soul,—which a follower of the Vedánta cannot allow]; and moreover it is not *unreal,* because we experience its effects; but it is in the shape of something at once real and unreal‡ [like Plato's ὀν και μη ὀν—see *Vedánta-sára* §21].

न तादृक्पदार्थाप्रतीतेः॥ २४ ॥

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* यद्यविद्या वस्तुभूता अनादिस्तदा नित्या आत्मतुल्या। अनात्मत्वे विजातीयद्वैतत्वं। तेहि वेदान्तिनो ऽद्वैतवादिनस्सजातीयविजातीयद्वैताभावं मन्यन्त इति॥

† शङ्कते॥

‡ अविद्या न सती येन विजातीयद्वैतापत्तिः। नाप्यसती कार्योपलम्भात्। किन्तु सदसद्रूपा चेदित्यर्थः॥

There is no such thing as a thing at once real and unreal.

Aph. 24. [To the suggestion that 'Ignorance' is at once real and unreal, we say] no,—because no such thing is known [as is at once real and unreal.]

a. That is to say,—it is not right to say that 'Ignorance' is at once real and unreal. The reason of this he states in the words 'because no such thing' &c.,—because any such thing as is at once real and unreal is not known. For, in the case of a dispute, it is necessary that there should be an *example* of the thing [—i. e.—see Nyáya Aphorisms §25—a case in which all parties are agreed that the property in dispute is really present—], and, as regards *your* opinion, such is not to be found [—for, where is there any thing in regard to which both parties are agreed that it is at once real and unreal, as they are agreed that fire is to be met with on the culinary hearth?]—such is the import.*

b. Again he ponders a doubt.†

न वयं षट्पदार्थवादिनो वैशेषिकादिवत् ॥ २५ ॥

A question whether the Vedánti is bound to avoid self-contradiction.

Aph. 25. [Possibly the Vedántí may remonstrate—] "*We* are not asserters of any Six Categories like the *Vaiśeshikas* and others."

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* सदसद्रूपा अविद्येति न युक्तमित्यर्थः। तत्र हेतुमाह तादृगिति। सदसद्रूपस्य कस्यचिदपि पदार्थस्याप्रतीतेः। विवादास्पदे हि वस्तुनि दृष्टान्त आवश्यकः सच भवन्नये ऽप्रसिद्ध इति भावः॥

† पुनः शङ्कते॥

a. "We are not asserters of a definite set of categories [—like the *Vaiśeshikas* who arrange all things under six heads, and the *Naiyáyikas* who arrange them under sixteen—]; therefore we hold that there *is* such a thing—unknown though it be [to people in general]—as 'Ignorance' which is at once real and unreal, or [if you prefer it] which differs at once from the real and the unreal [—see *Vedánta-sára* §21—], because this is established by proofs,* [scriptural or otherwise, which are satisfactory to *us*, although they may not comply with all the technical requisitions of Gautama's scheme of argumentative exposition,"—see Nyáya Aphorisms §35].

b. By the expression [in the aphorism] 'and others,' are meant the *Naiyáyikas*, for the *Naiyáyika* is an asserter of sixteen categories,† [—see Nyáya Aphorisms §1].

c. He confutes this‡ [pretence of evading the objection by disallowing the categories of the Nyáya].

अनियतत्वेऽपि नायौक्तिकस्य संग्रहोऽन्यथा बालोन्मत्तादिसमत्वम् ॥ २६ ॥

The self-contradictory is altogether inadmissible.

Aph. 26. Even although this be not fixed [that the categories are six or sixteen], there is no acceptance of the inconsistent, else we come to the level of children and madmen and the like.

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* न वयं नियतपदार्थवादिनः । अतोऽप्रतीतोऽपि सदसदात्मकः सदसद्विलक्षणो वा अविद्यापदार्थ इत्यङ्गीकुर्मः मानसिद्धत्वात् ॥

† आदिपदान्नैयायिकः स हि षोडशपदार्थवादीति ॥

‡ परिहरति ॥

a. Let there be [accepted] no system of categories [such as that of the Nyáya—§25], still, since *being* and *not-being* are contradictory, it is impossible for any disciples to admit, merely on your worship's assertion, a thing at once real and unreal, which is inconsistent,—contrary to all fitness; otherwise we might as well accept also the self-contradictory assertions of children and the like;—such is the meaning.*

b. Certain heretics [—deniers of the authority of the Vedas—] assert that there exist external objects, of momentary duration [individually, each being, however, replaced by its fac-simile the next instant, so that the uninterrupted series of productions becomes something equivalent to continuous duration], and that by the influence of these the bondage of the soul is occasioned. This he objects to as follows:†—

नानादिविषयोपरागनिमित्तको ऽप्यस्य ॥ २७ ॥

The heretical theory of a succession of objects from all eternity, as causing the soul's bondage, rejected.

Aph. 27. [The bondage] thereof, moreover, is not caused by any influence of objects from all eternity.

a. 'Thereof,'—i. e. of the soul. An eternal influence of objects,—an influence of objects the effect of which, in the shape

* पदार्थनियमो मास्तु तथापि भावाभावविरोधेन अयौक्तिकस्य युक्तिविरुद्धस्य सदसदात्मकपदार्थस्य संग्रहो भवद्वचनमात्राच्छिष्याणां न सम्भवति अन्यथा बालकाद्युक्तस्याप्ययौक्तिकस्य संग्रहः स्यादित्यर्थः ॥

† केचिन्नास्तिका आहुः सन्ति बाह्यविषयाः क्षणिकाः तेषां वासनया जीवस्य बन्ध इति तद्दूषयति ॥

of a continued stream, has had no commencement,—not by *this* either is it possible that the bondage [of the soul] has been occasioned;—such is the meaning.*

b. He states the reason of this† [impossibility].

न बाह्यान्तरयोरुपरज्योपरञ्जकभावो ऽपि देशव्यवधानात् स्रुघ्नस्थपाटलिपुत्रस्थयोरिव ॥ २८ ॥

A thing cannot act where it is not.

Aph. 28. Also [in my opinion as well as in yours apparently] between the external and the internal there is not the relation of the influenced and the influencer, because there is a local separation, as there is between him that stays at Srughna and him that stays at Páṭaliputra.

a. In the opinion of these [persons whose theory we are at present objecting to], the soul is circumscribed, residing entirely within the body; and that which is thus *within* cannot stand in the relation of the influenced and the influencer as regards an *external* object. Why? Because they are separated in regard to place, like two persons the one of whom remains in Srughna and the other in Páṭaliputra;—such is the meaning. Because the affection which we call 'influence' (*vásaná*) is seen only when there is conjunction,—such as that of madder and the cloth [—to which it gives its colour—], or that of flowers and the flower-basket‡ [—to which they impart their odour.]

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* अस्यात्मनः । अनादिविषयोपरागः प्रवाहरूपेणानादिकार्य्या विषयवासना तन्निमित्तको ऽपि बन्धो न सम्भवतीत्यर्थः ॥

† अत्र हेतुमाह ॥

‡ तन्मते परिच्छिन्नो देहान्तरस्थ एवात्मा तस्याभ्यन्तरस्य

b. By the word 'Also,' the absence of conjunction [between the soul and objects—see §15—], &c., which he himself holds, is connected* [with the matter of the present aphorism].

c. Srughna and Pâṭaliputra [—Palibothra, or Patna—] are two several places far apart.†

d. But then, [these heretics may reply] "The influence of objects [on the soul] may be asserted because there *is* a contact with the object, inasmuch as the soul, according to *us*, goes to the place of the object, just as the senses according to your worship." Therefore he declares as follows :‡

द्वयोरेकदेशलब्धोपरागान्न व्यवस्था ॥ २९ ॥

On the heretical view the free soul would be equally liable to bondage.

Aph. 29. [It is impossible that the soul's bondage should arise] from an influence received in the same place [where the object is, because, in that case,] there would be no distinction between the two [—the bond and the free].

न बाह्यविषयेण सहोपरज्योपरञ्जकभावो ऽपि सम्भवति। कुतः। स्रुघ्नस्थपाटलिपुत्रस्थयोरिव देशव्यवधानादित्यर्थः। संयोगे सत्येव हि वासनाख्य उपरागो दृष्टः। यथा मञ्जिष्ठावस्त्रयोर्यथा वा पुष्पपुटकयोरिति॥

* अपिशब्देन स्वमते संयोगाभावादिस्समुच्चीयते॥

† स्रुघ्नपाटलिपुत्रौ विप्रकृष्टदेशविशेषौ॥

‡ ननु भवतामिन्द्रियाणामिवास्माकमात्मनो विषयदेशगमनाद्विषयसंयोगेन विषयोपरागो वक्तव्यस्तत्राह॥

a. To complete the sense we must supply as follows :—'It is impossible that the bondage should arise from an influence received in one and the same place with the object.' Why? Because there would be no distinction between the two, the soul bound and the soul free, because bondage would [in that case] befal the liberated soul also [the free soul, according to this hypothesis, being just as liable to come across objects as any other—], such is the meaning.*

b. Here he ponders a doubt.†

अदृष्टवशाच्चेत् ॥ ३० ॥

The heretic's attempted defence.

Aph. 30. If [the heretic, wishing to save his theory, suggests that a difference between the two cases—see §29—*does* exist] in virtue of the *unseen* [—i. e. of merit and demerit,—then he will find his answer in the next aphorism].

a. That is to say [—the heretic may argue—] "But then, granting that they [the free soul and the bound] are alike in respect of their coming into contact with objects, when they become conjoined with them in one and the same locality, yet the *reception of the influence* may result merely from the force of the *unseen* [—i. e. from the merit or demerit of this or that soul,—the soul that is liberated alike from merit and demerit being able to encounter with impunity the object that would en-

* एकस्मिन्विषयदेशे लब्धादुपरागाद्बन्धो न सम्भवतीति शेषः । कुतः । यस्मात् द्वयोर्बद्धमुक्तात्मनोर्न व्यवस्था मुक्तस्यापि बन्धापत्तेरित्यर्थः ॥

† अत्र शङ्कते ॥

chain one differently circumstanced,]"—if* [*this* be urged, then we look forward].

a. This he disputes, as follows:†

न द्वयोरेककालायोगादुपकार्य्योपकारकभावः ॥ ३१ ॥

Each back must bear its own burden.

Aph. 31. They cannot stand in the relation of deserver and bestower, since the two do not belong to one and the same time.

a. Since in thy opinion, the agent and the patient are distinct, and do not belong to the same time [—believing, as thou heretically dost, not only that *objects*—see §26. *b*.—momentarily perish and are replaced, but that the duration of *souls* also is of a like description—], there is positively no such relation [between the soul at one time and its successor at another] as that of deserver and bestower [or transmitter of its merits or demerits]; because it is impossible that there should be an influence of objects [§27] taking effect on a patient [—say the soul of today—] occasioned by the 'unseen' [merit or demerit] belonging to an agent [—say the soul of yesterday—which, on the hypothesis in question, is a numerically different individual—];—such is the meaning.‡

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* नन्वेकदेशसम्बन्धेन विषयसंयोगसाम्येऽपि अदृष्टवशाद्वैषोपरागलाभ इति चेदित्यर्थः ॥

† परिहरति ॥

‡ तव मते कर्त्तृभोक्त्रोर्भेदात् एककालासम्बन्धाच्च नैवोपकार्य्योपकारकभावः । नहि कर्त्तृनिष्ठादृष्टेन भोक्तृनिष्ठो विषयोपरागः सम्भवतीत्यर्थः ॥

b. He ponders a doubt.*

पुत्रकर्म्मवदिति चेत्॥ ३२ ॥

Whether merit may or may not be imputed.

Aph. 32. If [the heretic suggests that] the case is like that of the ceremonies in regard to a son, [—then he will find his reply by looking forward].

a. But then [the heretic—admitting the principle that the merit or demerit of an act belongs entirely to the agent—may urge that] as the son is benefited by ceremonies in regard to a son,—such as that [ceremony—see Colebrooke's Hindú Law, vol. 3. p. 104—celebrated] in anticipation of conception,—which [no doubt] belongs to the *father* [who performs the ceremonies to propitiate the gods],—in like manner there may be an influence of objects on the experiencer [—say the soul of to-day—] through the 'unseen' [merit or demerit] that belongs even to a different subject [—say the soul of yesterday—]: such is the meaning† [of the heretic].

b. He refutes this by showing that the illustration is not a fact.‡

नास्ति हि तत्र स्थिर एक आत्मा यो गर्भाधानादिना संस्क्रियेत॥ ३३ ॥

This will not help the heretic's argument.

Aph. 33. [Your illustration proves nothing,] for, in that case, there is no one per-

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* शङ्कते॥

† ननु यथा पितृनिष्ठेन गर्भाधानादिना पुत्रकर्मणा पुत्रस्योपकारो भवति तद्वत् व्यधिकरणेनैवादृष्टेन भोक्तुर्विषयोपरागः स्यादित्यर्थः॥

‡ दृष्टान्तासिद्ध्या परिहरति॥

manent soul which could be consecrated by the ceremonies in anticipation of conception, &c.

a. 'In that case'—i. e. on thy theory too the benefit of the son, by means of the performance of the ceremonies in anticipation of conception, &c., could not take place,—'for,' i. e. because, on that theory there is not one [self-identical] soul, continuing from the [time of] conception to the birth, which could be consecrated [by the ceremonies in question] so as to be a fit subject for the duties that pertain to the time subsequent to birth [—such as the investiture with the sacred thread, for which the young bráhman would not be a fit subject if the ceremonies in anticipation of his conception had been omitted—]; and thus your illustration is not a real one* [on your *own* theory;—it is not a thing that you can assert as a fact].

b. And according to *my* theory also your illustration is not a fact, seeing that it *is* possible that the benefit to the son should arise from the 'unseen' [merit] deposited in the son by means of the ceremony regarding the son, for it is an implied tenet [of my school] that it [the soul] is permanent [in its self-identity], and there is the injunction† [of Manu— ch. 2. v. 26.—, with regard to the ceremonies in question, which proceeds on the same grounds].

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* तत्र त्वन्मते गर्भाधानादिकर्मणापि पुत्रस्योपकारो न घटते। हि। यस्मात्। तत्र गर्भाधानमारभ्य जन्मपर्यन्तस्थायी एक आत्मा नास्ति यो जन्मोत्तरकालीनकर्माधिकारार्थं संस्क्रियेतेति। तथाच दृष्टान्तासिद्धिः॥

† अस्मन्मतेऽपि स्थैर्याभ्युपगमाद्वचनाच्च पुत्रकर्मणा पुत्रनिष्ठादृष्टोत्पत्तेः पुत्रोपकारसम्भवात् दृष्टान्तस्यासिद्धिरित्यर्थः॥

c. Some other heretic may encounter us on the strength of [the argument here next stated, viz.] "But then, since *bondage* also [like every thing else] is momentary, let this bondage have nothing determinate for its cause, or *nothing at all* for its cause*"—[which view of matters is propounded in the next aphorism].

स्थिरकार्य्यासिद्धेः क्षणिकत्वम् ॥ ३४ ॥

Whether bondage may not be momentary and so require no cause.

Aph. 34. Since there is no such thing as a permanent result [—on the heretical view],—the momentariness [of bondage also is to be admitted].

a. 'Of bondage'—this must be supplied [to complete the aphorism].†

b. And thus the point relied on is that it [i. e. bondage] have no cause at all. And so this is the application [of the argument—viz.—]:

(1) Bondage, &c., is momentary:—

(2) Because it exists:—

(3) [Every thing that exists is momentary] as the apex of the lamp-flame, or the like.‡

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* ननु बन्धस्यापि क्षणिकत्वादनियतकारणको ऽभावकारणको वा बन्धो ऽस्त्वित्याशयेनापरो नास्तिकः प्रत्यवतिष्ठते ॥

† बन्धस्येति शेषः ॥

‡ तथाचाकारणक एवास्त्वित्याशयः । तथाचायं प्रयोगः । बन्धादिकं क्षणिकं । सत्त्वात् । दीपशिखादिवदिति ॥

c. And [—continues the heretic—] this [reason—viz. 'existence'—] does not extend *unduly* [—as you may object—] to the case of a jar or the like, because *that* also [in my opinion] is like the subject in dispute [in being momentary]. This [in fact] is precisely what is asserted in the expression 'Since there is *no such thing* as a permanent result:'—* [§34].

d. He objects to† [this heretical view].

न प्रत्यभिज्ञाबाधात् ॥ ३५ ॥

The fact of recognition proves that things are not momentary.

Aph. 35. Nay—[things are *not* momentary in their duration], for the absurdity of this is proved by *recognition.*

a. That is to say;—nothing is momentary, because the absurdity of its being momentary follows from the opposite argument [to that under §34. *b.*], taken from such facts of recognition as "What I saw,—that same do I touch,"—[an argument which may be stated as follows]—viz.

(1) Bondage, &c., is permanent:—

(2) Because it exists:—

(3) [Every thing that exists is permanent]—as a jar, or the like.‡

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* न च घटादौ व्यभिचारः तस्यापि पक्षसमत्वात्। एतदेवोक्तं स्थिरकार्यासिद्धेरित्यनेन ॥

† दूषयति ॥

‡ न कस्यापि क्षणिकत्वं यदद्राक्षं तदेवाहं स्पृशामीत्यादिप्रत्यभिज्ञानुगृहीतेन बन्धादिकं स्थिरं सत्त्वात् घटादिवदिति प्रत्यनुमानेन क्षणिकत्वस्य बाधादित्यर्थः ॥

श्रुतिन्यायविरोधाच्च ॥ ३६ ॥

That things are momentary is contradicted by Scripture and reasoning.

Aph. 36. And [things are not momentary] because this is contradicted by Scripture and by reasoning.

a. That is to say,—nothing is momentary, because the general principle that the whole world, consisting of effects and causes, is momentary, is contradicted by such texts as this—viz. "All this, O ingenuous one, was antecedently existing,"—and by such scriptural and other arguments as this, viz. "How should what exists proceed from the non-existent?"*

दृष्टान्तासिद्धेश्च ॥ ३७ ॥

The heretic's illustration is not a truth.

Aph. 37. And [we reject the argument of this heretic] because his instance is not a fact.

a. That is to say,—the general principle of the momentariness [of all things] is denied, because this momentary character does not in fact belong to the apex of the lamp-flame, &c., the instances [on which thou, heretic, dost ground thy generalization,—§34. *b.*]:—moreover thou quite errest in regard to momentariness in that instance from not taking account of the minute and numerous instants [really included in a duration which seems to thee momentary]:—such is the import.†

* सदेव सौम्येदमग्र आसीदित्यादिश्रुतिभिः कथमसतस्सज्जायेतेत्यादिश्रौतादियुक्तिभिश्च कार्यकारणात्मकाखिलप्रपञ्चे क्षणिकत्वानुमानस्य विरोधान्न क्षणिकत्वं कस्यापीत्यर्थः ॥

† दृष्टान्ते दीपशिखादौ क्षणिकत्वस्यासिद्धेः न क्षणिक-

If things were momentary there could be no relation of cause and effect.

b. Moreover, if the momentary duration [of things] be asserted, then there can be no such thing as the relation of cause and effect in the case of the earth and the jar, and the like. And you must not say that there *is* no such thing as that [relation of cause and effect], because it is proved to be a reality by the fact that otherwise there would be no such thing as the efforts of him who desires an effect [—and who therefore sets in operation the causes adapted to its production]. With reference to this he declares as follows :*

युगपज्जायमानयोर्न कार्यकारणभावः ॥ ३८ ॥

The causal relation is not between things that arise simultaneously.

Aph. 38. It is not between two things coming simultaneously into existence that the relation of cause and effect exists.

a. Let us ask,—does the relation of product and [material] cause exist between the earth and the jar as *simultaneously* coming into [their supposed momentary] existence, or as successive? Not the first,—because there is nothing to lead to such an inference, and because we should not [in that case] find the man who wants a jar operating with earth, &c., [with a view to the jar's *subsequent* production]. Neither is it the last,—in regard to which he declares as follows :†

त्वानुमानमित्यर्थः । किञ्च सूक्ष्मानेकक्षणानाकलनेन क्षणिकत्वभ्रम एव तत्र तवेति भावः ॥

* किञ्च क्षणिकत्ववादे मृद्घटादिस्थले कार्यकारणभावो नोपपद्यते । न च नास्त्येव स इति वाच्यं कार्यार्थिनः प्रवृत्त्यान्यथानुपपत्त्या तत्सिद्धेरित्यभिप्रेत्याह ॥

‡ किं मृद्घटयोर्युगपज्जायमानयोः कार्यकारणभावः किं

पूर्वापाये उत्तरायोगात् ॥ ३९ ॥

A product cannot survive its substantial cause.

Aph. 39. Because when the antecedent departs, the consequent is unfit [to arise and survive it].

a. The relation of cause and effect is further inconsistent with the theory of the momentary duration of things,—because, at the time when the antecedent, i. e. the cause, departs,—the consequent, i. e. the product, is 'unfit,' i. e. is not competent to arise ;—because, that is to say, a product is cognized only by its inhering in [and being substantially identical with, however formally different from] its substantial cause,* [and is incapable therefore, of surviving it].

b. With reference to this same topic—viz. the substantial cause, he mentions another [the converse] objection† [to the theory of the momentary duration of things].

तद्भावे तदयोगादुभयव्यभिचारादपि न ॥ ४० ॥

The co-existence of substance and product is impossible if things be momentary.

Aph. 40. Moreover not, [on the theory of the momentary duration of things, can there be such a relation as that of cause and effect,] because while the one [the antecedent] exists, the other [the consequent] is incompatible, because the two keep always asunder.

वा क्रमिकयोः। नाद्यः विनिगमकाभावात् घटार्थिनो मृदादिप्रवृत्त्यनुपपत्तेश्च। नान्त्य इत्याह ॥

* पूर्वस्य कारणस्यापायकाले उत्तरस्य कार्यस्यायोगादुत्पत्त्यनौचित्यादपि न क्षणिकत्ववादे सम्भवति कार्यकारणभावः। उपादानकारणानुगततयैव कार्यानुभवादित्यर्थः ॥

† उपादानकारणमधिकृत्यैव दूषणान्तरमाह ॥

a. To complete the aphorism we must say,—'moreover, [on the theory objected to] there can be no such relation as that of cause and effect, because at the time when the antecedent exists, the consequent cannot co-exist with it, the two being mutually exclusive.' The two suggesters of the relation of cause and effect are (1) this concomitancy of affirmatives—that while the product exists, the substance thereof exists, and (2) this concomitancy of negatives—that when the substance no longer exists, the product no longer exist:—and these two [conditions—on *your* theory—] cannot be, because, since things [in your opinion] are momentary in their duration, the two [—viz., the substance and the product—], inasmuch as they are antecedent and consequent, belong to opposite times* [—and cannot therefore co-exist,—for the product—according to you—does not come into existence until its substance has perished, which is contrary to the nature of the causal relation just defined].

b. But then [the heretic may say—do not let the *co-existence* of substance and product be insisted upon as indispensable to the causal relation between the two—but] let the nature of a cause belong to the substantial cause, as it belongs to the *instrumental* cause, in respect merely of its *antecedence*. To this he replies.†

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* पूर्वस्य भावकाले उत्तरस्यासम्भवादुभयव्यभिचारादपि न कार्यकारणभाव इति शेषः। यदोपादेयं तदोपादानं यदोपादानाभावस्तदोपादेयाभाव इत्यन्वयव्यतिरेकौ उपादेयोपादानयोः कार्यकारणभावग्राहकौ तौ च क्षणिकत्वेन क्रमिकयोस्तयोर्विरुद्धकालत्वान्न सम्भवतः॥

† ननु निमित्तकारणस्येवोपादानस्यापि पूर्वभावमात्रेणैव कारणतास्त्विति तत्राह॥

पूर्वभावमात्रे न नियमः ॥ ४१ ॥

Antecedence to the product does not distinguish the Matter from the Instrument.

Aph. 41. If there were merely *antecedence,* then there would be no determination [of a substantial or material cause as distinguished from an instrumental cause].

a. And it could not be determined that this was the *substance* [of this or that product] on the granting of nothing more than its *antecedence* [to the product], because antecedence constitutes no distinction between it and the *instrumental* causes;—for [—as we need scarcely remind you—], that there *is* a distinction between substantial and instrumental causes, the whole world is agreed:—such is the meaning.*

The question whether any thing exists besides Thoughts.

b. Other heretics say—"Since no thing [really] exists except *Thought,* neither does *Bondage,* just as the things of a dream [have no real existence]. Therefore it has *no* cause, for it is absolutely *false.*" He rejects the opinion of these† [heretics]:

न विज्ञानमात्रं बाह्यप्रतीतेः ॥ ४२ ॥

We have the evidence of Intuition for the External as well as the Internal.

Aph. 42. Not Thought alone exists, because there is the intuition of the external.

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* पूर्वभावमात्राभ्युपगमे च इदमेवोपादानमिति नियमो न स्यात् निमित्तकारणानामपि पूर्वभावाविशेषात्। ईदृगेव हि निमित्तोपादानयोर्विभागो सर्वलोकसिद्ध इत्यर्थः ॥

† अपरे नास्तिका आहुः। विज्ञानातिरिक्तवस्त्वभावेन बन्धो ऽपि स्वप्नपदार्थवत् अतो ऽत्यन्तं मिथ्यात्वेन न तत्र कारणमस्तीति तन्मतमपाकरोति ॥

a. That is to say—the *reality* is not *Thought* alone, because external objects also are proved to exist, just as Thought is, by intuition.*

b. But then [these heretics may rejoin]—"From the example of intuitive perception in *dreams* [see Butler's Analogy, Part I. ch. I.], we find this [—your supposed evidence of objective reality—] to exist even in the *absence* of objects!" To this he replies:—†

तदभावे तदभावाच्छून्यं तर्हि ॥ ४३ ॥

The denial of the external amounts to Nihilism.

Aph. 43. Then, since, if the one does not exist, the other does not exist, there is a void [—i. e. nothing exists at all].

a. That is to say;—if external things do not exist, then a mere *void* offers itself. Why? Because if the external does not exist, then *thought* does not exist. For it is *intuition* that proves the objective, and if the intuition of the external did not establish the objective, then the intuition of *thought* also would not establish [the existence of] thought.‡

b. "Then *let* the reality be a mere void;—and therefore the searching for the cause of Bondage is unfitting, just *because a*

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* न विज्ञानमात्रं तत्त्वं बाह्यार्थानामपि विज्ञानवत् प्रतीतिसिद्धत्वादित्यर्थः ॥

† ननु स्वप्नप्रतीतिदृष्टान्तेन विषयाभावेऽपि तदुपपत्तिरिति तत्राह ॥

‡ तर्हि बाह्याभावे शून्यं प्रसज्येत । कुतः । बाह्याभावे विज्ञानाभावात् । प्रतीतिर्हि विषयसाधिका बाह्यप्रतीतिश्चेन्न विषयं साधयेद्विज्ञानप्रतीतिरपि न विज्ञानं साधयेदिति भावः ॥

void is all:"—with such a proposal [as recorded in the next aphorism] does [some one who may claim the title of] the very crest-gem of the heretics rise up in opposition.*

शून्यं तत्त्वं भावो विनश्यति वस्तुधर्मत्वाद्विना-
शस्य ॥ ४४ ॥

The heretic goes the length of asserting sheer Nihilism.

Aph. 44. The reality is a void; what is, perishes,—because to perish is the habit of things.

a. The void alone [—says this prince of heretics,—or the fact that nothing exists at all—] is the reality [—or the only truth—]. Since every thing that exists perishes, and that which is perishable is false, as is a dream, therefore as of all things the beginnings and endings are merely nonentities, Bondage, &c., in the midst [of any beginning and ending], has merely a momentary existence,—is phenomenal and not real. Therefore *who* can be bound by *what?*—this [question] is what we rest upon. The reason assigned for the perishableness of whatever exists is 'because to perish is the habit of things,'—because to perish is the *very nature* of things. But nothing continues after quitting its own *nature* [—so that nothing could continue if it *ceased* to perish],—such is the meaning.†

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* अस्तु तर्हि शून्यमेव तत्त्वमतस्तु बन्धकारणान्वेषणमयुक्तं तुच्छत्वादिति नास्तिकशिरोमणिः प्रत्यवतिष्ठते ॥

† शून्यमेव तत्त्वं। यतस्सर्वो ऽपि भावो विनश्यति यश्च विनाशी स मिथ्या स्वप्नवत्। अतस्सर्ववस्तूनामाद्यन्तयोरभावमात्रत्वात् मध्ये क्षणिकसत्त्वं सांवित्तिकं न पारमार्थिकं बन्धादि। ततः किं केन बध्येत इत्याशयः। भावानां

b. He rejects* [this heretical view].

अपवादमात्रमबुद्धानाम् ॥ ४५ ॥

Aph. 45. This is a mere counter-assertion of unintelligent persons.

The indiscerptible is indestructible.

a. 'Of unintelligent persons'—i. e. of blockheads, this is 'a mere counter-assertion,'—i. e. a mere *idle* counter-assertion, that a thing must needs be perishable *because it exists;* [and such an assertion is idle] because things that are not made up of parts, since there is no cause of the destruction of such things, cannot perish.†

b. But what need of many words? It is not the fact that even *products* perish, for, just as by the cognition that 'the jar is old' [we mean that it has passed from the condition of new to that of old], so too by such a cognition as this that 'the jar has passed away,' it is only settled that the jar, or the like, *is in the condition* of having passed away.‡

विनाशित्वे हेतुर्वस्तुधर्मत्वाद्विनाशस्येति विनाशस्य वस्तुस्वभावत्वात्। स्वभावन्तु विहाय न पदार्थस्तिष्ठतीत्यर्थः॥

* परिहरति॥

† अबुद्धानां मूढानां अपवादमात्रं भावत्वाद्विनाशित्वमिति मिथ्यापवाद एव नाशकारणाभावेन निरवयवद्रव्यानां नाशासम्भवात्॥

‡ किं बहुना। कार्याणामपि न विनाशसिद्धिः। घटो जीर्ण इति प्रत्ययेनेव घटोऽतीत इत्यादिप्रत्ययेनापि घटादेरतीताख्याया अवस्थाया एव सिद्धेः॥

c. He states another objection* [to the heretical view].

उभयपक्षसमानक्षेमत्वादयमपि ॥ ४६ ॥

Nihilism is open to the same objections as both the Momentary and the Ideal theories.

Aph. 46. Moreover this [nihilistic theory is not a right one] because it has the same fortune as both the views [which were confuted just before].

a. This view moreover [§44] is not a good one, because it has the same fortune as—i. e. is open to similar reasons for rejection as the theory that external things are momentary [§26 *b.*], and as the theory that nothing exists besides Thought [§41. *b*]. The reason for the rejection of the theory that things are momentary in their duration, viz. [—as stated at §35—] the fact of *recognition*, &c., [—which is at least as little consistent with Nihilism as it is with the momentary duration of things], and the reason for the rejection of the theory that nothing exists besides Thought, viz. [—as stated at §42—] the intuition of the external, &c., apply equally here [in the case of Nihilism]:—such is the import†.

b. Moreover, as for the opinion which is accepted by these [heretics]—viz. "*Let the mere void* [of absolute nonentity] be the soul's aim [and summum bonum], since herein consist at once the cessation of pain [—which cannot continue when there is absolutely *nothing*]—and also the means thereof [—since there

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* दूषणान्तरमाह ॥

† क्षणिकबाह्यपक्षेण विज्ञानमात्रपक्षेण सह समानक्षेमत्वात् तुल्यनिरसनहेतुकत्वादयमपि पक्षो न सम्यक्। क्षणिकपक्षनिरासहेतुः प्रत्यभिज्ञादिः। विज्ञानपक्षनिरासहेतुर्बाह्यप्रतीत्यादिश्चात्रापि समान इति भावः॥

can be no further means required for the removal of any thing if it be settled that the thing positively does not exist],"—this too can hardly be,—so he declares as follows :*

अपुरुषार्थत्वमुभयथा ॥ ४७ ॥

The soul's aim is not annihilation.

Aph. 47. In neither way [—whether as a means or as an end—] is this [annihilation] the soul's aim.

a. "Let the void [of mere nonentity] be the soul's aim, whether as consisting in the cessation of pain, or as presenting the means for the cessation of pain"—[says the heretic] :—and this cannot be, because the whole world agrees that the aim of the soul consists in the joys, &c., that shall abide *in it,*—that is to say, because [*they* hold, while] *you* do not hold that there is a *permanent* soul [—see §33—in respect of which the liberation or beatification should be possible or even predicable].†

b. Now certain other things also entertained as causes of [the soul's] bondage by [imperfectly instructed] believers, remaining over and above those [proposed by unbelievers and] already rejected, are to be set aside.‡

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* यदपि दुःखनिवृत्तिरूपतया तत्साधनतयाच शून्यस्यैवास्तु पुरुषार्थत्वमिति तैर्मन्यते तदपि दुर्घटमित्याह ॥

† दुःखनिवृत्तिरूपतया दुःखनिवृत्तिसाधनतया वा शून्यस्य पुरुषार्थत्वं स्यात्। तच्च न घटते। स्वनिष्ठत्वेनैव सुखादीनां लोके पुरुषार्थत्वावगमात्। स्थिरस्य पुरुषस्यानङ्गीकारादित्यर्थः ॥

‡ इदानीं पूर्वनिरस्तावशिष्टान्यास्तिकसम्भाव्यान्यप्यन्यानि बन्धकारणानि निरस्यन्ते ॥

न गतिविशेषात् ॥ ४८ ॥

It is by no movement that the soul gets into bondage.

Aph 48. Not from any kind of motion —[such as its entrance into a body—does the soul's bondage result.].

a. 'Bondage' [—required to complete the aphorism—] is understood from the topic* [of discussion].

b. The meaning is,—that the soul's bondage, moreover, does not result from any sort of *motion*—in the shape, for instance, of its entrance into a body.†

c. He states a reason for this.‡

निष्क्रियस्य तदसम्भवात् ॥ ४९ ॥

What is all-pervading does not change place.

Aph. 49. Because this is impossible for what is inactive [—or, in other words, without motion].

a. That is to say,—because this is impossible—i. e. *motion* is impossible—in the case of the soul which is inactive [because] all-pervading [—and therefore incapable of changing its place].§

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* प्रकरणाद्बन्धो लभ्यते ॥

† गतिविशेषात् शरीरप्रवेशादिरूपादपि पुरुषस्य न बन्ध इत्यर्थः ॥

‡ अत्र हेतुमाह ॥

§ निष्क्रियस्य विभोः पुरुषस्य तदसम्भवात् गत्यसम्भवादित्यर्थः ॥

b. But then [—the objector may say]—"Since, in the books of scripture and of law, we hear of its *going* and *coming* into this world and the other world, let soul be [—not all-pervading, as you allege—but] merely limited [in its extent]; and to this effect also is the text 'Of the size of the thumb is the soul, the inner spirit', and the like":—but this conjecture he repels*.

मूर्त्तत्वात् घटादिवत्समानधर्मापत्तावपसिद्धान्तः ॥ ५० ॥

Were the soul limited it might be perishable.

Aph. 50. [We cannot admit that the soul is other than all-pervading, because] by its being limited, since it would come under the same conditions as jars, &c., there would be a contradiction to our tenet [of its imperishableness].

a. That is to say,—and if the soul were admitted to be, like a jar, or the like, limited, i. e., circumscribed [in dimension], then, since it would resemble a jar or the like, in being made up of parts, and [hence] in being perishable, &c., this would be contrary to our settled principle † [—that the soul is imperishable].

b. He now justifies the text [see §49. *b*] referring to the *motion*‡ [of the soul,—by showing that the motion is not really of the soul but of an accessary].

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* ननु श्रुतिस्मृत्योरिहलोकपरलोकगमनागमनश्रवणात्पुरुषस्य परिच्छिन्नत्वमेवास्तु तथाच श्रुतिरपि अङ्गुष्ठमात्रः पुरुषो ऽन्तरात्मेत्यादिरित्याशङ्कामपाकरोति ॥

† यदि च घटादिवत् पुमान्मूर्त्तः परिच्छिन्नः स्वीक्रियते तदा सावयवत्वविनाशित्वादिना घटादिसमानधर्मापत्तावपसिद्धान्तः स्यादित्यर्थः ॥

‡ गतिश्रुतिमुपपादयति ॥

गतिश्रुतिरप्युपाधियोगादाकाशवत् ॥ ५१ ॥

Soul moves not, any more than Space.

Aph. 51.—The text regarding the *motion* [of the soul], moreover, is [applicable only] because of the junction of an *attendant*, as in the case of the Ether [or *Space*, which moves not, though we talk of the space enclosed in a jar, as moving with the jar].

a. Since there are such proofs of the soul's unlimitedness as the declaration that 'It is eternal, omnipresent, permanent', the text regarding its *motion* is to be explained as having reference to a movement pertaining [not to the soul but] to an attendant;—for there is the text—'As the Ether [or space] included in a jar, when the jar is removed,—[in this case] the *jar* may be removed, but not the space,—and in like manner is the soul which is like the sky [incapable of being moved]';—and because we may conclude that the motion [erroneously supposed to belong to the soul—49. *b.*—] belongs to *Nature* [—see Vedánta Aphorisms, Part I, §4. *l.*—], from such maxims as this that '*Nature* does the works the fruits of which are blissful or baneful, and it is wilful *Nature* that in the three worlds reaps these';—such is the import.*

b. It has already been denied [§16] that the bondage [of the soul] is occasioned by works—in the shape either of enjoined or

* नित्यस्सर्वगतस्स्थाणुरित्यादिना प्रमाणेनात्मनोऽपरिच्छिन्नत्वे गतिश्रुतिरौपाधिकगतिपरा व्याख्येया। घटसंवृतमाकाशं नीयमाने घटे यथा। घटो नीयेत नाकाशं तद्वज्जीवो नभोपम इति श्रुतेः। प्रकृतिः कुरुते कर्म शुभाशुभफलात्मकं प्रकृतिश्च तदश्नाति त्रिषु लोकेषु कामगेत्यादिस्मृत्या गतेः प्रकृतिनिष्ठत्वावगमाच्चेति भावः॥

of forbidden actions. Now he declares that the bondage moreover does not arise from the 'unseen' [merit or demerit] resulting therefrom.*

न कर्मणाप्यतद्धर्मत्वात् ॥ ५२ ॥

The bondage of the soul is no result of any merit or demerit.

Aph. 52. Nor moreover [does the bondage of the soul result from the merit or demerit arising] from works, because these belong not thereto.

a. That is to say—the bondage of the soul does not arise directly from the 'unseen' [merit or demerit] occasioned by works. Why? Because this is no property thereof,—i. e. because this [merit or demerit—see §16. *a.*—] is no property of the soul.†

b. But then [some one may say]—"*Let* it be that the bondage resulting from the 'unseen' i. e., the merit [or demerit] even of another should attach to a different person,";—whereupon he declares as follows.‡

अतिप्रसक्तिरन्यधर्मत्वे ॥ ५३ ॥

Else bondage might cling even to the emancipated.

Aph. 53.—If the case were otherwise [than as I say], then it [the bondage of the soul] might extend unduly [even to the emancipated].

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* पूर्वं विहितनिषिद्धव्यापाररूपेण कर्मणा बन्धो निराकृतः। इदानीं तज्जन्यादृष्टेनापि न बन्ध इत्याह ॥

† कर्मणा अदृष्टेनापि साक्षान्न पुरुषस्य बन्धः। कुतः। अतद्धर्मत्वात् पुरुषधर्मत्वाभावादित्यर्थः ॥

‡ नन्वन्यधर्मेणाप्यदृष्टेनान्यस्य बन्धः स्यात्तत्राह ॥

a. That is to say,—if the case were otherwise—if bondage and its cause were under other conditions [than we have declared them to be]—, then there might be an undue extension,—bondage would befal even the emancipated* [—for the same reasons as those stated under §16. *a*].

b. What need of so much [prolixity]? He states a general objection why the bondage of soul cannot result from any one or other [of these causes]—beginning with its essence [—see §6. *b*—] and ending with its [supposed] works [—see §16—], inasmuch as it is contrary to scripture† [that any one of these should be the cause].

निगुणादिश्रुतिविरोधश्चेति ॥ ५४ ॥

A single text of scripture upsets equally all the heretical notions of the soul's relation to bondage.

Aph. 54.—And this [opinion that the bondage of the soul arises from any of these causes alleged by the heretics] is contrary to such texts as the one that declares it [the soul] to be without qualities;—and so much for that point.

a. And if the bondage of the soul arose from any one or other of those [supposed causes already treated of] among which its essential character [§6. *b*.] is the first, this would be contradic-

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* अन्यधर्मत्वे। बन्धतत्कारणयोरन्यधर्मत्वे। अतिप्रसक्तिः। मुक्तस्यापि बन्धापत्तिरित्यर्थः॥

† किं बहुना। स्वभावादिकर्मान्तैरन्येन वा केनापि पुरुषस्य बन्धोत्पत्तिर्न घटते श्रुतिविरोधादिति साधारणं बाधकमाह॥

tory to such texts as "Witness, intelligent, alone, and without the [three] 'qualities' [is the soul];"—such is the meaning.*

b. The expression 'and so much for that point' means that the investigation of the cause of the bondage [of the soul] here closes.†

c. The case then stands thus,—since all other theories are overthrown by the declaratory aphorisms "There would be no fitness in the enjoining" [see §7], &c., it is ascertained that the immediate cause of the bondage [of the soul] is just the conjunction of Nature and of the soul.‡

d. But then, in that case, [some one may say],—this conjunction of Nature and of the soul [§54. *c.*], whether it be essential or adventitiously caused by Time or something else [§5. *b.*], must occasion the bondage even of the *emancipated.* Having pondered this doubt, he disposes of it as follows :§

तद्योगो ऽप्यविवेकान्न समानत्वम् ॥ ५५ ॥

How the true cause of bondage affects not the emancipated.

Aph. 55.—Moreover the conjunction thereof does not, through non-discrimination, take place [in the case of the emancipated],

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* स्वभावाद्यन्यतमेन पुरुषस्य बन्धोत्पत्तौ साक्षी चेता: केवलो निर्गुणश्चेत्यादिश्रुतिविरोधश्चेत्यर्थ: ॥

† इतिशब्दो बन्धहेतुपरीक्षासमाप्तौ ॥

‡ तदेवं न स्वभावतो बन्धस्येत्यादिना प्रदर्शकेनेतरप्रतिषेधत: प्रकृतिपुरुषसंयोग एव साक्षाद्बन्धहेतुरवधारित: ॥

§ ननु तत्र प्रकृतिपुरुषसंयोगो ऽपि स्वाभाविकत्वे काला-

nor is there a parity [in this respect between the emancipated and the unemancipated].

a. 'The conjunction thereof'—i. e. the conjunction of Nature and of the soul;—this conjunction moreover does not take place again 'through non-discrimination'—i. e. through the want of a discrimination [between Nature and soul] in the emancipated [who *do* discriminate, and who thus avoid the conjunction which others, failing to discriminate, incur, and thus fall into bondage]; such is the meaning:—and thus the the emancipated and the bound are *not* on a level [—under the circumstances stated at §54. *c.*],—such is the import.*

विपर्य्ययाद्बन्धः ॥ ५६ ॥

The true cause of bondage, in other words non-discrimination.

Aph. 56.—Bondage arises from the error [of not discriminating between Nature and soul].

a. Having thus declared the cause of that [bondage] which is to be got rid of, he declares the means of getting rid of it.†

नियतकारणात्तदुच्छित्तिर्ध्वान्तवत् ॥ ५७ ॥

दिनिमित्तकत्वे वा मुक्तस्यापि बन्धापादक इत्याशंक्य समाधत्ते ॥

* तद्योगः प्रकृतिपुरुषसंयोगो ऽपि अविवेकात् मुक्ते अविवेकाभावात् न पुनस्संयोगो भवतीत्यर्थः। तथाच न मुक्तबद्धसाम्यमित्याशयः॥

† एवं हेयहेतुं प्रतिपाद्य हानोपायं प्रतिपादयति ॥

Non-discrimination is removeable by discrimination alone.

Aph. 57.—Its removal is to be effected by the regular [and appropriate] means, just like darkness.

a. The regular means, established throughout the world, in such cases as 'shell-silver' [i. e. a pearl-oyster-shell mistaken for silver], viz. the *immediacy* of discrimination,—by *this* alone is 'its removal'—i. e. the removal of the non-discrimination [between Nature and soul] to be effected, and not by *works* or the like;—such is the meaning:—just as darkness—the dark—is removed by light alone* [and by no other means].

b. "But then [some one may say]—if merely the non-discrimination of Nature and soul be, through the conjunction [of the two, consequent on the want of discrimination,] the cause of bondage, and if merely the discrimination of the two be the cause of liberation, then there would be liberation even while there remained the conceit of [one's possessing] a body &c.; and this is contrary to scripture, to the institutes of law, and to sound reasoning." To this he replies.†

प्रधानाविवेकादन्याविवेकस्य तद्धानं हानम्॥ ५८ ॥

The discrimination of Nature, as other than soul, involves all discrimination.

Aph. 58.—Since the non-discrimination of other things [from soul] results from the non-discrimina-

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* शुक्तिरजतादिस्थले लोकसिद्धं यन्नियतं कारणं विवेकसाक्षात्कारस्तत एव तदुच्छित्तिरविवेकोच्छित्तिः न कर्मादिभिरित्यर्थः। यथा ध्वान्तमन्धकारः प्रकाशेनैव नश्यति॥

† ननु प्रकृतिपुरुषाविवेक एव चेत्संयोगद्वारा बन्धहेतुस्तयोर्विवेक एव मोक्षहेतुस्तर्हि देहाद्यभिमानसत्त्वेऽपि मोक्षः स्यात् तच्च श्रुतिस्मृतिन्यायविरुद्धमिति तत्राह॥

tion of *Nature* [from soul], the cessation of this will take place on the cessation of that [from which it results].

a. By reason of the non-discrimination of *Nature* from the soul, what non discrimination of *other* things there *is*—such as the non-discrimination of the *understanding* [as something other than the soul],—*this* necessarily ceases on the cessation of the non-discrimination of Nature; because, when the non-discrimination of the understanding, for example, [as something other than soul] does occur, it is *based* on the non-discrimination [from soul] of that cause to which there is none antecedent [viz. Nature], since the non-discrimination of an *effect* [—and the 'understanding' is an effect or product of Nature] is itself an effect* [and will of course cease with the cessation of its cause].

b. The state of the case is this;—as, when the soul has been discriminated from *body*, it is impossible but that it should be discriminated from the *colour* and other properties—the effects of the body [which is the substantial cause of its own properties], —so, by parity of reasoning,—from the departure of the cause—when soul, in its character of *unalterableness* &c., has been discriminated from *Nature*, it is impossible that there should remain a conceit of [the soul's being any of] the *products* thereof [i. e. of Nature], such as the 'understanding' and the like, which have the character of being *modifications*† [of primal Nature, while the soul, on the other hand, is a thing unalterable].

* पुरुषे प्रधानाविवेकात्कारणात् योऽन्याविवेको बुद्ध्याद्यविवेको बुद्ध्याद्यविवेके जाते कार्याविवेकस्य कार्यतया अनादिकारणाविवेकमूलकत्वात्तस्य प्रधानाविवेकहाने सत्यवश्यं हानमित्यर्थः ॥

† यथा शरीरादात्मनि विविक्ते शरीरकार्येषु रूपादिष्व-

c. But then [some one may say]—"What proof is there that there is a conceit [entertained by people in general] of a *Nature* [or primal principle] different from the conceit of an 'understanding' &c. [which you tell us are products of this supposed first principle]?—for all the various conceits [that the soul falls into], such as 'I am ignorant' and so on, can be accounted for on the ground simply of an 'understanding' &c. [without postulating a primal Nature which is to assume the shape of an 'understanding' &c.]:"—well, if any one says this, I reply, No, —because, without there were such a thing as Nature, we could not account for such conceits as the following,—viz.—"Having died, having died, again when there is a creation let me be a denizen of Paradise and not of hell;"—because no *products*, such as the 'understanding,' when they have perished, can be created anew* [—any more than a gold bracelet, melted down, can be reproduced, though another like it may be produced from the materials].

The soul's confounding itself with Nature is logically antecedent to its confounding itself with anything else.

d. Moreover it is inadmissible to say that men's conceit of [the identity of themselves with their] 'understanding' &c., is [the *primary* cause of the soul's bondage, and is] not preceded by any thing,—because 'understanding' and the rest [—as you will not deny—] are

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विवेको न सम्भवति तथा कूटस्थत्वादिधर्मैः प्रधानात्पुरुषे विविक्ते तत्कार्येषु परिणामादिधर्मकेषु बुद्ध्यादिष्वभिमानो न स्यातुमुत्सहते तुल्यन्यायात्कारणनाशाच्चेति भावः ॥

* ननु, बुद्ध्याद्यभिमानातिरिक्ते प्रधानाभिमाने किं प्रमाणमहमज्ञ इत्याद्यखिलाभिमानानां बुद्ध्यादिविषयत्वेनै-वोपपत्तेरिति चेन्न मृत्वा मृत्वा पुनः सृष्टौ स्वर्गी स्यां माच

effects. Now while it is to be expected that there should be some predetermining agency to establish a conceit of [ownership in, or of one's identity with] any *effects*, it is clear that it is a conceit of [ownership, &c.,] in respect of the *cause*, and nothing else, that must be the predetermining agency;—for we see this in ordinary life, and our theories are bound to conform [deferentially] to experience. For [—to explain—] we see, in ordinary life, that the conceit of [the ownership of] the grain, &c., produced by a field, results from the conceit of [the ownership of] the field,—and from the conceit of [the ownership of] gold the conceit of [the ownership of] the bracelets or other things formed of that gold. And by the removal of these [i. e. the removal of the logically antecedent conceits that the field or the gold is one's property], there is the removal of those* [i. e. the removal of the conceits that the grain &c., and that the bracelets &c., the corresponding products or effects of the field and of the gold, are one's property:—and so the soul will cease to confound itself with the 'understanding' when it ceases to confound itself with Nature, of which the 'understanding' is held to be a product].

नारकोत्याद्यभिमानानां प्रधानविषयत्वं विनानुपपत्तेः अतोऽतानां बुद्ध्याद्यखिलकार्याणां पुनः सृष्ट्यभावात् ॥

* किञ्च बुद्ध्यादिषु पुरुषाणामभिमानो ऽनादिर्वक्तुं न शक्यते बुद्ध्यादीनां कार्यत्वात् । कार्येष्वभिमानव्यवस्थार्थं नियामकाकाङ्क्षायां कारणाभिमान एव नियामकतया सिद्ध्यति लोके दृष्टत्वात्कल्पनायाश्च दृष्टानुसारित्वात् । दृष्टो हि लोके क्षेत्राभिमानात्क्षेत्रजन्यधान्यादिष्वभिमानः सुवर्णाभिमानात्तज्जन्यकटकादिष्वभिमानः तयोर्निवृत्त्याच तयोर्निवृत्तिरिति ॥

e [And if it be supposed that we thus lay ourselves open to the charge of a *regressus in infinitum,* seeing that, whatever we may assign as the *first* cause, we may, on our own principles, be asked what was the 'predetermining agency' in regard to *it,*—or if it be supposed that we are chargeable with reasoning in a circle when we hold that the soul's confounding itself with Nature is the cause of its *continuing* so to confound itself, and its continuing so to confound itself is reciprocally the cause why it con founds itself,—we reply that] there is no occasion to look for any other 'predetermining agency' in the case of the conceit of [the identity of the soul with] Nature, or in the case of the self-continuance thereof [i. e. of that error of confounding one's self with Nature], because these two are [alike] without antecedent—like seed and sprout*—[of which it is needless to ask which is the first,—the old puzzle "which was first—the acorn or the oak?"—being a frivolous question].

f. But then [some one may say]—if we admit the soul's bondage [at one time] and its freedom [at another], and its discrimination [at one time] and its non-discrimination [at another], then this is in contradiction to the assertion [in §19] that it is "ever essentialy a pure and free intelligence:"—and it is in contradiction to such texts as this—viz.,—"The absolute truth is this, that neither is there destruction [of the soul], nor production [of it], nor is it bound, nor is it an effecter [of any work], nor is it desirous of liberation, nor is it indeed *liberated* [—seeing that that cannot desire or obtain liberation which was never *bound*]." This [charge of inconsistency] he repels.†

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* प्रधानाभिमानतद्वासनयोश्च बीजाङ्कुरवदनादित्वान्न तदभिमाने नियामकान्तरापेक्षेति ॥

† ननु पुरुषस्य चेद्बन्धमोक्षौ विवेकाविवेकौ च स्वीकृतौ तर्हि नित्यशुद्धबुद्धमुक्तत्वोक्तिविरोधः। तथा न निरोधो

वाङ्मात्रं नत तत्त्वं चित्तस्थितेः ॥ ५९ ॥

The bondage of the soul is merely verbal.

Aph. 59.—It is merely verbal, and not a reality, [this so-called bondage of the soul,] since it [the bondage] resides in the *mind* [and not in the soul].

a. That is to say,—since bondage &c. all reside only in the *mind* [and not in the soul], all this, as regards the soul, is merely verbal—i. e. it is 'vox et praeterea nihil,,'—because it is merely a *reflection,* like the redness of [pellucid] crystal [when a China-rose is near it]; but not a reality, with no false imputation, like the redness of the China-rose itself. Hence there is *no* contradiction to what had been said before [—as the objector under §58. *f.* insinuates—], such is the state of the case.*

Whether Testimony or Inference, without Perception, might not avail to dissipate the soul's bondage.

b. But then, if bondage &c., as regards the soul, be merely verbal, then let it be set aside by *hearing* [that it is merely verbal], or by argument [establishing that it is so]:—why, in the Scripture and the Law, is there enjoined, as the cause of liberation, a discriminative know-

नचोत्पत्तिर्न बद्धो नच साधकः। न मुमुक्षुर्न वै मुक्त इत्येषा परमार्थतेत्यादिश्रुतिविरोधश्चेति तां परिहरति ॥

* बन्धादीनां सर्वेषां चित्त एवावस्थानात्तत्सर्वम्पुरुषे वाङ्मात्रं शब्दमात्रं स्फटिकलौहित्यवत्प्रतिबिम्बमात्रत्वात् नतु तत्त्वं अनारोपितं जवालौहित्यवदित्यर्थः। अतो नोक्तविरोध इति भावः॥

ledge [of Soul as distinguished from Not-soul] going the length of *immediate cognition?*—To this he replies.*

युक्तितोऽपि न बाध्यते दिङ्मूढवदपरोक्षादृते ॥ ६० ॥

The truth must be directly discerned, and not merely accepted on the ground of Testimony or of Inference.

Aph. 60.—Moreover it is not to be removed by argument, as that of the person perplexed about the points of the compass [is not to be removed] without immediate cognition.

a. By 'argument' we mean thinking. The word 'moreover' is intended to aggregate [or take in—along with 'argument'—] 'testimony'† [—or verbal authority—which, no more than 'argument,' or inference, can remove the evil, which can be removed by nothing short of direct intuitive *perception* of the real state of the case].

b. That is to say—the bondage, &c., [of the soul], is not to be removed by merely hearing, or inferring, without *perceiving*;—just as the contrariety in regard to the proper direction, in the case of a person who is mistaken as to the points of the compass [and hence as to his own bearings], is not removed by testimony or inference without immediate cognition, i. e. without his directly perceiving‡ [how the points of the compass really lie,—to

* ननु बन्धादिकं चेत्पुरुषे वाङ्मात्रं तर्हि श्रवणेन युक्त्या वा तस्य बाधो भवतु । किमर्थं श्रुतिस्मृत्योः साक्षात्कारपर्यन्तं विवेकज्ञानमुपदिश्यते मोक्षहेतुतया । तत्राह ॥

† युक्तिर्मननं । अपिशब्दः श्रवणसमुच्चयार्थः ॥]

‡ वाङ्मात्रमपि पुरुषस्य बन्धादिकं श्रवणमननमात्रेण न बाध्यते अपरोक्षादृते साक्षात्कारं विना यथा दिङ्मूढ-

which immediate perception 'testimony' or 'inference' may conduce, but the necessity of which these *media* or instruments of knowledge cannot supersede].

c. Or it [—*Aph*. 60—] may be explained as follows:—viz.—But then [seeing that] it is declared by the assertion [in *Aph*. 57] viz. that "Its removal must be through the appropriate means," that knowledge in the shape of discrimination [between soul and Nature] is the remover of *non*-discrimination [in regard to the matter in question],—tell us—is that knowledge of a like nature with the hearing [of Testimony], &c., or is it something peculiar? A reply to this being looked for, he enounces the aphorism [§60] "Moreover it is not to be removed by argument," &c. That is to say,—non-discrimination is not excluded, is not cut off, by argument or by testimony, without there be discrimination as an immediate perception,—just as is the case with one who is bewildered in regard to his direction;—because the only thing to remove an *immediate* error is an immediate individual perception* [of the truth. For example, a man with the jaundice

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जनस्य वाङ्मात्रमपि दिग्वैपरीत्यं श्रवणयुक्तिभ्यां न बाध्यते साक्षात्कारं विनेत्यर्थः ॥

* अथवेत्थं व्याख्येयं। ननु नियतकारणात्तदुच्छित्तिरित्यनेन विवेकज्ञानमविवेकोच्छेदकमुक्तं तत् ज्ञानं किं श्रवणादिसाधारणमुतास्ति कश्चिद्विशेष इत्याकाङ्क्षायामाह युक्तितोऽपीत्यादि सूत्रम्। अविवेको युक्तितः श्रवणतश्च न बाध्यते नोच्छिद्यते विवेकापरोक्षं विना दिङ्मोहवदित्यर्थः। साक्षात्कारिभ्रमे साक्षात्कारिविशेषदर्शनस्यैव विरोधित्वादिति ॥

perceives *white* objects as if they were *yellow*. He may *infer* that the piece of chalk which he looks at is really white; or he may believe the *testimony* of a friend that it *is* white; but still nothing will remove his erroneous *perception* of yellowness in the chalk except a direct perception of its whiteness].

d. Having thus, then, set forth the fact that Liberation results from the immediate discrimination [of soul from Nature], the next thing to be set forth is the 'discrimination,'* [here referred to].

e. This being the topic, in the first place since, only if soul and Nature exist, liberation can result from the discrimination of the one from the other, therefore—that 'instrument of right knowledge' *(pramáṇa)* which establishes the existence of these [two *imperceptible* realities] is [first] to be set forth.†

अचाक्षुषाणामनुमानेन बोधो धूमादिभिरिव
वह्नेः ॥ ६१ ॥

The evidence for things imperceptible. *Aph.* 61.—The knowledge of things imperceptible is by means of Inference, as that of fire [when not directly perceptible] is by means of smoke, &c.

a. That is to say—'Of things imperceptible,'—i. e. of things not cognizable by the senses,—e. g. Nature and the Soul,—'the knowledge'—i. e. the fruit lodged in the soul,—is brought about by means of that instrument of knowledge [which may be call-

* तदेवं विवेकसाक्षात्कारान्मोक्षं प्रतिपाद्यातः परं विवेकः प्रतिपादनीयः ॥

† तत्रादौ प्रकृतिपुरुषसिद्धौ हि तद्विवेकान्मोक्षः स्यादतस्तत्सिद्धौ प्रमाणमुपन्यस्यते ॥

ed] 'Inference' *(anumána)* [—but which—see Nyáya Aphorisms —§5—is more correctly 'the recognition of a Sign'], as [the knowledge that there is] fire [in such and such a locality where we cannot directly perceive it,] is brought about by the 'recognition of a Sign' occasioned by smoke, &c.*

b. Moreover, it is to be understood that that which is [true, but yet is] not established by 'Inference,' is established by Revelation;—but since 'Inference' is the chief [among the instruments of knowledge] in this [the Sánkhya] System, 'Inference' only is laid down [in the aphorism] as the *chief* thing,—but Revelation is not disregarded† [in the Sánkhya system—see §89—].

c. He next exhibits the order of creation of those things among which Nature is the first, and the relation of cause and effect [among these severally], which subserves the argument that will be [afterwards] stated.‡

सत्त्वरजस्तमसां साम्यावस्था प्रकृतिः प्रकृतेर्म्महान् महतोऽहङ्कारोऽहङ्कारात्पञ्च तन्मात्राणि उभयमिन्द्रियं

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* अचाक्षुषाणां अप्रत्यक्षाणां प्रकृतिपुरुषादीनां अनुमानेन प्रमाणेन बोधः पुरुषनिष्ठं फलं सिद्धं भवति यथा धूमादिभिर्जनितेनानुमानेन वह्नेः सिद्धिरित्यर्थः ॥

† अनुमानासिद्धमपि आगमात्सिद्ध्यतीत्यपि बोध्यं अस्य शास्त्रस्य अनुमानप्राधान्यात्तु केवलानुमानस्य मुख्यतयैवोपन्यासः नत्वागमस्यानपेक्षेति ॥

‡ प्रकृत्यादीनां सृष्टिक्रमं वक्ष्यमाणानुमानोपयोगिकार्यकारणभावञ्च दर्शयति ॥

तन्मात्रेभ्यः स्थूलभूतानि पुरुष इति पञ्चविंशति-गणः ॥ ६२ ॥

The twenty-five realities enumerated.

Aph. 62.—Nature *(prakriti)* is the state of equipoise of Goodness *(sattwa)* Passion *(rajas)* and Darkness *(tamas)*; from Nature [proceeds] Mind *(mahat)*, from Mind Self-consciousness *(ahankára)*, from Self-consciousness the five Subtile Elements *(tanmátra)*, and both sets [external and internal] of Organs *(indriya)*, and from the Subtile Elements the Gross Elements *(sthúla-bhúta)*. [Then there is] Soul *(purusha)*:—such is the class of twenty-five.

a. 'The state of equipoise' of the [three] things called 'Goodness' &c., i. e. their being neither less nor more [—one than another—], that is to say the state of *not* being [developed into] an *effect*:—and thus 'Nature' is the triad of 'Qualities' *(guṇa)* distinct from the products [to which this triad gives rise];—such is the complete meaning.*

b. These things, viz. 'Goodness' &c., [though spoken of as the three *Qualities*], are not 'Qualities' *(guṇa)* in the *Vaiśeshika* sense of the word, because [the 'Qualities' of the *Vaiśeshika* system have themselves *no* qualities,—see Kaṇáda's 16th Aph.—while] *these* have the qualities of Conjunction, Disjunction, Lightness, Force, Weight, &c. In this [Sánkhya] system, and in Scripture, the word 'Quality' *(guṇa)* is employed [as the name of the three things in question] because they are subservient to Soul [and therefore hold a secondary rank in the scale of being],

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* सत्त्वादिद्रव्याणां या साम्यावस्था अन्यूनानतिरिक्तावस्था अकार्यावस्थेत्यर्थः । एवञ्च कार्यभिन्नं गुणत्रयं प्रकृतिरिति पर्यवसितोऽर्थः ॥

and because they form the *cords* [—which the word *guṇa* also signifies—], viz. 'Understanding' &c., which consist of the three [so called] 'Qualities,' and which *bind* the brute-beast [—so to speak—] the Soul.*

c. Of this [Nature] the principle called 'the great one' *(mahat)*, viz. the principle of 'Understanding' *(buddhi)*, is the product. 'Self-consciousness' is a conceit [of separate personality]. Of this there are two products, (1) the 'Subtile Elements' and (2) the two sets of 'Organs'. The 'Subtile Elements' are [those of] Sound, Touch, Colour, Taste, and Smell. The two sets of 'Organs,' through their division into the external and the internal, are of eleven kinds. The products of the 'Subtile Elements' are the five 'Gross Elements'. But 'Soul' is something distinct from either product or cause. Such is the class of twenty-five,—the aggregate of things:—that is to say, besides these there is nothing.†

d. He next, in several aphorisms, declares the order of the in-

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* सत्त्वादीनि द्रव्याणि न वैशेषिका गुणाः संयोगविभागवत्त्वाल्लघुत्वबलवत्त्वगुरुत्वादिधर्मकत्वाच्च तेष्वत्र शास्त्रश्रुत्यादौ च गुणशब्दः पुरुषोपकरणत्वात्पुरुषपशुबन्धकत्रिगुणात्मकमहदादिरज्जुनिर्मातृत्वाच्च प्रयुज्यते ॥

† तस्याः कार्यं महत्तत्त्वं बुद्धितत्त्वं । अहङ्कारोऽभिमानः । तस्य कार्यद्वयं तन्मात्राणि उभयमिन्द्रियञ्च । तन्मात्राणि शब्दस्पर्शरूपरसगन्धाः । उभयमिन्द्रियं बाह्याभ्यन्तरभेदेनैकादशविधं । तन्मात्राणां कार्याणि पञ्च स्थूलभूतानि । पुरुषस्तु कार्यकारणविलक्षण इति । इत्येवं पञ्चविंशतिगणः पदार्थव्यूहः एतदतिरिक्तः पदार्थो नास्तीत्यर्थः ॥

ferring* [the existence of these principles—the one from the other];

स्थूलात्पञ्चतन्मात्रस्य ॥ ६३ ॥

The existence of the 'Subtile Elements' is inferred from that of the 'Gross'.

Aph. 63—[The knowledge of the existence] of the 'Subtile Elements' is [by inference] from the 'Gross Elements.'

a. 'The knowledge—by inference'—so much is supplied,† [to complete the aphorism, from Aph. 61].

b. Earth, &c., the 'Gross Elements,' are proved to exist by Perception; and thereby [—i. e. from that Perception,—for Perception must precede Inference, as stated in Gautama's 5th Aphorism—] are the 'Subtile Elements' inferred—[the στοιχεῖα στοιχείων of Empedocles];—and so the application [of the process of inference to the case] is as follows:—

(1). The Gross Elements, or those which have not reached the absolute limit [of the atomic], consist of things [—Subtile Elements, or Atoms,—] which have distinct qualities, [—the earthy element having the distinctive quality of Odour, and so of the others]:

(2). Because they are gross:—

(3). [Everything that is gross is formed of something less gross, or in other words more subtile,] as jars, webs, &c.,‡ [—the gross web being formed of the less gross threads, and so of the others].

* अनुमानक्रममाह स्थूलैः ॥

† अनुमानेन बोध इत्यनुवर्त्तते ॥

‡ स्थूलं पृथिव्यादि प्रत्यक्षसिद्धं। तेन तन्मात्राणामनुमानं। तथाच अप्रकर्षकाष्ठापन्नानि स्थूलभूतानि सविशेषगुणवद्द्रव्योपादानकानि स्थूलत्वात् घटपटादिवदिति प्रयोगः ॥

बाह्याभ्यन्तराभ्यां तैश्चाहङ्कारस्य ॥ ६४ ॥

And thence that of self-consciousness.

Aph. 64—[The knowledge of the existence] of Self-consciousness is [by inference] from the external and internal [organs] and these ['Subtile Elements'—§63].

a. By inference from [the existence of] the external and internal organs, and from [that of] these 'Subtile Elements,' there is the knowledge of [the existence of such a principle as] Self-consciousness.*

b. The application [of the process of inference to the case] is in the following [somewhat circular] manner:—

(1) The Subtile Elements and the Organs are made up of things consisting of Self-consciousness:—

(2) Because they are products of Self-consciousness:—

(3) Whatever is not so [—i. e. whatever is *not* made out of Self-consciousness—] is not thus [—i. e. is not a *product* of Self-consciousness]—as the Soul [—which, not being made up thereof, is not a product of it].†

c. But then if it be thus [i. e. if it be, as the Sánkhyas declare, that all objects, such as jars, are made up of Self-consciousness, while Self-consciousness depends on 'Intellect'],

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* बाह्याभ्यन्तराभ्यामिन्द्रियाभ्यां तैस्तन्मात्रैश्चाहङ्कारस्यानुमानेन बोधः ॥

† तन्मात्रेन्द्रियाण्यभिमानवद्द्रव्योपादानकानि अभिमानकार्यद्रव्यत्वात् यन्नैवं तन्नैवं यथा पुरुष इति प्रयोगः ॥

then [some one may object, that,] since it would be the case that the Self-consciousness of the potter is the material of the jar, the jar made by him would disappear on the beatification of the potter whose 'Intellect' then surceases; and this [—the objector may go on to say—] is not the case, because *another* man [*after* the beatification of the potter] recognizes that 'This is that same jar* [which you may remember was fabricated by our deceased acquaintance].'

d. [In reply to this we say] it is *not* thus,—because, on one's beatification, there is an end of only those modifications of his internal organ [—'intellect', or 'inner man'—] which could be causes [as the *jar* no longer can be] of the emancipated soul's *experiencing* [either good or ill], but not an end of the modifications of his intellect in general, nor [an end] of that intellect in its essence:†—[so that we might spare ourselves the trouble of further argument so far as concerns the objection grounded on the assumption that the intellect of the potter *surceases* on his beatification:—but we may go further and admit, for the sake of argument, the surcease of the 'intellect' of the beatified potter, without conceding any necessity for the surcease of his pottery. This alternative theory of the case may be stated as follows] :—

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* नन्वेवं कुलालाहङ्कारस्यापि घटोपादानत्वापत्त्या कुलालमुक्तौ तदन्तःकरणनाशे तन्निर्मितघटनाशः स्यात्। न चैतत् युक्तं पुरुषान्तरेण स एवायं घट इति प्रत्यभिज्ञायमानत्वादिति॥

† नैवं मुक्तपुरुषभोगहेतुपरिणामस्यैव तदन्तःकरणे मोक्षोत्तरमुच्छेदात् न तु परिणामसामान्यस्यान्तःकरणस्वरूपस्य वोच्छेदः॥

e. Or [—as Berkeley suggests in his Principles of Human knowledge, ch. vi.] let the Self-consciousness of the *Deity* be the cause why jars and the like continue to exist, and not the Self-consciousness of the potter &c.* [—who may lose their Self-consciousness,—whereas the Deity—the sum of all life—*Hiraṇya-garbha*—see *Vedánta-śara* §62—never loses *His* Self-consciousness while aught living continues].

तेनान्तःकरणस्य ॥ ६५ ॥

And thence that of Intellect.

Aph. 65.—[The knowledge of the existence] of Intellect is [by inference] from that [Self-consciousness—§64].

a. That is to say,—by inference from [the existence of] 'that' —viz. Self-consciousness—which is a product, there comes the knowledge of 'Intellect' *(buddhi)*—the *great* 'inner organ' *(antah-karaṇa)* and hence called 'the great one' *(mahat)*,—[the existence of which is recognised] under the character of the *cause* of this† [product—viz. Self-consciousness].

b. And so the application [—again rather circular—of the process of inference to the case] is as follows :—

(1) The thing called Self-consciousness is made out of the things that consist of the mood of [mental] assurance :—

(2) Because it is a thing which is a product of [mental] assurance :—

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* अथवा घटादिष्वपि हिरण्यगर्भाहङ्कार एव कारणमस्तु न कुलालाद्यहङ्कारः ॥

† तेनाहङ्कारेण कार्येण तत्कारणतया मुख्यस्यान्तःकरणस्य महदाख्यस्य बुद्धेरनुमानेन बोध इत्यर्थः ॥

(3) Whatever is not so [—i. e. whatever is *not* made out of mental assurance—], is not thus [—i. e. is not a product of mental assurance—] as the Soul [which is not made out of anything antecedent], &c *

c. Here the following reasoning is to be understood. Every one, having first determined any thing under a concept [i. e. under such a form of thought as is expressed by a general term,—for example, that this, which presents itself, is a jar, or a human body, or a possible action of one kind or other—], after that makes the judgment "This is I,"—or "This ought to be done by me,"—and so forth:—so much is quite settled [—and there is no dispute that the fact is as here stated]. Now, having in the present instance, to look for some *cause* of the thing called 'Self-consciousness' [which manifests itself in the various judgments just referred to], since the relation of cause and effect subsists between the two functions [—the occasional conception and the subsequent occasional judgment which is a function of Self-consciousness—], it is assumed, for simplicity, merely that the relation of cause and effect exists between the two substrata to which the [two sets of] functions belong,—[and this is sufficient] because it follows as a matter of course that the occurrence of a *function* of the effect must result from the occurrence of a *function* of the cause† [—nothing, according to the Sánkhya, being in any product except so far and in suchwise as it pre-existed in the cause of that product].

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* तथा चायं प्रयोगः अहङ्कारद्रव्यं निश्चयवृत्तिमद्द्रव्योपादानकं निश्चयकार्यद्रव्यत्वात् यन्नैवं तन्नैवं यथा पुरुषादिरिति ॥

† अत्रायं तर्को बोध्यः। सर्वो ऽपि लोकः पदार्थमादौ स्वरूपतो निश्चित्य पश्चादभिमन्यते अयमहं मयेदं कर्त्तव्यमि-

ततः प्रकृतेः ॥ ६६ ॥

And thence that of Nature.

Aph. 66.—[The knowledge of the existence] of Nature is [by inference] from that ['Intellect'—§65].

a. By inference from [the existence of] 'that'—viz. the principle [of Intellect] termed 'the Great one'—which is a *product*, —there comes the knowledge of [the existence of] Nature, as its cause.*

b. The application [of the process of inference to the case] is as follows:—

(1) Intellect, the affections whereof are Pleasure, Pain, and Dulness, is produced from something which has these affections,—of Pleasure, Pain, and Dulness:—

(2) Because, whilst it is a *product* [and must therefore have arisen from something consisting of that which it itself now consists of], it consists of Pleasure, Pain, and Dulness:—

(3) [Every *product* that has the affections of, or that occasions, Pleasure, Pain, or Dulness, takes its rise in something which consists of these,] as lovely women, &c.†

त्यादिरूपेणेति तावत्सिद्धमेव। तत्राहङ्कारद्रव्यकारणाकाङ्क्षायां वृत्त्योः कार्यकारणभावेन तदाश्रययोरेव कार्यकारणभावो लाघवात्कल्प्यते कारणस्य वृत्तिलाभेन कार्यवृत्तिलाभस्यौत्सर्गिकत्वादिति ॥

* ततो महत्तत्त्वात् कार्यात् कारणतया प्रकृतेरनुमानेन बोधः ॥

† अयं प्रयोगः। सुखदुःखमोहधर्मिणी बुद्धिः सुखदुःख-

c. For, an agreeable woman gives pleasure to her husband, and therefore [is known to be mainly made up of or] partakes of the quality of 'Goodness;' the indiscreet one gives pain to him, and therefore partakes of the quality of 'Foulness;' and she who is separated [and perhaps forgotten], occasions indifference, and so partakes of the quality of 'Darkness.'*

d. And the appropriate refutation [of any objection] in this case is [the principle] that it is fitting that the qualities of the effect should be [in every case] in conformity with the qualities of the cause.†

e. Now he states how, in a different way, we have the evidence of inference for [the existence of] Soul, which is void of the relation of cause and effect that has been mentioned,‡ [in the four preceding aphorisms, as existing between Nature and its various products].

संहतपरार्थत्वात्पुरुषस्य ॥ ६७ ॥

The argument for the existence of Soul.

Aph. 67.—[The existence] of Soul [is inferred] from the fact that

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मोहधर्मकद्रव्यजन्या कार्यत्वे सति सुखदुःखमोहात्मकत्वात् कान्तादिवदिति ॥

* कान्ता हि भर्त्तुः सुखदेति सात्त्विकी । अविनया दुःखदेति राजसी । विरहव्मोहदेति तामसी भवति ॥

† कारणानुसारेणैव कार्यगुणौचित्यञ्चात्रानुकूलतर्कः ॥

‡ अथ यथोक्तकार्यकारणभावशून्यस्य पुरुषस्य प्रकारान्तरेणानुमानमाह ॥

the combination [of the principles of Nature into their various effects] is for the sake of another [than unintelligent Nature or any of its similarly unintelligent products].

a. 'Combination'—i. e. conjunction which is the cause [of all products,—these resulting from the conjunction of their constituent parts]:—since whatever has this quality—as Nature, Mind, and so on, [unlike Soul which is *not* made up of parts]—is for the sake of some other,—for this reason it is understood that Soul exists:—such is the remainder* [—required to complete the aphorism].

b. But the application [of the argument in this particular case is as follows]:—

(1) The thing in question—viz. Nature, the 'Great one,' and the rest [of the aggregate of the unintelligent],—has, as its fruit [or end], the [mundane] experiences and the [eventual] Liberation of some other than itself;—

(2) Because it is a combination [or *compages*];—

(3) [Every combination,] as a couch or a seat, or the like, [is for another's, use, not for its own, and its several component parts render no mutual service].†

c. Now, in order to establish that it is the cause of all [products], he establishes the *eternity* of Nature *(prakriti)*.‡

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* संहतः कारणीभूतसंयोगस्तद्वतो ऽव्यक्तमहदादेः परार्थत्वाद्धेतोः पुरुषस्य बोध इति शेषः ॥

† प्रयोगस्तु विवादास्पदं प्रकृतिमहदादिकं स्वेतरस्य भोगापवर्गफलकं संहतत्वाच्छय्यासनादिवदिति ॥

‡ इदानीं सर्वकारणत्वोपपत्तये प्रकृतेर्नित्यत्वमुपपादयति ॥

मूले मूलाभावादमूलं मूलम्॥ ६८॥

Argument for the eternity of Nature.

Aph. 68.—Since the root has no root, the root [of all] is root-less.

a. Since 'the root' *(múla)*,—i. e. the cause of the twenty-three principles [—which, with Soul and the root itself make up the twenty-five realities recognized in the Sánkhya,]—'has no root'—i. e. has no cause;—the 'root'—viz. Nature *(pradhána)*—is 'rootless'—i. e. devoid of root:—that is to say, there is no other cause of Nature, because there would be a *regressus in infinitum** [if we were to suppose another cause, which, by parity of reasoning, would require another cause, and so on without end].

b. He states the argument [just mentioned] in regard to this, as follows.†

पारम्पर्य्येऽप्येकत्र परिनिष्ठेति संज्ञामात्रम्॥ ६९॥

The employment of the term Primal Agency, or Nature, is merely to debar the regressus in infinitum.

Aph. 69—Even if there be a succession, there is a halt at some *one* point, and so it is merely a name, [that we give to the point in question, when we speak of the *root* of things under the name of 'Nature'].

a. Since there would be the fault of *regressus in infinitum* if there were a succession of causes—another cause of Nature, and

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* मूले त्रयोविंशति तत्त्वानां कारणे मूलाभावात्कारणाभावान्मूलं प्रधानममूलं मूलशून्यं अनवस्थापत्त्या प्रधानस्य न कारणान्तरमस्तीत्यर्थः॥

† अत्र युक्तिमाह॥

another cause of that one again,—there must be at last a halt, or conclusion, at some one point, somewhere or other, at some one uncaused, eternal thing;—therefore, that at which we stop is the *Primal Agency (pra-kriti)*,—for this word *prakriti* [usually, and conveniently, rendered by the term *Nature*,] is nothing more than a sign to denote the cause which is the *root*.*

b. But then [some Vedántí may object,—according to this view of matters]—the position, that there are just twenty-five realities, is not made out; for, in addition to the 'Indiscrete' [or primal Nature] which [according to you] is the cause of Mind, *another* unintelligent principle, named 'Ignorance' [see *Vedánta-sára*—§21—] presents itself. Having pondered this doubt, he declares as follows:†

समानः प्रकृतेर्द्वयोः ॥ ७० ॥

He meets a Vedantic objection.

Aph. 70.—Alike [is the opinion] of both [of us] in respect of Nature.

a. In the discussion of the Primal Agent [Nature]—the cause which is the root [of all products]—the same side is taken by us both, the asserter [of the Sánkhya doctrine] and the opponent [Vedántí]. This may be thus stated:—As there is mention in

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* प्रकृतेरन्यत्कारणं तस्याप्यन्यदिति कारणपारम्पर्येऽप्यनवस्थादोषादन्ततोऽकारणे एकत्र एकस्मिन्यत्रकुत्रचिन्नित्ये परिनिष्ठा पर्यवसानं भविष्यतीत्यतो यत्र पर्यवसानं सैव प्रकृतिरिति हि मूलकारणस्य संज्ञामात्रमित्यर्थः ।

† ननु पञ्चविंशति तत्त्वानीति नोपपद्यते । महत्तत्त्वकारणाव्यक्तापेक्षया ऽविद्याख्यजडतत्त्वान्तरापत्तेरित्याशंक्याह ॥

scripture of the *production* of Nature, so too is there of that of *Ignorance* in such texts as this—viz.—"This Ignorance, which has five divisions, was produced from the great Spirit." Hence it must needs be that a figurative production is intended to be asserted in respect of *one* of these [—and not the *literal* production of both, else we should have no root at all—], and of the two, it is with *Nature* only that a figurative production, in the shape of a manifestation through conjunction with Soul, &c., is congruous. A production [such as that metaphorical one here spoken of], the characteristic of which is conjunction, *is* mentioned, for there is mention of such a figurative origination of Soul and Nature in a passage of the *Kaurma Puráṇa* beginning "Of action [or the Primal Agency] and knowledge [or Soul]," and so on. And as there is no mention in scripture of the origin of *Ignorance* as figurative, *it* is *not* from eternity. And Ignorance, which consists of false knowledge, has been declared in an aphorism of the *Yoga* to be [not a separate entity but] an affection of the mind. Hence there is no increase to the [list of the twenty-five] Realities* [in the shape of a twenty-sixth principle to be styled 'Ignorance'].

* प्रकृतेर्मूलकारणविचारे द्वयोर्वादिप्रतिवादिनोरावयोः समानः पक्षः एतदुक्तम्भवति यथा प्रकृतेरुत्पत्तिः श्रूयते एवमविद्याया अपि अविद्या पञ्चपर्वैषा प्रादुर्भूता महात्मन इत्यादिवाक्ये अत एकस्या अवश्यं गौण्युत्पत्तिर्वक्तव्या तत्रच प्रकृतेरेव पुरुषसंयोगादिभिरभिव्यक्तिरूपा गौण्युत्पत्तिर्युक्ता। संयोगलक्षणोत्पत्तिः कथ्यते कर्मज्ञानयोरिति कौर्मवाक्ये प्रकृतिपुरुषयोर्गौण्युत्पत्तिस्मरणात्। अविद्यायाश्च क्वापि गौण्युत्पत्त्यश्रवणात्तस्या अनादिता। अविद्याच मिथ्याज्ञानरूपा बुद्धिधर्म इति योगे सूत्रितमतो न तत्त्वाधिक्यम्॥

b. Or [according to another and more probable interpretation of the aphorism] the meaning is this, that the argument is the same in support of both, i. e. of both Soul and Nature.*

c. But then, there being [as has been shown] a mode of arriving by inference at [a knowledge of the saving truth in regard to] Nature, Soul, &c., whence is it that reflection, in the shape of discrimination [between Soul and Nature], does not take place in the case of *all* men? In regard to this point he states as follows:—†

अधिकारित्रैविध्यान्न नियमः ॥ ७१ ॥

It is only the best kind of people that are fully amenable to reason.

Aph. 71.—There is no rule [or necessity that *all* should arrive at the truth—] because those who are privileged [to engage in the enquiry] are of three descriptions.

a. For those privileged [to engage in the enquiry] are of three descriptions through their distinction into those who, in reflecting, are dull, mediocre, and best. Of these—by the dull, the [Sánkhya] arguments are frustrated [and altogether set aside] by means of the sophisms that have been uttered by the *Bauddhas*, &c. By the mediocre, they [are brought into doubt, or, in other words,] are made to appear as if there were equally strong arguments on the other side, by means of arguments which really prove the

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* अथवा द्वयोः प्रकृतिपुरुषयोः समान एव न्याय इत्यर्थः ॥

† ननु प्रकृतिपुरुषाद्यनुमानप्रकारसत्त्वे सर्वेषां विवेकमननं कुतो न जायते तत्राह ॥

reverse [of what these persons employ them to prove], or by arguments which are not true; [—see the section on Fallacies in the *Tarka-sangraha*]. But it is only the *best* of those privileged that reflect in the manner that has been set forth [in our exposition of the process of reflection which leads to the discriminating of Soul from Nature];—such is the import. But there is no rule that *all* must needs reflect in the manner so set forth;—such is the literal meaning.*

b. He now, through two aphorisms, defines 'the Great one' and 'Self-consciousness'† [—the reader being presumed to remember that Nature consists of the three 'Qualities' in equipoise, and to be familiar with the other principles, such as the 'Subtile elements:'—see §62].

महदाख्यमाद्यं कार्यं तन्मनः॥ ७२ ॥

By 'the Great one' is meant Mind.

Aph. 72.—That first product [of the Primal Agent, Nature,] which is called 'the Great one,' is Mind.

a. 'Mind' *(manas)*. Mind is so called because its function is 'thinking' *(manana)*. By 'thinking' is here meant 'judging' *(niśchaya)*:—that of which this is the function is 'intellect'

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* मनने हि मन्दमध्यमोत्तमभेदेन त्रिविधा अधिकारिणस्तत्र मन्दैर्बाह्याद्युक्तकुतर्कैरनुमानानि बाध्यन्ते। मध्यमैर्विरुद्धासल्लिङ्गैः सत्प्रतिपक्षितानि क्रियन्ते। उत्तमाधिकारिणामेव तूक्तरीत्या मननमिति भावः। सर्वेषामेव तूक्तरीत्या मनननियमो नेत्यक्षरार्थः॥

† महदहङ्कारयोः स्वरूपमाह सूत्राभ्याम्॥

(buddhi);—and *that* is the first product—that called 'the Great one' *(mahat)*:—such is the meaning.*

चरमो ऽहङ्कारः ॥ ७३ ॥

The relation of Self-consciousness to Mind.

Aph. 73.—'Self-consciousness,' is that which is subsequent [to Mind.]

a. 'Self-consciousness,' the function of which is a conceit [that "*I* exist"—"*I* do this that and the other thing"--], is that which is subsequent;—that is to say 'Self-consciousness' is the next after 'the Great one'† [§72].

b. Since 'Self-consciousness' is that whose function is a conceit [which brings out the *Ego* in every case of cognition, the matter of which cognition would else have lain dormant in the bosom of Nature—the formless Objective]—it therefore follows that the others [among the phenomena of mundane existence] are effects of this [Self-consciousness];—and so he declares as follows:‡—

तत्कार्यत्वमुत्तरेषाम् ॥ ७४ ॥

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* मन इति। मननवृत्तिकं मनः। मननमत्र निश्चयवृत्तिका बुद्धिस्तन्महदाख्यमाद्यं कार्यमित्यर्थः ॥

† अहङ्कारो ऽभिमानवृत्तिकः पदार्थश्चरमो महतो ऽनन्तरो ऽहङ्कार इत्यर्थः।

‡ यतो ऽभिमानवृत्तिको ऽहङ्कारो ऽतस्तत्कार्यत्वमुत्तरेषामुपपन्नमित्याह ॥

All products, save Mind, result from Self-consciousness.

Aph. 74.—To the others it belongs to be the products thereof [—i. e. of Self-consciousness].

a. 'To be products thereof,' i. e. to be products of Self-consciousness;—that is to say, the fact of being products thereof belongs to the others, the eleven 'Organs' *(indriya)*, the five 'Subtile elements,' and, mediately, to the [gross] Elements also —the products of the Subtile elements.*

b. But then, if it be thus, [some one may say],—you relinquish your dogma that *Nature* is the cause of the whole world. Therefore he declares as follows:†

आद्यहेतुता तद्द्वारा पारम्पर्येऽप्यणुवत्॥ ७५॥

Nature, immediately the cause of Mind, is mediately the cause of all other products.

Aph. 75.—Moreover, mediately, through that [i. e. the 'great one' §72—], the first [cause—viz. Nature—] is the cause [of all products], as is the case with the Atoms [—the causes—though not the immediate causes—of jars &c].

a. 'Moreover, mediately'—i. e. moreover not in the character of the immediate cause;—'the first'—i. e. Nature—*is* the cause, of 'Self-consciousness' and the rest, [mediately] through 'the

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* तत्कार्यत्वमहङ्कारकार्यत्वमन्येषामेकादशेन्द्रियाणां पञ्चतन्मात्राणां पारम्पर्येण तन्मात्रकार्याणामपि भूतानां तत्कार्यत्वमित्यर्थः॥

† ननु यद्येवं तर्हि प्रधानं सर्वजगत्कारणमिति सिद्धान्तहानिरत आह॥

Great one,' and the rest;—as, in the theory of the Vaiśeshikas, the Atoms are the cause of the jar or the like, only [mediately] through combinations of two atoms, and so on;—such is the meaning.*

b. But then, since both Nature and Soul too are eternal, which of them is [really] the cause of the creation's commencing? In regard to this he declares as follows:†—

पूर्वभावित्वे द्वयोरेकतरस्य हाने ऽन्यतरयोगः ॥ ७६ ॥

Why Nature is the sole cause.

Aph. 76.—While both [Soul and Nature] are antecedent [to all products], since the one [viz. Soul] is devoid of this [character of being a cause], it is applicable to the other of the two [—viz. Nature].

a. That is to say—'while both'—viz. Soul and Nature—are pre-existent to every product,—still, 'since the one'—viz. Soul—from the fact of its never being modified [into anything else—as clay is modified into a jar—] must be 'devoid of,' or lack, the nature of a cause,—'it is applicable'—i. e. the nature of a cause must belong to the *other* of the two.‡

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* पारम्पर्येऽपि साक्षाद्धेतुत्वेऽपि आद्यायाः प्रकृतेर्हेतुता अहङ्कारादिषु महदादिद्वारास्ति यथा वैशेषिकमते ऽणूनां घटादिहेतुता द्व्यणुकादिद्वारैवेत्यर्थः ॥

† ननु प्रकृतिपुरुषयोर्द्वयोरपि नित्यत्वात्सृष्ट्यादौ कस्य कारणत्वमित्यत आह ॥

‡ द्वयोरेव पुम्प्रकृत्योरखिलकार्यपूर्वभावित्वे ऽप्येकतरस्य पुरुषस्यापरिणामित्वेन हाने कारणताहान्यामन्यतरस्य योगः कारणतासम्भव इत्यर्थः ॥

b. But then [some one may say]—let *Atoms* alone be causes, since there is no dispute [that *these* are causal]. In reply to this he says:—*

परिच्छिन्नं न सर्वोपादानम् ॥ ७७ ॥

Why the theory of a plastic Nature is preferable to that of Atoms.

Aph. 77.—What is limited cannot be the substance of all things.

a. That which is limited cannot be the substance of all things, as yarn cannot be the [material] cause of a jar;—therefore it would [on the theory suggested] be necessary to mention separate causes of all things severally, and it is simpler to assume a single cause; therefore Nature alone is the cause,—such is the meaning.†

b. He alleges scripture in support of this.‡

तदुत्पत्तिश्रुतेश्च ॥ ७८ ॥

Scripture declares in favour of the theory.

Aph. 78.—And [the proposition that Nature is the cause of all is proved] from the text of scripture that the origin [of the world] is therefrom, [—i. e. from Nature].

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* नन्वविवादात्परमाणूनामेव कारणत्वमस्त्वित्यत आह ॥

† यत्परिच्छिन्नं न तत्सर्वोपादानं यथा न तन्तुर्घटस्य कारणं तस्मात्पदार्थानां पृथक् पृथक् कारणं वक्तव्यमेककारणत्वे च लाघवं तस्मात्प्रधानस्यैव कारणत्वमित्यर्थः ॥

‡ अत्र श्रुतिं दर्शयति ॥

a. An argument, in the first instance, has been set forth [in §77—for, till argument fails him, no one falls back upon authority]. Scripture, moreover, declares that Nature is the cause of the world, in such terms as "From Nature the world arises" &c.*

b. But then [some one may say],—a jar, which antecedently did not exist, is seen to come into existence;—let, then, *antecedent non-existence* be the cause [of each product], since this is an invariable antecedent,—[and hence a cause—"the invariable antecedent being denominated a cause," if Dr. Brown, in his 6th lecture, is to be trusted]. To this he replies:†—

नावस्तुनो वस्तुसिद्धिः ॥ ७९ ॥

Ex nihilo nihil fit.

Aph. 79.—A thing is not made out of nothing.

a. That is to say,—it is not possible that out of nothing—i. e. out of a nonentity—a thing should be made—i. e. an entity should arise. If an entity were to arise out of a nonentity, then, since the character of a cause is visible in its product, the *world* also would be unreal;—such is the meaning.‡

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* युक्तिस्तावत्प्रोक्ता श्रुतिरपि प्रधानस्य जगत्कारणतामाह प्रधानाज्जगज्जायत इति ॥

† ननु प्रागसतो घटस्य भवनं दृश्यते। नियतपूर्वभावित्वात्प्रागभावः कारणमस्त्वित्यत आह ॥

‡ अवस्तुनोऽभावाद्वस्तुसिद्धिः भावोत्पत्तिर्न सम्भवतीत्यर्थः। यद्यभावाद्भावोत्पत्तिः तर्हि कारणरूपं कार्ये दृश्यत इति जगतोऽप्यवस्तुत्वं स्यादित्यर्थः॥

b. Let the world too *be* unreal,—what harm is that to *us*? [—if any ask—] he therefore declares as follows:*—

अबाधाद्दुष्टकारणजन्यत्वाच्च नावस्तुत्वम्॥ ८०॥

Reasons why the world is not to be supposed unreal.

Aph. 80.—It [the world] is not unreal, because there is no fact contradictory [to its reality], and because it is not the [false] result of depraved causes [—leading to a belief in what ought not to be believed].

a. When there is the notion, in regard to a shell [of a pearl-oyster, which sometimes glitters like silver], that it is silver, its being silver is contradicted by the [subsequent and more correct] cognition that this is *not* silver. But, in the case in question [—that of the world regarded as a reality—], no one ever has the cognition 'This world is *not* in the shape of an entity,'—by which [cognition—if any one ever really had such—] its being an entity might be opposed.†

b. And it is inferred that that is false which is the result of a *depraved* cause,—e. g. some one's cognition of a [white] conch-shell as *yellow,* through such a fault as the jaundice [which depraves his eye-sight]. But, in the case in question [—that of the world regarded as a reality—], there is no such [temporary or occasional] depravation [of the senses], because all, at all times,

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* भवतु जगदप्यवस्तु का नो हानिरित्यत आह॥

† शुक्तौ रजतमितिज्ञाने नेदं रजतमितिज्ञानाद्रजतबाधः। नचात्र नेदं भावरूपं जगदिति कस्यापि ज्ञानं येन भावरूपबाधः स्यात्॥

cognize the world as a reality; therefore the world is *not* an unreality.*

c. But then [some one may suggest]—*let* a nonentity be the cause of the world, still the world will not [necessarily therefore] be unreal. In regard to this he declares as follows :†

भावे तद्योगेन तत्सिद्धिरभावे तदभावात्कुतस्तरान्त-
त्सिद्धिः ॥ ८१ ॥

The product of something is something, and of nothing nothing.

Aph. 81.—If it [—the substantial cause—] be an entity, then this would be the case [that the product should be an entity], from its union [or identity] therewith :—but if [the cause be] a nonentity, then how could it possibly be the case [that the product should be real] since *it* is a nonentity [like the cause with which it is united in the relation of identity] ?

a. If an *entity* were the substantial cause [of the world], then, since [it is a maxim that] the qualities of the cause present themselves in the product,—'this would be the case'—i. e. it would be the case that the product is real,—'because of union therewith'—i. e. because of the union [of the product] with the reality [which is its substratum] :—But since [by parity of reasoning], if a *nonentity* [were the substantial cause], the world would be a nonentity, then, by reason of its being a nonentity—i. e. by reason of the world's being [on that supposition] necessa-

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* दुष्टकारणजन्यत्वाच्च मिथ्येत्यवगम्यते यथा कामलादिदोषात् पीतशंखज्ञानं कस्यचित् । अत्र च जगज्ज्ञानस्य सर्वेषां सर्वदा सत्त्वान्न दोषो ऽस्ति तस्मान्नावस्तु जगदिति ॥

† नन्वभावः कारणमस्तु तथाप्यभावत्वं न जगतो भविष्यतीति तत्राह ॥

rily a nonentity [like its supposed cause],—how could this be the case* [that it should be *real*]?

b. But then [some one may say], since [it would appear that] nonentity can take no shape but that of nonentity, let *works* alone be the cause of the world;—what need have we of the hypothesis of 'Nature'? To this he replies.†

न कर्मण उपादानायोगात् ॥ ८२ ॥

Action cannot serve as a substratum.

Aph. 82.—Nay,—for *works* are not adapted to be the *substantial* cause [of any product].

a. Granting that 'the unseen' [merit or demerit arising from actions] may be an *instrumental* cause [in bringing about the mundane condition of the agent], yet we never see merit or demerit in the character of the *substantial* cause [of any product], and our theories ought to show deference to our experience. 'Nature' is to be accepted, because Liberation arises [—see §57. *a.* and §84—] from discerning the distinction between Nature and the Soul.‡

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* भावे उपादानकारणे । कारणगुणाः कार्ये इति तद्योगेन भावयोगेन तत्सिद्धिः कार्यस्य वस्तुत्वसिद्धिः अभावे जगतोऽभावत्वे तदभावाज्जगदभावस्यावश्यम्भावात् कुतस्तत्सिद्धिरिति ॥

† नन्वभावस्याभावरूपत्वात् कर्मैव जगत्कारणमस्तु किं प्रधानकल्पनयेत्यत आह ॥

‡ निमित्तं कारणमदृष्टमस्तु धर्माधर्मयोस्तु उपादानकारणत्वं न क्वचिद्दृष्टं । कल्पना हि दृष्टानुसारेणैव भवति । प्रकृतिपुरुषविवेकदर्शनान्मुक्तिरिति प्रकृतिस्वीकारः ॥

b. But then [some one may say]—since Liberation can be attained by undertaking the things directed by the Veda, what occasion is there for [our troubling ourselves about] *Nature*? To this he replies.*

नानुश्रविकादपि तत्सिद्धिः साध्यत्वेनावृत्तियोगादपुरु-षार्थत्वम् ॥ ८३ ॥

Salvation is not to be obtained by ritual observances.

Aph. 83.—The accomplishment thereof [i. e. of Liberation] is not, moreover, through scriptural means:—the chief end of man does not consist in this [that is gained through such means], because, since this consists of what is accomplished through *means*, [and is therefore not *eternal*], there is [still left impending over the ritualist] the liability to repetition of births.

a. 'Scriptural means'—such as sacrifices—are so called because they are heard [from the mouth of the instructor in scripture];—not thereby, moreover, is 'the accomplishment thereof'—i. e. the accomplishment of Liberation. 'Because one is liable to repetition of births by reason of the fact that it [the supposed Liberation] was accomplished by *means*,'—i. e. because the [thus far] liberated [soul] is still liable to repetition of births inasmuch as this [its supposed Liberation] is not *eternal*, just because it is [the result of] *act*;—for *this* reason the chief end of man does not consist in this† [that is gained through ritual observances].

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* ननु वेदोक्तार्थानुष्ठानादेव मुक्तिसम्भवात् किं प्रकृत्येत्यत आह ॥

† वेदादनुश्रूयत इत्यानुश्रविको यज्ञादिः। तस्मादपि न तत्सिद्धिः मोक्षसिद्धिः। साध्यत्वेनावृत्तियोगात् कर्मत्वेनानित्यत्वान्मुक्तस्य पुनः संसारावृत्तियोगः तस्मादपुरुषार्थत्वम्॥

b. He now shows what *does* constitute the chief end of man.*

तत्र प्राप्तविवेकस्यानावृत्तिश्रुतिः ॥ ८४ ॥

In regard to the attainment of the chief end of man the Scripture concurs with the Sánkhya.

Aph. 84.—There is scripture for it that he who has attained to discrimination in regard to these [i. e. Nature and Soul] has no repetition of births.

a. 'In regard to these'—i. e. in regard to Nature and Soul,—of him who has attained to discrimination, there is a text declaring that, in consequence of his knowledge of the distinction, there shall be no repetition of births;—the text—viz.—"*He* does not return again," &c.†

b. He states an objection to the opposite view.‡

दुःखाद्दुःखं जलाभिषेकवन्न जाड्यविमोकः ॥ ८५ ॥

Pain can only lead to pain, not to liberation from it.

Aph. 85.—From pain [occasioned, e. g., to victims in sacrifice] must come pain [to the sacrificer,—and not *liberation* from pain], as there is not relief from chilliness by affusion of water.

a. If Liberation were to be effected by *acts* [such as sacrifices], then, since the acts involve a variety of pains, Liberation itself [—on the principle that every effect includes the qualities

* पुरुषार्थत्वं दर्शयति ॥

† तत्र प्रकृतिपुरुषयोः प्राप्तविवेकस्य विवेकज्ञानादनावृत्तिश्रुतिः न स पुनरावर्त्तत इति श्रुतिः ॥

‡ विपक्षे दोषमाह ॥

of its cause—] would have a variety of pains; and it would be a grief from the fact that it must eventually end:—for to one who is distressed by chilliness the affusion of water does not bring liberation from his chilliness but rather [additional] chilliness.*

b. But then [some one may say], the fact that the act is productive of pain is not the *motive* [to the performance of sacrifice]; but the [real] reason is this, that the act is productive of *things desirable*:—and, in accordance with this, there is the text "By means of acts [of sacrifice] they may partake of immortality," &c. To this he replies.†

काम्ये ऽकाम्ये ऽपि साध्यत्वाविशेषात् ॥ ८६ ॥

The character of the end makes no difference in regard to the transitoriness of what is effected by works.

Aph. 86—[Liberation cannot arise from acts] because, whether the end be something desirable or undesirable, this makes no difference in regard to its being the result of *means* [and therefore not eternal but transitory].

a. Grant that pain is not what is [intended] to be accomplished by works done without desire [on the part of the virtuous sacri-

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* यदि कर्मसाध्यो मोक्षो भवेत् कर्मणो दुःखबहुलत्वात् मोक्षोऽपि दुःखबहुलः स्यात्। अन्ततः क्षयित्वेनापि दुःखं स्यात्। नहि जाड्यार्त्तस्य जाड्यविमोको जलाभिषेकात् प्रत्युत जाड्यमेवेति ॥

† ननु दुःखस्य कर्मसाध्यत्वमप्रयोजकं किन्तु काम्यकर्मसाध्यत्वं हेतुः। तथाच श्रुतिः कर्मभ्यो ऽमृतत्वमानशुरिति तत्राह ॥

ficer], still, though there *is* a difference [as you contend] between [an act done to secure] something enjoyable and an act done without reference to enjoyment, this makes no difference with respect to the fact of the Liberation's being produced by *acts*[—which, I repeat, *permanent* Liberation cannot be—]:—there must still again be pain, for it [the Liberation supposed to have been attained through works,] must be perishable because it is a *production*. The text which declares that works done without desire are instruments of Liberation, has reference to *knowledge* [which, I grant, may be gained by such means], and Liberation comes through knowledge,—so that these [works] are instruments of Liberation *mediately*;* [—but you will recollect that the present enquiry regards the *immediate* cause].

b. [But then some one may say]—supposing that Liberation may take place [as you Sánkhyas contend] through the knowledge of the distinction between Nature and Soul, still, since, from the perishableness [of the Liberation effected by *this* means as well as any other means], mundane life may return, we are both on an equality [—*we* whose Liberation you Sánkhyas look upon as transitory,—and you Sánkhyas, whose Liberation we again look upon as being, by parity of reasoning, in much the same predicament]. To this he replies.†

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* मा भून्निष्कामकर्मसाध्यं दुःखं तथापि काम्यान्निष्कामकर्मविशेषे ऽपि मोक्षस्य कर्मसाध्यत्वमविशिष्टं साध्यत्वात् क्षयित्वेन पुनरपि दुःखं स्यात्। निष्कामकर्मणो मोक्षसाधनत्वश्रुतिः ज्ञानार्थं। ज्ञानाच्च मोक्ष इति पारम्पर्येण मोक्षसाधनत्वम्॥

† यदि प्रकृतिपुरुषविवेकज्ञानान्मोक्षो भवेत्तथापि क्षयित्वात्पुनरपि संसार इत्यावयोस्तुल्यत्वमित्यत आह॥

निजमुक्तस्य बन्धध्वंसमात्रं परं न समानत्वम्॥ ८७॥

The right means effect Liberation once for all.

Aph. 87. Of him who is essentially liberated, his bonds having absolutely perished, it [i. e. the fruit of his saving knowledge] is absolute:—there is no parity [between his case and that of him who relies on works].

a. Of him 'who is essentially liberated'—who in his very essence is free—there is the destruction of bondage. The bond [—see §56—] is Non-discrimination [between Nature and Soul]. By the removal thereof, there is the destruction—the annihilation—of Non-discrimination;—and how is it possible that there should again be a return of the mundane state when the destruction of Non-discrimination is *absolute?* Thus there is no such similarity* [between the two cases as is imagined by the objector under §86. *b*].

b. It has been asserted [in §62] that there is a class of twenty-five [things which are realities]:—and since these cannot be ascertained [or made out to be *true*] except by *proof,* therefore he displays this† [—i. e. he shows what he *means* by proof].

द्वयोरेकतरस्य वाप्यसन्निकृष्टार्थपरिच्छित्तिः प्रमा तत्साधकतमं यत्तत्॥ ८८॥

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* निजमुक्तस्य स्वभावमुक्तस्य बन्धध्वंसः। बन्धो ऽविवेकस्तद्विरोधेनाविवेकध्वंसो नाशः। अविवेकनाशस्य च प्रध्वंसत्वात् कुतः संसारस्य पुनरावर्त्तनमिति न समत्वम्॥

† पञ्चविंशतिगण इत्युक्तं तत्सिद्धिस्च न प्रमाणेन विनेति तद्दर्शयति॥

What is meant by evidence.

Aph. 88. The determination of something not [previously] lodged in both [the Soul and the Intellect] nor in one or other of them, is 'right notion' *(pramá)*. That [is what we mean by proof, or evidence—*pramáṇa*—] which is in the highest degree productive thereof [—i. e. of any given 'right notion'].

a. 'Not lodged'—i. e. not deposited in 'one rightly cognizing' *(pramátri)*,—in short, not previously got at. The 'discrimination', i. e. the ascertainment [or right apprehension] of such a thing, or reality, is 'right notion':—and whether this be an affection 'of *both*'—i. e. of Intellect and also of Soul [as some hold that it is], or of only one or other of the two [as others hold], *either* way, that 'which is in the highest degree productive' of this 'right notion' is [what we term proof or] evidence *(pramáṇa)*. Such is the definition of evidence in general [—the definition of its several species falling to be consisted hereafter] :—such is the meaning.*

b. It is with a view to the exclusion of Memory, Error, and Doubt, in their order, that we employ [when speaking of the result of evidence] the expressions 'not previously known' [which excludes things remembered], and 'reality' [which excludes mistakes and fancies], and 'discrimination'† [which excludes doubt].

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* असन्निकृष्टः प्रमातर्यनारूढो ऽनधिगत इति यावत्। एवम्भूतस्यार्थस्य वस्तुनः परिच्छित्तिरवधारणं प्रमा। सा च द्वयोर्बुद्धिपुरुषयोरेव धर्मो भवतु किंवैकतरमात्रस्य उभयथैव तस्याः प्रमाया यत्साधकतमं तत्प्रमाणमिति प्रमाणसामान्यलक्षणमित्यर्थः॥

† स्मृतिभ्रमसंशयव्युदासाय क्रमेणानधिगत इति वस्तुन इति अवधारणमिति॥

c. In regard to this [topic of knowledge and the sources of knowledge], if 'right notion,' is spoken of as located in the *Soul* [—see §88. *a.*—], then the [proof or] evidence is an affection of the *Intellect.* If [on the other hand, the 'right notion'] is spoken of as] located in the Intellect, in the shape of an affection [of that, the affections of which are mirrored by the Soul], then it [the proof or evidence—or whatever we may choose to call that from which 'right notion' results,] is just the conjunction of an organ [with its appropriate object,—such conjunction giving rise to sense-perception—], &c. But if *both* the Soul's cognition, and the affections of the Intellect, are spoken of as [cases of] 'right notion,' then *both* of these aforesaid [—the affection of the Intellect in the first case, and the conjunction of an organ with its appropriate object, &c., in the other case—] are [to receive the name of] proof *(pramáṇa).* You are to understand that when the organ of vision, &c., are spoken of as 'evidence,' it is only as being *mediately** [the sources of right knowledge].

d. How many [kinds of] proofs are there? To this he replies.†

त्रिविधं प्रमाणं तत्सिद्धौ सर्वसिद्धेर्नाधिक्यसिद्धिः ॥ ८९ ॥

There are three kinds of evidence.

Aph. 89.—Proof is of three kinds:—there is no establishment of more, because if these be established then all [that is true] can be established [—by one or other of these three proofs].

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* अत्र यदि प्रमारूपं फलं पुरुषनिष्ठमुच्यते तदा बुद्धिवृत्तिरेव प्रमाणं। यदि बुद्धिनिष्ठं वृत्तिरूपं तत् तदेन्द्रियसन्निकर्षादिरेव। यदि तु पौरुषेयबोधो बुद्धिवृत्तिश्चोभयमपि प्रमेत्युच्यते तदोक्तमुभयमेव प्रमाणं भवति। चक्षुरादिषु प्रमाणव्यवहारः परम्परयैवेति बोध्यम्॥

† कति प्रमाणानीत्यत आह॥

a. 'Proof is of three kinds;'—that is to say, 'the use of the senses' *(pratyaksha)*, 'the recognition of signs' *(anumána)*, and 'testimony' *(śabda)*, are the [three kinds of] proofs.*

b. But then [some one may incline to say,] let 'comparison' [which is reckoned in the Nyáya a specifically distinct source of knowledge,] and the others [—such as 'Conjecture,' &c., which are reckoned in like manner in the Mímánsá—], be instruments of right knowledge [as well as these three] in [the matter of] the discriminating of Nature and Soul:—he therefore says 'because if these [three] be established,' &c. And, since, if there be the three kinds of proof, everything [that is really true] can be established [by means of them] there is no establishment of more,'—no addition to the proofs can be fairly made out,—because of the cumbrousness [—that sins against the philosophical maxim that we are not to assume more than is necessary to account for the case—]: such is the meaning†.

c. For the same reason Manu also has laid down only a triad of proofs—where he says [—see the Institutes, ch. xii. v. 105—] "By that man who seeks a distinct knowledge of his duty, these three [sources of right knowledge] must be well understood—viz. Perception, Inference, and Scriptural authority in its various shapes [of legal institute, &c]". And 'Composition' and 'Tradition' *(aitihya)*, and the like, are include under Inference and Testimony; and 'Non-perception' *(anupalabdhi)*, and the

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* त्रिविधं प्रमाणमिति प्रत्यक्षानुमानशब्दाः प्रमाणानीत्यर्थः ॥

† ननूपमानाद्यपि प्रकृतिपुरुषविवेकप्रमाणमस्त्वित्यत आह तत्सिद्धाविति त्रिविधप्रमाणसिद्धौ च सर्वस्यार्थस्य सिद्धेर्नाधिक्यसिद्धिर्न प्रमाणाधिक्यं सिध्यति गौरवादित्यर्थः ॥

like, are included under Perception* [—for, the non-perception of an absent jar on a particular spot of ground, is nothing else than the perception of that spot of ground *without* a jar on it].

d. He next states the definitions of the varieties† [of proof,—having already,—§88,—given the general definition].

यत्सम्बद्धं सत्तदाकारोल्लेखिविज्ञानं तत्प्रत्यक्षम् ॥ ९० ॥

Perception defined. *Aph.* 90.—Perception *(pratyaksha)* is that discernment which, being in conjunction [with the thing perceived], portrays the form thereof.

a. 'Being in conjunction'—[literally] 'existing in conjunction;'—'portrays the form thereof'—i. e. assumes the form of the thing with which it is in conjunction [—as water assumes the form of the vessel into which it is poured—]; what 'discernment'—or affection of the Intellect—[does *this*], that [affection of the Intellect—see *Yoga* Aphorisms, §5 and §8. *b.*] is the evidence called Perception;—such is the meaning.‡

b. But then, [some one may say] this [definition of Perception

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* अत एव मनुनापि प्रमाणत्रयमेवोपन्यस्तं प्रत्यक्षमनुमानञ्च शास्त्रञ्च विविधागमं त्रयं सुविदितं कार्यं धर्मशुद्धिमभीप्सतेति । उपमानैतिह्यादीनाञ्चानुमानशब्दयोः प्रवेश अनुपलब्ध्यादीनाञ्च प्रत्यक्षे प्रवेश इति ॥

† विशेषलक्षणमाह ॥

‡ सम्बद्धं सत् सम्बद्धं भवत् । तदाकारोल्लेखि सम्बद्धवस्त्वाकारधारि भवति । यद्विज्ञानं बुद्धिवृत्तिस्तत्प्रत्यक्षं प्रमाणमित्यर्थः ॥

—§90—] does not extend [as we conceive it ought, and presume it is intended, to do] to the perception, by adepts in the *Yoga*, of things past, future, or concealed [by stone-walls or such intervening things as interrupt ordinary perception], because there is here no 'form of the thing—in *conjunction*' [with the mind of him who perceives it while absent]:—having pondered this doubt, he corrects it by [stating as follows] the fact that this [supernatural sort of perception] is not what he intends to define.*

योगिनामबाह्यप्रत्यक्षत्वान्न दोषः ॥ ९१ ॥

The definition not to be blamed though it should not apply to the perceptions of the mystic.

Aph. 91.—It is not a fault, [in the definition, that it does not apply to the perceptions of adepts in the *Yoga*,] because that of the adepts in the *Yoga* is not an *external* perception.

a. That is to say,—it is only *sense*-perception that is to be here defined, and the adepts of the Yoga do not perceive through the *external* [organs of sense];—therefore there is no fault [in our definition],—i. e. there is no *failure* to include the perceptions of these† [because there is no *intention* to include them].

b. [But, although this reply is as much as the objector has any right to expect,] he states the real justification‡ [of the definition in question].

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* ननु योगिनामतीतानागतव्यवहितवस्तुप्रत्यक्षे ऽव्याप्तिः सम्बद्धवस्त्वाकाराभावादित्याशंक्य तस्यालक्ष्यत्वेन समाधत्ते ॥

† ऐन्द्रियकप्रत्यक्षमेवात्र लक्ष्यं योगिनस्त्वबाह्यप्रत्यक्षकावतो न दोषो न तत्प्रत्यक्षे ऽव्याप्तिरित्यर्थः ॥

‡ वास्तवं समाधानमाह ॥

लीनवस्तुलब्धातिशयसम्बन्धाद्वाऽदोषः ॥ ९२ ॥

But the definition does apply to the perceptions of the mystic.

Aph. 92.—Or, there is no fault [in the definition] because of the conjunction, with causal things, of that [mystical mind] which has attained exaltation.

a. Or, be it so, that the perception of the *Yogí* also shall be the thing to be defined, still there is no fault [in our definition, §90], —it does not fail to extend [to this also], since the mind of the *Yogí*, in the exaltation gained from the habitude produced by concentration, *does* come into conjunction with things [as existent] in their causes* [whether or not with the things as developed into products perceptible by the external senses].

b. Here the word rendered "causal" *(lína)* denotes the things, *not* in conjunction [with the senses], alluded to by the objector [in §90. *b*]:—for *we*, who assert that effects *exist* [from eternity in their causes before taking the shape of effects, and likewise in these same causes when again resolved into their causes], hold that even what is past, &c., still essentially exists, and that hence its conjunction [with the mind of the mystic or the clairvoyant] is possible.†

Objection that the definition does not apply to the perceptions of the 'Lord.'

c. But then [some one may say]—still this [definition] does not extend to the *Lord's* perceptions, because,

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* अथवास्तु योगिप्रत्यक्षमपि लक्ष्यं तथापि न दोषो नाव्याप्तिः। यतो लीनवस्तुषु लब्धयोगजधर्मजन्यातिशयस्य योगिचित्तस्य सम्बन्धो घटते ॥

† अत्र लीनशब्दः पराभिप्रेतासन्निकृष्टवाची। सत्कार्यवादिनां ह्यतीतादिकमपि स्वरूपतोऽस्तीति तत्सम्बन्धसम्भवेदिति ॥

since these are from everlasting [—past, present, and future, being, as regards Him, indifferent—], they cannot *result* from conjunction. To this he replies :*—

ईश्वरासिद्धेः ॥९३॥

That any 'Lord' exists is not proved.

Aph. 93.—[This objection to the definition of Perception has no force] because it is not proved that there *is* a Lord *(íśwara)*.

a. That there is no fault [in the definition of Perception] because there is no proof that there *is* a Lord—is supplied† [from §91].

b. And this demurring to there being any 'Lord' is merely in accordance with the arrogant dictum of certain partisans [who hold an opinion not recognised by the majority]; therefore, it is to be understood, the expression employed is 'because it is not *proved* that there is a Lord,'—but not the expression 'because there *is no* Lord.'‡

c. But on the implication that there *is* a 'Lord,' what we mean to speak of [in our definition of Perception—§90—] is merely the being of the same kind with what is produced by conjunction§ [of a sense-organ with its object,—and the percep-

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* ननु तथापीश्वरप्रत्यक्षे ऽव्याप्तिस्तस्य नित्यत्वेनासन्निकर्ष-जन्यत्वात्तत्राह ॥

† ईश्वरे प्रमाणाभावाददोष इत्यनुवर्त्तते ॥

‡ अयञ्चेश्वरप्रतिषेध एकदेशिनां प्रौढवादेनैव अत एवे-श्वरासिद्धेरित्युक्तं न त्वीश्वराभावादिति बोध्यम् ॥

§ ईश्वराभ्युपगमे तु सन्निकर्षजन्यजातीयत्वमेव विवक्षि-तम् ॥

tions of the 'Lord' may be of the same *kind* with such perceptions, though they were not to come from the same *source*].

d. Having pondered the doubt '*How* should the Lord not be proved [to exist] by the Scripture and the Law [which declare his existence] ?'—he states a dilemma which excludes this.*

मुक्तबद्धयोरन्यतराभावान्न तत्सिद्धिः ॥ ९४ ॥

A dilemma to exclude proof that there is any 'Lord.'

Aph. 94.—It is not proved that He [the 'Lord'] exists, because, of free and bound, He can be neither the one nor the other.

a. The 'Lord' whom you imagine,—tell us—is He free from troubles &c., or is He in bondage through these? Since He is not,—cannot be,—either the one or the other, it is not proved that there is a 'Lord :'—such is the meaning.†

b. He explains just this point.‡

उभयथाप्यसत्करत्वम् ॥ ९५ ॥

The force of the dilemma.

Aph. 95.—Either way He would be inefficient.

a. Since, if He were free, He would have no desires which instigate Him to create; and, if He were bound, He would be

* श्रुतिस्मृतिभ्यां कथमीशो न सिद्धोदित्याशंक्य तर्कविरोधं बाधकमाह ॥

† ईश्वरो ऽभिमतः किं क्लेशादिभिमुक्तो वा तैर्बद्धो वा अन्यतरस्याप्यभावादसम्भवान्नेश्वरसिद्धिरित्यर्थः ॥

‡ तदेवाह ॥

under delusion;—He must be [on either alternative,] unequal to the creation &c.* [of this world].

b. But then, [it may be asked,] if such be the case, what becomes of the scripture texts which declare the 'Lord?' To this he replies.†

मुक्तात्मनः प्रशंसा उपासा सिद्धस्य वा ॥ ९६ ॥

The import of the texts which speak of the 'Lord.'

Aph. 96.—[The scriptural texts which make mention of the 'Lord,' are] either glorifications of the liberated Soul, or homages to the rocognised [deities of the Hindú pantheon].

a. That is to say:—accordingly as the case may be, *some* text [among those in which the term 'Lord' occurs,] is intended—in the shape of a glorification [of Soul] as the 'Lord' [as Soul is held to be,] merely in virtue of junction [with Nature]—to incite [to still deeper contemplation],—to exhibit, as what is to be known, the liberated Soul—i. e. absolute Soul in general:—and some other text, declaratory, for example, of creatorship preceded by resolution [to create], is intended to extol [—and to purify the mind of the contemplator by enabling him to take a part in extolling—] the eternity, &c., of the familiarly known Brahmá, Vishṇu, Śiva, or other *non*-eternal 'Lord,'—since these, though possessed of the conceit [of individuality] &c., [and in so far liable to perish] have immortality in a secondary sense‡ [—seeing that the Soul in *every* combination is immortal, though the combination itself is not so].

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* मुक्तत्वे सृष्टिप्रयोजकरागाद्यभावाद्बद्धत्वेच मूढत्वाच्च स्रष्ट्याद्यसमत्वमित्यर्थः ॥

† नन्वेवमीश्वरप्रतिपादकश्रुतीनां का गतिस्तत्राह ॥

‡ यथायोगं काचित् श्रुतिर्मुक्तात्मनः केवलात्मसामान्यस्य

b. But then [some one may say], even if it were thus [as alleged under §96], what is heard [in scripture—viz.—] the fact that it [viz. Soul] is the *governor* of Nature &c., would not be the case,—for, in the world, we speak of government only in reference to modifications [preceded and determined] by resolutions [that so and so shall take place], &c. To this he replies.*

तत्सन्निधानादधिष्ठातृत्वं मणिवत् ॥ ९७ ॥

Soul, like the loadstone, acts not by resolve but through proximity.

Aph. 97.—The governorship thereof [i. e. of Soul over Nature] is from its proximity [thereto,—not from its resolving to act thereon—], as is the case with the gem [—the load-stone—in regard to iron].

a. If it were alleged that its [Soul's] creativeness or its governorship were through a *resolve* [to create or to govern], then this objection [brought forward under §96. *b.*] would apply;—but [it is not so—for] by *us* [Sánkhyas] it is held that the Soul's governorship, in the shape of creatorship, or the like, is merely from its *proximity* [to Nature]—"as is the case with the [load-stone] gem."†

ज्ञेयताविधानाय सन्निधिमात्रैश्वर्येण स्तुतिरूपा प्ररोचनार्था काचिच्च सङ्कल्पपूर्वकस्रष्टृत्वादिप्रतिपादिका श्रुतिः सिद्धस्य ब्रह्मविष्णुहरादेरेवानित्येश्वरस्याभिमानादिमतो ऽपि गौणनित्यत्वादिमत्त्वान्नित्यत्वाद्युपासापरेत्यर्थः ॥

* ननु तथापि प्रकृत्याद्यधिष्ठातृत्वं श्रूयमाणं नोपपद्यते लोके सङ्कल्पादिना परिणमनस्यैवाधिष्ठानव्यवहारादिति तत्राह ॥

† यदि सङ्कल्पेन स्रष्टृत्वमधिष्ठातृत्वमुच्यते तदायं दोषः

b. As the gem, the load-stone, acts as an attracter of iron, merely by proximity, without resolving [so to act], so, by the mere conjunction of the primal Soul, Nature is changed into the principle called the 'Great One' [or Mind—see §62—]. And in this alone consists [what we speak of as] its acting as *creator* to- towards that which is superadded to it:—such is the meaning.*

c. And thus it is declared [in some one of the Puráṇas]—"As the iron acts whilst the gem [the loadstone] stands void of volition, just so the world is created by a deity who is mere Existence. Thus it is that there is in the Soul both agency [seemingly], and non-agency [really]:—it is *not* an agent, inasmuch as it is devoid of volition; and it *is* an agent, merely through approximation [to Nature]."†

d. In respect of worldly products also, animal souls overrule merely through their approximation [to Nature]; so he declares as follows.‡

स्यात्। अस्माभिस्तु पुरुषस्य सन्निधानादेवाधिष्ठातृत्वं स्रष्टृत्वादिरूपमिष्यते मणिवत्॥

* यथायस्कान्तमणेः सान्निध्यमात्रेण लोहाकर्षकत्वं सङ्कल्पादिना विना तथैवादिपुरुषस्य संयोगमात्रेण प्रकृतेर्महत्तत्त्वरूपेण परिणमनं। इदमेवच स्वोपाधिस्रष्टृत्वमित्यर्थः॥

† तथाचोक्तं। निरिच्छे संस्थिते रत्ने यथा लोहः प्रवर्त्तते। सत्तामात्रेण देवेन तथैवायं जगज्जनिः॥ अत आत्मनि कर्त्तृत्वमकर्त्तृत्वञ्च संस्थितम्। निरिच्छत्वादकर्त्तासौ कर्त्ता सन्निधिमात्रत इति॥

‡ लौकिककार्य्येष्वपि जीवानां सन्निधिमात्रेणैवाधिष्ठातृत्वमित्याह॥

विशेषकार्य्येष्वपि जीवानाम् ॥ ९८ ॥

Embodied souls do not energize.

Aph. 98.—In the case of individual products also, [the apparent agency] of animal souls [is solely through proximity].

a. 'The agency is solely through proximity,'—so much is supplied* [from §97].

b. The meaning is this,—that, in the case also of particular productions,—the creation, &c., of things individual [as contradistinguished from that of all things in the lump—see *Vedánta-śara* §67], animal souls—i. e. souls in which the intellects [of individuals] reflect themselves [—see §100. *a.*]—over-rule merely through proximity, but not through any effort,—seeing that these [animal souls] are none other than the motionless Thought.†

c. But then [some one may say], if there were no eternal and omniscient 'Lord', then, through the doubt of a blind tradition [obviated by no intelligently effective guardianship], the *Vedas* would cease to be an authority—[a possibility which, of course, cannot be entertained for an instant]. To this he replies.‡

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* अधिष्ठातृत्वं सन्निधानादेवेत्यनुषज्यते ॥

† विशेषकार्य्येषु व्यष्टिसृष्ट्यादिष्वपि जीवानां अन्तःकरणप्रतिबिम्बितचेतनानां सन्निधानादेवाधिष्ठातृत्वं नतु केनापि व्यवहारेण कूटस्थचिन्मात्रत्वादित्यर्थः ॥

‡ ननु नित्यसर्वज्ञेश्वराभावेऽन्धपरम्पराशङ्कया वेदाप्रामाण्यं स्यादत आह ॥

सिद्धरूपबोद्धृत्वाद्वाक्यार्थोपदेशः ॥ ९९ ॥

How the Vedas need not the 'Lord' to authenticate them.

Aph. 99.—The declaration of the texts or sense [of the Veda, by Brahmá for example], since *he* knows the truth—[*is* authoritative evidence].

a. To complete the aphorism we must say—"since *Hiranya-garbha* [i. e. *Brahmá*] and others [viz. *Vishnu* and *Śiva*], are knowers of what is certain—i. e. of what is true—, the declaration of the texts or sense of the Vedas, where *these* are the speakers, *is* evidence* [altogether indisputable].

b. But then, if Soul, by its simple proximity [to Nature—§97—], is an overruler in a *secondary* sense [only] of the term, [—as the magnet may be said, in a secondary sense, to draw the iron, while the conviction is entertained that actually, and literally, the iron draws the magnet,—] then who is the *primary* [or actual] overruler? In reference to this he says.†

अन्तःकरणस्य तदुज्ज्वलितत्वाल्लोहवदधिष्ठातृ-त्वम् ॥ १०० ॥

It is in the shape of the internal organ that Nature affects Soul.

Aph. 100.—The internal organ, through its being enlightened thereby [—i. e. by Soul—] is the over-ruler,—as is the iron [in respect of the magnet].

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* हिरण्यगर्भादीनां सिद्धरूपस्य यथार्थस्य बोद्धृत्वात्तद्वक्तृको वेदवाक्यार्थोपदेशः प्रमाणमिति शेषः ॥

† ननु पुरुषस्य चेत्सन्निधिमात्रेण गौणमधिष्ठातृत्वं तर्हि मुख्यमधिष्ठातृत्वं कस्येत्याकाङ्क्षायामाह ॥

a. The internal organ, i. e. the understanding, is the over-ruler, through its fancying itself to be Soul, [as it does fancy] by reason of its being enlightened by the Soul, through its happening to reflect itself in [and contemplate itself in] Soul;—'just as the iron,'—that is to say—as the attracting iron, though inactive, draws [the magnet] in consequence of its mere proximity.*

b. He now [—having discussed the evidence that consists in direct perception—] states the definition of an induction† *(anumána).*

प्रतिबन्धदृशः प्रतिबद्धज्ञानमनुमानम् ॥ १०१ ॥

An Induction defined.

Aph. 101.—The knowledge of the connected, through perception of the connection, is an induction.

a. That is to say,—an induction [or conviction of a general truth] is [a kind of] evidence consisting in a mental modification, [which is none other than] the knowledge of the connected, i. e. of the constant accompanier, through the knowledge of the constant accompaniment:—by 'connection' *(pratibandha)* here being meant 'constant attendedness' *(vyápti)*, and through the perception thereof‡ [it being that the mind has possession of any general principle].

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* अन्तःकरणस्य बुद्धेः पुरुषच्छायापत्त्या तेन चैतन्येनोज्ज्वलितत्वाच्चेतनत्वाभिमानादधिष्ठातृत्वं लोहवदिति यथाकर्षको लोहो निष्क्रियोऽपि सन्निधिमात्रेण कर्षतीति ॥

† अनुमानलक्षणमाह ॥

‡ प्रतिबन्धो व्याप्तिस्तद्दृशः व्याप्तिज्ञानात् प्रतिबद्धस्य व्यापकस्य ज्ञानं वृत्तिरूपमनुमानं प्रमाणमित्यर्थः ॥

b. But an inference *(anumiti)* is knowledge in the soul*—[whilst the Induction—so far forth as it is an instrument in the establishment of knowledge deducible from it—is an affection of the internal organ, or understanding,—see §88. *c.*].

c. He next defines testimony† *(śabda)*.

आप्तोपदेशश्शब्दः ॥ १०२ ॥

Valid Testimony defined.

Aph. 102.—Testimony [such as is entitled to the name of evidence—] is a fit declaration.

a. Here 'fitness' means 'suitableness;'—and so the evidence which is called 'Testimony' is the knowledge arising from a suitable declaration;—such is the meaning:—and [while this belongs to the understanding, or internal organ,—see §101. *b.*—] the result is that [knowledge] in the Soul which is called 'knowledge by hearing'‡ *(śabda-bodha)*.

b. He next volunteers to tell us what is the use of his setting forth [the various divisions of] evidence.§

उभयसिद्धिः प्रमाणात्तदुपदेशः ॥ १०३ ॥

Why the kinds of Evidence have been here set forth.

Aph. 103.—Since the establishment of both [soul and not-soul] is by means

* अनुमितिस्तु पौरुषेयो बोध इति ॥

† शब्दं लक्षयति ॥

‡ आप्तिश्च योग्यता। तथाच योग्यशब्दजन्यज्ञानं शब्दाख्यप्रमाणमित्यर्थः। फलञ्च पौरुषेयशाब्दबोध इति ॥

§ प्रमाणप्रतिपादनस्य स्वयमेव फलमाह ॥

of evidence,—the declaration thereof [i. e. of the kinds of evidence, has been here made].

a. It is only by means of evidence that both Soul and not-soul are established as being distinct [the one from the other];—therefore has this, viz. evidence, been here declared;—such is the meaning.*

b. Among these [several proofs] he now describes that one by which especially—viz. by a proof which is one kind of inference—Nature and Soul are here to be established discriminatively.†

सामान्यतो दृष्टादुभयसिद्धिः ॥ १०४ ॥

The existence of Soul and Nature argued from analogy.

Aph. 104.—The establishment of both [Nature and Soul] is by analogy.

a. [Analogy *(sámányato-drishṭa)* is that kind of evidence which is employed in the case] where, by the force [as an argument] which the residence of any property in the subject derives from a knowledge of its being constantly accompanied [by something which it may therefore betoken], when we have had recourse to [as the means of determining this constant accompaniment,] what is, for instance, generically of a perceptible kind, [where—under such circumstances—we repeat—] anything of a *different* kind—i. e. *not* cognizable by the senses—is established:—as when, for example having apprehended a constant accompaniment [—e. g. that an

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* उभयोरात्मानात्मनोर्विवेकेन सिद्धिः प्रमाणादेव भवति अतस्तस्य प्रमाणस्योपदेशः कृत इत्यर्थः ॥

† तत्र येनानुमानविशेषेण प्रमाणेन मुख्यतोऽत्र प्रकृतिपुरुषौ विविच्य साधनीयौ तद्दर्शयति ॥

act implies an instrument—] by taking into consideration such instruments as axes, &c., which are of earthy and other kinds, a quite heterogeneous, imperceptible, instrument of *knowledge,*—viz. [the instrument named] Sense—is established [or inferred to exist] :—such is what we mean by Analogy; and it is by *this* [species of inference] that Nature and Soul are proved to exist,—such is the meaning.*

b. Of these [viz. Nature and Soul] the argument from analogy for [the existence of] Nature is as follows. The great Principle [—viz. Understanding see §62. *c.*] is formed out of the things [called] Pleasure, Pain, and Delusion [—to the aggregate of which three in equipoise—see §62—the name of Nature is given—], because, whilst it is [undeniably] a production, it has the characters of Pleasure, Pain, and Delusion; just as a bracelet, or the like, formed of gold, or the like,† [has the characteristic properties of the gold, or the like, and is thereby known to have been formed out of gold or the like].

c. But [as regards the argument from analogy in proof of the existence] of Soul—[it is, as stated before, under §67, to the following effect] :—Nature is for the sake of *another*, because it is something that acts as a combination,—as a house, for instance,

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* यत्र सामान्यतः प्रत्यक्षादिजातीयमादाय व्याप्तिग्रहणात्पक्षधर्मताबलेन तद्विजातीयोऽप्रत्यक्षार्थस्सिध्यति यथा पृथिवीत्वादिजातीयं कुठारादिकरणमादाय व्याप्तिं गृहीत्वा तद्विजातीयमतीन्द्रियं ज्ञानकरणमिन्द्रियं साध्यत इति तत् सामान्यतो दृष्टं तस्मादुभयोः प्रकृतिपुरुषयोस्सिद्धिरित्यर्थः ॥

† तत्र प्रकृतेस्सामान्यतो दृष्टमनुमानं । यथा । महत्तत्त्वं सुखदुःखमोहद्रव्योपादानकं कार्यत्वे सति सुखदुःखमोहधर्मकत्वात्सुवर्णादिजकुण्डलादिवदिति ॥

[which is a combination of various parts combined for the benefit of the tenant]. In this instance, having gathered, in regard to houses, &c., the fact, established on sense-perception, that they exist for the sake of [organised] bodies, for example,—something of a different kind therefrom [i. e. from Nature]—viz. Soul—is inferred [by analogy as something other than Nature, &c.,—[which, as being a compound thing, is not designed for itself];—such is the meaning.*

d. But then [some one may say]—since Nature is eternal, and exertion is habitual to her, [and the result of her action is the bondage of the Soul,] there should constantly be experience [whether of pleasure or of pain], and hence no such thing as thorough emancipation. To this he replies:†—

चिदवसानो भोगः ॥ १०५ ॥

When it is that experience ceases.

Aph. 105.—Experience [whether of pain or pleasure] ends with [the discernment of] Thought—[or Soul, as contradistinguished from Nature].

a. By 'Thought' we mean Soul. Experience [whether of pain or pleasure] ceases on the discerning thereof. As 'antecedent non-existence,' though devoid of a beginning, [—see *Tarka-sangraha* §92—] surceases [—when the thing antecedently non-existent begins to be—], so eternal Nature [—eternal as re-

* पुरुषस्य तु प्रधानं परार्थं संहत्यकारित्वाद्गृहादिवदित्यत्र प्रत्यक्षसिद्धं देहाद्यर्थकत्वं गृहादिषु गृहीत्वा तद्विजातीयः पुरुषः प्रधानादिपरत्वेनानुमीयत इति ॥

† ननु प्रकृतेर्नित्यत्वात्प्रवृत्तिशीलत्वाच्च सर्वदा भोग इत्यनिर्मोक्षः स्यादित्यत आह ॥

gards the absence of any beginning—] continues [no further than] till the discernment of the difference [between Nature and Soul] :—so that experience [whether of pain or pleasure] does *not* at all times occur :—such is the state of the case.*

b. [But some one may say]—if Nature were the agent, and Soul the experiencer, then it might happen that another should be the experiencer of [the results of] the acts done by one different. To this he replies :†—

अकर्त्तुरपि फलोपभोगोऽन्नाद्यवत् ॥ १०६ ॥

The fruit of the action is not always the agent's.

Aph. 106.—The experience of the fruit may belong even to another than the agent, as in the case of food, &c.

a. As it belongs to the cook to prepare the food, &c., and to one who was not the agent, viz. the master, to enjoy the fruit thereof [—i. e. the fruit of the cook's actions—], so is the case here.‡

b. Having stated a practical maxim [—which may serve in practice to silence, by the *argumentum ad hominem*, him on whose

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* चिदात्मा। तद्विवेकावसानो भोगः। यथानादिरपि प्रागभावो नश्यति तथा नित्यायाः प्रकृतेर्विवेकज्ञानपर्यन्तः प्रसर इति न सर्वदा भोगापत्तिरिति भावः ॥

† यदि कर्तृ प्रधानं भोक्ता पुरुषस्तर्हि अन्यकृतस्य कर्मणोऽन्यो भोक्तेति स्यादित्याह ॥

‡ यथा सूपकारस्यान्नादिकर्तृत्वमकर्तुरीश्वरस्य फलोपभोक्तृत्वं तथात्रापीति ॥

principles it may be valid—], he now declares his own doctrine* [in regard to the doubt started under §105. *b*].

अविवेकाद्वा तत्सिद्धेः कर्तुः फलावगमः ॥ १०७ ॥

Nature is agent but not patient.

Aph. 107.—Or [—to give a better account of the matter than that given in §106—], since it is from non-discrimination that it is derived, the notion that the *agent* has the fruit [of the act, is a wrong notion].

a. The soul is neither an agent nor a patient, but, from the fact that the Great Principle [—the actual agent—see §99 *b.*] is reflected in it, there arises the *conceit* of its being an agent. 'Or, since it is from non-discrimination, &c.,'—that is to say,—because it is from the failure to discriminate between Nature and Soul that this takes place,—i. e. that the conceit takes place that it is the *agent* that experiences the fruit :† [—whereas the actual agent is Nature, which, being unintelligent, can experience neither pain nor pleasure].

b. The opposite of this [wrong view referred to in §107] he states as follows.‡

नोभयञ्च तत्त्वाख्याने ॥ १०८ ॥

Soul is neither agent nor patient.

Aph. 108.—And when the truth is made known, there is [seen to be] neither [agency, in Soul, nor experience].

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* व्यवहारसिद्धान्तमुक्त्वा स्वसिद्धान्तमाह ॥

† न पुरुषः कर्त्ता न वा भोक्ता किन्तु महत्तत्त्वप्रतिबिम्बितत्वात् कर्तृत्वाभिमानः । अविवेकाद्वेति प्रकृतिपुरुषयोर्विवेकाग्रहात्तत्सिद्धेः कर्तुः फलोपभोगाभिमानसिद्धेरिति ॥

‡ एतद्व्यतिरेकमाह ॥

a. 'When the truth is told' [and discerned], i. e. when, by means of evidence, Nature and Soul are *perceived* [in their entire distinctness one from the other], 'there is neither'—i. e. neither the condition [as regards soul] of an agent or a patient.*

b. Having discussed [the varieties of] evidence, he now states the distribution of the object-matter of evidence.†

विषयोऽविषयोऽप्यतिदूरादेर्हानोपादानाभ्यामिन्द्रियस्य ॥ १०९ ॥

What is perceptible under certain circumstances may be imperceptible under others.

Aph. 109.—[A thing may be] an object [perceptible] and also [at another time] not an object, through there being, in consequence of great distance, &c., a want of, or [in the absence of opposing causes] an appliance of, the sense.

a. An object [is a perceived object], through the proximity, or conjunction, of the sense [with the object]. A thing may be not an object [perceived], through the want of the sense, i. e. through the want of conjunction [between the sense and what would otherwise be its object]. And this want of conjunction [may result] from the junction's being prevented by great distance, &c.‡

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* तत्त्वाख्याने प्रमाणेन प्रकृतिपुरुषयोस्साक्षात्कारे नोभयं न कर्तृत्वं न भोक्तृत्वमिति ॥

† प्रमाणमुक्त्वा प्रमेयव्यवस्थामाह ॥

‡ इन्द्रियस्योपादानात् सम्बन्धाद्विषयः । इन्द्रियस्य हानात् सम्बन्धाभावादविषयः । सम्बन्धश्चातिदूरादेरयोग्यत्वात् ॥

What may prevent perception.

b. [To explain the "&c.," and exemplify the causes that may prevent the conjunction, required in order to perception, between the thing and the sense, we may remark that]—it is in consequence of great distance that a bird [flying very high up] in the sky is not perceived:—[then again] in consequence of extreme proximity the collyrium located in the eye [is not perceived by the eye itself]:—a thing placed in [the inside of, or on the opposite side of,] a wall [is not perceived] in consequence of the obstruction:—from distraction of mind the unhappy, or other [agitated person], does not perceive the thing that is at his side [—or under his very nose—]:—through its subtilty an Atom [is not perceived]:—nor is a very small sound when overpowered by the sound of a drum:—and so on.*

c. How [—or, for which of the possible reasons just enumerated—] comes the imperceptibleness of *Nature?* In regard to this he declares:†—

सौक्ष्म्यात्तदनुपलब्धिः ॥ ११० ॥

The subtilty of Nature.

Aph. 110.—Her imperceptibless arises from her subtilty.

a. 'Her'—i. e. *Nature's*—imperceptibleness is from subtility. By subtilty is meant the fact of being difficult to investigate,

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* अतिदूराद्वियति पक्षी नोपलभ्यते। अतिसामीप्याल्लोचनस्थाञ्जनं। व्यवधानात्कुड्यस्थं वस्तु। मनोऽनवस्थानाच्छोकादिग्रस्तस्य पार्श्वस्थवस्त्वग्रहणं। सौक्ष्म्यादणोः। अभिभवात् महद्ध्वनिना स्वल्पध्वनेरित्यादि॥

† प्रकृतेः कथमनुपलब्धिरित्यत आह॥

not [—as a Naiyáyika might perhaps here prefer understanding the term—] the consisting of Atoms,—for Nature is [not atomic, in the opinion of the Sánkhyas, but] all-pervasive.*

b. How then [it may be asked] is [the existence of] Nature determined? To this he replies:†—

कार्यदर्शनात्तदुपलब्धेः ॥ १११ ॥

Nature inferred from the existence of productions.

Aph. 111.—[Nature exists] because her existence is gathered from the beholding of productions.

a. As the knowledge of [there being such things as] atoms comes from the beholding of jars, &c., [—which are agglomerations—], so the knowledge of Nature comes from the beholding of products which have the three Qualities;‡ [—see §62. *a.*—and the existence of which implies a cause, to which the name of Nature is given, in which these constituents exist from eternity].

b. Some [—the Vedántins—] say that the world has *Brahma* as its cause; others [—the Naiyáyikas—] that it has atoms as its cause; but our seniors [—the transmitters of the Sánkhya

* तस्याः प्रकृतेरनुपलब्धिः सौक्ष्म्यात्। दुरूहत्वं सौक्ष्म्यं न त्वणुत्वं प्रकृतेर्विभुत्वादिति ॥

† कथं तर्हि प्रकृतिव्यवस्थेत्यत आह ॥

‡ यथा घटादिदर्शनात्परमाणुज्ञानं तथा त्रिगुणकार्यदर्शनात् प्रकृतिज्ञानमिति ॥

doctrine—] that it has *Nature* as its cause:—so he sets forth a doubt [which might naturally found itself] thereon.*

वादिविप्रतिपत्तेस्तदसिद्धिरिति चेत्॥ ११२॥

A doubt thrown on the existence of Nature by the contradiction of dissentients.

Aph. 112.—If [you throw out the doubt that] it [—viz. the existence of Nature—] is not established, because of the contradiction of asserters [of other views, then you will find an answer in the next aphorism].

a. 'Because of the contradiction of asserters [of the Vedánta or Nyáya], *it* is not established,'—i. e. Nature [—as asserted by the Sánkhyas—] is not established.†

b. But then [—to set forth the objection of these counter-asserters—], if a product existed antecedently to its production [as that product,] *then* an eternal Nature [such as you Sánkhyas contend for] would be proved to exist as the [necessary] substratum thereof,—since, you will declare that a cause is inferred only as the invariable accompanier of an effect; but it is denied by us asserters [of the Vedánta, &c.] that the effect *does* exist [antecedently to its production—well] *if* [this doubt be thrown out];—such is the meaning‡ [of the aphorism].

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* ब्रह्मकारणं जगदिति केचित् परमाणुकारणमित्यन्ये प्रधानकारणकमिति वृद्धा इति तत्र संशयमाह॥

† वादिनां विप्रतिपत्तेस्तदसिद्धिः प्रधानासिद्धिः॥

‡ ननु कार्यं चेदुत्पत्तेः प्राक् सिद्धं स्यात् तदा तदाधारतया नित्या प्रकृतिः कार्यसाहित्येनैव कारणानुमानवच्यमाणत्वात् वादिविप्रतिपत्तेस्तत्कार्यस्यैवासिद्धिरिति यदीत्यर्थः॥

c. He states his doctrine on this point.*

तथा त्वेकतरदृष्ट्या एकतरसिद्धेर्नापलापः ॥ ११३ ॥

Mutual denials settle nothing.

Aph. 113.—But since thus each [doctrine] is established in the opinion of each, a [mere unsupported] denial is not [decisive].

a. If one side were disproved merely by the dissent of the opponent, then [look you] there is dissent against the other side too,—so how should *it* be established? If the one side is established by there being inevitably attendant the recognition of the constant accompanier on the recognition of that which is constantly accompanied by it, it is the same with *my* side also;—therefore my inference from effect [to cause] is not to be denied† [in this peremptory fashion].

b. Well then [—the opponent may say—], let [the inference of] cause from effect be granted, how is it that this [cause] is *Nature*—and nothing else [—such as Atoms, for instance]? To this he replies.‡

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* सिद्धान्तमाह ॥

† यदि वादिविप्रतिपत्तिमात्रेण पक्षासिद्धत्वं विपक्षेऽपि विप्रतिपत्तिरस्तीति कथं तत्सिद्धिः। यदि व्याप्यज्ञानाद् व्यापकज्ञानस्याविनाभावित्वात्पक्षसिद्धिस्तर्हि ममाप्येवमिति न कार्यादनुमानापलापः ॥

‡ ननु कार्यात्कारणमस्तु तच्च प्रकृतिरेवेति कथमित्यत आह ॥

त्रिविधविरोधापत्तेः ॥ ११४ ॥

Nature the only hypothesis consistent with what appears.

Aph. 114.—Because [if we were to infer any other cause than Nature] we should have a contradiction to the threefold [aspect which things really exhibit].

a. Quality is threefold [see §62. *a.*]—viz. Goodness, Passion, and Darkness:—there would be a contradiction to *these*,—such is the meaning.*

b. The drift here is as follows:—If the character of cause [of all things around us] belonged to Atoms, or the like, then there would be a contradiction to the fact of being an aggregate of pleasure, pain, and delusion, which is recognisable in the world;† [—because nothing, we hold, can exist in the effect which did not exist in the cause,—and pleasure, pain, &c., are no properties of Atoms].

c. He now repels the doubt as to whether the production of an effect is that of what existed [antecedently] or of what did not exist.‡

नासदुत्पादो नृशृङ्गवत् ॥ ११५ ॥

What never was will never be.

Aph. 115.—The production of what is no entity, as a man's horn, does not take place.

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* त्रिविधो गुणास्सत्त्वरजस्तमांसि तद्विरोध इत्यर्थः ॥

† इदमत्राकूतं यदि परमाण्वादीनां कारणत्वं तदा जगत्युपलभ्यमानस्य सुखदुःखमोहात्मकत्वस्य विरोधः स्यादिति ॥

‡ इदानीं कार्यस्य सत उत्पत्तिरसतो वेति संशयं निरस्यति ॥

a. Of that which, like the horn of a man, is not an entity, even the production is impossible;—such is the meaning. And so the import is, that that effect alone which [antecedently] exists is [at any time] produced.*

b. He states an argument, why an effect must be some [previously existent] entity.†

उपादाननियमात् ॥ ११६ ॥

A product cannot be of nothing.

Aph. 116.—Because of the rule that there must be some material [of which the product may consist].

a. And only when both are extant is there from the presence of the cause the presence of the effect:—otherwise everywhere, and always, every effect might be produced,—[the presence of the cause being, on the supposition, superfluous]. This he states as follows.‡

सर्वत्र सर्वदा सर्वासम्भवात् ॥ ११७ ॥

Else any thing might occur at any time anywhere.

Aph. 117.—Because every thing is not possible every where, always.

a. That is to say,—because in the world we see that every thing is *not* possible, i. e. that every thing is *not* produced,

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* नरशृङ्गतुल्यस्यासत उत्पादोऽपि न सम्भवतीत्यर्थः तथाच सदेव कार्यमुत्पद्यत इत्याशयः ॥

† सत्कार्ये न्यायमाह ॥

‡ कारणसम्बन्धात्कार्यसम्बन्धश्च विद्यमानयोरेव । अन्यथा सर्वत्र सर्वदा सर्वोत्पत्तिस्स्यात् । एतदेवाह ।

'every where,' i. e. in every place,—'always,' i. e. at all times.*

b. And for the following reason also, he declares, there is no production of what existed not† [antecedently].

शक्तस्य शक्यकरणात् ॥ ११८ ॥

Effects pre-exist potentially in their causes.

Aph. 118.—Because that which is possible is made out of that which is competent [to the making of it.]

a. Because the being the material [of any future product] is nothing else than the fact of [being it *potentially*, i. e. of] having the power to be the product; and this power is nothing else than the product's condition as that of what has not yet come to pass;—therefore, since that which has the power, viz., the cause, makes the product which is capable [of being made out of it], it is not of any nonentity that the production takes place:—such is the meaning.‡

b. He states another argument.§

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* सर्वत्र सर्वस्मिन् देशे सर्वदा सर्वस्मिन् काले सर्वासम्भवात्सर्वानुत्पत्तेर्लोकदर्शनादित्याशयः ॥

† इतश्च नासदुत्पाद इत्याह ॥

‡ कार्यशक्तिमत्त्वमेव ह्युपादानत्वं शक्तिश्च कार्यस्यानागतावस्थैवेति शक्तस्य कारणस्य शक्यकार्यकरणादपि नासत उत्पाद इत्यर्थः ॥

§ अपरं न्यायमाह ॥

कारणभावाच्च ॥ ११९ ॥

The product is nothing else than the cause.

Aph. 119—And because it [—the product—] is [nothing else than] the cause [in the shape of the product].

a. It is declared in scripture, that, previously to production, moreover, there is no difference between the cause and its effect; —and since it is thereby settled that a product is an entity, production is not of what [previously] existed not:—such is the meaning.*

b. He ponders a doubt.†

न भावे भावयोगश्चेत् ॥ १२० ॥

A doubt whether that which is can be said to become.

Aph. 120.—If [it be alleged that] there is no possibility of that *becoming,* which already *is*—[then the answer will be found in the next aphorism].

a. That is to say,—but then, if it be thus [—that every effect exists antecedently to its production—], since the effect [—*every* effect—] must be eternal [without beginning], there is no possibility of [or room for] the adjunction of *becoming,*—the adjunction of *arising,*—in the case of a product which is [already, by hypothesis,] in the shape of an entity,—because the employment of the term '*arising*' [or the fact of being produced] has refer-

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* उत्पत्तेः प्रागपि कार्यस्य कारणाभेदः श्रूयते तस्माच्च सत्कार्यसिद्ध्या नासदुत्पाद इत्यर्थः ॥

† शङ्कते ॥

ence solely to what did *not* exist [previously]:—if this be urged:—such is the meaning.*

b. He declares the doctrine in regard to this point.†

नाभिव्यक्तिनिबन्धनौ व्यवहाराव्यवहारौ ॥ १२१ ॥

Production is only manifestation, and so of the opposite.

Aph. 121.—Nay,—the employment and the non-employment [of the term 'production'] are occasioned by the manifestation [or non-manifestation of what is spoken of as produced or not].

a. 'Nay'—i. e. the view stated [in §120] is not the right one.‡

b. As the whiteness of white cloth which had become dirty is brought manifestly out by means of washing, &c., so, by the operation of the potter is the pot brought into manifestness;—whereas, on the blow of a mallet, it becomes hidden,§—[and no longer appears as a *pot*].

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* नन्वेवं सति कार्यस्य नित्यत्वे सति भावरूपे कार्ये भावयोग उत्पत्तियोगो न सम्भवति असत एवोत्पत्तिव्यवहारात् इतिचेदित्यर्थः ॥

† सिद्धान्तमाह ॥

‡ न नोक्तपक्षो युक्त इत्यर्थः ॥

§ यथा शुक्लपटस्य मलिनस्य क्षालनादिना शुक्लत्वमभिव्यज्यते तथा कुलालस्य व्यापाराद् घटोऽभिव्यज्यते मुद्गराभिघातात्तिरोभूयते ॥

c. And manifestation [is no fiction of ours, for it] is seen ;—or example, that of oil, from sesamum-seeds, by pressure; of milk, from the cow, by milking; of the statue, that resided in the midst of the stone, by the operation of the sculptor; of rice from the rice in the husk, by threshing; &c.*

d. Therefore the employment or non-employment of the [term] the *production* of an effect are dependent on *manifestation* —dependent on the manifestation of the *effect*:—that is to say, —the employment of [the term] production is in consequence of the manifestation [of what is spoken of as produced], and the non-employment of [the term] production is in consequence of there being no manifestation [of that which is therefore not spoken of as produced],— but [the employment of the term production is] not in consequence of that becoming an entity which was not an entity.†

e. But if [the employment of the term] *production* is occasioned by [the fact of] *manifestation*, by what is occasioned [the employment of the term] *destruction*? To this he replies.‡

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* दृष्टा चाभिव्यक्तिः पीडनेन तिलेषु तैलस्य दोहनेन गवि पयसः शिलामध्यस्थप्रतिमायाः शैल्पिकव्यापारेण अवघातेन धान्ये तण्डुलस्येत्यादि ॥

† तस्मात्कार्योत्पत्तेर्व्यवहाराव्यवहारौ अभिव्यक्तिनिबन्धनौ कार्याभिव्यक्तिनिमित्तकौ । अभिव्यक्तित उत्पत्तिव्यवहारोऽभिव्यक्त्यभावाच्चोत्पत्तिव्यवहाराभावो नत्वसतस्सत्त्ये-त्यर्थः ॥

‡ अभिव्यक्तिनिबन्धनात्तूत्पत्तिः किन्निबन्धनो विनाश इत्यत आह ॥

नाशः कारणलयः ॥ १२२ ॥

What is meant by destruction.

Aph. 122.—Destruction [of any thing] is the resolution [of the thing spoken of as destroyed,] into the cause [from which it was produced].

a. The resolution, by the blow of a mallet, of a jar into its cause [—i. e. into the particles of clay which constituted the jar],—to *this* are due both [the employment of] the term 'destruction', and the kind of action [or behaviour] belonging to any thing* [which is termed its destruction].

b. [But some one may say]—if there were [only] a resolution [of a product into that from which it arose], a resurrection [or παλινγενεσις] of it would be seen, and this is *not* seen:—well [—we reply—] it is not seen by blockheads, but it *is* seen by those who can discriminate. For example, when thread is destroyed, it is changed into the shape of earth [—as when burned to ashes]:—and the earth is changed into the shape of a cotton-tree; and this [successively] changes into the shape of flower, fruit, and thread [spun again from the fruit of the cotton-plant]. So is it with all entities.†

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* मुद्गराभिघाताद् घटस्य कारणे यो लयः तन्निबन्धनो नाश इति शब्दार्थक्रियाभेदौ ॥

† यदि लयः पुनरुद्भवो दृश्येत नच दृश्यत इति मूढैर्न दृश्यते विवेचकैर्दृश्यत एव। तथाहि। तन्तौ नष्टे मृद्रूपेण परिणामः। मृदश्च कार्पासवृक्षरूपेण परिणामः। तस्य पुष्पफलतन्तुरूपेण परिणामः। एवं सर्वे भावा इति ॥

c. Pray—[some one may ask]—is this *manifestation* [that you speak of under §121] something real, or something not real? If it be something real [and which, therefore, never ceases to be] then the effect [during this constant manifestation] ought constantly to be *perceived*; and if it be *not* real, then there is an end of your 'existent product' [§115 *b.*], because, also of this [manifestation—as being not from eternity—] there must be [in order to give rise to it] another manifestation, and of this another, and so on without end, [—seeing that a *manifestation* can be the result of nothing else than a manifestation,—on the principle that an effect consists of neither more nor less than its cause]. To this he replies.*

पारम्पर्यतोऽन्वेषणाद्बीजाङ्कुरवत्॥ १२३॥

How manifestation may occur without being an entity.

Aph. 123.—Because they seek each other reciprocally, as is the case with seed and plant, [—manifestation may generate manifestation from eternity to eternity].

a. Be it so, that there are thousands of manifestations, still there is no fault, for there *is* no starting point,—as is the case with seed and plant,† [—which we may suppose to have served from eternity as sources one to another reciprocally].

b. He states another argument.‡

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* किमभिव्यक्तिः सती असती वा। सती चेत् नित्यकार्योपलब्धिः स्यात्। असती चेत् सत्कार्यहानिः तस्या अपि अभिव्यक्तिरन्या तस्या अप्यन्येत्यनवस्थेत्यत आह॥

† भवत्वभिव्यक्तिसहस्रं तथापि न दोषोऽनादित्वात् बीजाङ्कुरवदिति॥

‡ युक्त्यन्तरमाह॥

उत्पत्तिवद्वा ऽदोषः ॥ १२४ ॥

The objections to the theory of manifestation retorted.

Aph. 124.—Or, [at all events, our theory of 'manifestation' is as] blameless as [that of] 'production'.

a. Pray [let us ask],—is *production* produced, or is it not? If it is produced, then of this [production of production] there must be production;—so that there is a *regressus in infinitum*, [such as you allege against our theory under §122. *c*]. If it be *not* produced, then, pray, is this because it is *un-real*, or because it is eternal? If because it is un-real, then production never is at all, so that it should never be perceived, [as you allege that it is]. Again, if [production is not something produced] because it is *eternal*, then there should be at all times the production of [all possible] effects,—[which you will scarcely pretend is the case]. Again, if you say,—since 'production' itself *consists* of production, what need of supposing an ulterior production [of production]?—then, in like manner, [*I* ask,]—since 'manifestation' itself *consists* of manifestation, what need of supposing an ulterior manifestation [of manifestation]? The view which you hold on this point is *ours* also,*—[and thus every objection stated or hinted under §122. *c.* is capable of being retorted].

* किमुत्पत्तिरुत्पद्यते न वा। उत्पद्यते चेत् अस्या उत्पत्तिरित्यनवस्था। नोत्पद्यते चेत् किमसत्त्वान्नित्यत्वाद्वा। यद्यसत्त्वात्कदाचिदप्युत्पत्तिर्नास्तीति सर्वदानुपलम्भः स्यात्। अथ नित्यत्वात् सर्वदा कार्योत्पत्तिः स्यात्। अथोत्पत्तेः स्वयमेवोत्पत्तिरूपत्वात्किमुत्पत्त्यन्तरकल्पनयेति तर्ह्यभिव्यक्तेरप्यभिव्यक्तिरूपत्वात्किमभिव्यक्त्यन्तरकल्पनयेति तुल्यं। तच यस्तव सिद्धान्तः सोऽस्माकमपि॥

b. He now states the community of properties [that exists] among the products of Nature mutually.*

हेतुमदनित्यमव्यापि सक्रियमनेकमाश्रितं लिङ्गम्॥ १२५॥

The characters common to all products.

Aph. 125.—[A product of nature is] caused, un-eternal, mutable, not all-pervading, multitudinous, dependent, mergent.

a. 'Caused'—i. e. having a cause. 'Un-eternal,'—i. e. destructible. 'Not all-pervading,' i. e. not present everywhere. 'Mutable'—i. e. distinguished by the act of leaving [one form] and assuming [another form]. It [the soul] leaves the body it had assumed, [and probably takes another]; and bodies, &c., move [and are mutable, as is notorious]. 'Multitudinous'—i. e.—, in consequence of the distinction of souls, [everything is proportionately multitudinous,—each man—e. g.—seeing a separate rainbow, though it be called but one]. 'Dependent'—i. e. [dependent] on its cause. Mergent,—that is to say, it [i. e. each product, in due time,] is resolved into that from which it originated].†

b. [But some one may say],—if realities be the twenty-five [which the Sánkhyas enumerate—see §62—and no more], pray, are such common operations as knowing, enjoying, &c., absolutely *nothing?*—[if you say that they are so] then you give up

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* प्रकृतिकार्याणामन्योन्यं साधर्म्यमाह॥

† हेतुमत् कारणवत्। अनित्यं विनाशि। अव्याप्य-सर्वगम्। सक्रियं त्यागोपादानादिक्रियाविशिष्टम्। उपात्त-देहं त्यजति शरीरादयश्च स्पन्दन्ते। अनेकं पुरुषभेदात्। आश्रितं स्वकारणे। लिङ्गं स्वकारणे लयं गच्छतीति॥

what you *see*—[in order to save a hypothesis, with which that which you see is irreconcilable]. To this he replies.*

आञ्जस्यादभेदतो वा गुणसामान्यादेस्तत्सिद्धिः प्रधानव्यपदेशाद्वा ॥ १२६ ॥

The qualities of the Nyáya are implied in the term Nature.

Aph. 126—There is the establishment of these, [which you fancy that we do not recognise because we do not explicitly enumerate them,] either by reason that these ordinary qualities [—as contradistinguished from the *three* Qualities of the Sánkhya—] are truly nothing different; or [—to put it in another point of view—] because they are hinted by [the term] Nature [—in which, like our own three Qualities, they are implied].

a. Either from their being nothing different from the twenty-four principles—'truly'—really—quite evidently,—since the character of these [twenty-four] fits the ordinary qualities, &c., [which you fancy are neglected in our enumeration of things,]—'there is the establishment of these'—i. e. there is their establishment [as realities] through their being implied just in those† [twenty-four principles which are explicitly specified in the Sánkhya].

b. The word 'or' shows that there is another alternative [reply, in the aphorism, to the objection in question]. 'Or because

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* यदि पञ्चविंशति तत्त्वं किं ज्ञानसुखादीनां सामान्यकर्मणामभाव एव तदा च दृष्टपरित्याग इत्यत आह ॥

† आञ्जस्यात् स्वरूपतः प्रत्यक्षत एव वा चतुर्विंशतितत्त्वादभेदतस्तल्लक्षणयोगाद्गुणसामान्यादीनां तत्सिद्धिस्तेष्वेवान्तर्भावात् सिद्धिः ॥

they are hinted by [the term] Nature :'— that is to say,—the qualities, &c., [such as Knowledge,] are established [as realities], just because they are hinted by [the term] Nature, by reason that these qualities are, mediately, products of Nature,—for there is no difference between product and cause;—but the omission to mention them [explicitly] is not by reason of their not being at all.*

c. He next mentions the points in which Nature and her products agree.†

त्रिगुणाचेतनत्वादि द्वयोः ॥ १२७ ॥

The characters common to Nature and her products.

Aph. 127.—Of both [Nature and her products] the fact that they consist of the three Qualities [§62. *a.*] and that they are irrational —[is the common property].

a. Consisting of the three qualities, and being irrational,— [such is the meaning of the compound term with which the aphorism commences]. By the expression "&c." is meant their being intended for *another*, [—see §67—]. 'Of both'—i. e. of the cause [viz. Nature], and of the effects [—viz. all natural products—], such is the meaning‡.

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* वाशब्दः पक्षान्तरं सूचयति । प्रधानव्यपदेशाद्वा । गुणानां पारम्पर्येण प्रधानकार्यत्वेन कार्यकारणयोरभेदात्प्रधानव्यपदेशादेव गुणादिसिद्धिर्नत्वभावादननुकीर्त्तनमिति ॥

† प्रकृतिकार्ययोस्साधर्म्यमाह ॥

‡ त्रिगुणत्वमचेतनत्वं । आदिशब्दात् परार्थत्वं । द्वयोरिति कार्यकारणयोरित्यर्थः ॥

b. He next states the mutual differences of character among the three Qualities which [see §62] are the [constituent] parts of Nature.*

प्रीत्यप्रीतिविषादाद्यैर्गुणानामन्योन्यवैधर्म्यम् ॥ १२८ ॥

In what the three Qualities differ.

Aph. 128.—The Qualities [§62] differ in character, mutually, by pleasantness, unpleasantness, lassitude, &c., [in which forms severally the Qualities present themselves].

a. 'Pleasantness,'—i. e. Pleasure. By the '&c,' is meant Goodness (*sattwa*), which is light [i. e., not heavy,] and illuminating. 'Unpleasantness,'—i. e. Pain. By the '&c.' [in reference to this,] is meant Passion *(rajas)*, which is urgent and restless. 'Lassitude,'—i. e. stupefaction. By the '&c.' is meant Darkness *(tamas)*, which is heavy and enveloping. It is by these habits that the Qualities, viz:—Goodness, Passion, and Darkness differ;—such is the remainder† [required to complete the aphorism].

b. At the time of telling their differences, he tells in what respects they agree.‡

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* प्रकृतिविभागस्य त्रिगुणस्यान्योन्यवैधर्म्यमाह ॥

† प्रीतिः सुखम् । आदिशब्दाल्लघु प्रकाशकं सत्त्वम् । अप्रीतिर्दुःखम् । आदिशब्दादुपष्टम्भकं चलञ्च रजः । विषादो मोहः । आदिशब्दाद्गुरुवरणकं तमः । एतैर्धर्मैर्गुणानां सत्त्वरजस्तमसां वैधर्म्यम्भवतीति शेषः ॥

‡ तेषां वैधर्म्यकथनावसरे साधर्म्यमाह ॥

लघ्वादिधर्मैरन्योन्यं साधर्म्यं वैधर्म्यं गुणानाम्॥ १२९॥

In what respects the Qualities agree as well as differ.

Aph. 129.—Through Lightness and other habits the Qualities, mutually, agree and differ.

a. The meaning is as follows. The enunciation [—in the shape of the term *laghu* 'light'—is not one intended to call attention to the concrete—viz. what things are light,—but] is one where the abstract [—the nature of light things—viz. 'lightness'—*laghutwa*] is the prominent thing. 'Through Lightness and other habits,'—i. e. through the characters of Lightness, Restlessness, and Heaviness,—the Qualities differ. Their *agreement* is through what is hinted by the expression 'and other.' And this consists in their mutually predominating [one over the other from time to time], producing each other, consorting together, and being reciprocally present [—the one in the other—], for the sake of the soul.*

b. By the expression [—in § 125—] 'caused,' &c., it was declared that the 'Great one' [or Mind], &c., are *products.* He states the proof of this.†

उभयान्यत्वात्कार्यत्वं महदादेर्घटादिवत्॥ १३०॥

Proof that Mind, &c., are products.

Aph. 130.—Since they are other than both [Soul and Nature—the only two un-

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* अयमर्थः। भावप्रधानो निर्देशः। लघ्वादिधर्मैर्लघुचलनगुरुत्वैर्गुणानां वैधर्म्यम्। आदिपदसूचितेन साधर्म्यम्। तच्च पुरुषार्थमन्योन्याभिभवजननमिथुनवृत्तित्वम्॥

† हेतुमदित्यादिना महदादीनां कार्यत्वमुक्तम्। तत्र प्रमाणमाह॥

caused entities—], Mind, and the rest, are products, as is the case with a jar or the like.

a. That is to say,—like a jar or the like, Mind and the rest are products, because they are something other than the two which [alone] are eternal, viz., Nature and Soul.*

b. He states another reason.†

परिमाणात् ॥ १३१ ॥

A second proof.

Aph. 131.—Because of their measure, [which is a limited one].

a. That is to say, [Mind and the rest are products] because they are limited in measure,‡ [while the only two that are uncaused, viz. Nature and soul, are unlimited].

b. He states another argument.§

समन्वयात् ॥ १३२ ॥

A third proof.

Aph. 132.—Because they conform [to Nature].

a. [Mind and the rest are products] because they well [follow and] correspond with Nature, i. e., because the Qualities of Nature [§62] are seen in all things:|| [and it is a maxim that there is nothing in the effect that was not in the cause].

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* नित्याभ्यां प्रकृतिपुरुषाभ्यामन्यत्वात् घटादेरिव महदादेः कार्यत्वमित्यर्थः ॥

† हेत्वन्तरमाह ॥

‡ परिमितत्वादित्यर्थः ॥

§ अपरां युक्तिमाह ॥

|| प्रधानेन सह सम्यगन्वयात् प्रधानगुणानां सर्वपदार्थेषु दर्शनात् ॥

b. He states the same thing* [in the next aphorism].

शक्तितश्चेति ॥ १३३ ॥

A fourth proof.

Aph. 133.—And, finally, because it is through the power [of the cause alone, that the product can do aught].

a. It is by the power of its cause that a product energizes [—as a chain restrains an elephant only by the force of the iron—], so that Mind and the rest, being [except through the strength of Nature] powerless, produce *their* products in subservience to Nature;—otherwise, since it is their habit to energize, they would at all times produce their products†—[which it will not be alleged that they do].

b. And the word *iti*, in this place, is intended to notify the completion of the set of [positive] reasons‡ [why Mind and the others should be regarded as *products*].

c. He next states [—in support of the same assertion—] the argument from negatives,§ [i. e. the argument drawn from the consideration as to what becomes of Mind and the others when they are *not* products].

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* एतदेवाह ॥

† कारणशक्त्या कार्यं प्रवर्त्तत इति महदादयः क्षीणाः सन्तः प्रकृत्यनुसारेण कार्यं जनयन्ति। अन्यथा प्रवृत्तिशीलत्वात्सर्वदा कार्यं जनयेयुः ॥

‡ इतिशब्दश्चात्र हेतुवर्गसमाप्तिसूचनार्थः ॥

§ व्यतिरेकमाह ॥

तद्धाने प्रकृतिः पुरुषो वा ॥ १३४ ॥

Proof of the same from negatives.

Aph. 134.—On the quitting thereof [—quitting the condition of product—], there is Nature or Soul, [into one or other of which the product must needs have resolved itself].

a. Product or not-product,—such is the pair of alternatives. 'On the quitting thereof,'—i. e. when Mind and the rest quit the condition of product,—Mind and the rest [of necessity] enter into Nature or Soul,*[—these two alone being not-products].

b. [But perhaps some one may say that] Mind and the rest may exist quite independently of the pair of alternatives [just mentioned]. In regard to this he declares as follows.†

तयोरन्यत्वे तुच्छत्वम् ॥ १३५ ॥

Mind and the rest would not be at all, if neither product nor not-product.

Aph. 135.—If they were other than these two they would be void.

a. If Mind and the rest were other 'than these two,' i. e. than product or not-product [—§134—], they would be in the shape of what is 'void,'—i. e. in the shape of nonentity.‡

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* कार्यमकार्यञ्चेति कोटिद्वयं। तद्धाने महदादेः कार्यताहाने प्रकृतौ पुरुषे वा महदादीनां प्रवेश इति ॥

† उभयकोटिविनिर्मुक्ता एव महदादयो भविष्यन्तीत्याह ।

‡ तयोः कार्याकार्ययोरन्यत्वे महदादीनां तुच्छरूपत्वमभावरूपत्वम् ॥

b. Well now, [some one may say,] why should it be under the character of a *product* that Mind and the rest are a sign of [there being such a principle as] Nature? They may be [more properly said to be] a sign merely in virtue of their not *occurring apart* from it. To this he replies.*

कार्यात्कारणानुमानं तत्साहित्यात् ॥ १३६ ॥

What kind of causes can be inferred from their effects.

Aph. 136.—The cause is inferred from the effect [—in the case of Nature and her products—], because it accompanies it.

a. This may indeed be the case where the nature [or essence] of the cause is not seen in the effect, as [is the case with] the inference—from the rising of the moon—that the sea is swoln [into full tide,—rising, with maternal affection, towards her son who was produced from her bosom on the occasion of the celebrated Churning of the Ocean. Though the swelling of the tide does not occur 'apart from' the rising of the moon, yet here the cause —moon-rise—is not seen in the effect—tide; and consequently, though we infer the effect from the cause, the cause could not have been inferred from the effect]. But in the present case, since we see in Mind and the rest, the characters of Nature, the cause *is* inferred from the effect. 'Because it accompanies it'— i. e. because, in Mind and the rest, we see the properties of Nature†—[i. e. Nature herself actually present, as we see the clay which is the cause of a jar actually present in the jar].

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* अथ किमर्थं महदादयः कार्यत्वेन प्रकृतेर्लिङ्गं । अविनाभावादेव लिङ्गम्भविष्यन्तीत्यत्राह ॥

† भवत्वेवं यत्र कारणरूपं कार्ये न दृश्यते यथा चन्द्रोदयात्समुद्रवृद्ध्यनुमानम् । अत्र तु प्रधानरूपस्य महदादौ

b. [But it may still be objected,—] if it be thus, then let that principle itself—the 'Great one' [or Mind]—be the cause of the world:—what need of *Nature?* To this he replies.*

अव्यक्तं त्रिगुणाल्लिङ्गात्॥ १३७ ॥

How Mind must have an antecedent.

Aph. 137.—The undiscrete, [Nature, must be inferred] from its effect, in which are the three Qualities, [which constitute Nature].

a. 'It goes to dissolution'—such is the import of the term *linga,* here rendered 'effect.' From that [effect],—viz. the 'Great' principle [or Mind]—in which are the three Qualities, Nature must be inferred. And that the 'Great' principle, in the shape of ascertainment [or distinct intellection], is limited [or discrete], and perishable, is established by direct observation. Therefore [—i. e. since Mind, being perishable, must be resolvable into something else,] we infer that into which it is resolvable,† [—in other words its 'cause,'—here analogously termed *lingin,* since 'effect' had been termed *linga*].

b. But then, [some one may say,] still something quite differ-

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दर्शनात् कार्यात्कारणानुमानमेव तस्माद्दित्यात् प्रकृतिरूपस्य महदादौ दर्शनात्॥

* एवं चेत् महत्तत्त्वमेव जगत्कारणमस्तु किं प्रधानेनेत्यत आह॥

† लयं गच्छतीति लिङ्गं कार्यम्। तस्मात् त्रिगुणात् महत्तत्त्वात् प्रधानमनुमातव्यम्। महत्तत्त्वञ्चाध्यवसायरूपं व्यक्तं विनाशि प्रत्यक्षसिद्धम्। तेन लिंग्यनुमानम्॥

ent may be the cause [of all things];—what need of this *Nature* of yours? In regard to this he remarks as follows.*

तत्कार्यतस्तत्सिद्धेर्नापलापः ॥ १३८ ॥

Why Nature, and nothing else, must be the root of all.

Aph. 138.—There is no denying that it [—Nature—] *is*, because of its effects, [—which will be in vain attributed to any other source].

a. Is the cause of this [world] a product or not a product? If it were a product, then, the same being [with equal propriety to be assumed to be] the case with *its* cause, there would be a *regressus in infinitum.* If effects be from any *root* [—to which there is nothing antecedent—], then *this* is that [to which we give the name of *Nature*]. 'Because of its effects,'—that is to say, because of the effects of Nature. There is no denying 'that it *is*,' —i. e. that *Nature* is.†

b. Be it so—[let us grant—] that Nature *is*; yet [—the opponent may contend—] *Soul* positively cannot be,—for [if the existence of causes is to be inferred from their products, Soul cannot be thus demonstrated to exist, seeing that] it has *no* products. In regard to this he remarks as follows.‡

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* ननु तथाप्यन्यदेव कारणम्भविष्यति किं प्रकृत्येत्यत्राह ॥

† तत्कारणं कार्यमकार्यं वा । कार्यत्वे तत्कारणस्यापि तथात्वे सत्यनवस्था । मूलकार्यत्वे तदेव सेति । तत्कार्यत इति प्रकृतिकार्यत इत्यर्थः । तत्सिद्धेः प्रकृतिसिद्धेर्नापलापः ॥

‡ भवतु प्रकृतिसिद्धिः पुरुषस्य सिद्धिस्तु न स्यादेव । न हि तस्य कार्यमस्तीत्यत्राह ॥

सामान्येन विवादाभावात् धर्मवन्न साधनम् ॥१३९॥

It is not from any effect that soul is inferred.

Aph. 139.—[The relation of cause and effect is] not [alleged as] the means of establishing [the existence of Soul], because, as is the case with [the disputed term] 'merit,' there is no dispute about there being such a kind of thing, [though *what* kind of thing *is* matter of dispute].

a. There is no dispute about 'there being such a thing'—i. e. as to there being Soul simply [—since everybody, who does not talk stark nonsense, must admit a Soul, or *self*, of *some* kind—]; for the dispute is [not as to its *being*, but] as to its peculiarity [of being],—as [whether it be] multitudinous or sole, all-pervading or *not* all-pervading, and so forth. Just as in every [philosophical system or] theory there is no dispute as to [there being something to which may be applied the term] 'merit' *(dharma)*; for the difference of opinion has regard to the particular kind of [thing,—such as sacrifices according to the Mímánsa creed, or good works according to the Nyáya,—which shall be held to involve] 'merit.'*

b. 'Not the means of establishing' that [—viz. the existence of soul]:—i. e. the relation of cause and effect is not the means of establishing it. This implies—"I will mention anŏther means of establishing it."†

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* सामान्येन तावदात्मनि विवादो नास्ति विशेषे हि विवादो ऽनेक एको व्यापको ऽव्यापक इत्यादि। यथा सर्वस्मिन् दर्शने धर्म इत्यविवादः धर्मविशेषे हि विप्रतिपत्तिः॥

† न तत्साधनं। न तत्र कार्यकारणभावः साधनम्। अन्यत्साधनं वक्ष्यामीत्यभिसन्धिः॥

b. [But some one may say—] Souls are nothing else than the body and its organs, &c.;—what need of imagining anything else? To this he replies.*

शरीरादिव्यतिरिक्तः पुमान्॥ १४०॥

Materialism scouted.

Aph. 140.—Soul is something else than the body, &c.

a. [The meaning of the aphorism is] plain.†

b. He propounds an argument in support of this.‡

संहतपरार्थत्वात्॥ १४१॥

The discerptible is subservient to the indiscerptible.

Aph. 141.—Because that which is combined [and is therefore discerptible,] is for the sake of some other [*not* discerptible].

a. That which is discerptible is intended for something else that is indiscerptible. If it were intended for something else that is discerptible, there would be a *regressus in infinitum.*§

b. And combinedness [—involving—see §67—discerptibleness—] consists in the Qualities' making some product by their state of mutual commixture;—or [to express it otherwise—] combinedness is the state of the soft and hard—[which distinguishes matter from spirit]. And this exists occultly in Na-

* देहेन्द्रियादय एवात्मानः किमन्यकल्पनयेत्यत आह॥

† व्यक्तम्॥

‡ अत्र न्यायमाह॥

§ यत्संहतं तदसंहतपरार्थं संहतपरार्थत्वे ऽनवस्था स्यात्॥

ture and the rest, because, otherwise, discerptibleness would not prove discoverable in the products thereof.*

c. He elucidates this same point.†

त्रिगुणादिविपर्ययात् ॥ १४२ ॥

Soul presents no symptom of being material.

Aph. 142.—[Soul is something else than the body, &c.], because there is [in Soul] the reverse of the three Qualities, &c.

a. Because, in Soul, there is 'the reverse' of the three Qualities, &c.,—i. e. because they are not seen in it. By the '&c.' is meant—because the *other* characters of Nature also are not seen [in Soul]‡.

b. He states another argument§.

अधिष्ठानाच्चेति ॥ १४३ ॥

Another proof that soul is not material.

Aph. 143.—And [Soul is not material] because of its superintendence [over Nature].

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* संहतत्वञ्च गुणानामन्योन्यमिथुनभावेन कार्यकरणं अथवा द्रवकठिनता संहतत्वं। तच्च प्रकृत्यादौ तिरोभूतमस्ति अन्यथा तत्कार्येषु संहतताऽदर्शनप्रसङ्गात्॥

† तदेव स्पष्टयति॥

‡ पुरुषे त्रिगुणादिविपर्ययात् तददर्शनात्। आदिशब्दादन्येषां प्रकृतिधर्माणामप्यदर्शनादिति॥

§ न्यायान्तरमाह॥

a. For a superintendent is an intelligent being, and Nature is unintelligent,—such is the meaning*.

b. He states another argument†.

भोक्तृभावात् ॥ १४४ ॥

Another proof.

Aph. 144.—And [Soul is not material] because of its being the experiencer.

a. Nature it is that is experienced;—the experiencer is Soul. Although Soul, from its being unchangeably the same, is not [really] an experiencer, still the assertion [in the aphorism] is made because of the fact that the reflection of the Intellect befals it‡ [—and thus makes it *seem* as if it experienced:—see §59. *a*].

b. Efforts are engaged in for the sake of Liberation. Pray, is this [for the benefit] of the soul or of Nature—[since Nature, in the shape of Mind, is, it seems, the experiencer]? To this he replies.§

कैवल्यार्थं प्रवृत्तेः ॥ १४५ ॥

For Soul, not Nature, is liberation wanted.

Aph. 145.—[It is for Soul and not for Nature,] because the exertions are with a

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* चेतनो ह्यधिष्ठाता भवति प्रकृतिश्च जडेत्यर्थः ॥

† युक्त्यन्तरमाह ॥

‡ भोग्या प्रकृतिः। भोक्ता पुरुषः। यद्यपि कूटस्थत्वादात्मनो भोक्तृत्वं नास्ति तथापि बुद्धिच्छायापत्त्येत्यर्थः ॥

§ मोक्षार्थं प्रवृत्तिः। सा किमात्मनः प्रकृतेर्वा इत्यत आह ॥

view to isolation [from all qualities,—a condition to which Soul is competent, but Nature not].

a. The very essence of Nature cannot depart from it [so as to leave it in the state of absolute solitary isolation contemplated], for the three Qualities are its very essence, [the departure of which from it would leave nothing behind]; and because it would thus prove to be *not* eternal [—while in reality it *is* eternal]. The isolation *(kaivalya)* of that alone is possible of which the qualities are reflectional [and not constitutive—see §59 *a.*—] and that is Soul.*

b. Of what nature is this [Soul]? To this he replies.†

जडप्रकाशायोगात्प्रकाशः ॥ १४६ ॥

The nature of the Soul. *Aph.* 146.—Since light does not pertain to the unintelligent, light, [which must pertain to something or other, is the essence of the Soul, which, self-manifesting, manifests whatever else is manifest].

a. It is a settled point that the unintelligent does not shine—[it is not self-manifesting]. If Soul also were unintelligent [—as the Naiyáyikas hold it to be in *substance*—knowledge being by them regarded not as its essence or substratum but as one of its *qualities*—], then there would need to be another light for *it*;—and, as the simpler theory, let Soul itself consist essentially of light‡.

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* त्रिगुणस्वभावत्वात् प्रकृतेर्न स्वभावप्रच्यवः अनित्यत्वप्रसङ्गाच्च । यस्यौपाधिकगुणास्तस्य कैवल्यं सम्भवति स चात्मेति ॥

† स किंरूप इत्यत आह ॥

‡ जडो न प्रकाश इति सिद्धम् । यद्यात्मापि जडः स्यात्

b. And there is scripture [in support of this view:—for example the two following texts from the *Vrihadáraṇyaka Upanishad*]:—'Wherewith shall one distinguish that wherewith one distinguishes all this [world]?' 'Wherewith shall one take cognizance of the cognizer?'*

c. [But the Naiyáyika may urge—] *let* Soul be unintelligent [in its substance], but having Intelligence as its attribute. *Thereby* it manifests all things, but it is not essentially Intelligence. To this he replies.†

निर्गुणत्वान्न चिद्धर्मा ॥ १४७ ॥

Soul has no quality.

Aph. 147.—It [Soul] has not Intelligence as its attribute, because it is without quality.

a. If soul were associated with attributes, it would be [as we hold everything to be that is associated with attributes] liable to alteration, and therefore there would be no Liberation,‡—[its attributes, or susceptibilities, always keeping it liable to be affected by something or other;—or, the absolutely simple being the only unalterable].

तथाप्यन्येन प्रकाशेन भवितव्यं लाघवाच्चात्मैव प्रकाशरूपो ऽस्तु ॥

* श्रुतिश्च । येनेदं सर्वं विजानाति तं केन विजानीयात् । विज्ञातारमरे केन विजानीयादिति ॥

† जडो ऽप्यात्मास्तु चिद्धर्मा तेन जगत्प्रकाशयति न तु चिद्रूप इत्यत आह ॥

‡ यद्यात्मनो धर्मयोगः स्यात् परिणामित्वं स्यात् ततश्चानिर्मोक्ष इति ॥

b. He declares that there is a contradicton to Scripture* [in the view which he is contending against].

श्रुत्या सिद्धस्य नापलापस्तत्प्रत्यक्षबाधात् ॥ १४८ ॥

Scripture higher evidence than supposed intuition.

Aph. 148.—There is no denial [to be allowed] of what is established by Scripture, because the [supposed] evidence of intuition for this [i. e. for the existence of qualities in the Soul] is confuted [by the scriptural declaration of the contrary].

a. The text—'For this Soul is un-companioned,' &c., would be confuted if there were any annexation of qualities† [to Soul:—and the notion of confuting Scripture is not to be entertained for a moment].

b. But the literal meaning [of the aphorism] is this, that, the fact, established by scripture, of its [i. e. soul's] being devoid of qualities, cannot be denied,—because the scripture itself confutes the [supposed] intuitive perception thereof,—i. e. the [supposed] intuitive perception of qualities, &c.,‡ [in the soul].

सुषुप्त्याद्यसाक्षित्वम् ॥ १४९ ॥

Argument against the soul's being unintelligent.

Aph. 149.—[If soul were unintelligent] it would not be witness [of its own comfort] in profound [and dreamless] sleep, &c.

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* श्रुतिविरोधमाह ॥

† असङ्गो ह्ययम्पुरुष इत्यादिश्रुतिर्गुणयोगे बाधिता स्यात् ॥

‡ अक्षरार्थस्तु श्रुत्या सिद्धस्य निर्गुणत्वादेर्नापलापः सम्भवति तत्प्रत्यक्षस्य गुणादिप्रत्यक्षस्य श्रुत्यैव बाधादिति ॥

a. If soul were unintelligent, then in deep sleep, &c., it would not be a witness—a knower. But that this is not the case [may be inferred] from the phenomenon that 'I slept *pleasantly*, &c.' By the '&c' [in the aphorism] dreaming is included.*

b. The Vedántins say that 'soul is *one* only'; and so, again, 'For Soul is eternal, omnipresent, changeless, void of blemish;'—'Being one [only], it is divided [into a seeming multitude] by Nature *(śakti)*—i. e.—Illusion *(máyá)*,—but not through its own essence, [—to which there does not belong multiplicity].' In regard to this he says as follows.†

जन्मादिव्यवस्थातः पुरुषबहुत्वम् ॥ १५० ॥

There is a multiplicity of soul.

Aph. 150.—From the several allotment of birth, &c., a multiplicity of souls [is to be inferred].

a. 'Birth, &c.' By the '&c.,' growth, death, &c., are included. 'From the several allotment' of these, i. e. from their being appointed—[birth to one, death to another, and so on]. 'A multiplicity of souls,'—that is to say, souls are many. If soul were one only, then when *one* is born, *all* would be born, &c.‡

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* सुषुप्त्यादौ असाक्षित्वमज्ञातृत्वं स्यात् नचैवं सुखमस्वाप्समिति प्रतिभासनात्। आदिशब्दात् स्वप्नग्रहणम् ॥

† एक एवात्मेति वेदान्तिनः। तथाच नित्यः सर्वगतो ह्यात्मा कूटस्थो दोषवर्जितः। एक एव स भिद्यते शक्त्या मायया न स्वभावत इत्यमाह ॥

‡ जन्मादीति आदिना उपचयमरणादि गृह्यते। तद्व्यवस्थातः तन्नियमात् पुरुषबहुत्वं बहव आत्मान इत्यर्थः। यद्येक एवात्मा एकस्मिन् जायमाने सर्वे जायेरन्निति ॥

b. He ponders as a doubt the opinion of the others* [—viz. of the Vedántins].

उपाधिभेदेऽप्येकस्य नानायोग आकाशस्येव घटादिभिः ॥ १५१ ॥

The view of the Vedánta on this point.

Aph. 151.—[The Vedántins would have us believe that] there being a difference in its investments, moreover, multiplicity attaches [seemingly] to the one [Soul], as is the case with Space by reason of jars, &c., [which mark out the spaces that they occupy].

a. As Space is one, [and yet] in consequence of the difference of adjuncts,—jars, &c.—when the jar is destroyed, it is [familiarly] said 'the jar's space is destroyed'—[for there then no longer exists a space marked out by the jar];—so also, on the hypothesis of there being but one Soul, since there is a difference of corporeal limitation, on the destruction thereof [—i. e. of the limitation occasioned by any particular body—], it is merely a way of talking [to say] 'The soul has perished.' [This indeed is the case] also on the hypothesis that there are many souls; otherwise, since soul is eternal [—without beginning or end—as both parties agree—], how could there be the appointment of birth and death?†

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* परमतमाशङ्कते ॥

† यथैकमाकाशं घटाद्युपाधिभेदात् घटे नष्टे घटाकाशं नष्टमिति व्यपदिश्यते तथैकात्मपक्षेऽपि देहावच्छेदभेदात् तन्नाशे आत्मा नष्ट इति व्यपदेशमात्रम् । नानात्मपक्षेऽपि अन्यथा आत्मनो नित्यत्वात् कथं जन्ममरणव्यवस्थेति ॥

b. He states [what may serve for] the removal of doubt* [as to the point in question].

उपाधिर्भिद्यते न तु तद्वान्॥ १५२॥

Refutation of the Vedánta on this point.

Aph. 152.—The investment is different [—according to the Vedántins—], but not that to which this belongs, [—and the absurd consequences of such an opinion will be seen].

a. 'The investment is different'—[—there are diverse bodies, of John, Thomas, &c.]; 'that to which this belongs'—i. e. that [Soul] to which this investment [of body in all its multiplicity] belongs,'—is *not* different [—but is one only—]; such is the meaning. And [now consider], in consequence of the destruction of one thing, we are not to speak as if there were the destruction of something else,—because this [evidence of a thing's being destroyed] would present itself where it ought not—[the destruction of Devadatta presenting itself as a fact when we are considering the case of Yajnadatta, who is not for *that* reason to be assumed to be dead];—and, on the hypothesis that Soul is one, the [fact that the Vedánta makes an] imputation of inconsistent conditions is quite evident, since Bondage and Liberation do not [and cannot] belong [simultaneously] to *one*. But the conjunction and [simultaneous] non-conjunction of the sky [or space] with smoke, &c., [of which the Vedántin may seek to avail himself as an illustration,] are *not* contradictory, for it is not the nature of Conjunction to abide in something wholly pervaded by it†; [—whereas, on the other hand, it would be nonsense to speak of Bondage as affecting one portion of a monad, and Liberation affecting another portion, as a monkey may be in con-

* समाधानमाह॥

† उपाधिर्भिद्यते तद्वानुपाधिमान् न भिद्यत इत्यर्थः। नचान्यनाशादन्यत्र नाशव्यवहारो ऽतिप्रसङ्गात्। एकात्म-

junction with a branch of a tree without being in conjunction with the stem].

b. "What may be [proved] by this?" To this he replies.*

एवमेकत्वेन परिवर्त्तमानस्य न विरुद्धधर्माध्यासः ॥ १५३ ॥

The Sánkhya is free from the charge of absurdity to which the Vedánta is open.

Aph. 153.—Thus [—i. e. by taking the Sánkhya view —] there is no imputation of contradictory conditions to [a Soul supposed to be] everywhere present as *one*.

a. 'Thus'—i. e. [if you regard the matter rightly] according to the manner here set forth,—there is no 'imputation,' or attribution, of incompatible conditions, Bondage, Liberation, &c., to a soul existing 'everywhere,' throughout all, as a monad.†

b. [But the Vedántin may contend]—we *see* the condition of another attributed even to one quite different, as—e. g.—Nature's character as an agent [is attributed] to Soul—which is one other [than Nature]. To this he replies.‡

अन्यधर्मत्वे ऽपि नारोपात्तत्सिद्धिरेकत्वात् ॥ १५४ ॥

Imputation is not proof.

Aph. 154.—Even though there be [imputed to Soul] the possession of the con-

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पक्षेष व्यक्त एव विरुद्धधर्माध्यासः एकस्यबन्धमोक्षाभावात् । आकाशस्य तु धूमादियोगायोगावविरुद्धौ संयोगस्याव्याप्यवृत्तित्वात् ॥

* एतेन किं स्यादित्यत आह ॥

† एवमुक्तरीत्या एकत्वेन परितः सर्वतो वर्त्तमानस्यात्मनो बन्धमोक्षादिविरुद्धधर्माणामध्यास आरोपो न भवतीत्यर्थः ॥

‡ अन्यधर्मस्याप्यन्यत्रारोपो दृष्टो यथा प्रकृतेः कर्तृत्वं पुरुषे ऽन्यत्वेनाह ॥

dition of another, this [—that it really possesses such—] is not established by the imputation, because it [Soul] is *one* [absolutely simple unqualified entity].

a. [The notion] that Soul is an agent is a mistake, because, that Soul is *not* an agent is true, and the imputation [of agency to Soul] is *not* true, and the combination of the true and the untrue is not real. Neither birth nor death, or the like, is compatible with Soul, because it is un-companioned,* [—unattended either by qualities or by actions].

b. [But the Vedántin may say]—and thus there will be an opposition to the scripture,—for according to that—" Brahma is one without a second;—there is nothing here diverse;—death after death does he obtain who here sees as it were a multiplicity." To this he replies.†

नाद्वैतश्रुतिविरोधो जातिपरत्वात् ॥ १५५ ॥

Scripture, speaking of Soul as one, is speaking of it generically.

Aph. 155.—There is no opposition to the scriptures [declaratory] of the non-duality [of Soul], because the reference [in such texts] is to the *genus* [or to Soul in general].

a. But there is no opposition [in our Sánkhya view of the matter] to the scriptures [which speak] of the oneness of Soul, because these [scriptural texts] refer to the *genus*. By *genus* we

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* पुरुषकर्तृत्वं भ्रान्तं पुरुषाकर्तृत्वस्य सत्त्वात् आरोपस्यासत्यत्वात् । नच सत्यासत्ययोस्सम्बन्धस्तात्त्विको भवति । असङ्गित्वादात्मनो न जन्ममरणादि सम्भवति ॥

† एवञ्च श्रुतिविरोधः स्यात् तथाचैकमेवाद्वितीयं ब्रह्म नेह नानास्ति किञ्चन मृत्योस्स मृत्युमाप्नोति य इह नानेव पश्यति । अत्राह ।

mean sameness, the fact of being of the same nature;—and it is to this alone that the texts about the non-duality [of Soul] have reference. It is not the indivisibleness [of Soul,—meaning by its indivisibleness the impossibility that there should be more souls than one,—that is meant in such texts—] because there is no motive [for viewing Soul as *thus* indivisible];—such is the meaning.*

b. But then [—the Vedántin may rejoin—] the Bondage and Liberation are incompatible of any single soul [—and yet these may coexist according to the opinion] of him who asserts that souls are many. To this he replies.†

विदितबन्धकारणस्य दृष्ट्या तद्रूपम् ॥ १५६ ॥

The compatibility of Bondage and Freedom.

Aph. 156.—Of him [i. e. of that soul] by whom the cause of Bondage is known, there is that condition [of isolation, or entire liberation], by the perception [of the fact that Nature and soul are distinct, and that he really was *not* bound even when he seemed to be so].

a. By whom is known 'the cause of Bondage'—viz., the non-perception that Nature and soul are distinct,—of him, 'by discerning it'—i. e. by cognizing the distinction,—there is 'that condition'—viz., the condition of isolation, [—the condition, see §145, to which the soul aspires. The soul in Bondage which is no real bondage, may be typified by Don Quixote hanging in

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* आत्मैक्यश्रुतीनां विरोधस्तु नास्ति तासां जातिपरत्वात्। जातिः सामान्यमेकरूपत्वं। तत्रैवाद्वैतश्रुतीनां तात्पर्यात्। नाखण्डत्वं प्रयोजनाभावादित्यर्थः ॥

† नन्वनेकात्मवादिनोऽपि एकस्यात्मनो बन्धमोक्षौ विरु-
द्धावित्यत आह ॥

the dark from the ledge of a supposed enormous precipice, and bound to hold on for his life, from not knowing that his toes were within six inches of the ground].*

b. [Well, rejoins the Vedántin,] Bondage [—as you justly observe—] is dependent on non-perception, and is not real:—it is a maxim that non-perception is removed by perception:—and, on this showing, we see the [force of the] reasoning on the hypothesis that soul is one, but not on that of Soul's being multitudinous. To this he replies.†

नान्धादृष्ट्या चक्षुष्मतामनुपलम्भः ॥ १५७ ॥

He jeereth the Vedántin.

Aph. 157.—Nay—because the blind do not see, can those that have their eyesight not perceive?

a. What,—because a blind man does not see, does also one who has his eyesight not perceive? There are many arguments [in support of the view] of those who assert that souls are many, [—though *you* do not see them—]: such is the meaning.‡

b. He declares, for the following reason also, Souls are many.§

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* विदितं बन्धकारणं प्रकृतिपुरुषविवेकादर्शनं यस्य तस्य दृष्ट्या विवेकज्ञानेन तद्रूपं कैवल्यरूपम् ॥

† विवेकादर्शननिमित्तो बन्धो न तात्त्विकः। दर्शनाददर्शनं निवर्त्तत इति युक्तिः। एवञ्चैकात्मपक्ष एव न्यायं पश्यामो न नानात्मक इत्यत आह ॥

‡ अन्धो न पश्यतीति किं चक्षुष्मानपि नोपलभते। नानात्मवादिनामनेके न्यायाः सन्तीत्यर्थः ॥

§ इतोऽपि नानात्मान इत्याह ॥

वामदेवादिर्मुक्तो नाद्वैतम् ॥ १५८ ॥

Scripture proof that Souls are many.

Aph. 158.—Vámadeva, as well as others, has been liberated, [if we are to believe the scriptures, therefore] the non-duality [asserted in the same scriptures] is not [a fact,—if we are to understand it in the sense of the Vedántins].

a. In the Puráṇas, &c., we hear—"Vámadeva has been liberated," "Suka has been liberated," and so on. If Soul were *one*, since the liberation of all would take place on the liberation of one, the scriptural mention of a diversity [of separate and successive liberations] would be self-contradictory.*

b. [But the Vedántin may rejoin]—on the theory that Souls are many,—since the world has been from eternity [without beginning], and from time to time some one or other is liberated, so, by degrees *all* having been liberated, there should be a universal void:—but on the theory that Soul is *one*, Liberation is merely the departure of an adjunct—[which, the Vedántin flatters himself, does not involve the inconsistency which he objects to the Sánkhya]. To this he replies.†

अनादावद्ययावदभावाद्भविष्यदप्येवम् ॥ १५९ ॥

As it has been, so will it be.

Aph. 159.—Though it [—the world—] has been from eternity, since

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* पुराणादौ श्रुतं वामदेवो मुक्तः शुको मुक्त इत्यादि । यद्येक एवात्मा एकमुक्तौ सर्वमुक्तेर्भेदश्रुतिबाधः स्यात् ॥

† नानात्मपक्षे ऽनादौ संसारे कदापि को ऽपि मुच्यते इति क्रमेण सर्वमुक्तौ सर्वशून्यता स्यात् एकात्मपक्षे तु उपाधिविगम एव मोक्ष इत्यत आह ॥

there, up to this day, has not been [an entire emptying of the world], the future also [may be inferentially expected to be] thus [as it has been heretofore].

a. Though the world has been from eternity, since up to this day we have not seen it become a void, there is no proof [in support] of the view that there will be Liberation* [of *all* Souls, so as to leave a void].

b. He states another solution of the difficulty.†

इदानीमिव सर्वत्र नात्यन्तोच्छेदः ॥ १६० ॥

The stream of mundane things will flow on for ever.

Aph. 160.—As now [things are, so] everywhere [will they continue to go on;—hence there will be] no absolute cutting short [of the course of mundane things].

a. Since souls are [in number] without end, though Liberation successively take place, there will not be [as a necessary consequence] a cutting short of the world. As now, so every where,—i. e. in time to come also,—there will be Liberation, but not therefore an absolute cutting short [of the world], since of this the on-flowing is eternal.‡

b. On the theory also that Liberation is the departure of an adjunct [§158. *b.*], we should find a universal void,—so that the

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* अनादौ संसारे ऽद्य यावच्छून्यताया अदर्शनात् भविष्यति मुक्तिरिति पक्षे नास्ति प्रमाणम् ॥

† समाधानान्तरमाह ॥

‡ अनन्तत्वादात्मनां क्रमेण मुक्तिरपि स्यात् संसारोच्छेदो ऽपि न स्यात् । इदानीमिव सर्वत्र भविष्यत्काले ऽपि मुक्तिर्भविष्यतीति नात्यन्तोच्छेदो ऽस्य प्रवाहनित्यत्वात् ॥

doubt is alike [in its application to either view]. Just as there might be an end of all things on the successive liberation of many souls, so since all adjuncts would cease when [the fruit of] works [—this fruit being in the shape of Soul's association with body as its adjunct—] came to an end, the world would be void* [on the Vedánta theory as well as on the Sánkhya one].

c. Now—[if the Vedántin says,] there will not be a void, because adjuncts are [in number] endless; then it is the same on the theory that Souls are many too;—for therefore, while those get liberated who become knowing [in regard to the fact that Nature and Soul are different], there will not be a void, because there is everlastingly no end of multitudes of souls in the universe.†

d. Pray [—some one may ask—] is Soul essentially bound or free? If [essentially] bound, then, since its essence cannot depart, there is no Liberation;—for if it [the essence] departed, then it [Soul] would [cease with the cessation of its essence and] not be eternal. If [on the other hand, you reply that it is essentially] free, then meditation, and the like, [which you prescribe for the attainment of liberation] is unmeaning. To this he replies.‡

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* उपाधिविगमो मोक्ष इति पक्षेऽपि सर्वशून्यताप्रसङ्ग इति तुल्यो ऽनुयोगः। यथा नानात्मनां क्रमेण मुक्तौ सर्वोच्छेदः तथा कर्मोच्छेदे सर्वोपाधिनाशाज्जगच्छून्यं स्यात्॥

† अथोपाधीनामनन्तत्वान्न शून्यता नानात्मपक्षेऽपि तुल्यमत एव हि विद्वत्सु मुच्यमानेषु सन्ततं ब्रह्माण्डजीवलोकानामनन्तत्वादशून्यता॥

‡ किमात्मा बद्धो मुक्तो वा। बद्धत्वे स्वरूपस्याप्रच्यवादनिर्मोक्षः प्रच्यवे ऽनित्यत्वम्। मुक्तत्वे व्यर्थो ध्यानादिरित्यत आह॥

व्यावृत्तो भूयरूपः ॥ १६१ ॥

Soul is ever free, though it may seem bound in all sorts of ways.

Aph. 161.—It [Soul] is altogether free, [but seemingly] multiform [through a delusive semblance of being bound].

a. It is not bound, nor is it liberated, but it is ever free; [see §19]. But the destruction of ignorance [as to its actual freedom] is effected by meditation, &c.,* [which are therefore not unmeaning, as alleged in §160. *d*].

b. It has been declared that Soul is a witness. Since it is a witness [—some one may object—] even when it has attained to discriminating [between Nature and Soul], there is no Liberation,—[Soul, on this showing, being not an absolutely simple entity but something *combined* with the character of a spectator or witness]. To this he replies.†

अक्षसम्बन्धात्साक्षित्वम् ॥ १६२ ॥

How Soul is a spectator.

Aph. 162.—It [Soul] is a witness through its connection with sense-organs [—which quit it on Liberation].

a. A sense-organ is an organ of sense. Through its connection therewith, it [Soul] is a witness;—and where is its connection with sense-organs [—these products of Nature—see §62—]

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* न बद्धो नायं मुच्यते किन्तु नित्यमुक्तः। अज्ञाननाशस्तु ध्यानादिना क्रियत इति ॥

† आत्मनस्साक्षित्वमुक्तम्। प्राप्तविवेकस्यापि साक्षित्वे ऽनिर्मोक्ष इत्यत्राह ॥

when discrimination [between Nature and Soul] has taken place?*

b. [Well—some one may ask—] at all times of *what* nature is Soul? To this he replies.†

नित्यमुक्तत्वम् ॥ १६३ ॥

The real condition of Soul.

Aph. 163.—[The nature of Soul is] constant freedom.

a. 'Constant freedom,'—that is to say, it is positively always devoid of the Bondage called Pain [—see §1 and 19—], because Pain, and the rest, are modifications of Understanding‡—[which —see §62—is a modification of Nature, from which Soul is really distinct].

औदासीन्यञ्चेति ॥ १६४ ॥

Soul's indifference.

Aph. 164.—And finally [the nature of the Soul is] indifference [to Pain and Pleasure alike].

a. By 'indifference' is meant inaction. The word *iti* [rendered 'finally'] implies that the exposition of the Nature of Soul is completed.§

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* आद्यमिन्द्रियं तत्सम्बन्धात्साक्षित्वं विवेकेन क्वेन्द्रियसम्बन्ध इति ॥

† सर्वदा किंरूप आत्मेत्यत आह ॥

‡ नित्यमुक्तत्वं सदैव दुःखाख्यबन्धशून्यत्वं दुःखादेर्बुद्धिपरिणामत्वादित्यर्थः ॥

§ औदासीन्यमकर्तृत्वम् । इतिशब्दः पुरुषधर्मप्रतिपादनसमाप्तौ ॥

b. [Some one may say]—the fact of Soul's being an agent is declared in Scripture:—how is this [—if, as you say, it be *not* an agent]? To this he replies.*

उपरागात्कर्तृत्वं चित्सान्निध्याच्चित्सान्निध्यात् ॥ १६५ ॥

How Soul, which is not an agent, is yet spoken of as such.

Aph. 165.—Its [—Soul's—fancy of] being an agent is from the proximity of Intellect, from the proximity of Intellect.

a. Its 'being an agent'—i. e. its Soul's *fancy* of being an agent, is 'from the proximity of Intellect,'—i. e. from the influence of Nature† [—see §19—of which Intellect—see §62—is a modification].

b. The repetition of the expression 'from the proximity of Intellect' is meant to show that we have reached the conclusion:—for thus do we see [practised] in the scriptures,‡—[e. g. where it is said in the Veda—"Soul is to be known, it is to be discriminated from Nature: thus it does not come again, it does not come again"].

c. So much, in this commentary on Kapila's aphorisms declaratory of the Sánkhya, for the First Book—that on the [topics or] object-matter§ [of the Sánkhya system].

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* आत्मनः कर्तृत्वं श्रूयते तत्कथमित्यत आह ॥

† चित्सान्निध्येन प्रकृत्युपरागादात्मनः कर्तृत्वं कर्तृत्वाभिमानः ॥

‡ चित्सान्निध्यादिति वीप्सा परिसमाप्तौ । श्रुतौ तथा दृष्टत्वादिति ॥

§ इति कापिलसांख्यप्रवचनसूत्रवृत्तौ विषयाध्यायः प्रथमः ॥

END OF BOOK I.

THE APHORISMS

OF THE

YOGA PHILOSOPHY,

OF

PATANJALI

WITH

ILLUSTRATIVE EXTRACTS FROM THE COMMENTARY

BY

BHOJA RÁJÁ.

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PREFACE.

The great body of Hindú Philosophy is based upon six sets of very concise Aphorisms. Without a commentary the Aphorisms are scarcely intelligible, they being designed not so much to communicate the doctrine of the particular school, as to aid, by the briefest possible suggestions, the memory of him to whom the doctrine shall have been already communicated. To this end they are admirably adapted; and, this being their end, the obscurity, which must needs attach to them in the eyes of the uninstructed, is not chargeable upon them as a fault.

For various reasons it is desirable that there should be an accurate translation of the Aphorisms, with so much of gloss as may be required to render them intelligible. A class of pandits, in the Benares Sanskrit College, having been induced to learn English, it is contemplated that a version of the Aphorisms, brought out in successive portions, shall be submitted to the criticism of these men, and, through them, of other learned Bráhmans, so that any errors in the version may have the best chance of being discovered and rectified. The employment of such a version as a class-book is designed to subserve further the attempt to determine accurately the aspect of the philosophical terminology of the East as regards that of the West.

The translation of this first portion of the *Yoga* Aphorisms has been attended with peculiar difficulties, among which it may suffice here to mention that no pandit in these days professes to teach this system. That the version should, in its present state, be found faultless, is therefore very unlikely. These pages, now submitted to the criticism of the pandits who read English, are to be regarded as proof-sheets awaiting correction. They merely *moot* the subject, on which they invite discussion.

J. R. B.

Benares College,
8th Sept. 1851.

THE

YOGA APHORISMS

OF

PATANJALI.

INTRODUCTION.

a. Salutation to Gaṇeśa! May that union of the twin-persons of Siva and his spouse,—by the recollection of which one enjoys emancipation, hard as it is to attain,—produce for you all blessings!*

b. From such passages of scripture as this—viz.—"NÁCHIKETA having received this science [viz. the Vedánta] declared to him by Yama, and all the rules of the *yoga*, having arrived at the Supreme Soul, became passionless and immortal:—whosoever else also thus knows the Supreme Spirit, &c.,"—it is inferred that the rules of the *yoga* ought to be understood and practised by those who are desirous of emancipation. Therefore the venerable PATANJALI, being about to exhibit the rules of the *yoga*, in order to gain the attention of his disciples, states as follows what doctrine it is that is going to be entered upon.†

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* श्री गणेशाय नमः। देहार्द्धयोगश्शिवयोस्स श्रेयांसि तनोतु वः। दुष्प्रापमपि यत्स्मृत्या जनः कैवल्यमश्नुते॥

† मृत्युप्रोक्तां नाचिकेतो ऽथ लब्ध्वा विद्यामेतां योगविधिञ्च कृत्स्नं ब्रह्मप्राप्तो विरजो ऽभूद्विमृत्युरन्यो ऽप्येवं यो वेदा

The subject proposed.

अथातो योगानुशासनम् ॥ १ ॥

Aph. 1.—Now, then, the exposition of Concentration [is to be made].

a. The expression 'Now, then,' intimates [that] a [distinct] topic [here commences]; and it serves as a benediction* [—the particle *atha* being regarded as an auspicious one].

b. The word *yoga*, from the root *yuj* 'to keep the mind fixed in abstract meditation,' means such a restraining of the exercise of the mind, or Concentration.†

c. An 'exposition' is that whereby something is expounded, or declared, through its characteristic marks, its nature, &c. An 'exposition *of* the *yoga*,'—[such is the meaning of the compound word] *yogánuśásana*. This [—viz. the expounding of the nature, &c., of Concentration—] is to be understood to be the topic even to the end of this Institute‡ [of Patanjali's].

d. But what *is* Concentration *(yoga)*? To this he replies:§—

ध्यात्मनेवेत्यादिश्रुतिषु मुमुक्षूणां योगविधिरनुष्ठेयत्वेन श्रेय तयावगम्यतेऽतो योगविधिमुपदिदिक्षुर्भगवान् पतञ्जलिश्शिष्यावधानाय तच्छास्त्रारम्भं प्रतिजानीते ॥

* अथशब्दोऽधिकारद्योतको मङ्गलार्थश्च ॥

† युक्तिर्योगस्समाधानं । युज समाधौ ॥

‡ अनुशिष्यते व्याख्यायते लक्षणस्वरूपादिभिर्येन तदनुशासनं । योगस्यानुशासनं योगानुशासनम् । तदाशास्त्रपरिसमाप्तेरधिकृतं बोद्धव्यम् ॥

§ को योग इत्यत आह ॥

Concentration defined.

योगश्चित्तवृत्तिनिरोधः ॥ २ ॥

Aph. 2.—Concentration *(yoga)* is the hindering of the modifications of the thinking principle.

a. That is to say,—Concentration is the hindering, or the preventing, of the modifications—to be described hereafter [see §5] —of the Mind or internal organ [—to which modifications the internal organ is liable when allowed to come into contact with objects, as will be explained further on—]; and this 'hindering' is a super-sensual species of effort which is the cause of the destruction of these modifications.*

b. But then [a doubt may here occur]. It is a tenet [—see Nyáya Aphorisms No. 31—] both of the *Sánkhya* and the *Yoga* that the soul just consists of the knowledge which has as its objects the modifications [in question—the two being united] like fire and the wood [or fuel of the fire]:—on the destruction of the modifications, then, the Soul too should be annihilated, as the fire is in the absence of the fuel:—and therefore, at the time of Concentration, what is the soul concerned about? With reference to this he declares as follows:†—

Condition of the soul during concentration.

तदा द्रष्टुः स्वरूपेऽवस्थानम् ॥ ३ ॥

Aph. 3.—Then [i. e. at the time of Concentration] it [the Soul] abides in the form of the spectator [without a spectacle.]

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* चित्तस्यान्तःकरणस्य वक्ष्यमाणा या वृत्तयस्तासां निरोधो निवर्त्तनं योग इत्यर्थः। निवर्त्तनञ्चातीन्द्रियः प्रयत्नविशेषो वृत्तिविलयहेतुरिति ॥

† ननु वृत्तिविषयकबोधस्वरूप एव पुरुषः काष्ठाग्निवदिति

a. 'Then';—i. e. at that time.*

b. 'In the form of the spectator;'—i. e. of soul [—see *Tattwa-samása* §3 :—], in the form of Thought simply [without any object thought of]. 'Its state is' :—such is the force of the term *avasthána*† [rendered 'it abides,' &c.]

c. And so the definition [of Concentration] is this, that concentration is the hindering of the modifications of the internal organ [§2], which [prevention of its being modified] is the cause of the abiding in the form of soul simply.‡

d. What then is the form of this [Soul] when in a state other than that of Concentration? To this he replies :§—

Condition of the soul at other times.

वृत्तिसारूप्यमितरत्र ॥ ४ ॥

Aph. 4.—At other times [than that of Concentration] it [the soul] is in the same form as the modifications [of the internal organ—§ 2. *b.* and 5.]

a. 'At other times;'—i. e. at another time than that of Concentration. The 'modifications' are those that are to be described

सांख्ययोगयोः सिद्धान्तो वृत्तिविलये पुरुषोऽपि नश्येत्काष्ठापायेऽग्निवत्ततश्च योगकाले कः पुरुषार्थ इत्याकाङ्क्षायामाह ॥

* तदा तस्मिन् काले ॥

† द्रष्टुः पुरुषस्य स्वरूपे। चिन्मात्रस्वरूपे। अवस्थानं। स्थितिर्भवति ॥

‡ तथाच द्रष्टुः स्वरूपावस्थितिहेतुश्चित्तवृत्तिनिरोधो योग इति लक्षणम् ॥

§ व्युत्थानदशायां तस्य किं स्वरूपमित्यत आह ॥

[see §5]. To be 'in the same form' as these—means to consist of these. The meaning [of the whole] is this, that when the internal organ [or Mind], through the senses, is affected [or modified] by the form of some object, the soul also [viewing the object through its organ the Mind] is as it were altered into that form, as the moon [reflected] in the moving ripples of the water, is like as if it were [itself] moving.*

b. Well, then:—it was stated that the modifications [of the internal organ] are to be hindered. Of how many kinds, then, are these [modifications], or what are they like? To this he replies:†—

The modifications of the thinking principle, how many and what like.

वृत्तयः पञ्चतय्यः क्लिष्टा अक्लिष्टाः ॥५॥

Aph. 5.—The Modifications [of the internal organ] are of five kinds, [and they are either] painful or not painful.

a. 'Modifications';—i. e. various altered states of the internal organ. 'Of five kinds,' or of five sorts. 'Painful';—i. e. invaded by vexations which will be defined in the sequel. 'Not painful';—i. e. the reverse thereof.‡

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* इतरत्र योगादन्यस्मिन्काले । वृत्तयो वक्ष्यमाणलक्षणाः । ताभिस्सारूप्यं तद्रूपत्वं । अयमर्थश्चित्ते इन्द्रियद्वारा विषयाकारेण परिणते सति पुरुषस्तदाकार इव परिभाव्यते यथा जलतरङ्गेषु चलत्सु चन्द्रश्चलन्निव भवति तद्वदिति ॥

† ननु वृत्तयो निरोद्धव्या इत्युक्तं । ताः पुनः कियत्प्रकाराः कीदृश्यो वेत्याकाङ्क्षायामाह ॥

‡ वृत्तयश्चित्तपरिणामविशेषाः । पञ्चतय्यः पञ्चप्रकाराः ।

b. Which are those five Modifications? With reference to this, he states:*—

These Modifications specified. प्रमाणविपर्ययविकल्पनिद्रास्मृतयः ॥ ६ ॥

Aph. 6.—[The modifications of the internal organ are] evidence [or right notion], misconception, fancy, sleep, and memory.

a. [All this is] clear.†

b. He defines these [modifications] in their order.‡

Right notions. प्रत्यक्षानुमानागमाः प्रमाणानि ॥ ७ ॥

Aph. 7.—The evidences [§6.] are Perception, Inference, and Testimony.

a. Here [—it will be observed—] without stating the definition of the several kinds of evidence, this being so familiarly known, he has only divided them. [Lest, however, the reader should require the information, we may remark, in passing, that] the evidence called Perception is that modification of the internal organ which takes the form of assurance in respect of some object not previously apprehended. Inference is the modification of the internal organ produced from a correct notion of a general proposition, &c. [—respecting objects previously apprehended—

क्लिष्टाः क्लेशैर्वक्ष्यमाणलक्षणैराक्रान्ताः । अक्लिष्टास्तद्विपरीताः ॥

* कास्ताः पञ्च वृत्तय इत्याकाङ्क्षायामाह ॥

† स्पष्टम् ॥

‡ आसां क्रमेण लक्षणान्याह ॥

as explained in the works of the Nyáya]. And the evidence called Testimony is [what produces] that modification of the internal organ which arises from the words of one worthy* [to be received as an authority].

b. Having thus spoken of the modification of the internal organ which consists in evidence [—or, as we should rather say—which consists in the correct state of cognition resulting from good evidence—], he mentions that which is in the shape of misconception.†

Misconception what. विपर्ययो मिथ्याज्ञानमतद्रूपप्रतिष्ठम् ॥ ८ ॥

Aph. 8.—Misconception is incorrect notion, not staying in the [proper] form of that [in respect whereof the misconception is entertained].

a. [That is to say—] misconception is a notion arising, in respect of something that is *not* so and so, that it *is* so and so; as, in the case of mother o'pearl, the notion of silver. 'Not staying in the [proper] form of that';—that is to say, which does not abide in that form which is the form of that thing [in respect of which the notion is entertained],—which amounts to its not *revealing* the form [or real nature] which belongs to the thing.‡

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* अत्रातिप्रसिद्धत्वात् प्रमाणानां लक्षणमनुक्त्वैव विभागः कृतः । तत्रानधिगतार्थनिश्चयरूपा चित्तवृत्तिः प्रत्यक्षं प्रमाणं । व्याप्त्यादिप्रमाजन्या वृत्तिरनुमानं । योग्यशब्दजन्या वृत्तिश्च शब्दः प्रमाणमिति ॥

† एवं प्रमाणरूपां वृत्तिं व्याख्याय विपर्ययरूपामाह ॥

‡ अतथाभूतेऽर्थे तथोत्पद्यमानं ज्ञानं विपर्ययः । यथा

b. [To illustrate this language of our author, we may here state the theory of the Understanding which he adopts, as we find it laid down in the *Vedánta Paribháshá.* The internal organ is there compared to water, in respect of its readiness to adapt itself to the form of whatever mould it may enter. "As the water of a reservoir, having issued from an aperture, having entered, by a channel, the basins [or beds with raised edges formed in the fields that require irrigation—] becomes four-cornered or otherwise shaped just like these; so the manifesting internal organ [or Mind,] having gone, through the sight or other channel, to where there is an object, for instance a jar, becomes modified by the form of the jar or other object. It is this altered state [of the internal organ] that is called its modification."* This 'manifesting internal organ,' whilst it is regarded as moulding itself upon the object, is regarded as at the same time manifesting it—or revealing it as a mirror does. To a considerable extent this theory of the Understanding is analogous to the theory of vision entertained by those who regard the retina as reflecting to the intelligent principle those visible forms of which the retina itself is uncognisant; whilst the intelligent principle itself is cognisant of things visible only inasmuch as they are reflected to it by the retina. The 'modifications' are akin to Locke's 'ideas'].

शुक्तिकायां रजतज्ञानं। अतद्रूपप्रतिष्ठमिति। तस्यार्थस्य यद्रूपं न तस्मिन् रूपे प्रतिष्ठते। तस्यार्थस्य यद्रूपं न तत्प्रतिभासयतीति यावत्॥

* यथा तडागोदकं छिद्रान्निर्गत्य कुल्यात्मना केदारान् प्रविश्य तद्वदेव चतुष्कोणाद्याकारं भवति तथा तैजसमन्तःकरणमपि चक्षुरादिद्वारा घटादिविषयदेशं गत्वा घटादिविषयाकारेण परिणमते। स एव परिणामो वृत्तिरित्युच्यते॥ वेद॰ परि॰॥

c. Doubt also—for example whether the object be a man or a post—is incorrect notion [§ 8], inasmuch as the real nature of the object is not thereby revealed.*

d. In order to declare what modification [of the internal organ] is fancy—he says as follows :—†

Fanciful notions what. शब्दज्ञानानुपाती वस्तुशून्यो विकल्पः ॥९॥

Aph. 9.—A fancy is [a notion] devoid of a thing [in reality corresponding thereto], following upon knowledge [conveyed] by words.

a. 'Knowledge produced [or conveyed] by words:'—[such is the sense of the compound] *śabda-jnána.* 'That, the habit whereof is to follow this [verbal information],' is what is so named [viz. fancy]. The meaning is—that a fancy is a conception, without a thing‡ [corresponding to it].

b. Examples of this are such notions as 'The head of *Ráhu,*' and 'The soul's Thinking,'—and 'Something like the horns of a a hare,' &c. Even after [discovering] the absurdity [involved in such notions], people yet deal with verbal knowledge [as if it were strictly receivable] in such senses, [—and it depends upon

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* संशयोऽप्यतद्रूपप्रतिष्ठत्वान्मिथ्याज्ञानं यथा स्थाणुर्वा पुरुषो वेति ॥

† विकल्पवृत्तिं व्याख्यातुमाह ।

‡ शब्दजनितं ज्ञानं शब्दज्ञानं । तदनुपतितुं शीलं यस्य स तथोक्तः । वस्तुशून्यः प्रत्ययो विकल्प इत्यर्थः ।

circumstances whether any serious error is to result from this or not.]*

c. [As a hare has no horn, the notion of a hare's horn is a fanciful one, 'devoid of a thing *in rerum naturâ* corresponding to the notion.' A person hearing the expression 'The head of *Ráhu*' naturally proceeds to fancy that there is some *Ráhu* to whom this head belongs;—but *Ráhu* is *all* head—being a bodiless monster who is held to cause eclipses by swallowing the sun and moon, which emerge from obscuration when they come to the end of his dissevered gullet. The notion, therefore, raised by the expression 'The head of *Ráhu*,' that there is any more of him besides the head, is a fancy—equally with that of the hare's horn—'devoid of a thing corresponding to the notion.' So again, a person hearing the expression 'The soul's Thinking,' naturally proceeds to fancy that there is some Soul to whom this Thinking belongs,—whereas the Soul is nothing besides the Thinking. Although, according to the commentator, such expressions are liable to suggest fancies that have nothing in reality corresponding to them, yet the employment of the expressions does not necessarily mislead if we carefully bear in mind what is the real state of the case. Much on the same principle people in Europe continue to speak of the sun's rising and setting, though, holding the heliocentric theory, they do not really fancy that the sun either rises or sets].

d. In order to declare what is sleep, he says†—

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* अस्योदाहरणानि । राहोश्शिरः । पुरुषस्य चैतन्यम् । शशशृङ्गतुल्यमित्यादिज्ञानानि । बाधोत्तरमप्येतादृशज्ञाने-नयाच्छब्दामरूपो व्यवहारः क्रियत इति ।

† निद्रां व्याख्यातुमाह ।

Definition of sound sleep.

अभावप्रत्ययालम्बना वृत्तिर्निद्रा ॥ १० ॥

Aph. 10.—Sleep is that modification [of the internal organ] which depends on the conception of nothing.

a. Of what modification [of the internal organ] the ground is the conception of nothing, this is what is so called* [—viz. sleep].

b. This may be [also] stated as follows:—Sleep is that modification [of the internal organ] which takes place on the quitting of all objects, through [the quality of] Darkness's getting everywhere the upper hand† [—to the exclusion of the other two qualities, which,—see Lecture on the Sánkhya § 96,—are held to be constituents of the phenomenal universe].

c. And the fact that this [dreamless sleep] *is* a modification [of the internal organ, and not a mere blank,] is [proved] by our seeing that one recollects [on arising from profound and dreamless sleep] that 'I slept pleasantly;'—and there could not be a *recollection* if there had not been a state of consciousness‡ [to furnish the matter of the recollection. Conf. Lecture on the Vedánta § 33].

d. In order to describe memory, he says§—

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* अभावप्रत्यय आलम्बनं यस्या वृत्तेस्सा तथोक्ता ॥

† एतदुक्तं भवति। या सन्ततमुद्रिक्तत्वात्तमसस्समस्तविषयपरित्यागेन प्रवर्त्तते वृत्तिस्सा निद्रेति ॥

‡ अस्याश्च सुखमहमस्वाप्समिति स्मृतिदर्शनात् स्मृतेश्चानुभवव्यतिरेकेणानुपपत्तेर्वृत्तित्वम् ॥

§ स्मृतिं व्याख्यातुमाह ॥

Memory defined.

अनुभूतविषयासम्प्रमोषः स्मृतिः ॥ ११ ॥

Aph. 11.—Memory is the not letting go of an object that one has been aware of.

a. [That is to say]—memory [or recollection] is the not letting go—or, by means of the self-reproductive quality [of the Soul —see *Tarka Sangraha* p 55]—the arising, in the understanding, of that which has been cognised through evidence* [of the senses, for example;—see § 7].

Waking, sleeping, and dreaming.

b. Of these [modifications of the internal organ, the three following, viz.] right notion [§ 7. *a.*] misconception [§ 8.] and fancy [§ 9.] are *waking* states. When just these [impressions—in the absence of the objects or of what gave rise to them] are sensible, through the force [or vividness] of the impression, then there is *dream.* But [dreamless] sleep [§ 10] is without any object cognised. And Recollection may take its rise either in a right notion, in a misconception, in a fancy, or in [dreamless] sleep† [—see § 10. *c.*]

c. Having thus described the modifications [of the internal organ], in order to explain the prevention of these [§ 2. *a.*], with the means thereof, he says‡—

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* प्रमाणेनानुभूतस्य योऽयमसम्प्रमोषः संस्कारद्वारेण बुद्धावारोहः सा स्मृतिः ॥

† तत्र प्रमाणविपर्य्ययविकल्पा जाग्रदवस्थाः । त एव यदानुभवबलात्प्रत्यच्चायमाणास्तदा स्वप्नः । निद्रात्वसंवेद्यमानविषया । स्मृतिश्च प्रमाणविपर्य्ययविकल्पनिद्रानिमित्ता ॥

‡ एवं वृत्तीर्व्याख्याय सोपायं निरोधं व्याख्यातुमाह ॥

अभ्यासवैराग्याभ्यां तन्निरोधः ॥ १२ ॥

Asceticism and mortification the means of repelling the transient.

Aph. 12. The hindering of these [modifications of the internal organ —§ 2—is to be effected] by means of exercise and dispassion.

a. 'Exercise and dispassion' will be defined [in § 13 and 15]. By these [viz. exercise and dispassion], the repelling of those modifications of the internal organ which [modifications, at different times] have the form of revealing, energising, and obstructing, —*this* is the 'hindering'—[which is to be striven after, and which is tantamount to] the resting [of these modifications], in a potential shape, in their cause, viz: in the internal organ* [without taking an actual shape as products of the internal organ modified.]

b. Of the two [viz. exercise and dispassion, §12,] it is from 'dispassion,' which originates in our discerning the perniciousness of the objective, that aversion thereto arises. And, by 'exercise,' confirmed steadfastness [in the indifference towards all objects] is produced. So, by these two, the internal organ is hindered from undergoing modification.†

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* अभ्यासवैराग्ये वक्ष्यमाणलक्षणे । ताभ्यां तासां प्रकाशप्रवृत्तिनियमरूपाणां चित्तवृत्तीनां यत्प्रतिहननं स निरोधः । स्वकारण एव चित्ते शक्तिरूपतयावस्थानम् ॥

† तत्र विषयदोषदर्शनजेन वैराग्येण तद्वैमुख्यमुत्पाद्यते । अभ्यासेनच दृढं स्थैर्यमुत्पाद्यते । इत्याभ्यां भवति चित्तवृत्तिनिरोधः ॥

d. In order to describe 'exercise' [§12] he says.*—

Ascetic effort what. तत्र स्थितौ यत्नो ऽभ्यासः ॥ १३ ॥

Aph. 13.—'Exercise' is the [repeated] effort that it [—*viz.* the internal organ—] shall remain in its [unmodified] state.

a. The condition of the internal organ, when free from modification, existing only in its own [unmodified] form, is what we mean by its [unmodified] state. And what we mean by 'exercise' is the effort, or endeavour, again and again to reduce the internal organ to such a condition† [of freedom from modification].

b. He next mentions a special character of this same‡ [exercise, or persevering effort].

स तु दीर्घकालनैरन्तर्यसत्कारसेवितो दृढभूमिः ॥ १४ ॥

Aph. 14.—But this [exercise—§13—] is a firm position observed out of regard [for the end in view, and perseveringly adhered to] for a long time unintermittingly.

a. That is to say :—it [—exercise—] is a firm ground [or state of steadfastness],—to be firm [we may remark in passing] is to be steadfast,—this [state of steadfastness] being assiduously attend-

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* अभ्यासं व्याख्यातुमाह ॥

† वृत्तिरहितस्य चित्तस्य स्वरूपनिष्ठः परिणामः स्थितिः । तस्याञ्च यत्न उत्साहः पुनः पुनस्तथात्वेन चेतसि विनिवेशनमभ्यास इत्युच्यते ॥

‡ तस्यैव विशेषमाह ॥

ed to, during a long time unintermittingly, out of the excess of regard* [which one entertains for the end to be gained].

b. He now mentions the definition of 'dispassion'† [§12].

Dispassion defined. दृष्टानुश्रविकविषयवितृष्णस्य वशीकारसंज्ञा वैराग्यम्॥ १५॥

Aph. 15. Dispassion is the consciousness of having overcome [one's desires,—this consciousness being that] of him who thirsts after neither the objects that are seen [on earth] nor those that are heard of [in scripture].

a. Object is of two kinds—'seen' *(drishta)* and 'heard of' *(ánuśravika)*. One 'seen' is one apprehended here [on earth]—such as a Sound [or other object of sense]. One 'heard of' means one in the world of the gods or elsewhere [where it cannot be seen by us]. The *Veda* is called *anuśrava* because it is [not first *read* by the young student, but is] listened to *(śrúyate)* from the mouth of the preceptor [—and heard *after*, or consequently on, the teacher's utterance,—as the prefix *anu* implies]. What [object] comes [to our knowledge] therefrom [i. e. from the Veda] is what we mean by one 'heard of'‡ *(ánuśravika)*.

b. What is called 'dispassion' is the reflection "These [objects—whether of this world or of the one beyond—§15. *a.*—] are *my*

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* बहुकालं नैरन्तर्येणादरातिशयेन सेव्यमानो दृढभूमिः स्थिरो भवति दार्ढ्याय भवतीत्यर्थः॥

† वैराग्यस्य लक्षणमाह॥

‡ द्विविधो विषयो दृष्ट आनुश्रविकश्च। दृष्ट इहैवोपलभ्यमानशब्दादिः। देवलोकादावानुश्रविकः। अनुश्रूयते गुरुमुखादित्यनुश्रवो वेदस्तत आगत आनुश्रविकः॥

subjects; I am not *their* slave,"—this 'consciousness of having overcome' entertained by h m who, from discerning the insipidity of the results of both of those [classes of objects] has dismissed all eagerness about them.*

c. He next mentions a peculiar aspect of this same† [i. e. of 'dispassion.']

Dispassion carried the length of indifference to all objects.

तत्परं पुरुषख्यातेर्गुणवैतृष्ण्यम् ॥ १६ ॥

Aph. 16.—This [viz. 'dispassion,'] carried to the utmost is indifference regarding the 'qualities' [i. e. everything else than Soul], and this indifference arises from a knowledge of Soul [as distinguished from the 'qualities.' See Lecture on the *Sánkhya* §49].

a. 'This:'—i. e. 'dispassion,' 'carried to the utmost:'—i. e. elevated [to its utmost]. The first [degree of 'dispassion,'—see §15—] has regard to [ordinary] *objects*;—but the second [§16], has regard to the 'qualities' [from which, according to the Sánkhya, ordinary objects arise]. This arises only from familiarity with the distinction between the 'qualities' and Soul [—or the objective and subjective]. From its extreme conduciveness to abstract meditation‡ [it ranks above the dispassion which has regard only to the grosser objects].

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* तयोर्द्वयोरपि परिणामविरसत्वदर्शनाद्विगतगर्द्धस्य या वशीकारसंज्ञा ममैत वशाः नाहमेतेषां वश इति योऽयं विमर्शस्तद्वैराग्यमुच्यते ॥

† तस्यैव विशेषमाह ॥

‡ तद्वैराग्यं। परमुत्कृष्टं। प्रथमं वैराग्यं विषयविषयं द्वितीयन्तु गुणविषयमुत्पन्नगुणपुरुषविवेकख्यातेरेव भवति निरोधसमाधेरत्यन्तानुकूलत्वात् ॥

b. Having thus stated the nature of concentration (*Yoga*), he [next] mentions the difference between the nature of [meditation, which is of two kinds—viz.] that 'in which there is distinct recognition,' *(samprajnáta)* and that 'in which distinct recognition is lost,'* *(a-samprajnáta)*.

वितर्कविचारानन्दास्मितानुगमात्सम्प्रज्ञातः ॥ १७ ॥

Meditation, with an object.

Aph. 17.—[Meditation—of the kind called] that 'in which there is distinct recognition' [arises, in its fourfold shape,] from the attendance of (1) 'argumentation' *(vitarka)*, (2) 'deliberation' *(vichára)*, (3) 'beatitude' *(ánanda)*, and (4) 'egotism' *(asmitá)*.

a. The word 'Meditation' is required to supply the ellipsis in the aphorism.†

b. Meditation 'in which there is distinct recognition' *(samprajnáta)* is a kind of 'pondering' *(bhávaná)* whereby the nature of that which is to be pondered is known thoroughly and well—apart from either doubt or error. This meditation 'in which there is distinct recognition' excludes every modification of the mind [or every idea—see §8. *b*] other than what is to be pondered:—it is, in short, meditation with its *seed*‡ [i. e. with the

* एवं योगस्य स्वरूपमुक्त्वा सम्प्रज्ञातासम्प्रज्ञातस्वरूपभेदमाह ॥

† समाधिरिति शेषः ।

‡ सम्यक् संशयविपर्ययरहितत्वेन प्रज्ञायते प्रकर्षेण ज्ञायते भाव्यस्वरूपं येन स सम्प्रज्ञातः समाधिर्भावनाविशेषः । ध्येयातिरिक्तसकलवृत्तिनिरोधस्सम्प्रज्ञातस्सबीजसमाधिरिति यावत् ॥

object, in the effort to apprehend which exclusively the meditation originates].

c. This [meditation 'in which there is distinct recognition'—§ 17—], through its division into the 'argumentative' &c., is of four kinds, viz. (1) the 'argumentative,' (2) the 'deliberative,' (3) the 'beatific,' and (4) the 'egotistical.'*

d. As for 'Pondering' [§17. *b.*], this means the taking into the mind again and again, to the exclusion of all other objects, that which is to be pondered. And that which is [a suitable object] to be pondered is of two kinds, being either the Lord *(Íśwara)* or the twenty-five principles [—see *Tattwa-samása* §37—]. These [twenty-five principles] also are of two kinds, through their distinction as senseless and not senseless. Twenty-four [of the principles, including Earth, &c.], are senseless:—that which is not senseless is Soul.†

e. Among these [objects suitable for being pondered—§17 *d.*—] when, having taken as the object the Senses and the Elements which are gross [in comparison with the Subtile Elements next to be spoken of], pondering is engaged in, in the shape of the investigation as to which is antecedent and which is consequent [—i. e. whether the Senses generate the Elements or the

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* स सवितर्कादिभेदाच्चतुर्विधः सवितर्कस्सविचारस्सानन्दस्सास्मितश्च ।

† भावना तावत्। भाव्यस्य विषयान्तरपरिहारेण चेतसि पुनः पुनर्निवेशनं। भाव्यञ्च द्विधा ईश्वरस्तत्त्वानिच पञ्चविंशतिः। तान्यपि द्विविधानि जडाजडभेदात्। जडानि चतुर्विंशतिरजडः पुरुषः।

Elements generate the senses—] then the Meditation is [technically said to be] 'argumentative' *(savitarka)*.*

f. When, having taken as the object something subtile, as the Subtile Elements and the Internal Organ, pondering is engaged in, in so far as regards the *where* and the *when* thereof,—then it [—the pondering—] is [technically said to be] 'deliberative' *(savichára)*.†

g. But when the 'pure element' (*sattwa*—see *Sánkhya Lecture* §50) of the Internal Organ, commingled with somewhat of [the two other elements,—viz.] 'passion' and 'darkness' [—*Sánkhya Lecture* §51 and 52], is pondered, then the meditation is [technically termed] 'beatific' (*sánanda*—§17 *c.*), because the 'pure element' then pondered, which consists in the manifestation of joy [*Sánkhya Lecture* §50], is predominant—inasmuch as the intellectual faculty is then [—i. e. in this particular case of pondering—] a secondary matter.‡

h. After that [pondering of the 'pure element' commingled with the two others--§ 17. *g.*—], the meditation which is engaged in, having, as that on which it rests, the clear 'pure element' unaffected by even a little of 'passion' or 'darkness,' is called 'egotistical' meditation [§17. *c.*], because, here, [personal] ex-

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* तत्र यदा महाभूतेन्द्रियाणि स्थूलानि विषयत्वेनादाय पूर्वापरानुसन्धानेन भावना प्रवर्त्तते तदा सवितर्कस्समाधिः ॥

† तन्मात्रान्तःकरणलक्षणं सूक्ष्मं विषयमालम्ब्य तस्य देशकालधर्म्मावच्छेदेन यदा भावना प्रवर्त्तते तदा सविचारः ॥

‡ यदा तु रजस्तमोलेशानुविद्धमन्तःकरणसत्त्वं भाव्यते तदा गुणभावाच्चिच्छक्तेस्सुखप्रकाशमयस्य सत्त्वस्य भाव्यमानस्योद्रेकात्सानन्दस्समाधिर्भवति ॥

istence only remains, since the intellectual faculty becomes now predominent inasmuch as the 'pure element' which is to be apprehended [as the object of the meditation] is here disregarded* [as the mere stepping stone to higher things].

i. Among these [four kinds of 'meditation, where there is distinct recognition' of an object,—§ 17. *c.*], the first, the 'argumentative' meditation [§ 17. *e.*] includes all [that belongs to] the four. The second, the 'deliberative,' leaves out the 'argumentation' [of the preceding]:—the third, the 'beatific,' leaves out the deliberation [of the second]:—the fourth, consisting in mere self-consciousness, leaves out that [beatitude which belongs to the third]:—and all these [four] are meditations with something to rest upon† [as the object pondered;—the soul of the ascetic, like the body of the young swimmer, requiring supports to begin with, which are successively laid aside as power and confidence are gained by practice].

j. He next tells what is meant by that [meditation] 'in which distinct recognition is lost'‡ [§ 16. *b.*—the practised ascetic having parted with every vestige of object, as the practised swimmer with his last cork or bladder].

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* ततः परं रजस्तमोलेशानभिभूतं शुद्धं सत्त्वमालम्बनीकृत्य या प्रवर्त्तते भावना तस्यां ग्राह्यस्य सत्त्वस्य न्यग्भावात् चिच्छक्तेरुद्रेकात्सत्तामात्रावशेषत्वेन समाधिस्सास्मित इत्युच्यते।

† तत्र प्रथमश्चतुष्टयानुगतस्समाधिस्सवितर्कः। द्वितीयो वितर्कविकलस्सविचारः। तृतीयो विचारविकलस्सानन्दः। चतुर्थस्तद्विकलो ऽस्मितामात्र इति सर्व एते सालम्बनास्समाधय इति॥

‡ असम्प्रज्ञातमाह॥

विरामप्रत्ययाभ्यासपूर्व्वः संस्कारशेषो ऽन्यः ॥ १८ ॥

Meditation without an object.

Aph. 18.—The one [kind of meditation just described] is preceded by the exercise of thought in the shape of repose;—the other [—independent of any fresh antecedent—] is in the shape of the self-reproduction [of thought, after the departure of all objects].

a. By 'repose' *(viráma)* we mean that whereby one is rested,—the abandonment of all anxiety about argumentation, &c. [§ 17.]. Well—'thought' in the shape of this 'repose' is what we mean by the compound expression *viráma-pratyaya*;—and what we mean by the 'exercise' *(abhyása)* of this, is the reiteratedly dwelling mentally thereon, and constantly rejecting with a negative [as a delusion and an unreality] whatever 'modification' [or idea,—see § 5.—] springs up there [to interfere with it];—such is 'the exercise of thought in the shape of repose.' This [as remarked in the first half of the aphorism] produces meditation 'in which there is distinct recognition'* [§17:—and we have now to consider that kind of meditation which differs from this].

b. The other [kind of meditation] has nothing left but the self-reproduction of thought. It is different from that [above described]; that is to say, it is [as contra-distinguished from meditation 'in which there is distinct recognition,'] that 'in which distinct recognition is lost.' Here there is nothing to be thought of or accurately apprehended [—as it was necessary that there should be in the former process—];—it is meditation *without* a

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* विरम्यते अनेनेति विरामः। वितर्कादिचिन्तापरित्यागः। विरामश्चासौ प्रत्ययश्च विरामप्रत्ययः। तस्याभ्यासः पौनःपुन्येन चेतसि निवेशनं तत्र याकाचिद्वृत्तिरुल्लसति तस्यां नेति नेतीति नैरन्तर्य्येण पर्युदसनं विरामप्रत्ययाभ्यासः। तत्पूर्वकस्सम्प्रज्ञातसमाधिः।

seed* [—i. e. without any object—see §17 *b.*—in any effort to confine one's self to the apprehension of which the meditation has been entered upon].

c. Well, having thus stated the [two] distinctions [§18] in the nature of Concentration [§2], and having compendiously mentioned its methods, the author proceeds to speak of these methods more fully, first premising some account of the spurious semblance of concentration.†

भवप्रत्ययो विदेहप्रकृतिलयानाम् ॥ १९ ॥

Spurious semblances of abstract Meditation.

Aph. 19.—Of [the meditative state attained to by the two classes of aspirants, technically called] 'the unembodied and resolved into Nature,' *the world* is the cause.

a. By 'the unembodied and resolved into Nature' we mean to speak of [those technically called] 'the unembodied' [as one set], and 'the resolved into Nature' [as another set]. Of these the Meditation is caused by *the world*,—that is to say, it is such that the cause, or instrumental agency on which it depends, is the world—the creation—[—the phenomenal—beyond which the vision of these extends not to the discrimination of pure Spirit, and the uncreated energy Nature].‡

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* संस्कारशेषो ऽन्यः तद्विलक्षणः । असम्प्रज्ञात इत्यर्थः । न त्वत्र किञ्चिद्वेद्यं सम्प्रज्ञायत इत्यसम्प्रज्ञातो निर्बीजसमाधिः ॥

† तदेवं योगस्य स्वरूपभेदं संक्षेपेणोपायञ्चाभिधाय विस्तरेणोपायं योगाभासप्रदर्शनपूर्वकं वक्तुमुपक्रमते ।

‡ विदेहाश्च प्रकृतिलयाश्च विदेहप्रकृतिलयाः । तेषां समाधिर्भवप्रत्ययः भवस्संसार एव प्रत्ययः कारणं यस्य तादृशो भवतीत्यर्थः ।

b. The meaning is this—that, only while the world is manifest, are these men participators in such [inadequate] meditation [as we have described]. And this is a mere false semblance of meditation, because these do not discern the ultimate Reality. Hence, by him who desires emancipation, effort is to be made for [attaining to] the knowledge of the ultimate Reality, and for pondering *that** [instead of the lower things pondered by those of narrower ken, whose vision cannot pierce the phenomenal, and discriminate the spectator Soul, and the *natura naturans*].

c. And, of the persons spoken of in the aphorism, those who, having their energies directed to 'beatific' meditation [§17. *g.*], do not discern any other Reality, in the shape of Nature or Soul, these are they who are meant by the term the 'unembodied' *(videha)*, because their body and their self-consciousness are departed [—but they are not *further* advanced towards emancipation]. And those who [going just one step further] are content with the 'egotistic' meditation [§17. *h.*] but do not discern the Supreme Soul, and whose intellect has been resolved into [the *natura naturans* which is] its cause, these are they who are called the 'resolved into nature'† *(prakritilaya)*—[See *Sánkhya Lecture*, §15 and 54].

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* अयमर्थः। आविर्भूतमात्र एव संसारे तथाविधसमाधिभाजो भवन्ति। तेषां परतत्त्वादर्शनात् योगाभासो ऽयं। अतः परतत्त्वज्ञाने तद्भावनायाञ्च मुक्तिकामेन यत्नो विधेय इति।

† अत्र च ये सानन्दसमाधौ बद्धधृतयस्तत्त्वान्तरं प्रधानपुरुषरूपं न पश्यन्ति ते विगतदेहाहङ्कारत्वाद्विदेहशब्दवाच्याः। ये च सास्मितसमाधौ कृतपरितोषाः परं परमात्मानं न पश्यन्ति येषाञ्च चेतस्स्वकारणे लयमुपगतं ते प्रकृतिलया इत्युच्यन्ते॥

d. But of others than those* [whose inadequate style of meditation has been stated in aphorism 19, the meditation is as stated in the aphorism here following].

श्रद्धावीर्यस्मृतिसमाधिप्रज्ञापूर्वक इतरेषाम्॥ २०॥

The genuine order of abstract Meditation.

Aph. 20.—[In the practice] of others, this [Meditation] is preceded by Faith, Energy, Memory, Meditation, and Discernment.

a. "Of others"—i. e. of *Yogís* other than [those called] the 'unembodied' [§ 19. *c.*] and the 'resolved into nature'† [§ 19. *c.*].

b. "Preceded by Faith, &c." To complete the sense, we must supply the word 'Meditation.' 'Preceded by Faith, &c.,'—that is to say—the means antecedent [and conducive] to which are Faith, &c. And these, 'Faith, &c.,' acting in the relation of means to an end, constitute the means [or appliances] for Meditation 'in which there is distinct recognition'‡ [—§ 17.].

Faith defined.

c. Among these [antecedents enumerated in the Aphorism], 'Faith' *(śraddhá)* means a mental approval of Concentration§ [as a worthy and possible aim].

Energy.

d. 'Energy' *(vírya)* means perseverance.||

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* तदन्येषान्तु॥

† इतरेषां। विदेहप्रकृतिलयव्यतिरिक्तानां योगिनां॥

‡ श्रद्धादिपूर्वकः। श्रद्धादयः पूर्व उपाया यस्य स श्रद्धादिपूर्वकस्समाधिरिति शेषः। तेच श्रद्धादय उपायोपेयभावेन प्रवर्त्तमानाः सम्प्रज्ञातस्य समाधेरुपायतां प्रतिपद्यन्ते।

§ तत्र श्रद्धा योगविषये चेतसः प्रसादः।

|| वीर्यमुत्साहः।

Memory.

e. 'Memory' [or 'Recollection'—*smriti*] has already been explained,* [—see § 11].

Meditation.

f. 'Meditation' *(samádhi)* means intentness on a single point.†

Discernment.

g. 'Discernment' *(prajná)* means thorough discrimination of that which is to be known.‡

Reason for this order of statement.

h. Among these [antecedents,—to account for the order of statement adopted in the aphorism, we may remark, that]—of him who has 'Faith' there arises 'Energy,'—he becomes persevering in meditation;—and to one thus persevering the 'Memory' of past subjects springs up; and his mind becomes absorbed in 'Meditation' in consequence of the recollection thereof; and he whose mind is absorbed in meditation arrives at a thorough 'Discernment' of the matter pondered.§

i. Such are [according to those whose practice is recorded in §20.] the means of that Meditation 'in which there is distinct recognition' [§ 17.]. The [still higher step—the] Meditation 'in which distinct recognition is lost' [§ 18.] is arrived at through diligent practice [§ 13.] of this ['in which there *is* distinct recog-

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* स्मृतिर्व्याख्याता।

† समाधिरेकाग्रता।

‡ प्रज्ञा ज्ञातव्यप्रविवेकः।

§ तत्र श्रद्धावतो वीर्यं जायते योगविषये उत्साहवान् भवति सोत्साहस्य च पाश्चात्यासु भूमिषु स्मृतिरुपजायते तत्स्मरणाच्चेतस्समाधीयते समाहितचित्तस्य भाव्यं सम्यग्विजानाति।

nition' of some object pondered], and through extreme 'Dispassion'* [§ 16].

j. He next mentions the subdivisions of *Yogís*, adopting the abovementioned means, according to the difference of method adopted by them.†

तीव्रसंवेगानामासन्नः ॥ २१ ॥

Ascetics divisible according to their method of procedure.

Aph. 21.—[The attainment of the state of abstract Meditation is] speedy in the case of the hotly impetuous.

a. To complete the aphorism, the words 'The attainment of the state of abstract Meditation' require to be supplied.‡

b. By 'impetuosity' *(samvega)* is meant a more energetic self-reproducing impulse, which is a cause of action. Those persons in whose 'transcendent' methods [§ 22.] this [impetuosity] is violent, are close upon the attainment of abstract meditation and the fruits of meditation;—that is to say, this is, in their case, rapidly brought about.§

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* त एते सम्प्रज्ञातसमाधेरुपायाः। तस्याभ्यासात्पराच्च वैराग्याद्भवत्यसम्प्रज्ञातः ॥

† उक्तोपायवतां योगिनामुपायभेदाद्भेदानाह ॥

‡ समाधिलाभ इति शेषः।

§ संवेगः क्रियाहेतुर्दृढतरसंस्कारः स तीव्रो येषामधिमात्रोपायानां तेषामासन्नस्समाधिलाभस्समाधिफलञ्चासन्नं भवति शीघ्रमेव निष्पद्यत इत्यर्थः ॥

c. Who are those 'hotly impetuous' [§ 21]? To this he replies.*

मृदुमध्याधिमात्रत्वात्ततोऽपि विशेषः ॥ २२ ॥

Aph. 22.—Through the 'mild,' the 'medium,' and the 'transcendent' [nature of the methods adopted] there is thence also a distinction [among the ascetics who adopt the methods].

a. Through the diversity of these various methods, viz. the 'mild' &c., there is a distinction of those who employ the methods. The divisions of method are the 'mild' *(mridu)*, the 'medium' *(madhya)*, and the 'transcendent' *(adhimátra)*. These are severally threefold from their being severally subdivided into the 'mildly impetuous,' the 'middlingly impetuous,' and the 'transcendently impetuous.'

The nine divisions of ascetics.

And in accordance with this division there are nine classes of followers of the *Yoga*. Thus—there is the 'mild method'—[the follower of which may be] the 'mildly impetuous,' the 'middlingly impetuous,' or the 'transcendently impetuous.' Then there is the 'medium method'—[the follower of which may be] the 'mildly impetuous,' the 'middlingly impetuous,' or the 'transcendently impetuous.' And there is the 'transcendent method'—[the follower of which may be] the 'mildly impetuous,' the 'middlingly impetuous,' or the 'transcendently impetuous'. And great endeavours ought to be made after the 'transcendent method' and after warm impetuosity [in following out the same]. So much for the declaration of the distinctions† [among the followers of the *Yoga*].

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* के ते तीव्रसंवेगा इत्यत आह ॥

† तेभ्य उपायेभ्यो मृद्वादिभेदभिन्नेभ्य उपायवतां विशेषो भवति। मृदुर्मध्योऽधिमात्र इत्युपायभेदाः। ते प्रत्येकं मृदु-

b. By 'mildness' [as we learn from Bhávágaṇeśa] is here meant 'smallness'. The meaning of 'middlingness' is the familiar one. By 'transcendentness' is meant the exceeding of all measure,—excessiveness, in short*.

c. Now he mentions a method which differs from these methods in being an easy one.†

ईश्वरप्रणिधानाद्वा ॥ २३ ॥

The devotional method. *Aph.* 23—Or by profound devotedness towards the Lord, [the ascetic may attain to the state of abstract Meditation].

a. By "the Lord" (*íśwara*) we mean what will be defined [in §24]. By "profound devotedness" towards Him, we mean a kind of devoted attachment, a peculiar serving of Him, the consigning of all one's actions to Him. The person [under the influence we speak of] desiring no fruit [of his actions] in the shape of enjoyment of sense-objects, or the like, makes over all his ac-

संवेगमध्यसंवेगतीव्रसंवेगभेदात्त्रिविधाः। तद्भेदेनच नव योगिनो भवन्ति। मृदूपायः। मृदुसंवेगो मध्यसंवेगः तीव्रसंवेगश्च। मध्योपायः। मृदुसंवेगो मध्यसंवेगः तीव्रसंवेगश्च। अधिमात्रोपायः। मृदुसंवेगो मध्यसंवेगः तीव्रसंवेगश्च। अधिमात्रोपाये तीव्रेच संवेगे महान् यत्नः कर्त्तव्य इति भेदोपदेशः॥

* मृदुत्वमल्पता। मध्यत्वं प्रसिद्धम्। अधिमात्रत्वमतिप्रमाणत्वमतिशयितत्वमिति यावत्॥ इति भावागणेशः॥

† इदानीमेतदुपायविलक्षणं सुगममुपायान्तरमाह॥

tions to Him, the pre-eminent guide. This 'profound devotedness' is a pre-eminent means of abstract Meditation and of the attainment of its fruits.*

The devotional method has reference to the 'Lord.'

b. It has been just stated that abstract Meditation may be attained through profound devotedness towards *the Lord.* With reference to this, he now proceeds to declare, in order, the nature, [§24] the proofs [§25], the pre-eminence [§26], and the name [§27], of the Lord, the order of His worship [§28], and the fruit thereof† [§29].

क्लेशकर्मविपाकाशयैरपरामृष्टपुरुषविशेष ईश्वरः ॥ २४ ॥

The term 'Lord' defined.

Aph. 24.—The Lord is a particular Spirit *(purusha)* untouched by troubles, works, fruits, or deserts.

a. 'Troubles'—i. e. things that distress,—such as ignorance &c., which will be spoken of [in the 2nd section]. 'Works'—i. e. [actions involving] merit or demerit. 'Fruits'—i. e. what ripen out of works, as birth, life, or whatever is experienced [by mortals as the consequences of their actions]. By 'deserts' are

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* ईश्वरो वक्ष्यमाणलक्षणः। प्रणिधानं तत्र भक्तिविशेषो विशिष्टमुपासनं सर्वक्रियाणामपि तत्रार्पणं विषयसुखादिकं फलमनिच्छन् सर्वाः क्रियास्तस्मिन् परमगुरावर्पयति तत्प्रणिधानं समाधेस्तत्फललाभस्य च प्रकृष्ट उपायः॥

† ईश्वरस्य प्रणिधानात्समाधिलाभ इत्युक्तं। तत्रेश्वरस्य स्वरूपं प्रमाणं प्रभावं वाचकमुपासनाक्रमं तत्फलञ्च क्रमेण वक्तुमाह॥

meant those self-continuant conditions, or tendencies [—leading to their inevitable consequences—], which take the name of *áśaya* [—from the root *śí* 'to sleep,—] because they rest on the tablets of the mind until their fruit shall have ripened. [The Lord, to whom no such things are attributable, is declared to be] 'Untouched' by these—i. e. not affected by them during any of the three times, [—past, present, or future].*

b. A 'particular Spirit,'—i. e. one who is different from other spirits;—such is the force of the term here rendered 'particular.'†

The Lord upholds all things by His mere will.

c. 'The Lord' (*íśwara*)—i. e. [—from the root *śí* 'to possess power'—]who is accustomed to rule,—who is able to uphold the world by his mere will. Such is the nature of 'the Lord.'‡

d. Having thus stated the nature of the Lord, he now [§23. *b.*] states the proofs§ [that such a Being exists].

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* क्लिश्नन्तीति क्लेशा अविद्यादयो वक्ष्यमाणाः। कर्म धर्माधर्मौ। विपाकाः कर्मफलानि जन्मायुर्भोगाः। आफलविपाकात् चित्तभूमौ शेरत इत्याशया वासनाख्याः संस्काराः। तैरपरामृष्टः त्रिष्वपि कालेषु न संस्पृष्टः।

† पुरुषविशेषः। अन्येभ्यः पुरुषेभ्यो विशिष्यत इति विशेषः।

‡ ईश्वरः। ईशनशीलः। इच्छामात्रेण सकलजगदुद्धरणक्षम इति स्वरूपमीश्वरस्येति॥

§ एवमीश्वरस्य स्वरूपमभिधाय प्रमाणमाह॥

तत्र निरतिशयं सर्वज्ञबीजम्॥ २५॥

Proof that there is such a Being as the Lord.

Aph. 25.—In Him does the germ of the omniscient become infinite.

a. 'In Him'—i. e. in that divine Being. The germ of omniscience is the less or more of the knowledge of the past, the future, &c. This is the germ, because like a germ it is the root [of what springs from it]. This [knowledge which in others is less or more] in Him, is infinite, or reaches its extreme limit. [And it is held to be a fair inference that Knowledge reaches the limit of Omniscience *somewhere*], for, properties that are capable of degrees, such as Parvitude and Magnitude, are [in particular instances] seen to have reached their extreme limits,—Parvitude, for example, in an Atom, and pre-eminent Magnitude in the Ether. So too Knowledge and the like, properties of the intellect, are seen admitting of degrees. They reach their extreme limit *somewhere*, and He in whom they are infinite is the Lord.*

b. Having thus declared the nature of the Lord, and the proof that such a Being exists, he next [§23. *b.*] declares His pre-eminence.†

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* तत्र। तस्मिन् भगवति। सर्वज्ञत्वस्य यद्बीजं अतीतानागतादिग्रहणस्याल्पत्वं महत्त्वञ्च मूलत्वात् बीजमिव बीजं। तत्तत्र निरतिशयं काष्ठाप्राप्तं। दृष्टाह्यल्पत्वमहत्त्वादीनां धर्माणां सातिशयानां काष्ठाप्राप्तिर्यथा परमाणावल्पत्वस्य आकाशेच परममहत्त्वस्य। एवं ज्ञानादयोऽपि चित्तधर्मास्तारतम्येन परिदृश्यमानाः क्वचिन्निरतिशयतामासादयन्ति यत्रचैते निरतिशयास्स ईश्वर इति॥

† एवमीश्वरस्य स्वरूपं प्रमाणञ्चाभिधाय प्रभावमाह॥

स एष पूर्वेषामपि गुरुः कालेनानवच्छेदात्॥ २६॥

The pre-eminence of the Lord.

Aph. 26.—He is the preceptor even of the first, for He is not limited by time.

a. 'Of the first;'—that is to say, even of the earliest [of created beings], such as Brahmá, &c. He [the Lord] is the preceptor, or instructor; for *He* is not bounded by time, since He is without beginning,—and *these*, on the other hand, *are* limited by time because they *had* a beginning.*

b. Having thus declared the pre-eminence [of the Lord], he declares His name [§ 23. *b.*], with a view to its employment in devotion.†

तस्य वाचकः प्रणवः॥ २७॥

The mystical name of the Lord.

Aph. 27. His name is Glory.

a. 'His,'—i. e. of the Lord as thus defined [§24], the name, or appellation, is 'Glory' *(praṇava)*, [which is the technical term employed in speaking of the mystical name] '*Om.*'‡

b. And of the two [—i. e. of the Lord and this name—] the relation, as 'denoted and denoter,' is eternal. It is convention-

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* पूर्वेषां। आद्यानां ब्रह्मादीनामपि स गुरुरुपदेष्टा यतस्स कालेनानवच्छिद्यते अनादित्वात्। तेषां पुनरादिमत्त्वादस्ति कालेनावच्छेदः॥

† एवं प्रभावमुक्त्वोपासनोपयोगाय वाचकमाह॥

‡ इत्थमुक्तस्वरूपस्य तस्येश्वरस्य वाचकोऽभिधायकः प्रणव ओङ्कारः।

ally *declared*,—but not *made* by any one. Just in like manner as the actual relation between a father and his son is *declared* [and not *created*] by some one who says "This is that one's father, and that is this one's son."*

c. He next speaks of worship† [—§23. *b.*]

तज्जपस्तदर्थभावनम्॥ २८॥

How the name of the Lord is to be used in worship.

Aph. 28.—Its repetition [should be made, and also] reflection on its signification.

a. 'Its',—i. e. of this mystical name, consisting of three and a half prosodial moments [viz: $(a=2)+(u=1)+(m=\frac{1}{2})=(om=3\frac{1}{2})$], the repetition, or proper pronunciation; and reflection on, or re-iterated mental attention to, its signification—viz: the Lord,—is a means of concentrating the thoughts; therefore it is here stated that the follower of the *Yoga* ought to repeat the mystical name and to reflect upon its import, with a view to the effecting of abstract Meditation.‡

b. He next mentions the fruits [§23. *b.*] of such worship.§

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* तयोश्च वाच्यवाचकभावलक्षणस्सम्बन्धो नित्यः। सङ्केतेन प्रकाश्यते नतु केनचित्क्रियते। यथा पितृपुत्रयोर्विद्यमानस्सम्बन्धो ऽस्यायं पितास्यायं पुत्र इति केनचित्प्रकाश्यते॥

† उपासनामाह॥

‡ तस्य सार्द्धत्रिमात्रस्य प्रणवस्य जपो यथावदुच्चारणं तद्वाच्यस्येश्वरस्य भावनं पुनःपुनश्चेतसि निवेशनं एकाग्रताया उपायो ऽतस्समाधिसिद्धये योगिना प्रणवो जप्यस्तदर्थश्च भावनीय इत्युक्तं भवति॥

§ उपासनायाः फलमाह॥

ततः प्रत्यक्चेतनाधिगमोऽप्यन्तरायाभावश्च ॥ २९ ॥

Aph. 29.—Thence comes the knowledge of the rightly intelligent [Spirit], and the absence of obstacles.

a. 'The rightly intelligent [Spirit]'—i. e. the Spirit possessed of knowledge,—He being an intelligence who rightly knows,—i. e. who knows in an opposite, or inverse way, [as contradistinguished from mortals, whose understanding—as explained under § 5.—is supposed to flow out and become modified by objects. Such a process of gaining knowledge, being regarded as undesirable in the case of mortals, is not to be imagined to belong to the Lord, who is therefore said to know in some opposite way]. There accrues to him [the ascetic] a knowledge, a complete apprehension, of Him,* [through the practice recommended in §23].

b. The obstacles [to the attainment of the end in view] will be mentioned. The absence of these means the exclusion of their power.†

c. Now, which are those *obstacles?* This being a point in doubt, he proceeds to remark as follows.‡

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* प्रतीपं विपरीतं अञ्चति विजानातीति प्रत्यक्। स चासौ चेतनश्चेति प्रत्यक्चेतनो विद्वान् पुरुषः। तस्य अधिगमो ज्ञानं स्वरूपतोऽस्य भवति।

† अन्तराया वक्ष्यमाणास्तेषामभावः शक्तिप्रतिबन्धो भवति॥

‡ अथ के तेऽन्तराया इत्याशङ्कायामाह॥

व्याधिस्त्यानसंशयप्रमादालस्याविरतिभ्रान्तिदर्शनालब्धभूमिकत्वानवस्थितत्वानि चित्तविक्षेपास्तेऽन्तरायाः ॥ ३० ॥

The obstacles of the ascetic.

Aph. 30.—Sickness, languor, doubt, carelessness, laziness, addiction to objects [of sense], erroneous perception, failure to attain any stage [of abstraction], and instability [in the state when attained],—these distractions of the mind are obstacles [in the way of the ascetic].

a. These nine, prevailing through the power of the passionate and dark qualities [—the two which are opposed to the element of pure or good in the phenomenal world—] become distractions of the mind:—that is to say, the mind is distracted by these which are opposed to the mind's concentrating itself on any point.*

Sickness.

b. Among these, 'Sickness,' is a fever, or the like, caused by disorder of the humours.†

Languor.

c. 'Languor' is the mind's inactivity.‡

Doubt.

d. 'Doubt' is a [sort of] notion that leans to both alternatives. As, for example, [where one hesitates] "Is the *Yoga* practicable [e. g. for me the doubter], or is it not?"§

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* नवैते रजस्तमोवशात् प्रवर्त्तमानाश्चित्तस्य विक्षेपा भवन्ति। तैरेकाग्रताविरोधिभिश्चित्तं विक्षिप्यत इत्यर्थः॥

† तत्र व्याधिर्धातुवैषम्यनिमित्तो ज्वरादिः॥

‡ स्त्यानमकर्मण्यता चित्तस्य॥

§ उभयकोट्यालम्बनं विज्ञानं संशयः। योगस्साध्यस्स्याद्वा नवेति॥

Carelessness. e. 'Carelessness' is a habit of inattention,—a listlessness about the effecting of abstract meditation.*

Laziness. f. 'Laziness' is a heaviness of the body and mind, which causes a want of exertion in the department of abstract meditation.†

Addiction to objects. g. 'Addiction to objects' *(avirati)* is a greediness consisting in attachment of the mind to objects of sense.‡

Erroneous perception. h. 'Erroneous perception' is a mistaken notion [§8. *a.*] such as the notion that the thing is silver when it is mother o'pearl.§

Failure to attain any stage of abstraction. i. By 'failure to attain any stage' we mean the failing, for some reason or another, to attain to, or arrive at, the state of abstract meditation.||

Instability. j. 'Instability' is, even when the state of abstract meditation has been reached, the mind's not continuing steadily therein.¶

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* प्रमादोऽननुष्ठानशीलता समाधिसाधने औदासीन्यम्॥

† आलस्यं कायचित्तयोर्गुरुत्वं योगविषये प्रवृत्त्यभावहेतुः॥

‡ अविरतिश्चित्तस्य विषयसम्प्रयोगात्मा गर्द्धः॥

§ भ्रान्तिदर्शनं शुक्तिकायां रजतत्ववद्विपर्ययज्ञानम्॥

|| अलब्धभूमिकत्वं कुतश्चिन्निमित्तात्समाधिभूमेरलाभ असम्प्राप्तिः॥

¶ अनवस्थितत्वं लब्धायामपि समाधिभूमौ चित्तस्य तत्राप्रतिष्ठा॥

k. These [§ 30.] are called 'obstacles' because, as they present themselves, they oppose concentration or meditation.*

l. In order to declare other obstacles also, which cause distraction of mind, he says† :—

दुःखदौर्मनस्याङ्गमेजयत्वश्वासविक्षेपसहभुवः ॥ ३१ ॥

Aph. 31.—Grief, Distress, Trembling, and Sighing, are accompaniments of the distractions.

a. When, from whatever cause, distractions [such as enumerated in § 30.] have arisen, then these, viz. Grief, &c. [§ 31.] come on.‡

Grief. *b*. Among these [§ 31.] 'Grief' is a modification of mind, resulting from [other] mental affections and characterised by annoyance, in consequence of which annoyance sentient creatures exert themselves for its removal.§

Distress. *c*. 'Distress' is a tremulousness of mind, arising either from external or internal causes.||

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* एते समाधेरेकाग्रताया यथायोगं प्रतिपक्षत्वादन्तराया इत्युच्यन्ते ॥

† चित्तविक्षेपकारकानन्यानप्यन्तरायान् प्रतिपादयितुमाह ॥

‡ कुतश्चिन्निमित्तादुत्पन्नेषु विक्षेपेषु एते दुःखादयः प्रवर्त्तन्ते ॥

§ तत्र दुःखं चित्तस्य राजसः परिणामो बाधनालक्षणो यद्बाधात् प्राणिनस्तदुपघाताय प्रवर्त्तन्ते ॥

|| दौर्मनस्यं बाह्याभ्यन्तरैः कारणैर्मनसश्चाञ्चल्यम् ॥

Trembling. d. 'Trembling' *(angamejayatwa)* is a shaking of the whole body which prevents steadiness either in prescribed postures or in mind.*

Sighing. e. 'Sighing' *(śwása)* is an excessive entrance of air into the body. An excessive expiration of air from the body, is what is meant by *praśwása*.†

f. These [§ 31.], prevailing along with the distractions [enumerated in § 30.], are to be excluded by means of 'exercise' [§ 13.] and 'dispassion' [§ 15.] as aforesaid; and therefore it is that they are mentioned here.‡

h. He now mentions another method for the prevention of the obstacles [§ 30.] together with their supervenients [§ 31.].§

तत्प्रतिषेधार्थमेकतत्त्वाभ्यासः ॥ ३२ ॥

Means of combating distractions. *Aph.* 32.—For the prevention thereof let one truth be dwelt upon.

a. For the prevention, or hindrance, of these distractions, one should dwell upon, or again and again confine the attention, to

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* अङ्गमेजयत्वं सर्वाङ्गीणो वेपथुरासनमनःस्थैर्यबाधकः ॥

† श्वासो देहान्तर्वायोरधिकः प्रवेशः । प्रश्वासो देहाद्वायोरधिकनिर्गमः ॥

‡ त एते विक्षेपैः सह प्रवर्त्तमाना यथोदिताभ्यासवैराग्याभ्यां निरोद्धव्या इत्येषामुपदेशः ॥

§ सोपद्रवविक्षेपप्रतिषेधार्थमुपायान्तरमाह ॥

one truth,—some accepted truth,—by force of which, when concentration on one point has taken place, the distractions subside.*

b. He next states another method, premising some mention of purifying processes which conduce to the perfecting of the mind.†

मैत्रीकरुणामुदितोपेक्षाणां सुखदुःखपुण्यापुण्यविषयाणां भावनातश्चित्तप्रसादनम्॥ ३३ ॥

Amiable habits recommended. *Aph.* 33.—Through the practising of benevolence, tenderness, complacency, and disregard towards objects [i. e. persons who are respectively in possession] of happiness, grief, virtue, and vice, the mind becomes purified.

a. 'Benevolence' is good-heartedness; 'tenderness' is compassion; 'complacency' is sympathetic joy; 'disregard' is indifference. He should exercise these, respectively, towards the happy, the grieved, the virtuous, and the vicious. That is to say, when people are happy, he should show benevolence, saying, "Blessings on their joy!",—and not [show] envy. When people are grieved, he should show tenderness, saying "By what means, verily, can they be freed from their grief?"—and not [show] a disposition to stand aloof. And when people are virtuous, he

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* तेषां विक्षेपाणां प्रतिषेधार्थं निषेधार्थमेकस्मिन् कस्मिंश्चिदभिमते तत्त्वे अभ्यासश्चेतसः पुनःपुनर्निवेशनं कुर्य्यात् यद्बलात् प्रत्युदितायामेकाग्रतायां विक्षेपाः प्रशममुपयान्ति।

† इदानीं चित्तसंस्कारापादकपरिकर्मकथनपूर्वकमुपायान्तरमाह॥

should exhibit complacency, by sympathetically rejoicing in their virtue,—and not [show] aversion by saying "What!—are these forsooth *virtuous?*" And in regard to the vicious he should practise simply indifference, showing neither sympathy nor aversion.*

b. In the aphorism, by the words 'happiness' 'grief', &c., are denoted those to whom these belong. So, in this manner, by the purifying influences of friendliness, &c., the mind being rendered cheerful, the production of abstract meditation takes place readily.†

c. This purifying process is an external one [and not an intimate portion of the *Yoga* itself]. As, in arithmetic, in effecting the calculations of questions of Alligation, &c. the operations of Addition &c., are valuable [not so much in themselves, but] as aids in effecting the *important* matter, so by exercising benevo-

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* मैत्री सौहार्दं। करुणा कृपा। मुदिता हर्षः। उपेक्षा औदासीन्यं। एता यथाक्रमं सुखितेषु दुःखितेषु पुण्यवत्सु अपुण्यवत्सु च विभावयेत्। तथाहि। सुखितेषु साध्वेषां सुखित्वमिति मैत्रीं कुर्य्यान्नत्वीर्ष्याम्। दुःखितेषु कथमु नामैषां दुःखविमुक्ति स्यादिति कृपामेव कुर्य्यान्न ताटस्थ्यं। पुण्यवत्सु च पुण्यानुमोदनेन हर्षं कुर्य्यान्नतु किमेते पुण्यवन्त इति द्वेषं। अपुण्यवत्सु चौदासीन्यमेव भावयेन्नानुमोदनं न द्वेषम्॥

† अत्र सुखदुःखादिशब्दैस्तद्वन्तः प्रतिपादिताः। तदेवं मैत्र्यादिपरिकर्म्मणा चित्ते प्रसीदति सुखेन समाधेराविर्भावो भवति॥

lence, &c., which are [moods of mind] opposed to aversion and covetousness, the mind, in which composure has [thereby] been produced, becomes fitted for meditation—that 'in which there is distinct recognition of an object' [§ 17.], &c. Covetousness and aversion are the very chief raisers of distractions:—if therefore these be radically extirpated, then, through its composure [and freedom from distraction], the mind [the more readily] becomes concentrated on one point.*

d. He mentions another expedient.†

प्रच्छर्दनविधारणाभ्यां वा प्राणस्य ॥ ३४ ॥

Another expedient for combating distraction.

Aph. 34.—[Or, he may combat distractions] by forcibly expelling and by restraining the breath.

Regulation of the breath.

a. The 'expelling' of the breath is the vomiting or emitting it [by a slow but complete expiration]. The 'restraining' it, is the stopping it [by shutting the mouth and closing both nostrils with the fingers of the right hand]. And this, we mean to say, takes place after *inhalation* [—though men-

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* परिकर्मचैतद्बाह्यं कर्म । यथा गणिते मिश्रकादिव्यवहारगणितनिष्पत्तये सङ्कलितादिकर्मोपकारकत्वेन प्रधानकर्मनिष्पत्तये प्रभवति एवं द्वेषरागादिप्रतिपक्षभूतमैत्र्यादिभावनया समुत्पादितप्रसादं चित्तं सम्प्रज्ञातादिसमाधियोग्यं सम्पद्यते । रागद्वेषावेव मुख्यतया विक्षेपमुत्पादयतः । तौ चेत्समूलमुन्मूलितौ स्यातां तदा प्रसन्नत्वान्मनसो भवत्येकाग्रता ॥

† उपायान्तरमाह ॥

tioned in the aphorism as if immediately following *expiration*—], because, after expelling the breath, it is impossible to *restrain* it without [having made a previous] inhalation. Thus, then, the regulation of the breath [*práṇáyáma*], being of three descriptions according to the distinction of 'expiration' *(rechaka)*, 'inspiration' *(púraka)*, and 'restraining' *(kumbhaka)*, causes steadiness of the mind, and its concentration in a single direction.*

b. He states another means of steadiness.†

विषयवती वा प्रवृत्तिरुत्पन्ना स्थितिनिबन्धिनी ॥ ३५ ॥

Another expedient. *Aph.* 35.—Or a sensuous immediate cognition, being produced, may serve as a cause of the steadiness [of the mind].

a. To complete the sentence, we must supply 'of the mind.'‡

b. Objects of sense are odour, savour, colour, touch, and sound. Wherever these exist as fruits, that case of perception, or especially immediate cognition, is sensuous:—and this, when it is excited, causes fixation of the mind.§

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* प्राणस्य प्रच्छर्दनं वमनं रेचनमिति यावत्। विधारणं कुम्भकं। तच्चार्थात् पूरकानन्तरं। रेचकोत्तरं पूरकं विना विधारणासम्भवात्। तदेवं रेचकपूरककुम्भकभेदेन त्रिविधः प्राणायामश्चित्तस्य स्थितिमेकाग्रतां निबध्नाति॥

† स्थितिनिबन्धान्तरमाह॥

‡ मनस इति वाक्यशेषः॥

§ विषया गन्धरसरूपस्पर्शशब्दास्ते विद्यन्ते फलत्वेन यस्यां

Mystical sense-perception.

c. To explain:—in the case of him who fixes his mind on the tip of his nose, there arises a perception of celestial odour. [If he fix his mind] on the tip of the tongue, in like manner, there is a perception of savour; on the fore-part of the palate, a perception of colour; on the middle of the tongue, a perception of the touch; on the root of the tongue, a perception of the sound. Thus, then, through this or that organ, the perception arising of this or that celestial sense-object becomes a cause of the mind's concentration in one direction.*

d. He mentions another expedient of the like description.†

विशोका वा ज्योतिष्मती ॥ ३६ ॥

Another expedient.

Aph. 36.—Or a luminous [immediate cognition, being produced,] free from sorrow, [may serve as a cause of the steadiness of the mind].

e. To complete the aphorism, we must supply 'an immediate

सा विषयवती प्रवृत्तिः प्रकृष्टा साक्षात्काररूपा वृत्तिः । सा चोत्पन्ना मनसः स्थैर्यं करोति ।

* तथाहि । नासाग्रे चित्तं धारयतो दिव्यगन्धसंविदुपजायते । तादृश्येव जिह्वाग्रे रससंवित् । ताल्वग्रे रूपसंवित् । जिह्वामध्ये स्पर्शसंवित् । जिह्वामूले शब्दसंवित् । तदेवं तत्तदिन्द्रियद्वारेण तस्मिन् तस्मिन् दिव्ये विषये जायमाना संवित् चित्तस्यैकाग्रताया हेतुर्भवति ।

† एवंविधमेवोपायान्तरमाह ।

cognition, being produced, may serve as a cause of the steadiness of the mind.'*

b. Here, by the word 'lumen' *(jyotis)* is meant the light that consists of the Pure element [out of the three elementary qualities that constitute the phenomenal]. A luminous immediate cognition [§ 35. *b.*] is that in which this [Pure element] is excellent, abundant, exceeding.†

c. 'Free from sorrow,'—that is to say, that cause of the steadiness of the mind in respect of which [agency] all sorrow, which [—see *Sánkhya Lecture*, § 61.—] is a modification of the Passionate [or *foul* element of the phenomenal universe], is removed by virtue of the exercise of the 'beatific'‡ [degree of meditation—§ 17. *g.*,—where the ascetic, not yet liberated from the phenomenal, is nearly freed from the two coarser of its three chains].

Dwelling on the inner light of the heart.

d. The meaning is this, that, on the disappearance of all 'modifications' [§ 5.] through the beholding of perfect knowledge, steadiness takes place in the mind of him who, in the midst of the lotus-cup of his heart, broods on the Pure element of thought [spread out in the heart] like the milky ocean when its waves are stilled.§

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* प्रवृत्तिरुत्पन्ना चित्तस्य स्थितिनिबन्धिनीति वाक्यशेषः ॥

† अत्र ज्योतिःशब्देन सात्त्विकः प्रकाश उच्यते। स प्रशस्तो भूयानतिशयवांश्च विद्यते यस्यां सा ज्योतिष्मती प्रवृत्तिः ॥

‡ विशोका विगतसुखमयसत्त्वाभ्यासवशात् शोको रजःपरिणामरूपो यस्याः सा चेतसः स्थितिनिबन्धिनी ॥

§ अयमर्थः। हृत्पद्मपुटमध्ये प्रशान्तकल्लोलक्षीरोदधि-

e. By means of exhibiting another expedient, he declares an object [worthy of being meditated] in the meditation 'in which there is distinct recognition of an object'*—[§ 17].

वीतरागविषयं वा चित्तम् ॥ ३७ ॥

Dwelling on admirable examples.

Aph. 37.—Or the thought, taking as its object some one devoid of passion, [may find what will serve as a cause of the steadiness of the mind].

a. To complete the aphorism we must supply 'may [find what will] serve as a cause of the steadiness of the mind.'†

b. 'Devoid of passion,' i. e., who has abandoned all desire for objects of sense,—like Sanaka and others. [The mind, we repeat, may be steadied by the expedients previously mentioned,] or the thoughts of the Yogí, directed to *this* [—i. e. to one devoid of passion as Sanaka was—], becomes fixed;—that is to say, the unimpassioned thought becomes more firmly steady through reflecting on one whose thoughts are devoid of passion.‡

प्रख्यं चित्तसत्त्वं भावयतः प्रज्ञालोकात् सर्ववृत्तिक्षये चेतसः स्थैर्यमुत्पद्यत इति ॥

* उपायान्तरप्रदर्शनद्वारेण सम्प्रज्ञातसमाधेर्विषयं दर्शयति ॥

† मनसः स्थितिनिबन्धनम्भवतीति वाक्यशेषः ॥

‡ वीतरागः परित्यक्तविषयाभिलाषस्सनकादिः । तद्विषयकं वा योगिचित्तं निबद्धं भवति विरक्तचित्तस्य भावनया विरक्तं चित्तं दृढस्थितये भवतीत्यर्थः ॥

c. He mentions another expedient of this description.*

स्वप्ननिद्राज्ञानालम्बनं वा ॥ ३८ ॥

Recourse had to dreaming and sleeping.

Aph. 38.—Or the dwelling on knowledge [that presents itself] in dream, or in sleep, [may serve as a cause of the steadiness of the mind].

Dreaming defined.

a. 'Dream' is that wherein the soul is affected through the mind alone, when the modifications of the external organs of sense have departed.†

b. 'Sleep' has already been defined‡ [—see § 10.].

c. [We say, then, that] knowledge dependent on dream, or dependent on sleep, when dwelt upon, causes steadiness of mind,§—[there being in either case nothing to distract the attention].

d. Since [different] men have different tastes, on whatever thing the Yogí places his faith, by meditating on that same thing he may attain what he wants [—viz. steadiness of mind] :—in order to declare this, he states as follows.||

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* एवंविधमुपायान्तरमाह ।

† प्रत्यस्तमितबाह्येन्द्रियवृत्तेः मनोमात्रेणैव यत्र भोक्तृत्वमात्मनः स स्वप्नः ॥

‡ निद्रा उक्तलक्षणा ॥

§ स्वप्नालम्बनं निद्रालम्बनं वा ज्ञानमालम्ब्यमानं चेतसः स्थितिं करोति ॥

|| नानारुचित्वात्प्राणिनां यस्मिन् कस्मिंश्चिद्वस्तुनि यो

यथाभिमतध्यानाद्वा ॥ ३९ ॥

Anything you please may be dwelt upon to steady the mind.

Aph. 39.—Or [the steadying of the mind may be effected] by pondering anything that one approves.

a. [That is to say] the mind becomes steadied when any object that one prefers is pondered,—whether external, as the Moon or the like, or internal, as a congeries of arteries or the like.*

The fruit of meditation.

b. Having thus exhibited the means [of accomplishing meditation], in order to exhibit the fruits, he proceeds to remark.†

परमाणुपरममहत्त्वान्तोऽस्य वशीकारः ॥ ४० ॥

To apprehend the infinitely small or great.

Aph. 40.—His mastery extends to the atomic and to the infinite.

a. The ascetic, effecting, by these methods, steadiness of mind, obtains, through meditation on subtile objects, unresisted mastery as far as the Atoms;—that is to say, his mind, in [dealing with] subtile objects, even as far as the Atoms [which elude the cognizance of ordinary perspicacity], is nowhere baffled. In like

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गिनः श्रद्धा भवति तस्य ध्यानेनापि भवतीष्टसिद्धिरिति प्रतिपादयितुमाह ॥

* यथाभिमते वस्तुनि बाह्ये चन्द्रादावाभ्यन्तरे नाडीचक्रादौ वा भाव्यमाने चेतः स्थिरीभवति ॥

† एवमुपायान् प्रदर्श्य फलप्रदर्शनार्थमाह ॥

manner no mental obstacle arises anywhere to him meditating the gross, even to the extent of infinite magnitude,—as the Ether, for example;—but everywhere he is uncontrolled,—such is the meaning.*

b. Of the mind thus by these methods rectified, what is the aspect [or actual condition]? To this he replies.†

क्षीणवृत्तेरभिजातस्येव मणेर्ग्रहीतृग्रहणग्राह्येषु तत्स्थ-तदञ्जनतापत्तिः ॥ ४१ ॥

The state of the mind properly intent on a single object.

Aph. 41.—To that [mind] whose 'modifications' [—all save that there remains some one object of meditation—] have disappeared, there occurs, as [occurs] to a noble gem [—e. g. rock-crystal, when brought into conjunction with a coloured substance—], when intent on any one out of these—viz.—the perceiver, the perception, and the perceivable,—a tingeing thereby.

a. That is to say—to that [mind] whose 'modifications' [§ 5.]

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* एभिरुपायैश्चित्तस्थैर्यम्भावयतो योगिनः सूक्ष्मविषयभावनाद्वारेण परमाण्वन्तो वशीकारोऽप्रतिघातरूपो जायते क्वचित् परमाणुपर्यन्ते सूक्ष्मे विषयेऽस्य मनो न प्रतिहन्यत इत्यर्थः। एवं स्थूलमाकाशादिपरममहत्त्वपर्यन्तम्भावयतो न क्वचिच्चेतःप्रतिघात उत्पद्यते किन्तु सर्वत्र स्वातन्त्र्यम्भवतीत्यर्थः ॥

† एवमेभिरुपायसंस्कृतस्य चेतसः कीदृशं रूपम्भवतीत्याह ॥

have disappeared, which has repelled all modifications *except* that which has to be pondered,—which has accomplished that concentration 'in which there is distinct recognition'* [of a single object to the exclusion of all others,—§ 17.].

b. 'Out of [the three viz.] the perceiver, the perception, and the perceivable'—i. e. Soul, the organs of sense, and the [five] elements.†

c. 'To it [—the thought—] intent on any one [of these §41, *b.*—] there occurs a tingeing thereby.' By 'being intent thereon' we mean attending to that alone. 'A tingeing thereby,'—i. e. the [thought's] coming to consist thereof [by taking the colour or character of the object as its own];—the coming to be of the same description;—that is to say, it [—the thought—] becomes modified into the aspect of that‡ [which is thought upon].

d. He mentions an illustration. To the noble—i. e. pure [transparent and colourless]—gem, such a gem as rock-crystal or the like, there occurs this or that colour in consequence of its being the receptacle of this or that colour, [—as when the red or other colour of flowers has place within a crystal vase—]. In like manner, to the stainless pure element of thought [§36. *d.*]

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* क्षीणा वृत्तयो यस्य तस्य निरुद्धध्येयातिरिक्तवृत्तेः सम्पन्नसम्प्रज्ञातयोगस्येत्यर्थः ॥

† ग्रहीतृग्रहणग्राह्येषु पुरुषेन्द्रियभूतेषु ॥

‡ तत्स्थतदञ्जनतापत्तिः। तत्स्थत्वं तदेकाग्रता। तदञ्जनता तन्मयत्वं। तथाविधा समापत्तिः तद्रूपपरिणामो भवतीत्यर्थः ॥

there occurs the hue of this or that, through the adjacent hue of this or that thing which is meditated upon.*

e. 'The perceived, the perception, and the perceiver'—such is the inverse order in which these are to be understood [—instead of the order adopted in the aphorism—], because it is on 'the perceived' [—the external or objective—] that meditation is first fixed,† [—see §17. *e.* &c].

f. He now states [in three aphorisms] a fourfold division of the abovementioned [§41] change‡ [of the mind into the likeness of what it ponders].

शब्दार्थज्ञानविकल्पैःसङ्कीर्णा सवितर्का ॥ ४२ ॥

The first stage of the mind properly intent.

Aph. 42.—This [change of the mind into the likeness of what is pondered—§41—], when mixed up of the fancy of the 'word,' the 'meaning,' and the 'knowledge,' is [technically termed] the 'argumentative.'

a. A 'Word,' is what is apprehended by the organ of hearing, or [in the technical language of the grammarians] a manifestation§ *(sphoṭa)*.

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* दृष्टान्तमाह । अभिजातस्य निर्मलस्य मणेः स्फटिकादिमणेः तत्तद्रूपाश्रयवशात् तत्तद्रूपापत्तिः । एवं निर्मलस्य चित्तसत्त्वस्य तत्तद्भावनीयवस्तूपरागात् तत्तद्रूपापत्तिः ।

† ग्राह्यग्रहणग्रहीतृष्विति व्यत्यासेन योजनीयं यतः प्रथमं ग्राह्यनिष्ठ एव समाधिरिति ॥

‡ इदानीमुक्ताया एव समापत्तेश्चतुर्विधभेदमाह ॥

§ श्रोत्रेन्द्रियग्राह्यः स्फोटो वा शब्दः ।

b. The 'Meaning' i. e. the thing meant by a sound or word] is a genus [—such as 'cow,' 'horse,'—] &c.,* [see *Sáhitya Darpaṇa* §12].

c. 'Knowledge,' is a modification of the understanding [—see §5 and 6—] where the quality of Purity prevails† [—to the suppression of the elements of Passion and Darkness,—see §17. *g*].

d. A 'Fancy' has been already defined‡ [in *Aph.* 9].

e. 'Mixed up of these'—i. e. in which the three—viz. the 'Word,' &c., [§42],—by mutually commingling, appear in an [ambiguous and] fanciful shape,—in the shape [at once] of the *word* 'cow,' [for example], the *thing* 'cow,' and the *notion* 'cow,'—this is what is called [technically] 'the argumentative' (*savitarka*) change§ [of the mind reflecting a mixed object of thought—while the attention is divided among the sound, the thing signified, and the knowledge of the thing].

f. He now mentions that 'non-argumentative' [affection of the mind] which is the opposite of the one just defined|| [§42].

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* अर्थो जात्यादिः।

† ज्ञानं सत्त्वप्रधाना बुद्धिवृत्तिः।

‡ विकल्प उक्तलक्षणः।

§ तैस्संकीर्णा। यस्यामेते शब्दादयः परस्पराध्यासेन विकल्परूपेण त्रयः प्रतिभासन्ते गौरिति शब्दो गौरित्यर्थो गौरिति ज्ञानमित्यनेनाकारेण सा सवितर्का समापत्तिरित्युच्यते।

|| उक्तलक्षणविपरीतां निर्वितर्कामाह।

स्मृतिपरिशुद्धौ स्वरूपशून्येवार्थमात्रनिर्भासा निर्वितर्का ॥ ४३ ॥

The second stage of the mind properly intent.

Aph. 43.—On the clearing off of the memory [of the word and the sense attached to it by convention], the [mental] display only of the thing itself as if of something indefinite [and no longer referred to any term—no longer regarded as being what is meant by the word 'cow,' or what is meant by the word 'horse,' &c.—], this [affection of the mind which no longer reflects a mixed object of thought—§42—] is that which is called [technically] the 'non-argumentative.'

a. 'Of the memory'—i. e. of the memory of the convention as to the sense of the word. 'The clearing off'—i. e. the departure. When this takes place, the change [of the mind] when it reveals the thing itself alone, as if devoid of any character [which would suggest a term as applicable to it],—when it [the mind in its changed state—§41—] is employed about the object to be pondered alone [without regard to its having any name], and thus clear of 'fancy' [—nothing being pondered but the actual thing itself—], is what is called the 'non-argumentative' [affection of the mind]; such is the meaning.*

b. In order to declare another division, he says:†—

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* स्मृतेः। शब्दार्थसङ्केतस्मृतेः। परिशुद्धिरपगमस्तस्यां सत्यां स्वरूपशून्येव अर्थमात्रनिर्भासा ध्येयार्थमात्रावगाहिनी विकल्पशून्या समापत्तिर्निर्वितर्कसंज्ञेत्यर्थः।

† भेदान्तरं प्रतिपादयितुमाह॥

एतयैव सविचारानिर्विचाराच सूक्ष्मविषया व्या-
ख्याता ॥ ४४ ॥

The third and fourth stages of the mind properly intent.

Aph. 44.—Just by this [mental affection under the two aspects explained in Aphorisms 42 and 43], that which is [technically termed] 'deliberative' *(sa-vichára)*, and [that termed] 'non-deliberative' *(nir-vichára)*, where the object [pondered,—instead of being gross as in these two preceding cases—] is 'subtile,' has been [sufficiently] explained; [—the distinction between this pair, out of the four referred to at §41 *f.*, being the same as that between the other pair].

a. Just by this mental affection, in the shape of the 'argumentative' [§42] and the 'non-argumentative' [§43], where the object is a 'gross' one [as contradistinguished from the 'subtile' objects,—see §44 *b.*—], the pair of mental affections also, in the shape of the 'deliberative' and the 'non-deliberative,' where the object is 'subtile,' has been explained.*

b. What sort [of mental affection] is that where the object is *subtile?* That [mental affection] is so called, the object whereof, such as the 'subtile elements' or the 'organs' [§17. *f.*], is subtile. By this [mention that the object, in the case of the latter pair,—§44, *a.*,—as 'subtile'] it is declared that in the former [pair] the object is 'gross,'—for [in truth] it is on the gross elements that it [—the former pair §42—43—] is dependent. That is [called] the 'deliberative' [§44] in which the 'subtile object' appears whether as the object of a question as to the name, the meaning, and the notion [§42], or apart from any such question, but yet as qualified by the characters of space and time, &c. That [on the

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* एतयैव सवितर्कनिर्वितर्करूपया स्थूलविषयकसमापत्त्या सूक्ष्मविषयापि सविचारनिर्विचाररूपसमापत्तिद्वयी व्याख्याता ।

other hand] is [called] the 'non-deliberative' [§44], in which the 'subtile object,' in the shape of the Subtile Elements or the Organs, independently of the properties of space and time, &c., is presented simply as the thing itself. It is of this [pair of mental modifications] alone that the objects are 'subtile'* [—and not of the other pair,—see §44. *a*].

c. In reply to the question how far [the term] 'where the object is subtile' [§44] [extends], he says:—†

सूक्ष्मविषयत्वञ्चालिङ्गपर्यवसानम्॥ ४५॥

The limit of analysis. *Aph.* 45.—**And 'the having a subtile object' ends with the Indissoluble.**

a. This fact that has been mentioned of the 'deliberative' and the 'non-deliberative' mental affections [§44], that their object is a 'subtile' one [§44. *b.*], ends with the Indissoluble,—meaning, by the 'Indissoluble,' Nature, [that primordial principle—see Sánkhya Lecture §7—] which is nowhere resolved [into any thing underlying it],—or which [to take another etymological

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* कीदृशी सूक्ष्मविषया। सूक्ष्मस्तन्मात्रेन्द्रियादिर्विषयो यस्यास्सा तथोक्ता। एतेन पूर्वस्यां स्थूलविषयत्वं प्रतिपादितम्भवति सा हि महाभूतालम्बना। शब्दार्थज्ञानविकल्पविषयत्वेन तद्रहितत्वेनच देशकालधर्माद्यवच्छिन्नः सूक्ष्मोऽर्थः प्रतिभाति यस्यां सा सविचारा। देशकालधर्मादिरहितो धर्मिमात्रतया सूक्ष्मोऽर्थस्तन्मात्रेन्द्रियरूपः प्रतिभाति यस्यां सा निर्विचारेत्यर्थः। अस्या एव सूक्ष्मविषयाः।

† किम्पर्यन्तसूक्ष्मविषय इत्याह।

explanation] declares or suggests nothing. It is at this point that 'the having a subtile object' ceases* [—seeing that, beyond this, there exists nothing more subtile lying further back].

b. To explain:—in the modification of the Qualities there arise four divisions—(1) that which has a diversified character, (2) that which has an undiversified character, (3) that which merely has a character, and (4) that which has not a character. [By] 'that which has a diversified character' *(viśishṭa-linga)* [is meant] the [gross] elements [Sánkhya Lecture §33]. [By] 'that which has an undiversified character' *(aviśishṭa-linga)* is meant the subtile elements and the organs [S. L. §25]. [By] 'that which merely has a character' *(linga-mátra)* is meant Intellect [S. L. §8]. [By] 'that which has not a characteristic attribute' *(alinga)* is meant the First Principle [S. L. §7] beyond which there is nothing subtile† [underlying or originating it.]

c. He next mentions, as the topic presents itself, the motive for [valuing] these mental affections [or tinges, §41.]‡

ता एव सबीजस्समाधिः ॥ ४६ ॥

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* सविचारनिर्विचारयोस्समापत्त्योर्यत्सूक्ष्मविषयत्वमुक्तं तदलिङ्गपर्यवसानं। न क्वचिल्लीयते न वा किञ्चिल्लिङ्गति गमयतीत्यलिङ्गं प्रधानं। तत्पर्यन्तं सूक्ष्मविषयत्वमिति।

† तथाहि। गुणानां परिणामे चत्वारि पर्वाणि विशिष्टलिङ्गमविशिष्टलिङ्गं लिङ्गमात्रमलिङ्गञ्चेति। विशिष्टलिङ्गं भूतानि। अविशिष्टलिङ्गं तन्मात्रेन्द्रियाणि। लिङ्गमात्रं बुद्धिः। अलिङ्गं प्रधानमिति नातः परं सूक्ष्ममस्तीत्युक्तं भवति।

‡ एतासां समापत्तीनां प्रकृते प्रयोजनमाह॥

What the aforesaid mental affections constitute.

Aph. 46.—**These themselves constitute 'Meditation with its *seed*' [§17. *b*].**

a. 'These themselves,' i. e. the mental affections above described. Meditation 'in which there is distinct recognition' [§17. *b.*] is called [meditation] 'with its seed'—i. e. that which is with a seed or with something to rest upon—because all these [varieties of mental affection which we have been treating of] have something to rest upon* [—which—see §17. *i.*—must eventually be deserted].

b. Now he states the fruit of the 'non-deliberative' [mental affection], seeing that, of the other mental affections, this 'non-deliberative' one [§44] is the fruit.†

निर्विचारवैशारद्येऽध्यात्मप्रसादः ॥ ४७ ॥

The fruit of this.

Aph. 47.—**When wisdom has come, through the 'non-deliberative' [mental affection], there is spiritual clearness.**

a. What we mean by 'non-deliberative' has been already explained‡ [—§44].

b. 'Wisdom' here stands for 'purity'.§

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* ता एवोक्तलक्षणाः समापत्तयः । सह बीजेन आलम्बनेन वर्तत इति सबीजः सम्प्रज्ञातः समाधिरुच्यते सर्वासां सालम्बनत्वात् ॥

† अथेतरासां समापत्तीनां निर्विचारफलत्वान्निर्विचारायाः फलमाह ॥

‡ व्याख्यातं निर्विचारत्वम् ॥

§ वैशारद्यं नैर्मल्यम् ॥

c. In comparison with the 'argumentative' [mental affection], when the object is a gross one, the 'non-argumentative' is the superior. In respect of that too the 'deliberative,' whose object is a subtile one, [is the superior]. In respect of this again the 'non-deliberative' [where the object is subtile, is the superior]. And when, in virtue of pre-eminent practice of this, there has arisen wisdom, or purity, then there is spiritual clearness. By 'spiritual' we mean what resides in the soul, or in the understanding. Such clearness [viz. spiritual clearness] arises [from the 'non-deliberative' mental affection with a subtile object]. And it is just this spiritual clearness which we mean by the firm steadfastness* [attained on the removal of distractions—§32].

d. [Well],—this having been attained, what next? To this he replies.†

ऋतम्भरा तत्र प्रज्ञा ॥ ४८ ॥

From spiritual clearness comes right knowledge.

Aph. 48.—In that case there is knowledge which holds to the truth.

a. By 'knowledge which holds to the true' we mean that

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* सवितर्कां स्थूलविषयामपेक्ष्य निर्वितर्कायाः प्राधान्यं । ततोऽपि सूक्ष्मविषयायाः सविचारायाः । ततोऽपि निर्विचारायाः । तस्यास्तु प्रकृष्टाभ्यासवशाद्वैशारद्ये नैर्मल्ये सति अध्यात्मप्रसादः । आत्मनि बुद्धौ वर्त्तत इत्यध्यात्मं । तादृशः प्रसादस्समुपजायते । एतदेव चित्तस्य वैशारद्यं यत् स्थितेा दार्ढ्यमिति ॥

† तस्मिन् सति किम्भवतीत्याह ॥

knowledge which is never overshadowed by error,—which holds to the truth—i. e. to the real.*

b. 'In that case'—i. e. when *spiritual clearness* has been attained, this [true knowledge] takes place.†

c. And, through this rightly intelligent view, regarding everything as it really is, the *Yogí* attains to pre-eminent Concentration‡ [§2].

d. He now states the distinction of this from other [forms of] correct knowledge.§

श्रौतानुमानप्रज्ञाभ्यां सामान्यविषयाविशेषार्थत्वात्॥ ४९॥

This knowledge differs from ordinary knowledge.

Aph. 49.—[This kind of knowledge differs] from the knowledge due to testimony and inference because the object of these two is not particulars but generals.

a. By 'testimony' we mean scriptural information. By 'inference' we mean what has been already defined [at §7 *a*]. The knowledge which arises from these two [sources of knowledge] has generals [and not individuals] as its object; for, neither testimony nor a [logical] sign [τεκμηρίον] is able, like a sense-organ, to convey a knowledge of particularities|| [meaning thereby the ultimate and no further explicable distinctions that exist between individuals generically similar and numerically different].

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* ऋतं सत्यं बिभर्त्ति कदाचिदपि न विपर्ययेणाच्छाद्यते सा ऋतम्भरा प्रज्ञा॥

† तत्र। अध्यात्मप्रसादे सति भवतीत्यर्थः।

‡ तस्माच्च प्रज्ञालोकात्सर्वं यथावत्पश्यन् योगी प्रकृष्टं योगं प्राप्नोति॥

§ अस्याः प्रज्ञान्तराद्वैलक्षण्यमाह॥

|| श्रौतमागमज्ञानम्। अनुमानमुक्तलक्षणं। ताभ्यां या

b. On the other hand this meditative knowledge—that associated with the clearness which comes through the 'non-deliberative' [mental affection—§47]—differs from these two kinds of knowledge [§49 *a*], in its having individualities as its objects;—that is to say, [it differs from them] because its object is the individual 'subtile element' or the individual Soul itself.* [And so this knowledge, since its object is the particular, has an object other than that which belongs to testimony or inference].

c. Moreover, when this has been attained, one can discern with one's ordinary organs [even] minute things, hidden or very far off.†

d. The states the [especial] fruit of this correct knowledge.‡

तज्जस्संस्कारोऽन्यसंस्कारप्रतिबन्धी ॥ ५० ॥

One train of thought with one object, is to put an end to all other trains.

Aph. 50.—The train [of self-reproductive thought] resulting from this puts a stop to other trains.

a. The [self-reproductive] continuous flow [of thought—§18] produced by this [meditative] knowledge [§49] prevents other

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जायते प्रज्ञा सा सामान्यविषया। नहि शब्दलिङ्गयोरिन्द्रियवद्विशेषप्रतिपत्तौ सामर्थ्यं ॥

* इयं पुनर्निर्विचारवैशारद्यसमुपेता समाधिप्रज्ञा ताभ्यां प्रज्ञाभ्यां विलक्षणा विशेषविषयत्वात्। विशेषः भूतसूक्ष्मगतः पुरुषगतो वा विषयो यस्य तत्त्वादित्यर्थः ॥

† किञ्चास्यां सूक्ष्मव्यवहितविप्रकृष्टस्य वस्तुनो लोकप्रत्यक्षेण ग्रहणमस्तीति ॥

‡ अस्याः प्रज्ञायाः फलमाह ॥

trains, whether they arise during relaxation or concentration;—is to say, it makes them incapable of producing their effects. It is for this reason that it is directed that one should addict himself to this kind of knowledge alone.*

b. Having thus described Meditation where there is distinct recognition [of an object §17], in order to declare that in which the distinct recognition is dropped [§17. *j*.], he says:—†

तस्यापि निरोधे सर्वनिरोधान्निर्बीजस्समाधिः ॥ ५१ ॥

Finally this last train of thought is to drop its object.

Aph. 51.—On the removal of this also, since there is removal of all [the mental modifications], the Meditation is 'without a seed.'

a. On the removal, i. e. on the dissolution, of this also,—i. e. of the meditation where there is distinct recognition of an object [§17],—when all the modifications of the mind [§5] have been resolved into their causes [or sources—as a jar, when broken, is resolved into the earth which it was made of—], so that there arises merely a continuous train [of thought self-reproductive], thereupon, as there is nothing but the negation 'This is not'—'This is not,'—meditation appears with relinquishment of the seed [§17. *b*];—on which taking place, the Soul is said to abide in its own nature pure—alone—emancipated.‡

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* तया प्रज्ञया जनितो यस्संस्कारस्सो ऽन्यान्व्युत्थानजान् समाधिजांश्च संस्कारान्प्रतिबध्नाति स्वकार्यकरणाक्षमान्करोतीत्यर्थः। अतस्तामेव प्रज्ञामभ्यसेदित्युक्तं भवति ॥

† एवं सम्प्रज्ञातसमाधिमभिधायासम्प्रज्ञातं वक्तुमाह ॥

‡ तस्यापि सम्प्रज्ञातस्यापि निरोधे प्रविलये सति सर्वासां चित्तवृत्तीनां स्वकारणे प्रविलयाद्या या संस्कारमात्रवृत्ति-

Recapitulation.

b. Well then [—to recapitulate briefly—], having set forth the definition [§2] of 'Concentration' which is the subject of the work [§1], the explanation of the terms 'Modification of the mind' [§5] and the 'Prevention' thereof [§12], the definition of 'Exercise' [§13] and 'Dispassion' [§15], and having thus stated the nature of and the difference between these two expedients; then having stated the division of Concentration, into principal and secondary, by distinguishing it as 'Meditation in which there is distinct recognition' [§17] and that 'in which distinct recognition is lost [§18]; then having exhibited diffusively [§20—22] the expedients [for attaining to concentration], after premising an exposure of the 'Spurious semblance of concentration,' [§19]; then, with a view to exhibiting an *easy* method, having determined the nature of the Lord [§23—24], the proof of His existence [§25], His pre-eminence [§ 26], His name [§27], the order of His worship [§28] and the fruits thereof [§29]; then having described the distractions of the mind [§30] and their supervenients, grief &c. [§31], and diffusively, the means of combating these—viz. the dwelling upon some one truth [§ 32], the practice of benevolence &c. [§ 33], the regulation of the breath [§34], and other such means—viz. 'sensuous immediate cognitions &c.' [§35—39]—as are conducive to Meditation with or without distinct recognition of an object; having declared the mental affections [§ 41], with an eye to the winding up, with their definitions [§42—44], their fruits [§ 46—48], and their object [§49]; then by finally summing up, in regard to the Meditation with distinct recognition and that without distinct recognition of an object,—in words to the effect that Meditation without a seed is preceded by that which has a

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रुद्धेति तस्यां नेति नेति केवलं पर्युदसनान्निर्बीजस्समाधिराविर्भवति यस्मिन् सति पुरुषः स्वरूपनिष्ठश्शुद्धः केवलो मुक्त इत्युच्यत इति ॥

seed §51, the chapter on Concentration has been expounded* [by Pantanjali.]

c. Thus is completed the First Book—that on Meditation—of the commentary, composed by the illustrious great king and governor King Bhojarájá, on the Aphorisms of Patanjali's System of the Yoga.†

Remarks. *d.* The commentator, it will be observed [—see Introduction, *b.*—], justifies Patanjali's undertaking to expound the *Yoga*, by citing a passage from the Veda [—the Náchiketa

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* तदत्राधिकृतस्य योगस्य लक्षणं चित्तवृत्तिनिरोधपदानां व्याख्यानं अभ्यासवैराग्यलक्षणं तस्योपायद्वयस्य स्वरूपं भेदञ्चाभिधाय सम्प्रज्ञातासम्प्रज्ञातभेदेन योगस्य मुख्यामुख्यभेदमुक्त्वा योगाभासप्रदर्शनपूर्वकान् विस्तरेणोपायान् प्रदर्श्य सुगमोपायप्रदर्शनपरतयेश्वरस्य स्वरूपप्रमाणप्रभाववाचकोपासनाक्रमतत्फलानि निर्णीय चित्तस्य विक्षेपान् तत्सहभुवश्च दुःखादीन् विस्तरेण च तत्प्रतिषेधोपायानेकतत्त्वाभ्यासमैत्र्यादीन् प्राणायामादीन् सम्प्रज्ञातासम्प्रज्ञातपूर्वरङ्गभूतविषयवतीप्रवृत्तिरित्यादीनाख्यायोपसंहारद्वारेण समापत्तीस्वलक्षणाः सफलाः स्वस्वविषयसहितास्चोक्त्वा सम्प्रज्ञातासम्प्रज्ञातयोरुपसंहारमभिधाय सबीजपूर्वको निर्बीजस्समाधिरिति व्याख्यातो योगपादः ॥

† इति श्रीमहाराजाधिराजश्रीभोजराजदेवविरचितायां पातञ्जलयोगशास्त्रसूत्रवृत्तौ प्रथमः समाधिपादः समाप्तः ॥

Upanishad—] recommendatory of the *Yoga*. The *Yoga*, therefore, under that name, was recognised antecedently to Patanjali, and is not to be regarded as an invention of his.

e. The term *Yoga*, we are told [§2], implies the hindering of the modifications of the thinking principle. All the six Hindú systems, five of which we have already partially examined, agree in regarding the distinction between Subject and Object as the most momentous of facts, and the emancipation of the former from all entanglement with the latter as the one desirable end. In their treatment of the Objective the systems differ, at least in appearance, more widely than in their treatment of the Subjective. The Vedánta denies reality—or most grudgingly allows any thing of reality—to the Objective. The Nyáya accords to it a reality co-ordinate with that of the Subject, giving impartially the name of Substance to both. The Sánkhya steers a middle course between these two. It treats the Objective as an aggregate of *qualities*, which exist as *such* but not as substances. In this respect, the Sánkhya comes even nearer than the Vedánta to Bishop Berkeley. The Yoga, as far as we have seen, concurs with the Sánkhya on this point. While the systems thus differ in regard to the objective or Material, they all agree, on the other hand, in regarding the Subject *(átman)*—call it Soul, or Spirit,—as a self-dependant reality. The only dispute here is, whether Soul, or Spirit, is one or manifold. The Vedánta holds that it is one; the other systems, so far as we have yet seen, that it is manifold. It is to be observed that nowhere in any of the systems does the notion of a *created* spirit present itself. The Vedánta, availing itself of a sufficiently loose analogy, speaks of one Soul pervading all bodies as one thread might pervade a necklace of golden, silver, and earthen, beads; while the Sánkhya urges the objection that if Soul were but one, then all would be happy when one is happy, all would die, when one died, and so on, which is contrary to experience, [Sánkhya Lecture §48 and 45]. But, whether Soul be one or manifold, every one of the systems holds it to be self-dependant. Soul is the

substance—beneath which there stands nothing;—and the pity, in the estimation of Hindú philosophy, is, that anything should stand *above* it,—any more than beneath it. It ought to stand alone—apart from everything phenomenal.

f. In order to repel the transient or phenomenal, according to the *Yoga* [§ 12] we must have recourse to exercise and dispassion, or asceticism and mortification.

g. By means of ascetic exercises and the mortification of all desires, the mind is supposed to attain to a state of undisturbed Meditation [§ 17], where some one single object is pondered, to the exclusion of all others. But as the practised swimmer parts with his last cork or bladder, so the soul of the ascetic must in due course part with every object, and at length meditate without any object at all [§ 18]. To effect this being a matter of difficulty, devotion to *the Lord* [§ 23] is recommended as a comparatively easy method. In admitting the existence of a Divine Being (*íśwara*) in whom the good qualities belonging to man reach their limit, the Yoga, hence named the *seśwara sánkhya*, differs from the Sánkhya of Kapila, which is known as the *niríśwara*.

h. As the ascetic is exposed to obstacles, these are discussed by Patanjalí [§ 30—31], and means for combating them are indicated [§32—39].

i. When all obstacles have been thus removed, the mind is supposed to be as free from all contamination of the phenomenal as the pure crystal is free from the red colour which *seems* to belong to it while a rose is seen athwart it.

END OF BOOK I.

THE APHORISMS

OF THE

YOGA PHILOSOPHY,

OF

PATANJALI

WITH

ILLUSTRATIVE EXTRACTS FROM THE COMMENTARY

BY

BHOJA RÁJÁ.

BOOK II.

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THE

YOGA APHORISMS

OF

PATANJALI.

BOOK II.

a. May that three-eyed Lord of the World, by whom were shown the several means for securing the difficultly attainable riches of Concentration *(yoga)*, be [adjuvant] for the attainment of what is desired !*

b. Thus then having declared, in the First Book, the Concentration, along with its means, of him whose mind is abstracted [from all objects];—how, preceded by the practice of means, does the concentration of him whose mind is *not* abstracted, advance to accomplishment? [Since this question presents itself—]

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* ते ते दुष्प्रापयोगर्द्धिसिद्धये येन दर्शिता उपायाश्च जगन्नाथस्त्र्यक्षो ऽस्तु प्रार्थिताप्तये ॥

in order to set forth the practice of what is instrumental thereto, he declares the practical [part of] Concentration.*

तपःस्वाध्यायेश्वरप्रणिधानानि क्रियायोगः ॥ १ ॥

Practices conducive to Concentration.

Aph. 1.—The practical [part of] Concentration is mortification *(tapas)*, muttering *(swádhyáya)*, and resignation *(praṇidhána)* to the Lord.

a. The penances and fastings enjoined in another Institute [—viz. the *Dharma-śástra*—], are what are meant by 'mortification.' 'Muttering' is the muttered repetition of formulæ preceded by the mystic name of the deity [B. I. §27]. 'Resignation to the Lord' is the consigning to Him, the Supremely Venerable, without regard to fruit, all one's works. These are what are called the practical [part of] Concentration *(kriyá-yoga)*.†

b. For what purpose is this?—He replies.‡—

समाधिभावनार्थः क्लेशतनूकरणार्थश्च ॥ २ ॥

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* तदेवं प्रथमे पादे समाहितचित्तस्य सोपायं योगमभिधाय व्युत्थितचित्तस्य कथमुपायाभ्यासपूर्वको योगस्सात्म्यतामुपयातीति तत्साधनानुष्ठानप्रतिपादनाय क्रियायोगमाह ॥

† तपः शास्त्रान्तरोपदिष्टं कृच्छ्रचान्द्रायणादि । स्वाध्यायः प्रणवपूर्वाणां मन्त्राणां जपः । ईश्वरप्रणिधानं सर्वक्रियाणां तस्मिन् परमगुरौ फलनिरपेक्षतया समर्पणम् । एतानि क्रियायोग इत्युच्यन्ते ॥

‡ स किमर्थ इत्यत आह ॥

The purpose of such practices.

Aph. 2.—It is for the purpose of establishing meditation, and for the purpose of extenuating afflictions.

a. The 'afflictions' *(kleśa)* will be mentioned [under §3]. The 'extenuating' of them, is the opposing their producing their effects. 'Meditation' is what has been already defined [B. I. §20, *f*]. The 'establishing' of it, is the repeatedly taking into one's thoughts [the thing to be meditated upon]. That the purpose, or motive, of which is this, is what is so called [—i. e. is what is spoken of in the aphorism].*

b. That is to say,—these, viz., penance, &c., being practised, rendering inert the 'Ignorance' and the other afflictions [§8] that assail the mind, sustain the part of subservients to Meditation. Therefore it is to the practical [part of] Concentration that the *Yogi* should first direct his attention.†

c. 'For the purpose of extenuating affiiction,'—this has been stated [in §2];—what are here meant by afflictions? He replies.‡

अविद्यास्मितारागद्वेषाभिनिवेशाः क्लेशाः ॥ ३ ॥

* क्लेशा वक्ष्यमाणास्तेषां तनूकरणं स्वकार्यकरणप्रतिबन्धः । समाधिरुक्तलक्षणः । तस्य भावना पुनः पुनश्चेतसि निवेशनं । सोऽर्थः प्रयोजनं यस्य तथोक्तः ॥

† एतदुक्तम्भवति । एते तपः प्रभृतयोऽभ्यस्यमानाश्चित्तगतानविद्यादीन् क्लेशान् शिथिलीकुर्वन्तः समाधेरुपकारतां भजन्ते। तस्मात् प्रथमतः क्रियायोगावधारणपरेण योगिना भवितव्यमिति ॥

‡ क्लेशतनूकरणार्थं इत्युक्तं। तेऽत्र के क्लेशा इत्याह ॥

Afflictions to be alleviated by such practices.

Aph. 3.—The afflictions are Ignorance, Egotism, Desire, Aversion, and Tenacity [of mundane existence].

a. And the 'afflictions,'—Ignorance and the rest,—the definitions of which will be stated [in the sequel], are five; and these, giving rise to distress, the characteristic of which is its being obstructive [to what we miserable mortals wish], are called 'afflictions,' because they, operating in the mind, consolidate that modification of the [three] Qualities which is recognised as mundane existence* [—the state of existence which it is the aim of the Yogí to eschew].

b. Although these are all equal in respect of being afflictions, yet, in order to declare that 'Ignorance' *(avidyá)*, from its being the root, is the principal one, he says.†

अविद्या क्षेत्रमुत्तरेषां प्रसुप्ततनुविच्छिन्नोदाराणाम् ॥ ४ ॥

The source of the afflictions.

Aph. 4.—Ignorance is the field of the others, whether they be dormant, extenuated, intercepted, or simple.

a. 'Ignorance' means delusion; the notion, in short, that what is *not* Soul *is* Soul. This is the 'field,'—the place of origin,

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* क्लेशाश्चाविद्यादयो वक्ष्यमाणलक्षणाः पञ्च । ते च बाधनालक्षणं परितापमुपजनयन्तः क्लेशशब्दवाच्या भवन्ति । ते हि चेतसि प्रवर्त्तमानाः संसारलक्षणं गुणपरिणामं द्रढयन्ति ॥

† सत्यपि सर्वेषां तुल्ये क्लेशत्वे मूलभूतत्वादविद्यायाः प्राधान्यं प्रतिपादयितुमाह ॥

of the others, viz., 'Egotism,' &c., which are severally fourfold through the division into 'dormant,' &c. Therefore where Ignorance, in the shape of a mistaken notion [that what is not soul is soul], becomes inoperative, there the springing up of the 'afflictions' is not seen; but, since, where this mistaken notion really exists, they *are* seen to spring up, it is quite settled that it is Ignorance that is the source.*

b. 'The dormant, extenuated, intercepted, and simple:'—among these, those 'afflictions' are called 'dormant,' which, deposited in the site of the mind, do not give rise to their effects for want of something to wake them up;—as in the state of childhood;—for the child's 'afflictions,' though present in the shape of mental deposits, are not developed for want of something to assist in awakening them.†

c. Those ['afflictions'] are the 'extenuated,' which, through one's meditating something that is opposed to each severally, their power of producing their effect having been rendered inert, abiding in the mind as a species of mental deposit, are incapable

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* अविद्या मोहः। अनात्मन्यात्माभिमान इति यावत्। सा चेवं प्रसवभूमिरुत्तरेषामस्मितादीनां प्रत्येकं प्रसुप्तादिभेदेन चतुर्विधानां। अतो यत्राविद्या विपर्ययज्ञानरूपा शिथिलीभवति तत्र क्लेशानां नोद्भवो दृश्यते विपर्ययज्ञानसद्भावे च तेषामुद्भवदर्शनात् स्थितमेव मूलत्वमविद्यायाः॥

† प्रसुप्ततनुविच्छिन्नोदाराणामिति। तत्र ये क्लेशाश्चित्तभूमौ स्थिताः प्रबोधकाभावे स्वकार्यं नारभन्ते ते प्रसुप्ता इत्युच्यन्ते। यथा बाल्यावस्थायां। बालस्य हि वासनारूपेण स्थिता अपि क्लेशाः प्रबोधकसहकार्यभावेन न व्यज्यन्ते॥

of giving rise to their effects without an ample apparatus [of auxiliaries];—for example [such are the 'afflictions'] of the ascetic *Yogí*.*

d. Those ['afflictions'] are the 'intercepted,' which abide with their power overpowered by some strong 'affliction,'—as desire [is overpowered and 'intercepted'] when there is the condition of aversion, or aversion when there is the condition of [an overpowering] desire;—for those two, mutually opposite, cannot simultaneously co-exist.†

e. Those ['afflictions'] are the 'simple,' which operate their several effects when the things with which they co-operate are beside them;—[such are,] for example, the things adverse to Concentration at all times during the state of non-abstraction.‡

f. 'Ignorance,' though standing moreover as the *root* of these four kinds [of 'afflictions'] severally, is recognised as [also] *at-*

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* ते तनवो ये स्वस्वप्रतिपक्षभावनया शिथिलीकृतकार्यसम्पादनशक्तयो वासनाविशेषतया चेतस्यवस्थिताः प्रभूतां सामग्रीमन्तरेण न स्वकार्यमारब्धुं क्षमाः। यथा अभ्यासवतो योगिनः॥

† ते विच्छिन्ना ये केनचिद्बलवता क्लेशेनाभिभूतशक्तयस्तिष्ठन्ति। यथा द्वेषावस्थायां रागो रागावस्थायां वा द्वेषः। न ह्यनयोः परस्परविरुद्धयोर्युगपत् सम्भवोऽस्ति॥

‡ ते उदारा ये प्राप्तसहकारिसन्निधयः स्वं स्वं कार्यमभिनिर्वर्त्तयन्ति। यथा सर्वदैव योगपरिपन्थिनो व्युत्थानदशायाम्॥

tending them; for nowhere is there found the nature of 'afflictions' having the character of being irrespective of the attendance of error; and when that, being a falsity, is removed by right knowledge, these ['afflictions'], like burnt seeds, never spring up again; hence it is ascertained that Ignorance is their cause and Ignorance is their attendant. Therefore they all partake of the name of Ignorance; and, since all the 'afflictions' cause distraction of mind, the *Yogí* must cut these off at the very outset.*

g. He defines 'Ignorance.'†

अनित्याशुचिदुःखानात्मसु नित्यशुचिसुखात्मख्यातिरविद्या ॥ ५ ॥

'Ignorance' defined.

Aph. 5.—Ignorance *(avidyá)* is the notion that the uneternal, the impure, evil, and what is not soul, are [severally] eternal, pure, joy, and soul.

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* एषां प्रत्येकं चतुर्विधानामपि मूलभूतत्वेन स्थिताप्यविद्या अन्वयित्वेन प्रतीयते। नहि क्वचिदपि क्लेशानां विपर्य्ययान्वयनिरपेक्षरूपाणां स्वरूपमुपलभ्यते। तस्याञ्च मिथ्याभूतायां सम्यक् ज्ञानेन निवर्त्तितायां दग्धबीजकल्पानामेषां न क्वचित्प्ररोहो ऽस्तीति अविद्यानिमित्तत्वमविद्यान्वयश्चैषां निश्चीयते। अतः सर्वे ऽप्यविद्याव्यपदेशभाजः सर्वेषाञ्च क्लेशानां चित्तविक्षेपकारित्वाद् योगिना प्रथममेव तदुच्छेदः कर्त्तव्य इति ॥

† अविद्याया लक्षणमाह ॥

a. The definition of ignorance in general, is this,—that, ignorance is the notion that what is *not* this *is* this. The declaration of the varieties of that same [is made in the aphorism]. The notion that there is eternalness in things uneternal, such as water-jars, is called 'Ignorance.' So too the notion that things impure, such as the body, are pure; and the notion that objects which are evils are joy; and the notion that the body, which is not the soul, is the soul, [—as when a bumpkin fancies that his eye *sees*, or a phrenologist that his brain *thinks*—]. This explains the mistake of vice for virtue, and of the useless for the useful.*

b. In order to define 'Egotism', he says.†

दृग्दर्शनशक्त्योरेकात्मतवास्मिता ॥ ६ ॥

'Egotism' defined.

Aph. 6.—Egotism (*asmitá*) is the identifying of the power that sees with the power of seeing.

a. The 'power that sees' is Soul. The 'power of seeing' is a modification of the Quality of 'Purity' [—see Sánkhya Aphorisms, B. I. §62,] unobstructed by 'Passion' and 'Darkness', in the shape of the internal organ [or Mind]. What is called

* अतस्मिन् तत्प्रतिभासो ऽविद्येत्यविद्यायाः सामान्यलक्षणं। तस्या एव भेदप्रतिपादनं। अनित्येषु घटादिषु नित्यत्वाभिमानो ऽविद्येत्युच्यते। एवमशुचिषु कायादिषु शुचित्वाभिमानो दुःखेषु च विषयेषु सुखत्वाभिमानो ऽनात्मनि शरीरे आत्मत्वाभिमानः। एतेन अपुण्ये पुण्यभ्रमो ऽनर्थेचार्थभ्रमो व्याख्यातः ॥

† अस्मितां लक्षयितुमाह ॥

'Egotism' is the notion that these two things, entirely different as being the experienced and the experiencer—the unintelligent and the *not* unintelligent,—are one and the same. For example,—Nature, though really neither agent nor experiencer, fancies "*I* am agent,—*I* am experiencer":—this blunder is the 'affliction' called 'Egotism.'*

b. He states the definition of 'Desire' *(rága)*.†

सुखानुशयी रागः॥ ७॥

Desire defined.

Aph. 7.—Desire is what dwells on pleasure.

a. 'Dwells on pleasure'—i. e. reposes on [—or is the affection of the mind when the thought rests on—] joy. This 'affliction', named 'Desire,' is a longing, in the shape of a thirst, for the means of enjoyment, preceded by [—or, in other words, consequent on] the remembrance of enjoyment, on the part of him who has known joy.‡

b. He states the definition of 'Aversion' *(dwesha)*.§

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* दृक्शक्तिः पुरुषः। दर्शनशक्ती रजस्तमोभ्यामनभिभूतः सात्त्विकः परिणामोऽन्तःकरणरूपः। तयोर्भोग्यभोक्तृत्वेन जडाजडत्वेनचात्यन्तं भिन्नयोरेकताभिमानोऽस्मितेत्युच्यते। यथा। प्रकृतिर्वस्तुतः कर्तृत्वभोक्तृत्वरहितापि कर्त्र्यहं भोक्त्र्यहमित्यभिमन्यते सोऽयमस्मिताख्यो विपर्यासः क्लेशः॥

† रागस्य लक्षणमाह॥

‡ सुखमनुशेते इति सुखानुशयी। सुखज्ञस्य सुखानुस्मृतिपूर्वकः सुखसाधनेषु तृष्णारूपो गर्द्धो रागसंज्ञः क्लेशः॥

§ द्वेषस्य लक्षणमाह॥

दुःखानुशयी द्वेषः ॥ ८ ॥

Aversion defined.

Aph. 8.—Aversion is what dwells on pain.

a. 'Pain' is what has been already defined [—B. I. §31. *b*]. Of him who has known it, disliking what things occasion it, in consequence of his remembrance of it, the feeling of disapproval is the 'affliction' called 'aversion'.*

b. He states what is 'tenacity of life'† *(abhiniveśa)*.

स्वरसवाही विदुषो ऽपि तन्वनुबन्धो ऽभिनि-
वेशः ॥ ९ ॥

The clinging to mundane existence.

Aph. 9.—Continuant through its self-reproductive property, even on the part of the wise, attachment to the body is 'Tenacity of life.'

a. Continuant 'through its self-reproductive property;'—that is to say, it flows on by reason of its own nature, just by reason of its being self-continuant. The 'affliction' called 'tenacity of life' is what prevails in the case of every one, from the worm up to Brahmá, without any concomitant cause [in addition to its own self-continuant property], in the shape of the constant clinging [which expresses itself in such terms as], "May I not be separated from the body and things sensible, &c.,"—this springing up in the shape of dread, through the force of the im-

* दुःखमुक्तलक्षणं । तदभिज्ञस्य तदनुस्मृतिपूर्वकं तत्सा-धनेषु अनभिलषतो यो ऽयं निन्दात्मकः स द्वेषलक्षणः क्लेशः ॥

† अभिनिवेशमाह ॥

pression from the experience of the pain of a death that took place in a previous life.*

b. Since thus, then, non-abstraction is made up of the 'afflictions,' the 'afflictions' are at the outset to be removed by the practice of intentness on a single point;—such is the import.†

c. And not without their being known can these be removed; therefore having, with a view to the knowledge of them, declared their name, source, division, and characteristic, he now states the division of the methods for the removal of these bipartitely gross and subtile‡.

ते प्रतिप्रसवहेयाः सूक्ष्माः ॥ १० ॥

The Subtile 'afflictions' how to be evaded.

Aph. 10.—These, when subtile, are to be evaded by an antagonistic production.

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* स्वस्य रसेन संस्कारेणैव वहतीति स्वरसवाही । पूर्वजन्मजातमरणदुःखानुभववासनाबलात् भयरूपः समुपजायमानः शरीरविषयादिभिर्मम वियोगो मा भूदित्यन्वहमनवच्छिन्नरूपः सर्वस्यैवाक्रमिब्रह्मपर्यन्तं निमित्तं विना प्रवर्त्तमानो ऽभिनिवेशाख्यः क्लेशः ॥

† तदेवं व्युत्थानस्य क्लेशात्मकत्वाद् एकाग्रताभ्यासेन प्रथमं क्लेशाः परिहर्त्तव्या इत्याशयः ॥

‡ नचाज्ञातानां तेषां परिहारः शक्यः कर्त्तुमिति तज्ज्ञानाय तेषामुद्देशं क्षेत्रं विभागं लक्षणमभिधाय स्थूलसूक्ष्मभेदभिन्नानां तेषां प्रहाणोपायविभागमाह ॥

a. These subtile 'afflictions,' which, abiding in the form of mental deposits, do not occasion any change, in the shape of a 'modification' [—see B. 1. §5,—stored in the mind, like Locke's 'ideas' while not objects of attention—], these are 'to be evaded,' to be avoided, 'by an antagonistic production,' by an alteration adverse to them. When the understanding, with its deposits, having done its work, lapses into its cause, viz., egotism, then how should these ['afflictions'], being deprived of their root, possibly continue?*

b. He now mentions the method for the removal of the 'gross' ones.†

ध्यानहेयास्तद्वृत्तयः ॥ ११ ॥

The gross 'afflictions' how to be got rid of.

Aph. 11.—Their 'modifications' [—when the 'afflictions' modify the mind by pressing themselves upon the attention—] are to be got rid of by meditation.

a. The 'modifications,' in the shape of pleasure, pain, or indifference, which consist of these 'afflictions' that have set in operation their effects,—*these* are 'to be got rid of,' to be quitted, by means of meditation, i. e., by intentness of the mind on a single point;—such is the meaning.‡

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* ते सूक्ष्माः क्लेशा ये वासनारूपेणावस्थिता न वृत्तिरूपं परिणाममारभन्ते ते प्रतिप्रसवेन प्रतिलोमपरिणामेन हेयास्त्यक्तव्याः । स्वकारणास्मितायां कृतार्थं सवासनं चित्तं यदा प्रविष्टं भवति तदा कुतस्तेषां निर्मूलकानां सम्भवः ॥

† स्थूलानां हानोपायमाह ॥

‡ तेषां क्लेशानामारब्धकार्याणां याः सुखदुःखमोहा-

b. These 'from their being gross, can be removed by the mere practice of what purifies the mind [—see B. I. §33, *c*—], as the coarse gross dirt on clothes and the like is removed by mere washing; but that subtile [impurity] which is in them can be removed only by such [more recondite] expedients as bleaching, &c.*

c. Having thus mentioned what the 'afflictions' are he remarks as follows, with the view of mentioning the stock of works† [that stands at each man's credit or discredit].

क्लेशमूलः कर्माशयो दृष्टादृष्टजन्मवेदनीयः ॥ १२ ॥

One's merits and demerits.

Aph. 12.—The stock of works, whose root is the 'afflictions,' is what is to be had fruition of in this visible state, or in that unseen.

a. By 'the stock of works' the nature of this [that he is speaking of] is set forth, for works exist only in the shape of mental deposits.‡

त्मिका वृत्तयः ता ध्यानेन चित्तैकाग्रतालक्षणेन हेया हातव्या इत्यर्थः ॥

* चित्तपरिकर्माभ्यासमात्रेणैव स्थूलत्वात्तासां निवृत्तिर्भवति यथा वस्त्रादौ घनः स्थूलो मलः प्रक्षालनमात्रेणैव निवर्त्तते यस्तु तत्र सूक्ष्मः स तैस्तैरुपायैरुत्तापनप्रभृतिभिरेव निवर्त्तयितुं शक्यते ॥

† एवं क्लेशानां तत्त्वमभिधाय कर्माशयस्याभिधातुमाह ॥

‡ कर्माशय इत्यनेन तस्य स्वरूपमभिहितं यतो वासनारूपाण्येव कर्माणि ॥

b. By 'whose root is the afflictions' the *cause* is set forth, since the 'afflictions' alone are the cause of acts.*

c. By 'what is to be had fruition of in this visible state, or in that unseen,' the fruit is declared. What is to be experienced in this present state, is 'what is to be had fruition of in this visible state.' What is to be experienced in another life, is 'what is to be had fruition of in that unseen.'†

d. Thus some meritorious acts, such as the worship of the gods, performed with excessive impetuosity [—see B. I. §21, *b*—], bestow, even in this life, fruit in the shape of rank, years, and enjoyment,—as distinguished rank [—that of a demigod—], &c., accrued, even in this life, to Nandíśwara, through the force of his worship of the divine Maheśwara. So to others, as Viśwamitra [—who, according to the *Rámáyaṇa,* from being a *Kshattriya* was raised to the rank of a *Bráhmaṇ*—], through the efficacy of penance, rank and long life [have accrued]. To others [has accrued change of] rank only,—as the change to another rank, &c., of those doing wicked acts with hot impetuosity, such as Nahusha [who was changed to a snake], and Urvaśí [—the nymph who was punished] by her metamorphosis into a creeper in the grove of Kártikeya. In this way is the rule to be applied, according to circumstances, distributively or collectively,‡

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* क्लेशमूल इत्यनेन कारणमभिहितं यतः कर्मणां क्लेशा एव निमित्तम् ॥

† दृष्टादृष्टवेदनीय इत्यनेन फलमुक्तम् । अस्मिन्नेव जन्मनि अनुभवनीयो दृष्टजन्मवेदनीयः । जन्मान्तरानुभवनीयो ऽदृष्टवेदनीयः ॥

‡ तथाहि कानिचित्पुण्यानि कर्माणि देवताराधनादीनि तीव्रसंवेगेन कृतानीहैव जन्मनि फलं जात्यायुर्भोग-

[—each well-deserving or ill-deserving person being understood to receive rank, or years, or enjoyment, one or more of them, or all of them, or none of them,—and so on through the string of permutations and combinations possible].

e. Now he mentions the fruit of the stock of works divided according to its division* [into merit and demerit].

सति मूले तद्विपाको जात्यायुर्भोगाः ॥ १३ ॥

The fruit of works. *Aph.* 13—While there is the root, its fructification is rank, years, and enjoyment.

a. The 'afflictions' above-mentioned are the 'root;' whilst these remain unsubdued, of these acts, virtuous or vicious, 'rank, years, and enjoyment,' are the 'fructification,' i. e. the fruit. 'Rank' means the being a man [or a god, or a beast,] or the like. 'Years' mean abiding for a long time in the body. 'Enjoyments' mean sense-objects, the senses, and the aggregate of pleasures and pains, because the word *bhoga* [—here rendered 'enjoyment'—] is formed [from the root *bhuj*] so as to denote the object, the instrument, or the state† [of enjoyment].

लक्षणं प्रयच्छन्ति यथा नन्दीश्वरस्य भगवन्महेश्वराराधनबलादिहैव जन्मनि जात्यादयो विशिष्टाः प्रादुर्भूताः । एवमन्यषां विश्वामित्रादीनां तपःप्रभावाज्जात्यायुषी । केषाञ्चिज्जातिरेव । यथा तीव्रसंवेगेन दुष्टकर्मकृतां नहुषादीनां जात्यन्तरादिपरिणाम उर्वश्याश्च कार्त्तिकेयवने लतारूपतया । एवं व्यस्तसमस्तरूपत्वेन यथायोगं योज्यम् ॥

* इदानीं कर्माशयस्य स्वभेदभिन्नं फलमाह ॥

† मूलमुक्तलक्षणाः क्लेशाः । तेष्वनभिभूतेषु सत्सु तेषां

b. The gist of this is this, that the mental deposits of works, collected, from time without beginning, in the ground of the mind, as they by degrees arrive at maturation, so do they, existing in lesser or greater measure [—the sum of the merit being lesser than that of the demerit, or conversely—], lead to their effects in the shape of rank [raised or lowered—], years, and enjoyment* [or experience of good or ill].

c. In respect of the 'rank,' &c., that have been declared to be the fruit of acts, he states, according to the works that are the cause of each, which is the efficient of which effect.†

ते ह्लादपरितापफलाः पुण्यापुण्यहेतुत्वात्॥ १४॥

What works have what fruits.

Aph. 14.—These have joy or suffering as their fruits, accordingly as the cause is virtue or vice.

a. 'Joy' means pleasure; 'suffering' means pain. Those the fruit of which are joy and suffering, are what are so named [—i.

कर्मणां कुशलाकुशलरूपाणां विपाकः फलं जात्यायुर्भोगा भवन्ति। जातिर्मनुष्यत्वादिः। आयुश्चिरकालं कायसम्बन्धः। भोगा विषया इन्द्रियाणि सुखदुःखसंविच्च कर्मकरणभावसाधनव्युत्पत्त्या भोगशब्दस्य॥

* इदमत्र तात्पर्यं चित्तभूमावनादिकालसञ्चिताः कर्मवासना यथा यथा पाकमुपयान्ति तथा तथा गुणप्रधानभावेन स्थिता जात्यायुर्भोगलक्षणं स्वकार्यमारभन्ते॥

† उक्तानां कर्मफलत्वेन जात्यादीनां स्वकारणकर्मानुसारेण कार्यकर्तृत्वमाह॥

e. are what are denoted in the aphorism by the compound term here analysed]. By 'virtue' (*punya*) is meant any good deed; by 'vice,' its opposite. Of what things these two, viz., virtue and vice, are the causes, the nature of these things [is what is meant by the compound term *punyápunyahetukatwa*; and it is] thereby* [—or accordingly as the cause is virtue or vice, that the effect is joy or suffering].

b. What is asserted is this, that the rank, years, and enjoyment, originating in good works, are pleasant fruits; and what originate in evil acts are painful fruits.†

c. This twofold character [of the fruit of works] is in respect of mortals simply; but to the Yogí *all* [mundane experience] is sorrow, as he proceeds to state.‡

परिणामतापसंस्कारदुःखैर्गुणवृत्तिविरोधाच्च दुःखमेव सर्वं विवेकिनः ॥ १५ ॥

Pleasure and pain alike vexations to the Yogí.

Aph. 15.—And, to the discriminating, *all* is grief simply, since the modifications due to the Qualities are adverse [to the summum bonum] through

* ह्लादः सुखं। परितापो दुःखं। ह्लादपरितापौ फलं येषां ते तथोक्ताः। पुण्यं कुशलं कर्म। तद्विपरीतमपुण्यं। ते पुण्यापुण्ये कारणे येषां तेषां भावस्तस्मात् ॥

† एतदुक्तम्भवति पुण्यकर्मारब्धजात्यायुर्भोगा ह्लादफलाः। अपुण्यारब्धाः परितापफलाः ॥

‡ एतच्च प्राणिमात्रापेक्षया द्वैविध्यं योगिनस्तु सर्वं दुःखमित्याह ॥

the vexations of the various forms [of Nature], and of anxiety and of impressions self-continuant.

a. That is to say,—[in the opinion] of him who understands discriminatively the 'affections,' &c., *every* instrument of experience [whether of pleasure or of pain] that comes under his view, is, like food with poison in it, a grief only,—something felt to be against the grain.*

b. Since the Yogí who has become a complete adept is distressed even by the slightest pain,—as the eye-ball, and no other member, experiences great pain from the mere touch of a thread of wool, so the discriminating [votary of Quietude] is averse to the adherence of even a very little pain;—*how* is it [that he shrinks from such pains]? To this he replies, 'through the vexations of the various forms, and of anxiety, and of impressions self-continuant.†

c. Since there is increase of desire in proportion as more objects are enjoyed, and since these [objects] are causes of other pains occasioned by their non-attainment, they are really nothing else than griefs [—according to the principle that the nature of the cause is not other than the nature of the product—]; thus

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* परिज्ञातक्लेशादिविवेकस्य परिदृश्यमानं सकलमेव भोगसाधनं सविषान्नवत् दुःखमेव प्रतिकूलवेदनीयमित्यर्थः ॥

† यस्मादत्यन्ताभिजातो योगी दुःखलेशेनाप्युद्विजते यथाक्षिपात्रमूर्णातन्तुस्पर्शमात्रेणैव महतीं पीडामनुभवति नेतरदङ्गं तथा विवेकी स्वल्पदुःखानुषङ्गेनापि विरज्यते। कथमित्याह परिणामतापसंस्कारदुःखैः ॥

is it that the various forms [of Nature presented to us in the shape of objects] are sorrow.*

d. While the means of enjoyment are being enjoyed, since there must ever exist an aversion towards what is hostile to that [enjoyment,—so that thus ever "surgit amari aliquid medio de fonte leporum"—], even at the time of experiencing pleasure, the pain of distress is hard to be got rid of,—such is what constitutes the pain [called] anxiety.†

e. As for the fact that 'impressions self-continuant' are griefs,—the sense of enjoyment, and the sense of suffering, that arises on the contact of objects which one desires or does not desire, originates in one's [mental] field a corresponding self-continuant impression. Again we [thence] experience sensations of the same sort, so that, since, through the emergence of innumerable self-continuant impressions, the mundane state is never cut short, every-thing whatever is a grief.‡

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* विषयाणामुपभुज्यमानानां यथायथं गर्द्धाभिवृद्धेस्तदप्राप्तिकृतस्य दुःखान्तरसाधनत्वाच्चास्त्येव दुःखरूपतेति परिणामदुःखत्वम् ॥

† उपभुज्यमानेषु सुखसाधनेषु तत्प्रतिपन्थिनं प्रति द्वेषस्य सर्वदैवावस्थितत्वात् सुखानुभवकालेऽपि तापदुःखं दुष्परिहारमिति तापदुःखता ॥

‡ संस्कारदुःखत्वं । स्वाभिमतानभिमतविषयसन्निधाने सुखसंविद्दुःखसंविच्चोपजायमाना तथाविधमेव स्वक्षेत्रे संस्कारमारभते। पुनस्तथाविधसंविदनुभव इत्यपरिमितसंस्कारोत्पत्तिद्वारेण संसारानुच्छेदात्सर्वस्यैव दुःखत्वम् ॥

f. 'And since the modifications due to the Qualities are adverse.' Of the Qualities, viz., Purity, Passion, and Darkness, the modifications [or psychical influences] which arise in the shape of Pleasure, Pain, and Indifference, are opposed to one another, since they reciprocally are overpowered or do overpower. These are but griefs, since they are, in absolutely every instance, the cause of grief* [—grief continuing while the mundane state due to the Qualities continues].

g. What is asserted is this, that to the discriminating one, who desires entire and complete cessation of suffering, the whole quaternion [enumerated in the aphorism] are causes of the alleged description† [i. e., causes of grief]. Hence, since all objects exhibit themselves in the shape of vexations, therefore the harvest of all works is in the shape of vexation alone.†

h. This, that, since the aforesaid fund of 'afflictions', the harvest of [each one's] stock of works, takes its rise in Ignorance, and since Ignorance, as being in the shape of false knowledge, is to be expelled by correct knowledge, and since correct knowledge consists in the ascertainment of what is to be rejected and what to be accepted, with the means [of rejection, &c.,]—in order [—I repeat—] to declare this, he says.‡—

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* गुणवृत्तिविरोधाच्चेति। गुणानां सत्त्वरजस्तमसां या वृत्तयः सुखदुःखमोहरूपाः परस्परमभिभाव्याभिभावकत्वेन विरुद्धा जायन्ते। तासां सर्वत्रैव दुःखानुबन्धाद् दुःखत्वं॥

† एतदुक्तम्भवति। ऐकान्तिकीमात्यन्तिकीञ्च दुःखनिवृत्तिमिच्छतो विवेकिन उक्तरूपकारणं चतुष्टयं। यावत्सर्वे विषया दुःखस्वरूपतया प्रतिभान्ति तस्मात्सर्वकर्मविपाको दुःखरूप एवेति॥

‡ एतदेवमुक्तस्य क्लेशकर्माशयविपाकराशेरविद्याप्रभव-

हेयं दुःखमनागतम् ॥ १६ ॥

What is to be shunned.

Aph. 16.—What is to be shunned is pain not yet come.

a. Since what *has* been is past, and what is *being* experienced is incapable of being shunned [*whilst* being experienced], it is only mundane pain not yet arrived that is to be shunned:—such is what is here asserted.*

b. He states the cause of that which is to be shunned.†

द्रष्टृदृश्ययोः संयोगो हेयहेतुः ॥ १७ ॥

The origin of evil.

Aph. 17.—The cause of what is to be shunned is the conjunction of the seer with the visual.

a. The 'seer'—in the shape of Thought. The 'visual' means the principle of understanding [which does not itself see, but is Thought's organ]. The conjunction of these two, occasioned by the absence of discriminative knowledge,—their contact as the experienced [—for all that seems external is developed out of the principle of the understanding—] and the experiencer,—*this* is the cause or reason 'of what is to be shunned,'—of

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त्वादविद्यायाश्च मिथ्याज्ञानरूपतया सम्यग्ज्ञानोच्छेद्यत्वात्सम्यग्ज्ञानस्य ससाधनहेयोपादेयावधारणरूपत्वात् तदभिधानायाह ॥

* भूतस्य व्यतिक्रान्तत्वादनुभूयमानस्य च त्यक्तुमशक्यत्वादनागतमेव संमारदुःखं हातव्यमित्युक्तमिति ॥

† हेयहेतुमाह ॥

pain,—of the world in the shape of a modification of the Qualities;—because when *this* surceases, the mundane state surceases,—such is the meaning.*

a. We have spoken of 'the conjunction of the seer with the visual.' Among these things, of the 'visual' he states the nature, the products, and the motive.†

प्रकाशक्रियास्थितिशीलम्भूतेन्द्रियात्मकं भोगापवर्गार्थं दृश्यम् ॥ १८ ॥

The nature and purpose of the visible.

Aph. 18.—The visual [—including the visible—] whose habit is illumination, action, and rest, and which consists of the Elements and the Organs, is for the sake of experience and emancipation.

a. 'Illumination' is the property of 'Purity'. 'Action,' in the shape of exertion, is that of 'Passion.' 'Rest,' in the shape of fixation, is that of 'Darkness.' Of which these,—illumination, action, and rest,—are the habit, or the essential nature,—*that* is what is so described [—i. e. described in the aphorism by the compound epithet here analysed]. Thus has its nature been set forth.‡

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* द्रष्टा चिद्रूपः। दृश्यं बुद्धितत्त्वं। तयोरविवेकख्यातिपूर्वको यो ऽसौ संयोगो भोग्यभोक्तृत्वेन सन्निधानं स हेयस्य दुःखस्य गुणपरिणामरूपस्य संसारस्य हेतुः कारणं। तन्निवृत्त्या संसारनिवृत्तिर्भवतीत्यर्थः ॥

† द्रष्टृदृश्ययोः संयोग इत्युक्तं। तत्र दृश्यस्य स्वरूपं कार्यं प्रयोजनञ्चाह ॥

‡ प्रकाशः सत्त्वस्य धर्मः। क्रिया प्रवृत्तिरूपा रजसः।

b. 'Consisting of the Elements and the Organs.' The 'Elements,' according to their division into the Gross and the Subtile, are Earth, &c., and the rudiments of Odour; &c. The 'Organs,' according to their division into the organs of knowing, the organs of action, and the internal organ, are of three sorts. Of which this two-fold character of percept and perception is 'what it consists of,'—a modification not other than itself,—*that* is what is so described [—i. e. described as 'consisting of the Elements and the Organs']. Thus have its products [—which are not other than Nature herself—] been stated.*

c. 'Experience' means what has been already defined [at §13. *a*]. 'Emancipation' is the surcease, occasioned by discriminative knowledge, of the mundane state. Of which these two, experience and emancipation, are the motive or purpose, *that* is what is so described [—i. e. described by the compound epithet now analysed—], that is to say 'the visual [including the visible.]'†

स्थितिर्नियमरूपा तमसः। ताः प्रकाशक्रियास्थितयः शीलं स्वाभाविकं रूपं यस्य तत्तथाविधमिति स्वरूपमस्य निर्दिष्टम्॥

* भूतेन्द्रियात्मकमिति। भूतानि स्थूलसूक्ष्मभेदेन पृथिव्यादीनि गन्धतन्मात्राणि च। इन्द्रियाणि बुद्धीन्द्रियकर्मेन्द्रियान्तःकरणभेदेन त्रिविधानि। उभयमेतद्ग्राह्यग्रहणरूपमात्मा स्वरूपाभिन्नः परिणामो यस्य तत्तथाविधमित्यनेन कार्यमस्योक्तम्॥

† भोगः कथितलक्षणः। अपवर्गो विवेकख्यातिपूर्विका संसारनिवृत्तिः। तौ भोगापवर्गावर्थः प्रयोजनं यस्य तत्तथाविधं दृश्यमित्यर्थः॥

d. And since this, the 'visible,' which consists of modifications in the shape of various conditions, requires to be known as what is to be shunned in order to declare its conditions, he says.*

विशेषाविशेषलिङ्गमात्रालिङ्गानि गुणपर्वाणि ॥ १९ ॥

The aspects of the Qualities.

Aph. 19.—The divisions [of condition] of the Qualities are (1) the diverse, (2) the non-diverse, (3) the merely [once] resolvable, and (4) the irresolvable.

a. The divisions, i. e. the several conditions, of the Qualities are to be understood to be four,—such is what we are here informed of. Among these, the 'diverse' are the gross elements and the organs; the 'non-diverse' are the subtile elements and the internal organ; the 'merely [once] resolvable' is intellect [—which is resolvable into the Undiscrete, but not further—]; the 'irresolvable' is the Undiscrete [or Nature]:—thus has it been declared.†

b. The four conditions [of developement] of the Qualities are set forth as necessarily requiring to be known at the time of Concentration, because we recognise the Undiscrete, which consists of the three Qualities, as being present everywhere that

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* तस्य च दृश्यस्य नानावस्थारूपपरिणामात्मकस्य हेयत्वेन ज्ञातव्यत्वादवस्थाः कथयितुमाह ॥

† गुणानां पर्वाण्यवस्थाविशेषाश्चत्वारो ज्ञातव्या इत्युपदिष्टम्भवति। तत्र विशेषा महाभूतेन्द्रियाणि। अविशेषास्तन्मात्रान्तःकरणे। लिङ्गमात्रं बुद्धिः। अलिङ्गमव्यक्तमित्युक्तम् ॥

these are,* [—so that if we did not know these, then the Undiscrete, the cause of bondage, might be present undetected].

c. Since the visible requires first to be known as that which is to be shunned, having thus explained it, with its conditions, in order now to explain what is to be accepted [and not to be got rid of—viz.] the 'seer,'—he says.†

द्रष्टा दृशिमात्रः शुद्धोऽपि प्रत्ययानुपश्यः ॥ २० ॥

Soul defined. *Aph.* 20.—The 'seer' [Soul] is vision simply, though pure, looking directly on ideas.

a. The 'seer,' i. e., Soul, is 'vision simply,' i. e., mere Thought. This 'though pure,' i. e. though abiding as itself, without becoming modified, or the like. 'Looking directly on ideas:'—'ideas' are thought coloured by objects:—it looks 'directly on' these,—immediately,—without the intervention of successive stages, or the like. What is asserted is this, that, whilst it is only the intellect that becomes coloured by the object, Soul is spectator merely through proximity.‡

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* सर्वत्र त्रिगुणरूपस्याव्यक्तस्यान्वयित्वेन प्रत्यभिज्ञानादवश्यं ज्ञातव्यत्वेन योगकाले चत्वारि पर्वाणि निर्दिष्टानि ॥

† एवं हेयत्वेन दृश्यस्य प्रथमं ज्ञातव्यत्वात्तदवस्थासहितं व्याख्यायोपादेयं द्रष्टारं व्याकर्त्तुमाह ॥

‡ द्रष्टा पुरुषो दृशिमात्रश्चेतनमात्रः । स शुद्धोऽपि । परिणामित्वाद्यभावेन स्वप्रतिष्ठोऽपि । प्रत्ययानुपश्यः । प्रत्यया विषयोपरक्तानि ज्ञानानि । तानि अनु अव्यवधानेन प्रतिसङ्क्रमाद्यभावेन पश्यति । एतदुक्तम्भवति । जातविषयोपरागायामेव बुद्धौ सन्निधानमात्रेणैव पुरुषस्य द्रष्टृत्वमिति ॥

b. It alone is the experiencer;—so he says.*—

तदर्थ एव दृश्यात्मा ॥ २१ ॥

Soul is the experiencer.

Aph. 21.—**For the sake of it alone is the entity of the visible.**

a. The 'entity,' the self, of the 'visible' which has been already defined [§17. *a.*],—this is 'for the sake of *it*;'—the bringing about that '*it*,' the Soul, shall be an experiencer, is its aim, to the exclusion in short of any selfish end. For Nature, energizing, energizes not with a view to any purpose of her own, but with the design "Let me bring about Soul's experience."†

b. If thus the motive be only the effecting of Soul's experience, then, when this has been effected, it should cease striving for that in the absence of a motive:—and, when it is free from alteration, since it is pure [—exhibiting neither the Qualities of Passion nor of Darkness when all three are in calm equipoise—], all souls should be freed from bondage, and the mundane state should be cut short. Having pondered this doubt, he says‡—

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* स एव भोक्तेत्यत आह ॥

† दृश्यस्य प्रागुक्तलक्षणस्य आत्मा यत्स्वरूपं स तदर्थस्तस्य पुरुषस्य भोक्तृत्वसम्पादनं नाम स्वार्थपरिहारेण प्रयोजनं। नहि प्रधानं प्रवर्त्तमानमात्मनः किञ्चित्प्रयोजनमपेक्ष्य प्रवर्त्तते किन्तु पुरुषस्य भोगं सम्पादयामीति ॥

‡ यद्येवं पुरुषस्य भोगसम्पादनमेव प्रयोजनं तदा सम्पादिते तस्मिंस्तस्मिन्निष्प्रयोजनं विरतव्यापारं स्यात्। तस्मिंश्च परिणामशून्ये शुद्धत्वात् सर्वे द्रष्टारो बन्धरहिताः स्युस्ततश्च संसारोच्छेद इत्याशंक्याह ॥

कृतार्थम्प्रति नष्टमप्यनष्टं तदन्यसाधारणत्वात् ॥ २२ ॥

The emancipation of one entails not that of others.

Aph. 22.—Though it have ceased to be, in respect of him who has effected what is required, it has not ceased [in regard to all], because it is common to others besides him.

a. Although, since it causes experience just till there is discriminative knowledge, it ceases to be, i. e., desists from acting, in respect of some soul which has effected the end [of discerning discriminatively], still, since it is common to all souls, it continues, as regards others, with its operations undestroyed. Therefore, since Nature is common to all experiencers, it never ceases; nor does the emancipation of one involve the emancipation of all:—such is what is asserted.*

b. Having explained the 'visible' and the 'seer,' in order to explain their conjunction, he says—‡

स्वस्वामिशक्त्योः स्वरूपोपलब्धिहेतुः संयोगः ॥ २३ ॥

The conjunction of soul and nature what.

Aph. 23.—The conjunction is the cause of the apprehension of the actual condition of the natures of the possessed and the possessor.

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* यद्यपि विवेकख्यातिपर्यन्ताद्भोगसम्पादनात्कमपि कृतार्थं पुरुषं प्रति तन्नष्टं विरतव्यापारं तथापि सर्वपुरुषसाधारणत्वादन्यान् प्रत्यनष्टव्यापारमवतिष्ठते। अतः प्रधानस्य सकलभोक्तृसाधारणत्वान्न कदाचनापि विनाश एकस्य मुक्तौ वा न सर्वेषां मुक्तिप्रसङ्ग इत्युक्तम्भवति ॥

† दृश्यद्रष्टारौ व्याख्याय संयोगं व्याख्यातुमाह ॥

a. He characterises this through its effect* [—telling us not what the conjunction is, but what it is the cause of].

b. 'The nature of the possessed' is the nature of the visible. 'The nature of the possessor' is the nature of the 'seer.' Moreover, the apprehension of the nature of these two, correlated as the known and the knower,—that which is the cause of *this* is the conjunction [here spoken of];—and this is none other than the nature of their cognate habit as the experienced and the experiencer. Because, of these two, which are from everlasting and all-pervading, there is no conjunction other than their essential character. That the experienced's character as something experienced, and the experiencer's character as an experiencer, has existed from everlasting,—this alone is the conjunction† [or relation between the two].

c. Moreover he states the cause thereof.‡

तस्य हेतुर्हेयमविद्या ॥ २४ ॥

The cause of the conjunction.

Aph. 24.—The cause thereof is what is to be quitted—viz., Ignorance.

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* कार्यद्वारेणास्य लक्षणं करोति ॥

† स्वशक्तिर्दृश्यस्य स्वभावः। स्वामिशक्तिर्द्रष्टुः स्वरूपं। तयोर्द्वयोरपि संवेद्यसंवेदकत्वेन व्यवस्थितयोर्या स्वरूपोपलब्धिस्तस्याः कारणं यस्संयोगः। स च सहजभोग्यभोक्तृभावस्वरूपान्नान्यः। नहि तयोर्नित्ययोर्व्यापकयोश्च स्वरूपादतिरिक्तः कश्चित्संयोगः। यदेव भोग्यस्य भोग्यत्वं भोक्तुश्च भोक्तृत्वमनादिसिद्धं स एव संयोगः॥

‡ तस्यापि कारणमाह ॥

a. That which has been already described [§4.] as Ignorance, in the shape of delusion, consisting in the confounding the unreal with the real, is declared to be of that conjunction in the shape of the absence of discriminative knowledge, the cause,—what is to quitted,—the [grammatical] object of the act of 'quitting.'*

b. What, again, is the 'quitting' thereof? To this he replies.†

तदभावात्संयोगाभावो हानं तद्दृशेः कैवल्यम् ॥ २५ ॥

The quitting of conjunction what.

Aph. 25.—The 'quitting' consists in the surcease of the conjunction, on that [Ignorance];—*this* is the isolation of the soul.

a. 'Of that,' i. e., of Ignorance, eradicated by its essential opposite, viz., right knowledge, 'the surcease,'—when this takes place, the surcease also of its effect, viz., of the conjunction, is what is called the 'quitting' of it.‡

b. What is meant is as follows;—abandonment does not apply in the case of this as in that of a circumscribed body [from which you may disjoin yourself by moving away into a portion of space unoccupied by it]; but, when discriminative knowledge

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* या पूर्वं विपर्यासात्मिका मोहरूपाऽविद्या व्याख्याता सा तस्याऽविवेकख्यातिरूपस्य संयोगस्य कारणं हेयं हानक्रियाकर्मोच्यते ॥

† किम्पुनस्तद्धानमित्याह ॥

‡ तस्या अविद्यायाः स्वरूपविरुद्धेन सम्यग्ज्ञानेनोन्मूलिताया योऽयमभावस्तस्मिन्सति तत्कार्यस्य संयोगस्याप्यभावस्तद्धानमित्युच्यते ॥

has been produced, the conjunction, which was due to the absence of discriminative knowledge, ceases quite of its own accord;—such is the 'quitting' of it. And, moreover, that quitting which there is of conjunction [with Nature], being for all eternity, is what is called the isolation *(kaivalya)* of the soul [thereafter existing entirely] *alone (kewala)*.*

c. Thus have the nature, the cause, and the effect, of the conjunction [of soul with Nature] been declared.†

d. Now, by means of declaring the means of 'quitting' [what ought to be quitted], he states [by implication] the cause of [the attainment of] what [condition] ought to be accepted‡ [as the most desirable possible].

विवेकख्यातिरविप्लवा हानोपायः ॥ २६ ॥

The means of quitting the conjunction.

Aph. 26.—The means of quitting [the state of bondage] is discriminative knowledge not discontinuous.

a. The 'knowledge,'—the perfect cognizance, of the distinction, in this shape, viz., that the Qualities are one thing and Soul is another thing, is 'the means,' the cause, 'of quitting,' i. e., of abandoning, the visible [or phenomenal]. *What* sort of [knowledge]? 'Not discontinuous.' That [knowledge] is 'not discontinuous,' in respect of which there is no skipping,—no

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* अयमर्थो नैतस्य मूर्त्तद्रव्यवत् परित्यागो युज्यते किन्तु जातायां विवेकख्यातावविवेकख्यातिनिमित्तसंयोगः स्वयमेव निवर्त्तत इति तस्य हानं। यदेवच संयोगस्य हानं तदेव नित्यं केवलस्यापि पुरुषस्य कैवल्यं व्यपदिश्यते ॥

† तदेवं संयोगस्य स्वरूपं कारणं कार्यञ्चाभिहितम् ॥

‡ अथ हानोपायकथनद्वारेणोपादेयकारणमाह ॥

breaks between and between, in the shape of non-abstraction* [or re-conjunction of soul with the things of sense].

b. The import here is this, that, when Ignorance is dissolved by force of meditating on what is opposed to it, that advent which there is of a reflection, in the soul, of the introspective intellect, where the conceit of being knower or agent has been laid aside, and when it is unoppressed by the filth of Passion and Darkness, is what is called discriminative knowledge, [—or the knowledge of the non-identity of soul and Nature]. And when this prevails permanently, there simply becomes, through the cessation of the rule of the visible, *isolation*.†

c. While telling of what description is the discernment of that soul in which discriminative knowledge has taken place, he declares [by implication] the nature of discriminative knowledge itself.‡

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* अन्ये गुणा अन्यः पुरुष इत्येवंविधस्य विवेकस्य ख्यातिः। प्रख्या सा हानस्य दृश्यपरित्यागस्योपायः कारणं। कीदृशी। अविप्लव। न विद्यते विप्लवो विच्छेदोऽन्तरान्तरा व्युत्थानरूपो यस्याः सा ऽविप्लवा॥

† इदमत्र तात्पर्यम्। प्रतिपक्षभावनाबलादविद्याप्रविलये विनिवृत्तज्ञातृत्वकर्तृत्वाद्यभिमानाया रजस्तमोमलानभिभूताया बुद्धेरन्तर्मुखाया या चिच्छायासंक्रान्तिः सा विवेकख्यातिरित्युच्यते। तस्याश्च सततत्वेन प्रवृत्तायां दृश्यस्याधिकारनिवृत्तेर्भवत्येव कैवल्यम्॥

‡ उत्पन्नविवेकख्यातेः पुरुषस्य यादृशी प्रज्ञा भवति तां कथयन् विवेकख्यातेरेव स्वरूपमाह॥

तस्य सप्तधा प्रान्तभूमौ प्रज्ञा ॥ २७ ॥

Discriminative knowledge of what nature.

Aph. 27.—Of that [enlightened soul] the perfect knowledge, up to the ground of the limit, is of seven kinds.

a. 'Of that' [soul] in which discriminative knowledge has sprung up; 'the perfect knowledge'—in the shape of the discrimination which it behooves us to understand; 'up to the ground of the limit', i. e., as far as is the extent of all the meditation that has a support [—see B. 1. §17, *j*,—]; is of seven sorts.*

b. Among these [seven], that which consists in liberation from the products [of mind] is of four sorts,—(1) "That which is to be known is known by me;" (2) "There is nothing that ought to be known;" (3) "My 'afflictions' are destroyed,—there is nothing of mine requiring to be destroyed;" (4) "Knowledge has been attained by me, discriminative knowledge has been attained by me;"—and so, by the abandonment of all other impressions, in that state of things, just such perfect knowledge takes place [as is spoken of in the aphorism]. Such perfect knowledge, being pure knowledge the object of which is some product [of mind], is what is called 'liberation from the products.'†

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* तस्योत्पन्नविवेकज्ञानस्य ज्ञातव्यविवेकरूपा प्रज्ञा। प्रान्तभूमौ सकलसालम्बनसमाधिभूमिपर्यन्तं। सप्तप्रकारा भवति ॥

† तत्र कार्यविमुक्तिरूपा चतुःप्रकारा। ज्ञातं मया ज्ञेयं। न ज्ञातव्यं किञ्चिदस्ति। क्षीणा मे क्लेशाः न मे किञ्चित् क्षेतव्यमस्ति। अधिगतं मया ज्ञानं प्राप्ता मया विवेकख्यातिरिति प्रत्ययान्तरपरिहारेण तस्यामवस्थायामीदृश्येव प्रज्ञा

c. 'Liberation from the mind' is of three sorts,—(1) "My mind has done its office [in enabling me to discern the distinction of soul and nature];" (2) "and the Qualities have lost their influence [over me],—like stones that have fallen from a mountain-peak they will not again resume their place; for why should these, when tending towards resolution into their cause, spring up again in the absence of the fundamental reason [for their springing up] which is called 'delusion,' and in the absence of a motive?"—(3) "And my meditation is such as has become one with soul;—such being the case, I exist in my real nature." Such is the threefold 'liberation from mind'.*

d. So then, when there has sprung up such a sevenfold perfect knowledge, reckoning as far as to the limit [where meditation ceases to rest upon an object], we say that soul is *alone*† [*kevala*, or in the desiderated state of *kaivalya*].

e. It has been stated [§26] that discriminative knowledge is

जायते। ईदृशी प्रज्ञा कार्यविषयं निर्मलं ज्ञानं कार्यविमुक्तिरित्युच्यते॥

* चित्तविमुक्तिस्त्रिविधा। चरितार्था मे बुद्धिः। गुणाश्च हृताधिकारा गिरिशिखरनिपतिता इव ग्रावाणः पुनः स्थितिं न यास्यन्ति स्वकारणे प्रलयाभिमुखानां मोहाभिधानमूलकारणाभावान्निष्प्रयोजनत्वाच्चामीषां कुतः प्ररोहः। सात्मीभूतश्च मे समाधिः तस्मिन् सति स्वरूपप्रतिष्ठोऽहमिति। ईदृशी त्रिप्रकारा चित्तविमुक्तिः॥

† तदेवमीदृश्यां सप्तविधप्रान्तभूमिप्रज्ञायामुपजातायां पुरुषः केवल इत्युच्यते॥

the cause of the removal of the Conjunction [between soul and nature]; but what is the cause of *that?* To this he replies.*

योगाङ्गानुष्ठानादशुद्धिक्षये ज्ञानदीप्तिराविवेकख्यातेः ॥ २८ ॥

Ascetic practices clear the way to discriminative knowledge.

Aph. 28.—Till there is discriminative knowledge, there is, from the practice of the things subservient to the *Yoga*, an illumination [more or less brilliant] of knowledge [which is operative] in the removal of impurity.

a. The 'things subservient to the *Yoga*' are what will be mentioned [in §29]. 'From the practice' of these, i. e. from the practice of them preceded by a knowledge of them,—'till there is discriminative knowledge,'—that 'illumination of knowledge' which, more or less, as a modification of the pure [or enlightening] principle, is [operative] 'in the removal of impurity'—in the removal of impurity in the shape of the 'afflictions' whose characteristic is their hiding the light of the pure principle of the mind,—until discriminative knowledge [takes place], *that* is the cause of this knowledge [of the distinction between soul and nature];—such is the meaning.†

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* विवेकख्यातिस्संयोगाभावे हेतुरित्युक्तं। तस्यास्तूत्पत्तौ किन्निमित्तमित्यत आह ॥

† योगाङ्गानि वक्ष्यमाणानि। तेषामनुष्ठानाद् ज्ञानपूर्वकादभ्यासादाविवेकख्यातेरशुद्धिक्षये चित्तसत्त्वस्य प्रकाशावरणलक्षणक्लेशरूपाशुद्धिक्षये या ज्ञानदीप्तिस्तारतम्येन सात्त्विकः परिणामो विवेकख्यातिपर्यन्तस्स तस्याः ख्यातेर्हेतुरित्यर्थः ॥

b. 'From the practice of the things subservient to the *Yoga*,—in the removal of impurity,'—has been said:—what, then, are those 'things subservient to the Yoga'? So he enunciates them.*

यमनियमासनप्राणायामप्रत्याहारधारणाध्यान-
समाधयोऽष्टावङ्गानि ॥ २९ ॥

The eight subservients of Concentration.

Aph. 29.—The eight things subservient [to Concentration] are (1) forbearance, (2) religious observance, (3) postures, (4) suppression of the breath, (5) restraint, (6) attention, (7) contemplation, and (8) meditation.

b. Some of these, as 'attention,' &c., are immediately subservient, since they are directly conducive to meditation. Some, as 'forbearance,' 'religious observance,' &c., conduce to meditation by means of their eradicating [all] hesitation about things opposed to it, such as killing, &c. Of 'postures,' and the rest [in the list,] the conduciveness is successive, it being, e. g., when one has succeeded in regard to 'posture,' that there is steadiness in 'suppression of breath;'—and so it is to be inferred also in respect of the others [in succession].†

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* योगाङ्गानुष्ठानादशुद्धिक्षय इत्युक्तं । कानि पुनस्तानि योगाङ्गानीति तेषामुद्देशमाह ॥

† इह कानिचित् समाधेस्साक्षादुपकारकत्वेनान्तरङ्गाणि यथा धारणादीनि । कानिचित् प्रतिपक्षभूतहिंसादिवितर्कोन्मूलनद्वारेण समाधेरुपकुर्वन्ति यथा यमनियमादयः । तत्रासनादीनामुत्तरोत्तरमुपकारकत्वं यथा सत्यासनजये प्राणायामस्थैर्यं । एवमुत्तरत्रापि न्याय्यम् ॥

b. He describes these in their order.*

अहिंसासत्यास्तेयब्रह्मचर्यापरिग्रहा यमः ॥ ३० ॥

Forbearance what.

Aph. 30.—'Forbearance' *(yama)* consists of not killing, veracity, not stealing, continence, and not coveting.

a. Among these [—to speak first of the first—], 'killing' is acting for the purpose of removing life; and this is a cause of all evils. The absence of this is what is meant by 'not killing.' Since 'killing' must be abstained from at *all* times, its opposite, 'not killing' is set down first† [in the list].

b. 'Veracity' means conformity, in speech and mind, to fact. Its opposite is falsehood. 'Theft' is the taking away another's property. Its absence is 'not stealing.' Continence' is the subjection of one's members. 'Not coveting' means not desiring for one's self means of enjoyment.‡

c. These five, 'not killing,' &c., which are meant by the word

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* क्रमेणैषां स्वरूपमाह ॥

† तत्र प्राणवियोगप्रयोजनव्यापारो हिंसा । सा च सर्वानर्थहेतुः । तदभावोऽहिंसा । हिंसायाः सर्वकालमेव परिहार्यत्वात्प्रथमं तदभावाया अहिंसाया निर्देशः ॥

‡ सत्यं वाङ्मनसयोर्यथार्थत्वं । तदभावोऽसत्यं । स्तेयं परस्वापहरणं । तदभावोऽस्तेयं । ब्रह्मचर्यं उपस्थसंयमः । अपरिग्रहो भोगसाधनानामस्वीकरणं ॥

'forbearance,' are laid down as things conducive to Concentration.*

d. He states a peculiarity of these.†

एते जातिदेशकालसमयानवच्छिन्नाः सार्वभौम-
महाव्रतम्॥ ३१॥

Honesty independent of circumstances.

Aph. 31.—These, without respect to rank, place, time, or compact, are the universal great duty.

a. 'Rank' means Bráhman-hood, &c. 'Place' means a place of pilgrimage, &c., 'Time' means the fourteenth of the month, or other [date which may affect the meritoriousness or otherwise of this or that otherwise perhaps indifferent act]. 'Compact' means that a Bráhman, for example, is the motive [of our doing or leaving undone]. The aforesaid 'forbearances,' viz. 'not killing,' &c., without respect to these four [considerations], abiding in all places—i. e. [as the moral law written on the heart, in all] understandings,—are what are called 'the great duty.'‡

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* त एते ऽहिंसादयः पञ्च यमशब्दवाच्या योगाङ्गत्वेन निर्दिष्टा॥

† एषां विशेषमाह॥

‡ जातिर्ब्राह्मणत्वादिः। देशस्तीर्थादिः। कालश्चतुर्दश्यादिः। समयो ब्राह्मणप्रयोजनादिः। एतैश्चतुर्भिरनवच्छिन्नाः पूर्वोक्ता अहिंसादयो यमाः सर्वासु क्षिप्तादिषु चित्तभूमिषु भवा महाव्रतमित्युच्यते॥

b. To explain :—'I will not kill a Bráhman,'—'I will not kill any one at a place of pilgrimage,'—'I will not kill any one on the fourteenth of the month,'—'I will not kill, except for the benefit of a god, a Bráhman, or the like,'—[well, the 'forbearances' must be] without this fourfold qualification,—unqualified, —thus 'I will not kill any one, anywhere, at any time, or for any purpose whatever.' And the same holds in respect of 'truth' and the rest, mutatis mutandis. It is these thus unqualified, and acted upon in their full generality, that are called 'the great duty.'*

c. He states what are 'religious observances' *(niyama)*.†

शौचसन्तोषतपःस्वाध्यायेश्वरप्रणिधानानि नियमाः

॥ ३२ ॥

Religious observances.

Aph. 32.—Religious observances *(niyama)* are (1) purification, (2) contentment (3) austerity, (4) inaudible mutterings, and (5) persevering devotion to the Lord.

a. 'Purification' *(śaucha)* is of two sorts, external, and internal. The external is the cleansing of the body by earth, water,

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* तद्यथा। ब्राह्मणं न हनिष्यामि तीर्थे कञ्चन न हनिष्यामि चतुर्दश्यां न हनिष्यामि देवब्राह्मणाद्यर्थव्यतिरेकेण न हनिष्यामीत्येवं चतुर्विधावच्छेदव्यतिरेकेण कञ्चित् क्वचित् कदाचित् कस्मिंश्चिदप्यर्थे न हनिष्यामीत्यनवच्छिन्नाः। एवं सत्यादिषु यथायोगं योज्यं। इत्थमनियतीभूताः सामान्येनैव प्रवृत्ताः महाव्रतमित्युच्यते ॥

† नियमानाह ॥

&c. The internal is the washing away the impurity of the mind by means of benevolence, &c.*

b. 'Contentment' *(santosha)* means contentedness. The rest have been already described. These, viz. 'purification,' and the rest, are what are meant by the term 'religious observances.'†

c. How are these subservient to Concentration? To this he replies.‡

वितर्कबाधने प्रतिपक्षभावनम् ॥ ३३ ॥

How these things are of use.

Aph. 33.—In excluding things questionable, the calling up something opposite [is serviceable].

a. 'Killing,' &c., as opponents of Concentration, are 'things questionable,' because they are doubted about [—it being questionable what real good they can do]. If these are excluded when things opposed to them are called up, then concentration is facilitated. Hence 'forbearance' and 'religious observances' really are subservient to Concentration.§

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* शौचं द्विविधं बाह्यमाभ्यन्तरञ्च। बाह्यं मृज्जलादिभिः कायप्रक्षालनम्। आन्तरं मैत्र्यादिभिश्चित्तमलप्रक्षालनम्॥

† सन्तोषस्तुष्टिः। शेषाः प्रागेव भूतव्याख्यानाः। एते शौचादयो नियमशब्दवाच्याः॥

‡ कथमेषां योगाङ्गत्वमित्यत आह॥

§ वितर्क्यन्त इति वितर्का योगपरिपन्थिनो हिंसादयः। तेषां प्रतिपक्षभावने सति यदि बाधा भवति तदा योगसुकरो भवतीति भवत्येव यमनियमानां योगाङ्गत्वम्॥

b. Now he states, in order, the nature, the divisions, the kind, the cause, and the fruit, of the 'things questionable' *(vitarka)*.*

वितर्का हिंसादयः कृतकारितानुमोदिता लोभक्रोधमोहपूर्वका मृदुमध्याधिमात्रा दुःखाज्ञानानन्तफला इति प्रतिपक्षभावनम् ॥ ३४ ॥

Account of objectionable things.

Aph. 34.—The 'things questionable,' killing, &c.; whether done, caused to be done, or approved of; whether resulting from covetousness, anger, or delusion; whether slight, of intermediate character, or beyond measure; have no end of fruits [in the shape of] pain and ignorance;—hence the calling up of something opposite [is every way advisable].

a. These the 'killing,' &c., aforesaid are first divided tripartitely through the difference of 'done,' 'caused to be done,' and 'approved of.' Among these, those are 'done,' which are carried into effect by one's self. Those are 'caused to be done,' which are brought about by the employment of the incentive expression 'Do it, do it.' Those are 'approved,' which, when being done by another, are consented to by the expression 'Well done, well done.' And this threefold character is mentioned in order to debar hallucination in regard to these respectively; otherwise some dull-witted one might reflect thus, "The killing was not done by me myself, therefore the blame is not mine."†

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* इदानीं वितर्काणां स्वरूपं भेदं प्रकारं कारणं फलञ्च क्रमेणाह ।

† एते पूर्वोक्ता हिंसादयः प्रथमं त्रिधा भिद्यन्ते कृतकारितानुमोदितभेदेन । तत्र स्वयं निष्पादिताः कृताः । कुरु कुर्विति प्रयोजकव्यापारेण समुत्पादिताः कारिताः । अन्येन

b. In order to declare the causes of these ['questionable things'], he says, 'resulting from covetousness, anger, or delusion.'*

c. Although 'covetousness' is the one first specified, yet, since the source of *all* the 'afflictions' is delusion, whose mark is the conceit that what is *not* soul is soul, *this* we must be sure is the root, because, when *it* takes place, 'covetousness' 'anger' and the rest arise in consequence of there having gone before the division of *self* and *other one* [—but for the existence of which delusive division there would have been no room for either covetousness or anger]. We mean, then, that every class of evils results from delusion.†

d. 'Covetousness' is a thirst. 'Anger' is an inflamed condition of the mind, which uproots all discrimination between what ought to be done and what ought not to be done.‡

क्रियमाणाः साधु साध्वित्यङ्गीकृता अनुमोदिताः। एतच्च त्रैविध्यं परस्परव्यामोहनिवारणायोच्यते। अन्यथा मन्दमतिरेवं मन्येत न मया स्वयं हिंसा कृतेति नास्ति मे दोष इति।

* एतेषां कारणप्रतिपादनायाह लोभक्रोधमोहपूर्वका इति॥

† यद्यपि लोभः प्रथमं निर्दिष्टस्तथापि सर्वक्लेशानां मोहस्यानात्मन्यात्माभिमानलक्षणस्य निदानत्वात् तस्मिन् सति स्वपरविभागपूर्वकत्वेन लोभक्रोधादीनामुद्भवान्मूलत्वमवसेयं। मोहपूर्विका सर्वा दोषजातिरित्यर्थः॥

‡ लोभस्तृष्णा। क्रोधः कृत्याकृत्यविवेकोन्मूलकः प्रज्वलनात्मकश्चित्तधर्मः॥

e. 'Killing,' &c., moreover, which are severally threefold through the distinction between 'done,' &c., [§34. *a.*], are divided tripartitely through their having as their cause 'delusion,' &c., [§34. *b*]. He mentions, of these again, a threefold character, through their difference of state, as 'slight, of intermediate character, and beyond measure.' The 'slight,' or slow, are those that are neither fierce nor middling. Those 'of intermediate character,' are what are neither slow nor fierce. Those that are 'beyond measure' are what are vehement, neither middling nor slight. Thus the nine divisions, since there is thus a further threefold character, become twenty-seven.*

f. The 'slight,' &c., moreover severally may be of three sorts through the distinction of slight, intermediate, and excessive. These are to be combined accordingly as they can combine. For example, the 'slightly slight,' the 'slightly intermediate,' the 'slightly excessive,' and so on.†

g. He mentions their fruit, saying, 'having no end of fruits [in the shape of] pain and ignorance.' 'Pain' is a state of mind, dependent on the Quality of passion, exhibiting itself as some-

* प्रत्येकं कृतादिभेदेन त्रिप्रकारा अपि हिंसादयो मोहादिकारणत्वेन त्रिधा भिद्यन्ते। तेषामेव पुनरवस्थाभेदेन त्रैविध्यमाह मृदुमध्याधिमात्राः। मृदवो मन्दा न तीव्रा नापि मध्यमाः। मध्या न मन्दा नापि तीव्राः। अधिमात्राः तीव्रा न मध्या नापि मन्दा इति नव भेदा इत्थं त्रैविध्ये सति सप्तविंशतिः॥

† मृद्वादीनामपि प्रत्येकं मृदुमध्याधिमात्रभेदात् त्रैविध्यं सम्भवति। तद्यथायोगं योज्यं। तद्यथा। मृदुमृदुर्मृदुमध्यो मृदुतीव्र इत्यादि॥

thing repugnant. 'Ignorance' is false knowledge, in the shape of doubt or error. Those ['questionable things'] of which the endless, or unlimited, fruits are these two, viz. pain and ignorance, are what are so spoken of* [—i. e. spoken of by the compound epithet here analysed].

h. Thus it is enjoined, that the Yogi, by meditating on 'something opposite' is to get rid of these ['questionable things'] which he has understood by means of the division of natures, causes, &c.,† [that has been now set forth].

i. With a view to declare, in order, how perfections arise, consequent on these ['forbearances,' &c.], when, by practice, they have reached their highest degree, he says.‡—

तत्सन्निधौ वैरत्यागः ॥ ३५ ॥

Influence of the Yogi that is harmless.

Aph. 35.—When harmlessness is complete, near him, there is abandonment of enmity.

a. When the harmlessness of him that practises harmlessness is complete, even natural enemies, as the snake and the mungoose, abandon [when near him] their enmity, and abide in amity;—

* एषां फलमाह दुःखाज्ञानानन्तफला इति। दुःखं प्रतिकूलतयावभासमानो राजसश्चित्तधर्मः। अज्ञानं मिथ्याज्ञानं संशयविपर्ययरूपं। ते दुःखाज्ञाने अनन्तमपरिच्छिन्नं फलं येषां ते तथोक्ताः॥

† इत्थं तेषां स्वरूपकारणादिभेदेन ज्ञातानां प्रतिपक्षभावनया योगिना परिहारः कर्त्तव्य इत्युपदिष्टम्भवति॥

‡ एषामभ्यासात् प्रकर्षमागच्छतामनु निष्पादिन्यः सिद्धयो यथा भवन्ति तथा क्रमेण प्रतिपादयितुमाह॥

that is to say, those that delight in destroying, leave off their destructiveness.*

b. What happens in respect of him that practises veracity? To this he replies.†

सत्यप्रतिष्ठायां क्रियाफलाश्रयत्वम्॥ ३६ ॥

Influence of veracity.

Aph. 36.—When veracity is complete, he is the receptacle of the fruit of works.

a. For works, such as sacrifices, being performed, give fruits, such as Paradise. But of that Yogi who practises veracity, the veracity rises to such a degree that the Yogi receives the fruit even without the work's being performed. At his bidding, the fruit of works accrues to any one soever, even though not performing the work:—such is the meaning.‡

b. He states the fruit accruing to him that practises abstinence from theft.§

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* तस्याहिंसां भावयतोऽहिंसाप्रतिष्ठायां सहजविरोधिनामप्यहिनकुलादीनां वैरत्यागो निर्मत्सरतयावस्थानं भवति। हिंसारताः हिंस्रत्वं परित्यजन्तीत्यर्थः॥

† सत्याभ्यासवतः किं भवतीत्याह॥

‡ क्रियामाणा हि क्रिया यागादिकाः फलं स्वर्गादिकं प्रयच्छन्ति। तस्य तु सत्याभ्यासवतो योगिनस्तथा सत्यं प्रकृष्यते यथा अकृतायामपि क्रियायां योगी फलमाप्नोति। तद्वचनाद्यस्य कस्यचित् क्रियामकुर्वतोऽपि क्रियाफलं भवतीत्यर्थः॥

§ अस्तेयाभ्यासवतः फलमाह॥

अस्तेयप्रतिष्ठायां सर्वरत्नोपस्थानम् ॥ ३७ ॥

The reward of not thieving.

Aph. 37.—When abstinence from theft is complete, all jewels come near him.

a. When he practises abstinence from theft, then, on its reaching its highest degree, the jewels that exist in every quarter come to him even though he covet them not.*

b. He states the fruit of the practice of continence.†

ब्रह्मचर्यप्रतिष्ठायां वीर्यलाभः ॥ ३८ ॥

The reward of continence.

Aph. 38.—When continence is complete, there is gain of strength.

a. He, indeed, that practises continence, when it is complete, there is revealed in him excessive strength, or power. For continence is the preserving of one's manly vigour; and from this [continence] being of a high degree, vigour in body, organs, and mind, attains a high degree.‡

b. He states the fruit of the practice of non-covetousness.§

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* अस्तेयं यदाभ्यस्यति तदा तस्य प्रकर्षान्निरभिलाषस्यापि सर्वतो दिक्स्थानि रत्नान्युपतिष्ठन्ते ॥

† ब्रह्मचर्याभ्यासस्य फलमाह ॥

‡ यः किल ब्रह्मचर्यमभ्यस्यति तस्य तत्प्रकर्षान्निरतिशयं वीर्यं सामर्थ्यमाविर्भवति । वीर्यनिरोधो हि ब्रह्मचर्यं तस्य प्रकर्षाच्छरीरेन्द्रियमनःसु वीर्यं प्रकर्षमागच्छति ॥

§ अपरिग्रहाभ्यासस्य फलमाह ॥

अपरिग्रहस्थैर्ये जन्मकथन्तासम्बोधः ॥ ३९ ॥

The reward of non-covetousness.

Aph. 39.—When non covetousness is established, there is knowledge of all about [former] states of existence.

a. 'All about it' means the condition how [—*kathantá* being the abstract of the indeclinable *katham*]. 'All about states of existence,' such is the meaning of *janma-kathantá*. The 'knowledge' thereof, the perfect understanding. That is to say, he knows perfectly every thing in regard to the question 'Who was I in a former state of existence? What sort of person? The doer of what actions?'*

b. It is not merely the coveting of the means of enjoyment that is [here meant by] covetousness. Covetousness is [meant] even as far as the soul's coveting a body. Since a body is an instrument of enjoyment whilst *it* exists, from its association with desires, our energy being directed to the external, no real knowledge reveals itself. When, again, without regard to coveting a body, &c., one betakes one's self to indifference, then, since one abandons desire, &c., the acquaintance with past and future states of existence becomes indeed a cause of right knowledge to the indifferent† [person, who thus discerns how little there is deserving of a wise man's regard in any mundane condition whatever].

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* कथमित्यस्य भावः कथन्ता । जन्मनः कथन्ता जन्मकथन्ता । तस्याः सम्बोधः सम्यक् ज्ञानं । जन्मान्तरे कोऽहमासं कीदृशः किङ्कार्यकारीति जिज्ञासायां सर्वमेव सम्यक् जानातीत्यर्थः ॥

† न केवलं भोगसाधनपरिग्रह एव परिग्रहः । यावदात्मनः शरीरपरिग्रहोऽपि परिग्रहः । भोगसाधनत्वाच्छरी-

c. The fruits of the 'forbearances' have been stated. Now he mentions [those of] the 'religious observances.'*

शौचात्स्वाङ्गजुगुप्सा परैरसंसर्गः ॥ ४० ॥

Mental result of purifications.

Aph. 40.—From 'purification,' loathing for one's own members, and non-intercourse with others.

a. He who practises 'purification,' to him there springs up a loathing, an aversion, even for his own members, through his thoroughly discerning the cause and nature [of a body];—"This body is impure; any fondness for it is not to be entertained;"—and so for the same reason, there is 'non-intercourse,' the absence of intercourse, the avoidance of intercourse, 'with others,' with other possessors also of bodies;—such is the meaning. For whoso loathes his own body, through his discernment of this or that fault, how must he judge of intercourse with the similar bodies of others?†

रस्य तस्मिन् सति रागानुबन्धाद्बहिर्मेखायामेव प्रवृत्तौ न तात्त्विकज्ञानप्रादुर्भावः। यदा पुनः शरीरादिपरिग्रहनैरपेक्ष्येण माध्यस्थ्यमवलम्बते तदा मध्यस्थस्य रागादित्यागात्सम्यज्ज्ञानहेतुर्भवत्येव पूर्वापरजन्मसम्बोधः॥

* उक्ता यमानां सिद्धयः। अथ नियमानाह।

† यः शौचं भावयति तस्य स्वाङ्गेष्वपि कारणस्वरूपपर्यालोचनद्वारेण जुगुप्सा घृणा समुपजायते अशुचिरयं कायो नात्राग्रहः कर्त्तव्य इत्यमुनैव हेतुना परैरन्यैश्च कायवद्भिरसंसर्गः संसर्गाभावः संसर्गपरिवर्ज्जनमित्यर्थः। यः किल स्वमेव

b. He states another fruit of this same 'purification.'*

सत्त्वशुद्धिसौमनस्यैकाग्रतेन्द्रियजयात्मदर्शनयोग्य-
त्वानि च ॥ ४१ ॥

Other results of purifications.

Aph. 41.—And purity in the Quality of Goodness, complacency, intentness, subjugation of the senses, and fitness for the beholding of soul, [are fruits of 'purification'].

a. 'Are' is required to complete the sentence.†

b. The 'Quality of goodness' is what consists of light, joy, &c., [—see Sánkhya Aphorisms B. I. §62]; its 'purity' is its not being oppressed by Passion and Darkness. 'Complacency' is mental joy, from there not being the oppression of distress. 'Intentness' is steadiness of the mind on an object to which the senses are confined. 'Subjugation of the senses' is the abiding in themselves of the senses averted from objects. The 'fitness' of the mind means its power of beholding soul,—[this 'beholding' being] in the shape of the knowledge of the distinctness‡ [of soul from Nature].

कायं जुगुप्सते तत्तदवद्यदर्शनात्कथं परकीयैस्तथाभूतैः कायै-स्संसर्गमनुभवति ॥

* शौचस्यैव फलान्तरमाह ॥

† भवन्तीति वाक्यशेषः ॥

‡ सत्त्वं प्रकाशसुखाद्यात्मकं । तस्य शुद्धिः रजस्तमोभ्या-मनभिभवः । सौमनस्यं खेदाननुभवेन मानसी प्रीतिः । एकाग्रता नियतेन्द्रियविषये चेतसः स्थैर्यं । इन्द्रियजयो विषयपराङ्मुखानामिन्द्रियाणां स्वात्मन्यवस्थानं । आत्म-दर्शने विवेकख्यातिरूपे चित्तस्य योग्यत्वं समर्थत्वं ॥

c. These, 'purity in the Quality of Goodness,' and the rest, manifest themselves in succession, in the case of him that practises purifications. That is to say, from 'purification' comes 'purity in the Quality of Goodness;' from 'purity in the Quality of Goodness,' 'complacency; from 'complacency,' intentness; from 'intentness,' 'subjugation of the senses;' and from 'subjugation of the senses,' 'fitness for the beholding of soul.'*

d. He states the fruit of the practice of contentment.†

सन्तोषादनुत्तमसुखलाभः ॥ ४२ ॥

The fruit of contentment.

Aph. 42.—From contentment there is acquired superlative felicity.

a. From contentment's reaching its highest degree, there is revealed to the Yogi such an inward joy that the external enjoyment of objects is not equal to a hundreth part of it.‡

b. He states the fruit of 'austerity' *(tapas)*.§

कायेन्द्रियसिद्धिरशुद्धिक्षयात्तपसः ॥ ४३ ॥

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* शौचाभ्यासवत एते सत्त्वशुद्ध्यादयः क्रमेण प्रादुर्भवन्ति। शौचात् सत्त्वशुद्धिः। सत्त्वशुद्धेः सौमनस्यं। सौमनस्यादैकाग्र्यं। ऐकाग्र्यादिन्द्रियजयः। इन्द्रियजयादात्मदर्शनयोग्यतेति॥

† सन्तोषाभ्यासस्य फलमाह॥

‡ सन्तोषप्रकर्षेण योगिनस्तथाविधमान्तरं सुखमाविर्भवति यस्य बाह्यं विषयसुखं शतांशेनापि न समम्॥

§ तपसः फलमाह॥

The fruit of austerity.

Aph. 43.—The perfection of the bodily senses, by the removal of impurity, [is the fruit] of austerity.

a. 'Austerity,' when thoroughly practised, brings 'perfection,' i. e. a heightening, of the bodily senses, through the removal of the impurity, consisting in the 'afflictions,' &c., of the mind.*

b. What is meant is this;—by the *chándráyaṇa* [species of fast], and the like, there is the removal of the 'afflictions' [§ 3] of the mind. By the removal of these there is developed, in the senses, the power of, for example, discerning the subtile, the hidden, and the infinite; and, in the body, [the power of assuming] at will either an atomic or an enormous bulk, &c.†

c. He states the fruit of 'inaudible muttering' *swádhyáya*.‡

स्वाध्यायादिष्टदेवतासम्प्रयोगः ॥ ४४ ॥

The fruit of inaudible muttering.

Aph. 44.—Through inaudible muttering there is a meeting with one's favourite deity.

a. When 'inaudible muttering,' in the shape of charms and spells directed [to some deity or other], is at its height, there

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* तपः समभ्यस्यमानं चेतसः क्लेशादिलक्षणाशुद्धिक्षयद्वारेण कायेन्द्रियाणां सिद्धिमुत्कर्षमादधाति ॥

† अयमर्थः । चान्द्रायणादिना चित्तक्लेशक्षयः । तत्क्षयादिन्द्रियाणां सूक्ष्मव्यवहितविप्रकृष्टदर्शनादिसामर्थ्यमाविर्भवति कायस्य यथेच्छमणुमहत्त्वादीनि ॥

‡ स्वाध्यायस्य फलमाह ॥

takes place, in the case of the Yogi, a meeting with the 'favourite' deity, i. e. with the one to whom this [inaudible muttering] was directed. That is to say, the deity becomes visible* [—and most probably says "Ask a boon"].

b. He states the fruit of 'persevering devotion to the Lord' *(íswara-pranidhána)*.†

समाधिसिद्धिरीश्वरप्रणिधानात् ॥ ४५ ॥

The fruit of persevering devotion to the Lord.

Aph. 45.—Perfection in meditation comes from persevering devotion to the Lord.

a. As for this species of faith in the Lord, there is developed therefrom Meditation, which has been already described,—because that Divine Lord, being pleased, having removed the obstructive 'afflictions,' elicits meditation.‡

b. Having spoken of the 'forbearances' and the 'religious observances' [§29], he speaks of the 'postures' *(ásana)*.§

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* अभिप्रेतमन्त्रजपादिलक्षणे स्वाध्याये प्रकृष्यमाणे योगिन इष्टया अभिप्रेतया देवतया सम्प्रयोगो भवति । सा देवता प्रत्यक्षीभवतीत्यर्थः ॥

† ईश्वरप्रणिधानस्य फलमाह ॥

‡ ईश्वरे यो ऽयं भक्तिविशेषः तस्मात्समाधेरुक्तलक्षणस्याविर्भावो भवति यस्मात्स भगवानीश्वरः प्रसन्नः सन्नन्तरायरूपान् क्लेशानपहृत्य समाधिमुद्बोधयति ॥

§ यमनियमानुक्त्वासनमाह ॥

स्थिरसुखमासनम् ॥ ४६ ॥

Postures what.

Aph. 46.—A 'posture' is what is steady and pleasant.

a. A 'posture' means what one sets one's self in,—such as the *padma*, the *daṇḍa*, the *swastika*, &c., [with the precise character of which we are not at present concerned]. When this is 'steady,'—not wavering,—and 'pleasant,'—not uncomfortable,—then this serves as a subservient to Concentration.*

b. He mentions a plan for producing steadiness and pleasantness in this same.†

प्रयत्नशैथिल्यानन्त्यसमापत्तिभ्याम् ॥ ४७ ॥

'Postures' how managed.

Aph. 47.—Through slightness of effort and through attaining to the infinite [do 'postures,' become steady and pleasant].

a. The construction [with the preceding aphorisms] is this, that that,—viz., 'posture,' becomes steady and pleasant through slightness of effort and through attaining to the infinite.‡

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* आस्यते अनेनेत्यासनं। पद्मासनदण्डासनस्वस्तिकासनादि। तद्यदा स्थिरं निष्कम्पं सुखं अनुद्वेजनीयं भवति तदा तद्योगाङ्गतां भजते ॥

† तस्यैव स्थिरसुखत्वाप्त्यर्थमुपायमाह ॥

‡ तदासनं प्रयत्नशैथिल्येनानन्त्यसमापत्त्या च स्थिरं सुखं भवतीति सम्बन्धः ॥

b. When, when he forms the wish—"Let me establish [myself in such and such] a posture,"—that 'posture' is effected with slight effort, with little trouble; and when the mind attains to the boundlessness that belongs to space,—i. e. when in thought one has identified one's self with it,—then, from there being neither body nor self-consciousness, the 'posture' is no cause of pain;—when *this* command over the 'postures' has been attained, the tremblings, &c. [B. I. §31], which are obstacles to meditation, no longer prevail.*

c. He mentions a fruit of this same when accomplished.†

ततो द्वन्द्वानभिघातः ॥ ४८ ॥

Fruit of the 'postures.'

Aph. 48.—Thence there is no assault by the pairs.

a. When this command of the 'postures' has been attained, the Yogi is not assailed by 'the pairs,' cold and heat, hunger and thirst, &c.;—such is the meaning.‡

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* यदा यदासनं बध्नामीति इच्छां करोति प्रयत्नशै-
थिल्ये ऽप्यक्लेशेनैव तदासनं निष्पद्यते। यदा आकाशगते
आनन्त्ये चेतसः समापत्तिः क्रियते अवधानेन तादात्म्यमा-
पद्यते तदा देहाहङ्काराभावान्नासनं दुःखजनकं भवति।
अस्मिंश्चासनजये सति समाध्यन्तरायभूता न प्रभवन्त्यङ्गमे-
जयत्वादयः ॥

† तस्यैवानुनिष्पादितस्य फलमाह ॥

‡ तस्मिन्नासनजये सति द्वन्द्वैः शीतोष्णक्षुत्तृष्णादिभि-
र्योगी नाभिहन्यत इत्यर्थः ॥

b. Next after the mastering of the 'postures,' he speaks of the 'regulation of the breath' *(práṇáyáma)*.*

तस्मिन् सति श्वासप्रश्वासयोर्गतिविच्छेदः प्राणा-
यामः ॥ ४९ ॥

Regulation of the breath.

Aph. 49.—When this has taken place, there is regulation of the breath, a cutting short of the motion of inspiration and expiration.

a. When steadiness in a 'posture' has taken place, that species of auxiliary of Concentration, viz., 'regulation of the breath,' to which this [steadiness of posture] is conducive, is to be practised. Of what sort is this? In the shape of 'a cutting short of the motion of inspiration and expiration'.†

b. 'Inspiration and expiration' are what have been described [B. I. §31, *e*]. What is called 'regulation of the breath,' is the 'cutting short,' or restraining, 'of the motion,' or flow, in the places external or internal [—see §51—], of these two by means of the threefold process of [regulated] expiration, retention, and inspiration,‡[—see B. I. §34, *a*].

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* आसनजयादनन्तरं प्राणायाममाह ॥

† आसनस्थैर्ये सति तन्निमित्तकः प्राणायामलक्षणो यो-
गाङ्गविशेषो ऽनुष्ठेयो भवति। कीदृशः। श्वासप्रश्वासयोर्गति-
विच्छेदलक्षणः ॥

‡ श्वासप्रश्वासौ कृतलक्षणौ। तयोस्त्रिधा रेचनकुम्भन-
पूरणद्वारेण वाह्याभ्यन्तरेषु स्थानेषु गतेः प्रवाहस्य विच्छेदो
धारणं प्राणायाम उच्यते ॥

c. In order that this same may be easily understood, he states the nature of it, with its divisions.*

स तु बाह्याभ्यन्तरस्तम्भवृत्तिर्देशकालसंख्याभिः परिदृष्टो दीर्घसूक्ष्मः ॥ ५० ॥

This explained. *Aph.* 50.—But this, which is (1) outer, (2) inner, and (3) steady, peculiarised by place, time, and number, is long or short.

a. 'That which is outer' is the expiration, or expelling; 'that which is inner' is the inspiration, or filling; 'that which abides steady,' within, is called *kumbhaka*. It is called *kumbhaka* because, when it takes place, the vital spirits rest motionless like water in a jar (*kumbha*).†

b. This threefold regulation of the breath, further peculiarised by place, time, and number, is termed 'long or short'. 'Peculiarised by place,' e. g., [see the direction] "As regards beginning and end, twelve from the nose;"—that is to say, as far as twelve inches, beginning from the nose. 'Peculiarised by time,' as, "For the duration of thirty six *mátras*," &c. Peculiarised by number,'—e. g. the first *udváta* is made by so many inspirations and expirations, so many times; and the employment of number is had recourse to in order that this may be known [by substituting the definite number for the indefinite 'so many']. By *udváta* is meant the impinging of the air sent [upwards, in speak-

* तस्यैव सुखावगमाय विभज्य स्वरूपं कथयति ॥

† बाह्यवृत्तिः श्वासो रेचकः । अन्तरवृत्तिः प्रश्वासः पूरकः । अन्तस्तम्भवृत्तिः कुम्भकः । तस्मिन् जलमिव कुम्भे निश्चलतया प्राणा अवस्थाप्यन्ते इति कुम्भकः ॥

ing,] from the pit of the stomach, on the head,* [from which it is supposed to be reflected down again, so passing out of the mouth].

b. Having mentioned three regulations of the breath, in order to declare a fourth one, he says.†

वाह्याभ्यन्तरविषयाक्षेपी चतुर्थः ॥ ५१ ॥

A special variety. *Aph.* 51.—The fourth recognises both the outer and the inner spheres.

a. The 'outer sphere' of the breath is that [space] from beginning to end [—reckoning from the nose—] of twelve [inches;—see §50, *b*]. The 'inner sphere' is the heart, the navel, the plexus, &c. The fourth regulation of the breath is that which, in the shape of motionlessness, is a cutting off of the motion [of the breath], recognising, i. e. having an eye upon, both those two spheres.‡

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* त्रिविधोऽयं प्राणायामो देशेन कालेन संख्यया चोपलक्षितो दीर्घसूक्ष्मसंज्ञको भवति। देशेनोपलक्षितो यथा नासाद्वादशान्तादौ नासामारभ्य द्वादशाङ्गुलपर्यन्तमित्यर्थः। कालेनोपलक्षितो यथा षट्त्रिंशन्मात्रादिप्रमाणः। संख्ययोपलक्षितो यथा इयतो वारान् कृत एतावद्भिः श्वासप्रश्वासैः प्रथम उद्घातो भवति एतज्ज्ञानाय संख्याग्रहणमुपात्तं। उद्घातो नाभिमूलात्प्रेरितस्य वायोः शिरस्यभिहननम्॥

† त्रीन् प्राणायामानभिधाय चतुर्थमभिधातुमाह॥

‡ प्राणस्य वाह्यो विषयो द्वादशान्तादिः। अन्तरो

b. The distinction between this and the third one, viz., the *kumbhaka* [§50, *a*,] is this. That one [—the *kumbhaka*—], without paying any regard to the two spheres, the outer and the inner, suddenly, like a lotus dropped upon a heated stone, at once arrives at the condition of rigidity;—but *this* one is a restrainment that has respect to the two spheres.*

c. This also, like the former [§50, *b*], is to be regarded as being peculiarised by time, space, and number.†

d. Of this [regulation of the breath] which is of four descriptions, he mentions the fruit.‡

ततः क्षीयते प्रकाशावरणम्॥ ५२॥

The fruit of the regulation of the breath.

Aph. 52.—Thereby is removed the obscuration of the light.

a. 'Thereby,' i. e. by that regulation of the breath, there is 'removed,' or destroyed, that 'obscuration' which, in the shape

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विषयो हृदयनाभिचक्रादिः तौ द्वौ विषयावाक्षिप्य पर्यालोच्य यो विष्टम्भरूपो गतिविच्छेदः स चतुर्थः प्राणायामः॥

* तृतीयस्मात्कुम्भकादयमस्य विशेषः। स बाह्याभ्यन्तरौ विषयावपर्यालोच्यैव सहसा तप्तोपलनिपतितजलजन्यायेन युगपत् स्तम्भवृत्त्या निष्पद्यते। अस्य तु विषयद्वयाक्षेपको निरोधः॥

† अयमपि पूर्ववद्देशकालसंख्याभिरुपलक्षितो द्रष्टव्यः॥

‡ चतुर्विधस्यास्य फलमाह॥

of the 'afflictions' [§3], there is 'of the light,' that belongs to the Pure Quality of the mind ;—such is the meaning.*

b. He mentions another result.†

धारणासु च योग्यता मनसः॥ ५३॥

A further result.

Aph. 53.—And the mind becomes fit for acts of attention.

a. 'Acts of attention' are what will be spoken of [in the sequel]. The mind, freed from its defects by the several kinds of regulation of the breath, wherever it is directed to, there it remains fixed, and does not suffer distraction.‡

b. He defines 'restraint' *(pratyáhára)*.§

स्वस्वविषयसम्प्रयोगाभावे चित्तस्य स्वरूपानुकार इवेन्द्रियाणां प्रत्याहारः॥ ५४।

'Restraint' what.

Aph. 54.—'Restraint' is as it were the accommodation of the senses to the nature of the mind in the absence of concernment with each one's own object.

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* ततः तस्मात्प्राणायामात् प्रकाशस्य चित्तसत्त्वगतस्य यदावरणं क्लेशरूपं तत् क्षीयते विनश्यतीत्यर्थः॥

† फलान्तरमाह॥

‡ धारणा वक्ष्यमाणाः। तासु प्राणायामैः क्षीणदोषं मनो यत्र यत्र धार्यते तत्र तत्र स्थिरं भवति न विक्षेपं भजते॥

§ प्रत्याहारस्य लक्षणमाह॥

a. It is called 'restraint,' because, when it exists, the senses are restrained, are withheld, from their respective objects. And how is this effected? He replies;—'of the senses,' Sight, &c., there is 'each one's own object,' as Colour, &c:—'concernment' therewith is any energizing with respect thereto:—the 'absence' of this is the abiding in their mere nature after having abandoned all regard to such things. When this takes place, the senses simply accommodate themselves to the nature of the mind; for, all the senses are observed to follow obsequiously the mind, as the bees their leader. Hence, when the mind is restrained [from the exercise of its functions], these [senses] are restrained; and their accommodation to the nature thereof [under such circumstances] is what is called 'restraint'.*

b. He states the fruit.†

ततः परमा वश्यतेन्द्रियाणाम् ॥ ५५ ॥

The fruit of restraint. *Aph.* 55.—Therefrom is there complete subjection of the senses.

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* इन्द्रियाणि स्वस्वविषयेभ्यः प्रत्याह्रियन्ते प्रतिकूलतया ह्रियन्ते ऽस्मिन्निति प्रत्याहारः। स च कथं निष्पद्यत इत्याह। चक्षुरादीनामिन्द्रियाणां स्वः स्वो विषयो रूपादिः। तेन सम्प्रयोगस्तदाभिमुख्येन प्रवर्त्तनं। तदभावस्तदाभिमुख्यं परित्यज्य स्वरूपमात्रे ऽवस्थानं। तस्मिन् सति चित्तस्वरूपमात्रानुकारीणीन्द्रियाणि भवन्ति यतश्चित्तमनुवर्त्तमानानि मधुकरराजमिव मधुकरमक्षिकाः सर्वाणीन्द्रियाणि प्रतीयन्ते। अतश्चित्तनिरोधे तानि प्रत्याहृतानि भवन्ति। तेषां तत्स्वरूपानुकारः प्रत्याहार उक्तः॥

† फलमाह॥

a. For, when 'restraint' is practised, the senses become so subjected, so subdued, that, even when attracted towards external objects, they will not go;—such is the meaning.*

Recapitulation. *b*. Thus, then, [—to recapitulate briefly—] of Concentration, which was defined in the First Book, having declared that appendage, viz., the 'Practical [part of] Concentration' [§1], the fruit of which is the alleviating of of the 'afflictions' [§2]; having mentioned the names of the 'afflictions' [§3], their cause and source [§4], their nature and fruit [§5—11]; having stated also the division, cause, nature, and fruit, of works [§12]; the nature and cause of fructification are set forth [§13—14]. Then, since the 'afflictions,' &c., are to be got rid of, and since it is impossible to get rid of them without knowing what they are, and since knowledge is dependant on instruction, and since the instruction assumes four aspects, as it respects (1) what is to be got rid of, (2) what is not [desired] to be got rid of, (3) what is constituted by the cause, and (4) what is the cause constitutive, and since, without [an explanation of what is meant by the expression] 'getting rid of,' the nature of 'what is to be got rid of' cannot be explained, [therefore] having set forth the fourfold arrangement, with [an explanation of what is meant by] 'getting rid of', and with [an account of] the cause of each thing severally [§15—27]; having explained, along with the fruits, the nature of those appliances, 'forbearance,' &c., which stand in the relation of causes, immediate or mediate, in respect of the constitutive cause [of emancipation], viz., 'discriminative knowledge' [§28—46]; having exhibited the 'postures,' &c., as far as 'attention,' arranged according to their mutual relation as conduced to and conducers [§47—52]; their fruits,

* अभ्यस्यमाने हि प्रत्याहारे तथा वश्यान्यायत्तानीन्द्रियाणि सम्पद्यन्ते यथा बाह्यविषयाभिमुखतां नीयमानान्यपि न यान्तीत्यर्थः ।

along with the respective characters thereof, have been set forth [§53—55].*

c. **Thus this 'Concentration,' having, through 'forbearance,' 'religious observances,' &c., attained to the condition of a seed, and having sprouted by means of the 'postures' and 'regulation of the breath,' and having blossomed by means of 'self-restraint,' will fructify by means of 'attention,' 'contemplation,' and 'meditation' [§29]. Thus has the Book on the Means been explained.†**

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* तदेवं प्रथमपादोक्तलक्षणस्य योगस्याङ्गभूतं क्लेशतनूकरणफलं क्रियायोगमभिधाय क्लेशानामुद्देशं कारणं क्षेत्रं स्वरूपं फलं चोक्त्वा कर्म्मणामपि भेदं कारणं स्वरूपं फलं चाभिधाय विपाकस्य स्वरूपं कारणं चाभिहितम् ततस्त्याज्यत्वात्क्लेशादीनां ज्ञानव्यतिरेकेण त्यागस्याशक्यत्वात् ज्ञानस्य च शास्त्रायत्तत्वात् शास्त्रस्य च हेयाहेयकारणोपादेयोपादानकारणत्वेन चतुर्व्यूहत्वाद्धेयस्य हानव्यतिरेकेण स्वरूपानिष्पत्तेर्हानसहितं चतुर्व्यूहं स्वस्वकारणसहितमभिधाय उपादानकारणभूताया विवेकख्यातेः कारणभूतानामन्तरङ्गबहिरङ्गभावेन स्थितानां योगानां यमादीनां स्वरूपं फलसहितं व्याकृत्य धारणापर्य्यन्तानां चासनादीनां परस्परमुपकार्य्योपकारकभावेनावस्थितानामुद्देशमभिधाय प्रस्परलक्षणपूर्वकं फलमभिहितम् ॥

† तदयं योगो यमनियमादिभिः प्राप्तबीजभावः आसनप्राणायामैरङ्कुरितः प्रत्याहारेण कुसुमितो धारणाध्यानसमाधिभिः फलिष्यतीति व्याख्यातः साधनपादः ॥

d. Thus has been completed the Second Book—that on the Means—of the commentary called the *Rája Mártaṇḍa*, composed by the illustrious great king and governor, king Bhojarájá, on the Aphorisms of Patanjali's System of the Yoga.*

* इति श्री राजाधिराजभोजदेवविरचितायां राजमार्तण्डाभिधायां पातञ्जलयोगशास्त्रसूत्रवृत्तौ द्वितीयः साधनपादः समाप्तः ॥

END OF BOOK II.

THE APHORISMS

OF THE

VEDA'NTA PHILOSOPHY;

BY

BA'DARA'YAṆA.

WITH

ILLUSTRATIVE EXTRACTS FROM THE COMMENTARY.

IN SANSKRIT AND ENGLISH.

Printed for the use of the Benares College
by order of Govt. N. W. P.

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1851.

PREFACE.

The great body of Hindú Philosophy is based upon six sets of very concise Aphorisms. Without a commentary the Aphorisms are scarcely intelligible, they being designed not so much to communicate the doctrine of the particular school, as to aid, by the briefest possible suggestions, the memory of him to whom the doctrine shall have been already communicated. To this end they are admirably adapted; and, this being their end, the obscurity, which must needs attach to them in the eyes of the uninstructed, is not chargeable upon them as a fault.

For various reasons it is desirable that there should be an accurate translation of the Aphorisms, with so much of gloss as may be required to render them intelligible. A class of pandits, in the Benares Sanskrit College, having been induced to learn English, it is contemplated that a version of the Aphorisms, brought out in successive portions, shall be submitted to the criticism of these men, and, through them, of other learned Bráhmans, so that any errors in the version may have the best chance of being discovered and rectified. The employment of such a version as a class-book is designed to subserve further the attempt to determine accurately the aspect of the philosophical terminology of the East as regards that of the West.

J. R. B.

Benares College,
5th January, 1851.

THE APHORISMS KNOWN AS THE BRAHMA-SU'TRAS, THE S'A'RI'RAKA SU'TRAS, OR THE VEDA'NTA-SU'TRAS.

Book I. Chapter I.

Salutation to the venerable Gaṉes'a !

I reverence the pair of feet of the venerable Ráma, the instrument [in the attainment] of undivided joy,—from the touch of the dust whereof even a *stone* [—in the shape of the petrified Ahalyá, the wife of Gautama, whose story may be found in the *Rámáyaṉa*—Book I. sect. 38—] attained felicity.*

Section I.

Of The First Cause of the Universe.

The reader to whom the work is addressed.

a. Finding one, in this world, who had perused the Vedas in conformity with the injunction of their constant perusal, and

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* श्रीगणेशाय नमः । श्रीरामचरणद्वन्द्वमद्वन्द्वानन्दसाधनं । नमामि यद्रजोयोगात्पाषाणोऽपि सुखङ्कृतः ॥

[hence] possessing a rough knowledge [of the sense of what he had thus perseveringly perused], desiring to attain the chief end of [the soul of] man [—the "summum bonum"—], not hankering after the fruits of this world or of any one beyond it [—finding such a one—], the pre-eminently benevolent BÁDARÁYAṆA aphorised*—as follows.

अथातो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा ॥ १ ॥

The subject proposed.

APH. 1. Next, therefore, [O student that hast attained thus far] a desire to know God [is to be entertained by thee].

a. Here the word 'next' means immediately on the [enquirer's] attainment of the quaternion of requisites†—[which, as explained in the *Vedánta-sára*, § 9, are] a perception of the distinction of the eternal reality from the transient, a disregard of the enjoyment of the fruits of both here and hereafter, the possession of tranquillity and self-restraint, and the desire of liberation.‡]

b. The word 'therefore' refers to the reason [why a desire to know the nature of God ought to be experienced by the student

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* इह खलु नित्याध्ययनविधिना ऽधीतस्वाध्यायमापातज्ञानवन्तं परमपुरुषार्थकाममैहिकामुष्मिकफलेषु विरक्तमुपलभमानः परमकारुणिको बादरायणः सूत्रयामास ॥ भा० ॥

† अथाथशब्दः साधनचतुष्टयसम्पत्त्यानन्तर्यार्थः ।

‡ साधनानि नित्यानित्यवस्तुविवेकेहामुत्रफलभोगविरागशमदमादिसम्पत्तिमुमुक्षुत्वानि ॥ वे० सार० ॥

properly qualified to enter upon the enquiry ;—and this reason is] because the Veda itself shows us that the fruits of keeping up the sacred fire and of the like expedients [for the attainment]of blessedness, are not *eternal.** For example [the Veda declares]—"As, here, the world obtained by works perishes, just so, yonder, the world obtained by virtue perishes."† So too it shows us that the chief end of [the soul of] man is [to be attained] through the knowledge of God—[for the Veda tells us] "He who knows God obtains the highest" &c.‡ Therefore what is awanting [to supply the ellipsis in the aphorism] is this, that "after the attainment of the requisites, as declared, a desire to know God is to be formed."§

c. The expression *brahma-jijnásá* means 'desire to know God'—[being made up of the two words *brahma* and *jijnásá.*] The word *jijnásá* [according to its etymology as a desiderative derivative from the root *jná* 'to know'] means 'the desire to know ;'—and the word *brahma* 'God' means what is next to be told.||

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* अतश्शब्दो हेत्वर्थः। यस्माद्वेद एवाग्निहोत्रादीनां श्रेयस्साधनानामनित्यफलतां दर्शयति ॥

† तद्यथेह कर्म्मचितो लोकः क्षीयत एवमेवामुत्र पुण्यचितो लोकः क्षीयत इत्यादि ॥

‡ तथा ब्रह्मज्ञानादपि परमपुरुषार्थं दर्शयति। ब्रह्मविदाप्नोति परमित्यादि ॥

§ तस्माद्यथोक्तसाधनसम्पत्त्यनन्तरं ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा कर्त्तव्येति शेषः।

|| ब्रह्मणो जिज्ञासा ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा। ज्ञातुमिच्छा जिज्ञासा। ब्रह्मच वक्ष्यमाणलक्षणम् ॥

d. In the preceding aphorism it was stated that *God* ought to be desired to be known. How then, [it will of course be asked,] is this 'God' defined [—or, in other words, what is the characteristic mark—*lakshaṇa*—by which we may be able to recognise the object of our search—] ? Therefore the venerable maker of the aphorisms declares as follows.*

जन्माद्यस्य यतः ॥ २ ॥

What is meant by the name 'God.'

APH. 2. [God is that one] Whence the birth &c. of this [universe results.]

a. The compound [*janmádi*—rendered 'birth &c.' and meaning literally] 'that of which the first is birth or production,' is a Bahuvríhi compound of the kind [mentioned in the *Laghu Kaumudí*, under No. 541, as] "denoting that of which the matters implied in the name are perceived along with the thing itself." [For] the meaning of the compound is 'birth, continuance, and dissolution:†' [—so that 'birth,' which is a part of the compound word, is also a part of the thing meant by the compound].

b. And [as some one may ask why, in the compound word denoting 'birth continuance and dissolution', we speak of 'birth,' rather than of either of the others, as the *first*,—we may mention that] the treatment of 'birth' as the *first* has a regard both to the teachings of the Veda and to the nature of things. The teaching

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* पूर्व्वसूत्रे ब्रह्म जिज्ञासितव्यमित्युक्तं । किंलक्षणं पुनस्तद्ब्रह्मेत्यत आह भगवान् सूत्रकारः ॥

† जन्मोत्पत्तिरादिरस्येति तद्गुणसंविज्ञानो बहुव्रीहिः । जन्मस्थितिभङ्गं समासार्थः ॥

of the Veda, on the one hand, [authorises the form of expression in question] by exhibiting the consecutive order, of birth continuance and dissolution, in the sentence beginning with "or whence these elements are *produced*" &c. The nature of things also [authorises the form of expression in question] because the continuance or the dissolution is possible of that concrete thing alone which, through production, has obtained an existence.*

The created universe as far as we are concerned.

c. 'Of this'—i. e. of whatever concrete thing is presented to those [our instruments of cognition] among which the senses stand first.† By the 'this,' then, is denoted the things concreted with those properties whereof the being produced is the first in order. By the 'whence' is denoted the [Grand First] Cause.‡

The conception of God according to the Aphorism when explicated.

d. The meaning, then, of the aphorism is this, that, *That One* is God, from Whom, Omniscient, Almighty, First Cause, there is the production the continuance and the dissolution of this world, adjusted as it is

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* जन्मनश्चादित्वं श्रुतिनिर्देशापेक्षं वस्तुवृत्तापेक्षञ्च । श्रुतिनिर्द्देशस्तावत् । यतो वा इमानि भूतानि जायन्त इत्यस्मिन् वाक्ये जन्मस्थितिप्रलयानां क्रमदर्शनात् । वस्तुवृत्तमपि जन्मना लब्धात्मकस्य धर्मिणः स्थितिप्रलयसम्भवात् ॥

† अस्येति । प्रत्यक्षादिसन्निधापितस्य धर्म्मिणः ॥

‡ इदमा निर्द्देशः । जन्मादिधर्म्मसम्बन्धा अर्थाः । यत इति कारणनिर्द्देशः ॥

with its names and natures—[for language, as well as the things about which language is conversant, is regarded as the work of God—], furnished with its various agents & experiencers, the locality where are [experienced] those [fruits] of action which [fruits] are determined by established places and times—[for the character of a bare act, such as the extending of one's arm, is determined by the fact whether *there* and *then* that action was appropriate]—, and the nature of the construction of which [world] even the mind cannot conceive.* And thus, then, the *characteristic* of God—or that by which we are to recognise what is meant when the word 'God' is employed—is this, that He is the *cause of the production &c. of the world.*†

e. Here [—i. e. in speaking of the *modes* of mundane things—] we take in [or specify] production continuance and dissolution [and no others], because the other modifications of state are included under those three.‡

f. By saying that God is the *Cause* of the world, the maker of the aphorisms has, by the sense of the sentence, laid down the proposition that He is *Omniscient*; because creation, by one intelligent, presupposes *knowledge.* And thus God *knows* all because He *made* all. It is an admitted principle that he who

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* अस्य जगतो नामरूपाभ्यां व्याकृतस्य । अनेककर्तृभोक्तृसंयुक्तस्य । प्रतिनियतदेशकालनिमित्तक्रियाफलाश्रयस्य । मनसाप्यचिन्त्यरचनारूपस्य । जन्मस्थितिभङ्गं यतस्सर्वज्ञात्सर्वशक्तेः कारणाद्भवति तदेव ब्रह्मेति सूत्रार्थः ॥

† तथाच जगज्जन्मादिकारणत्वं ब्रह्मणो लक्षणम् ॥

‡ अन्येषां भावविकाराणां त्रिष्वेवान्तर्भाव इति जन्मस्थितिलयानामिह ग्रहणम् ॥

makes anything *knows* it,—as a potter* [knows a water-jar—so far forth as it is a water-jar—else how could he make one? and God made everything so far forth as it is anything].

g. By being represented as the *Cause* of the world, God was *implied* to be omniscient and almighty. It is merely to *impress* this that he says† [as follows].

शास्त्रयोनित्वात्॥३॥

How we are certain that God is omniscient.

APH. 3. [That God is omniscient follows] from the fact of [His] being the source of the Scriptures, [—or—on an alternative rendering—from the fact that the Scriptures, which declare this omniscience, are the source—scilicet of our knowledge—of Him.]

a. God is the source, i. e. the [only possible] cause, of a great Scripture such as the Rig-veda, augmented by its various repertories of learning [—meaning those appendages of the Veda, grammar &c.]— illuminating, as a lamp, everything, and [itself] the next thing to something omniscient. For—of such a Scripture as the Rig-veda and the like, which [by containing

* ब्रह्मणो जगत्कारणत्वोक्त्या सर्वज्ञत्वमर्थात्सूचकता प्रतिज्ञातं चेतनसृष्टेर्ज्ञानपूर्वकत्वात्। तथाच ब्रह्म सर्वज्ञं सर्वकारणत्वात्। यो यत्कर्त्ता स तज्ज्ञो यथा कुलाल इति सिद्धम्॥

† जगत्कारणत्वप्रदर्शनेन सर्वज्ञं सर्वशक्तिब्रह्मेत्युपक्षिप्तं। तदेव द्रढयन्नाह॥

information in regard to *everything*] is associated with the qualities of one omniscient, the origin could not have been from one otherwise than omniscient.*

Illustration of the induction by means of which this certainty is arrived at.

b. [In illustration of this, it may be observed that] it is an admitted fact that whatever treatise, embracing a wide range of topics, emanates from any particular man—as the *grammar*, for example, from Pánini—, although its topics be but a *part* of what is capable of being known [—or of the omne scibile—],—that man, even in consideration of *that* is inferred to be exceedingly knowing† [—and the author of a work that explains *everything* must, by parity of reasoning, be inferred to be omniscient.]

c. [And the omniscience of God may be learned] from such texts of the Veda as this, viz., "The Rig-veda, and the Yajur-veda is [—notwithstanding its excellence—not the product of laborious effort, but] the mere out-breathing of this Great Being." The drift of this text is this, viz.,—what need is there to declare

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* महत ऋग्वेदादेः शास्त्रस्यानेकविद्यास्थानोपबृंहितस्य प्रदीपवत्सर्वार्थावद्योतिनः सर्वज्ञकल्पस्य योनिः कारणं ब्रह्म । न हीदृशस्य शास्त्रस्य ऋग्वेदादिलक्षणस्य सर्वज्ञगुणान्वितस्य सर्वज्ञादन्यतस्संभवो ऽस्ति ॥

† यद्यद्विस्तरार्थं शास्त्रं यस्मात्पुरुषविशेषात्संभवति यथा व्याकरणादि पाणिन्यादेर्ज्ञेयैकदेशार्थमपि स ततो ऽप्यधिकतरविज्ञान इति प्रसिद्धम् ॥

the omniscience and the omnipotence of that Great Being, the Absolute, when he is [proved to be omniscient &c. by his being recognised as] the source of such works as the Rig-veda &c.*?

The alternative rendering of the third Aphorism.

d. [But there is another interpretation of the aphorism, for, according to the commentator,] otherwise—the Scripture, i. e. the Rig-veda and the rest, as above described,—is the source or cause or proof of *Him*,—of God—as far as regards our comprehension of His nature :—that is to say—it is from the Scriptures, as our evidence for the fact, that we come to comprehend that He is the cause of the production &c. of the world.† Such a text [—from which the fact may be learned that God is the cause of the production &c. of the world—] is that one already cited under the preceding aphorism—viz., " Or

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* अस्य महतो भूतस्य निश्वसितमेवैतद्यदृग्वेदो यजुर्वेद इत्यादिश्रुतेः ॥ अस्य महतो भूतस्यापरिच्छिन्नस्य तादृशर्ग्वेदादियोनित्वं तस्य सर्वज्ञत्वं सर्वशक्तित्वञ्च किं वक्तव्यमित्याशयः ॥

† अर्थान्तरं । अथवा । यथोक्तमृग्वेदादिशास्त्रं योनिः कारणं प्रमाणमस्य ब्रह्मणो यथावत्स्वरूपाधिगमे शास्त्रादेव प्रमाणाज्जगतो जन्मादिकारणमधिगम्यत इत्यभिप्रायः ॥

whence these elements are produced" &c.* [see § 2. c.]

Objections, of the Mímánsá, to the allegation that the Veda aims directly at revealing God.

e. [In the foregoing Aphorism, according to its second interpretation, it is asserted that the Institutes are what make us to know God;—but the followers of the *Mímánsá* object to this, declaring that the direct design of the Scriptures is to reveal *what we ought to do*—and not to reveal God apart from any consideration of a line of conduct to be followed in respect of Him. In order to obviate these objections, the orthodox tenet is laid down in the aphorism here following.]

तत्तु समन्वयात् ॥ ४ ॥

That it aims directly at revealing God—the only consistent theory of the Veda.

Aph. 4. But That One [—viz. God—is what the Scriptures declare, not with a view to anything ulterior, but simply in order that what is so declared may be known; and we make this assertion] because there is consistency [in this view, whilst the opposite view would land us in inconsistencies.]

a. The word "but" is intended to rebut the first view of the case† [stated in §. 3. e.]

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* शास्त्रमुदाहृतं पूर्वसूत्रे यतो वा इमानि भूतानि जायन्त इत्यादि ॥

† तुशब्दः पूर्वपक्षव्यावृत्त्यर्थः ॥

b. "That One," i. e. God, is declared in the *Vedántas* [—i. e. in those theological sections of the Vedas usually termed *upanishads*—] as the direct object of declaration [—and not merely, see §. 3. *e.*,—as a mediate step to the injunction of *works* :]—why?—"because there is consistency." Consistency means the suiting of expressions well together among themselves—and *that* is our reason*[—in as much as we find this consistency among the expressions of Scripture when we hold the pronoun "That" to refer to God, but not otherwise].

Consistency the test of correct interpretation.

c. [We make the assertions made in § 4 *b.* because it is a maxim that] *consistency* is that in virtue of which any one [out of several offered interpretations] is [to be recognised as] that which conveys the real import.†

d. Now, in order to demolish the opinion of those who wish [it to be believed] that God is set forth, in the theological part of the Vedas, [incidentally] through the injunction of devotions, and who do not wish [it to be believed] that the direct design [of the scriptures] is to declare God as He is,—another comment [on § 4] is undertaken.‡

* तद्ब्रह्म वेदान्तेषु तात्पर्य्येण प्रतिपाद्यते । कुतः । समन्वयात् । सम्यगन्वयस्समन्वयः । तस्मात् ॥

† अन्वयस्य सम्यक्त्वं तात्पर्य्यवत्त्वम् ॥

‡ सम्प्रति सिद्धे व्युत्पत्तिमनिच्छतां उपास्तिविधिद्वारा वेदान्तेभ्यो ब्रह्मसिद्धिमिच्छतां मतनिरासाय वर्णकान्तरमारभ्यते ॥

e. In the opinion of these [followers of the Mímánsá § 4 *d.*, the theological parts of the Vedas announce God] not as what is to be declared for itself, but with a view to something ulterior [—viz., as the object of the devotions which are enjoined]. They are not concerned [say these objectors] about God simply as he is—because [if you assert that they are so, then] there is an absence of the characteristic [by which an *Institute* or *S'ástra* is recognized—viz. *injunctions* respecting] conduct. Since an Institute has in view [as its direct object] the doing and forbearing [which it enjoins in respect of acts to be done or forborne], it is not possible that the name of Institute [*S'ástra* —derived as it is from the root *s'ás* 'to enact'] should belong [—as both parties agree it *does* belong—] to it [i. e. to the *Upanishad* if the object in view were merely God as he *is** [and not as He is to be acted towards].

f. Further [the objector goes on to say], it would present no end to be gained [if the *Upanishad* were intended merely to declare God as he is—which declaration according to the Vedánta, be it remembered, involves the declaration, addressed to every one that, "Thou art That One"—], for we do not see that any end is gained even on the knowledge taking place that "I am Brahma." If the end *were* gained through such

Remark, of the Mímánsá, that if man, on knowing God, is God, he does not seem to be much the better for it.

*तच । वेदान्ता विधेयोपासनाविषयत्वेन ब्रह्म समर्पयन्ति । प्रवृत्त्यादिलिङ्गाभावान्न सिद्धब्रह्मपराः । किञ्च प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्तिपरत्वेनैव शास्त्रत्वेन सिद्धब्रह्मपरत्वे शास्त्रत्वञ्च न सम्भवति ॥

knowledge [which knowledge, you assert, it is the direct purpose of the Scriptures to communicate], then there would not be [as, however, there is,] the enjoining of such things as *Meditation** [on the great fact—which to know at all is to know as completely as it can be known after any amount of meditation—for you either know it or you do not, the case not being one that admits of degrees.]

g. Therefore [the objector concludes], since, on meeting with such injunctions as "Only towards Soul should he direct his devotions"—"He who knows Brahma, becomes Brahma"—"He who is desirous of becoming Brahma should effect an understanding of Brahma—or of *Soul*,"—[since, on meeting with these] the question arises *who* is this 'Soul'?—all the *Upanishads* are serviceable [—for we do not dispute their utility—] in as much as they declare Him [—and, by answering the question, and so rendering the injunctions intelligible, subserve the direct aim of the Veda—viz. the conveying of injunctions;]—and Emancipation is to be accomplished [not by a mere *knowledge* of God, but] by devotions. Well—this objection having presented itself, it is stated [by the author of the Aphorisms in reply] "But That One, because there is consistency"†[—§ 4.] The meaning is this, that, "That One," i. e.

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* नापि प्रयोजनवत्त्वं । अहं ब्रह्मास्मीति ज्ञाने सत्यपि प्रयोजनस्यादर्शनाद्यद्येवम्भूतज्ञानात्प्रयोजनसिद्धिस्तर्हि मननादिविधानं न स्यात् ॥

† तस्मादात्मेत्येवोपासीत । ब्रह्म वेद ब्रह्मैव भवति । ब्रह्मभवनकामो ब्रह्मवेदनं कुर्य्यादित्येवमादिषु विधिषु कोऽसावात्मेत्याकाङ्क्षा-

God, is declared, in the theological parts of the Vedas, *simpliciter*; —why?—because this leads to no inconsistency* — and the Mímánsá supposition does].

Emancipation cannot be the fruit of works.

h. And it is not true, for the matter of that, that Emancipation is to be accomplished by [such works as] devotional exercises [§ 4. *b.*], for, since devotional exercise admits of degrees, there would be in the Emancipation thereby accomplished also differences of degree, and thus it would not be *absolute*† [—which is what we do not allow to be Emancipation at all].

The emancipated necessarily disembodied.

i. [And devotional exercises, subserved by a knowledge of God—see § 4. *g.*—cannot lead directly to absolute emancipation—see § 4. *h.*—] because, since a *body* is indispensable during the condition of enjoying the fruit of enjoined acts, there would be a body even in *Emancipation* [*from* the body and all that belongs to it—which is absurd].

Absolute emancipation implies the absence of things pleasing as well as of things displeasing.

Moreover [if the emancipated had a body] there would not be [—as, however, there is—] the denial that the emancipated is touched by what is pleasing or displeasing —[which denial we find in the following text] viz., "Him that abideth bodiless nei-

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यां तत्समपकत्वेन सर्वे वेदान्ता उपयुज्यन्ते । उपासनासाध्यस्य-मोक्ष इति प्राप्ते । उच्यते । तत्तु समन्वयात् ।

* तद्ब्रह्म साक्षाद्वेदान्तप्रतिपाद्यं । कुतः । समन्वयादित्यर्थः ॥

† न तावदुपासनासाध्यो मोक्षः । उपासनायास्तारतम्येन तत्साध्यमोक्षस्यापि तारतम्यमनित्यत्वञ्च स्यात् ।

"ther what is pleasing nor what is displeasing doth touch;"—for, if Emancipation were the fruit of meritorious acts then it would be something pleasing* [—*all* the fruits of meritorious acts, according to Scripture, being something pleasant.]

j. Therefore the theological parts of the Vedas are conversant about God directly, and not [indirectly] through injunctions [which give occasion for the mention of him—see § 4. g.— ;] and thus it is established that God is revealed by the Institutes independently† [—i.e. simply to the end that He may be known].

Summary, recapitulative, of the first four Aphorisms.

k. Thus has it been stated, in four Aphorisms, that God is the Omniscient, the omnipotent, the cause of the world, the object of revelation in the theological parts of the Vedas.‡

Section II.

Confutation of the Atheistical doctrine of the Sánkhyas.

l. [The following question has been mooted]—Is "That

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* विधेयकर्म्मफलभोगदशायां शरीरस्यावश्यकत्वेन मोक्षे ऽपि शरीरं स्यात्। किञ्चाशरीरं वावसन्तं न प्रियाप्रिये स्पृशत इति मुक्तस्य प्रियाप्रियस्पर्शनिषेधो न स्यात्। मोक्षस्यधर्म्मफलत्वेन तस्यैव प्रियस्य विद्यमानत्वात्॥

† तस्माद्वेदान्तास्साक्षादेव ब्रह्मणि समनुगता न विधिद्वारेति सिद्धं ब्रह्म स्वतन्त्रमेव शास्त्रप्रमाणकमिति॥

‡ एवं चतुर्भिस्सूत्रैस्सर्वज्ञं सर्वशक्ति जगत्कारणं वेदान्तप्रतिपाद्यं ब्रह्मे त्युक्तम्॥

The question whether the Cause of the world is intelligent or unintelligent.

One" [spoken of in § 4] something thinking or something unthinking? The Sánkhyas, in regard to this, [—admitting the authority, but taking liberties in regard to the interpretation, "of the Vedas,] say—" The cause of the world cannot be a God " who is fixed [in one perpetual and universal monotony of state], " because there is neither the possibility of knowledge nor of " action [in such a being]; but *Nature* [—see the *Tattwa Samása* " § 7.—] is the cause of the world, because there *is* [in nature] " that [viz. the possibility of knowledge and of action]. Taking " into account its [constituent] quality of purity [*Tattwa Samása* " § 96—] its capability of knowing follows of course, and, by " means of all its three qualities, it is capable of acting. [On the " other hand] Brahma, from being but one thing [along with " nothing else] cannot act:—therefore the Upanishads, by the " expression 'That One,' speak of omniscient and omnipotent " *Nature*."* In the design to demolish the opinion of those " who hold this opinion], the following Aphorism originates."

ईक्षतेर्नाशब्दम् ॥ ५ ॥

APH. 5. ["Nature"—as declared by the Sánkhyas to be the

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* वस्तुतस्तच्चेतनमचेतनं वा । तत्र सांख्याः कूटस्थब्रह्मणो ज्ञानक्रियाशक्त्यभावान्न जगत्कारणत्वं । प्रधानस्य तु तत्सत्त्वाज्जगत्कारणत्वं । सत्वगुणमादाय ज्ञानशक्तिमत्वं । त्रिगुणत्वात्क्रियाशक्तिमत्वं । ब्रह्मण एकत्वान्न क्रियाशक्तिः । तस्मात्सर्वज्ञं सर्वशक्ति प्रधानमेव तदनुवादका वेदान्ता इति वदन्ति ॥

Brute Nature not the Cause of the world, for the Cause is an intelligent one.

cause of the world—is] not so:—it is unscriptural, because of the "reflecting" [or "seeing", which Scripture speaks of as belonging to That which is the cause of the world.]

a. The "Nature" imagined [or postulated] by the Sánkhyas, is *not* the cause of the world. The reason [assigned in the Aphorism, for saying so,] is this, that "it is un-scriptural." This [expression—viz. "un-scriptural"—] is an epithet pregnant with a reason. He means to say, [*Nature* is not the cause of the world], because it is not *this* [viz. Nature] that the Scripture—that is to say the *Veda*—furnishes the evidence of. The reason [for asserting] that Scripture does not furnish the evidence of what the Sánkhyas call "Nature," is [the word cited in the Aphorism—viz.] "reflecting" [—or, literally, "seeing"—] which term [as it stands in the Aphorism] denoting the verbal root itself [—the employment of the word being that which the schoolmen term the *suppositio materialis,* and which the Sanskrit grammarians term *anukaraṇa*—] is intended to *indicate* [though it does not here *denote*] the *sense* of the verb "to see:" † [—conf. the *Sáhitya Darpaṇa* § 13. *a.*].

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* तन्मतनिरासार्थमिदं सूत्रमारभ्यते ।

† सांख्यपरिकल्पितं प्रधानं जगत्कारणं न भवति। तत्र हेतुरशब्दमिति । हेतुगर्भविशेषणमेतत् । अशब्दत्वादवेदप्रमाणकत्वादित्यर्थः । वेदाप्रमाणकत्वे हेतुः । ईक्षतेरिति धातुवाचकेक्षतिशब्दो लक्षणया धात्वर्थेक्षणपरः ॥

†. Mr. Colebrooke [—Essays Vol. 1. p. 338.—], when rendering the 5th Aphorism, makes BÁDARÁYAṆA say "It is not so;—for 'wish' (consequently volition) is attributed to that cause." The verb, however, is not *ish* 'to wish, but *íksh* 'to see.'

b. But then [the Sánkhyas rejoin]—it is certain that the cause of the world is not [proved to be] God by the mere [mention of] "reflecting" [or "seeing"]—for we hear of *senseless* things seeing—e. g. Water and Light—in such texts as "The Light saw," "The Waters saw;"—and so likewise in regard to *Nature* the "seeing" is used in a secondary or transferred meaning* [—i. e. tropically]. This [argument of the Sánkhyas] having presented itself, it is declared† [by the author of the Aphorisms as follows.]

॥ गौणश्चेन्नात्मशब्दात् ॥ ६ ॥

The scriptural expressions, implying that the cause of the world is intelligent, not to be explained away figuratively.

APH. 6. If [you say that the expression "seeing" is] employed tropically [the reference being to Nature, which does not "see"—then I say] No,—because of the word 'Soul' [which is *not* applicable to Nature, and which *is* applied to That which is in question].

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* Mr. Colebrooke (—Essays Vol. 1. p. 338—) views differently the scholastic term *gauṇa* which we have rendered by the expression "used in a secondary or transferred meaning." Whately (—in his Logic, B. III. § 10.)— says with reference to this employment of words, "Thus we speak of Homer, for 'the works of Homer'; and this is a secondary or transferred meaning." So, in the *Sáhitya Darpaṇa*—(see the translation thereof, § 13 *a*)—the expression 'a herd-station on the Ganges' is cited as an instance where a word, the *primary* (*mukhya*) sense of which is 'the stream of water named the Ganges', is employed in the *secondary* (*gauṇah* or *lakshaṇika*) sense of 'the *bank*' thereof. Mr. Colebrooke, applying these technical terms *mukhya* and *gauṇa* not to the employment of language, in a sense original or transferred, but to the *dignity of character* of the world's cause, writes as follows. "In the sequel "of the first chapter questions are raised upon divers passages of the *Vedas*, alluded to in the text, and quoted in the scholia, where minor attributes [*gauṇa?*] "are seemingly assigned to the world's cause; or in which subordinate designations occur, such as might be supposed to indicate an inferior being, but are "shown to intend the supreme one."—See § 8. *a*.

* नन्वीक्षणमात्रेण न ब्रह्म जगत्कारणमिति निश्चयः । तत्तेज ऐक्षत । ता आप ऐक्षन्तेत्यचेतनयोरप्यप्तेजसोरीक्षणश्रवणात्प्रधानेऽपीक्षतिर्गौणेति प्राप्ते । उच्यते ॥

a. If you say that the word "seeing" is used in a secondary sense [i. e. tropically] with reference to Nature, just as it is with reference to Water and Light [§ 5. *b.*], it is *not* as you say. Why? —"because of the word Soul":—that is to say because we hear the word Soul* [applied to the Cause of the world, while it is *not* in any kind of way applicable to Nature].

b. But then [the Sánkhyas may yet rejoin—dont say *that*,] but let the term 'Soul' also [as well as the term referred to in § 5,] be used tropically with reference to Nature;—or even say that it denotes it *literally*, for the term [as may be learned from the dictionary] has a variety of meanings. Because of this [suggestion of the Sánkhyas] he says† [as follows].

। तन्निष्ठस्य मोक्षोपदेशात् ॥ ७ ॥

Man—called upon to identify himself with the cause of the world—cannot be called upon to identify himself with what is unintelligent.

Aph. 7. [That "That One" is not "Nature," may be inferred] from the declaration that the Emancipation takes place of him who is intent upon "That"—[which "That," if unintelligent,—as Nature is—it is absurd that a thinking being should intently strive to identify himself with].

a. 'Nature' is *not* denoted by the word 'Soul,'—because, in such texts as the one beginning "The man that has a preceptor

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* अप्तेजसोरिव प्रधानेऽपि ईक्षतिर्गौणीति चेन्न । कुतः । आत्मशब्दादात्मशब्दश्रवणादित्यर्थः ॥

† नन्वात्मशब्दोऽपि प्रधाने गौणोऽस्तु । नानार्थकतया मुख्यो वेत्यत आह ॥

knows," and so on,—the Emancipation is declared [of *whom*?—] of S'WETAKETU mentioned in this text "That art thou, O S'wetaketu!"—[but of S'wetaketu how circumstanced?—why—of S'wetaketu] who is going to be emancipated after having been instructed to fix his mind intently upon '*That* One.' Now if unthinking 'Nature' were here denoted by the word 'That,' then the precept "That art thou" would cause the intelligent S'wetaketu, desirous of Emancipation, to understand as follows—"O thinking S'wetaketu!—thou art something unthinking." Then he, on the authority of that precept, pondering [as we are directed to ponder the precept, but pondering it under the erroneous impression that it means him to understand] "I am something unthinking," would miss his Emancipation and go to ruin :—and thus the precept would be [no better than] the babble of an idiot:—and this is not what we should like :—and therefore it is a settled point that the word "That" [§ 4] refers to an *intelligent* Being.*

b. But then [the Sánkhyas may still contend]—let it be supposed [—for the sake of argument—] that "Soul" *is* declared,

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* न प्रधानमात्मशब्दवाच्यं । तत्त्वमसि श्वेतकेतो इति श्वेतकेतोश्चेतनस्य मोक्षयितव्यस्य तन्निष्ठतामुपदिश्य आचार्यवान्पुरुषो वेदेत्यादिना मोक्षोपदेशात् । यदि ह्यचेतनं प्रधानं तच्छब्दवाच्यं मुमुक्षुं श्वेतकेतु चेतनं तत्त्वमसीति शास्त्रं ग्राहयेत् । हे श्वेतकेतो चेतनाचेतनोऽसीति । तदा शास्त्रप्रामाण्यादचेतनोऽस्मीति ध्यायमानो मोक्षाद्व्याहन्येत् । अनर्थश्च स्यात् । तथा च शास्त्रमुन्मत्तप्रलापो भवेत् । तच्चानिष्टं । तस्मादात्मशब्दश्चेतनपर इति सिद्धम् ॥

[—but at all events admit that, in the first instance, it is declared not *directly* by the word "That," in Aphorism § 4, but *indirectly*] through the declaration of "Nature" [which we still contend is denoted directly by the "That"], in the same way as in [the directions for finding the small star Arundhatí, beginning with] "The large Arundhatí" &c.—With reference to this [wilily offered compromise of the Sánkhyas] he says†—

॥ हेयत्वावचनाच्च ॥ ८ ॥

What the Veda means directly by the Cause of the world is no rude type of God but God Himself.

Aph. 8.—And [you must not say that the "That"—§ 4—denotes "Nature," and that the conception of "Nature" is afterwards to be quitted for that of "Soul,"] because there is no direction that it [—whatever the primary denotation of the "That" may be—] is to be quitted [for any other].

a. If Nature,—meaning thereby something that is *not* Soul,—were denoted [in § 4] by the word "That," then, on that occasion [when the declaration was made which runs thus—"That art thou"—] the declaration [–for we cannot suppose the declaration *designed* to mislead—]would have been "That—meaning That *Soul*—art thou:"— or, [if the ellipsis in the passage itself were still left unsupplied,—then assuredly] some precept, designed to declare the Supreme Soul, would tell us that that [first rude conception of God under the form of Nature] is to be *quitted*,—so that [we should understand, from that warning percept, that] he

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† ननु स्थूलारुन्धतीति न्यायेन प्रधानोपदेशद्वारा आत्मोपदेशो ऽयमस्त्वित आह ॥

[meaning S'wetaketu—see § 7. *a.*–] is *not*, is consequence of the [elliptically expressed] declaration of "That" [—which, on the hypothesis under consideration, denotes "Nature" and nothing else—] to become—through ignorance of the fact that *Soul* is meant—intent [in his meditations] upon *that* [which is not really meant through mentioned—viz. Nature. And this direction, to abandon the first rude conception after it had served its purpose of suggesting a better one, would resemble a familiar method of pointing out an object not itself readily discernible;—for the process would be] like as when a person wishing to point out [the small star, in the consellation of the Pleiades, called] Arundhatí, [first directs attention to the large star near it, and then] tells that the [large] star standing near it is [*not* the one wanted, but is] to be quitted, [and the small star, which that large one stands near, is the one to be observed]:—such is the meaning:* —[and this wily suggestion, of the Sánkhyas, we Vedántins repel,—because if we were to admit that the *primary* (*mukhya*) sense of the word 'That,' in Aph. 4., is 'Nature,' and that it means 'God' (—if at all—) only in a *secondary* (*gauṇa*) sense; then you Sánkhyas would go on to argue that your 'Nature'—for which you had secured the right of preoccupancy—suffices to account for the phenomena, and that the additional postulate of a Deity is an unphilosophical superfluity].†

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* यद्यनात्मैव प्रधानं सच्छब्दवाच्यं स आत्मा तत्त्वमसीति श्वे-तोपदिष्टं स्यात्। स तदुपदेशश्रवणादनात्मज्ञतया तन्निष्ठो मा भूदिति मुख्यमात्मानमुपदिदर्शयिषु शास्त्रं तस्य हेयत्वं ब्रूयात्। यथा अरुन्धतीं दिदर्शयिषुस्तत्समीपस्थताराया: हेयत्वं ब्रूते तद्वदित्यर्थः॥

† *Here compare the note on* § 5. *b.*

The knowledge of God involves all knowledge.

b. The word "And" [—in the Aph. 8. —is intended not to connect the reason there assigned with any reason expressly assigned before, but] is intended to attach it in addition to [the unexpressed reason] that this [theory of the Sánkhyas] is opposed to the arriving at *all* knowledge by means of a single case of knowing *; [and what we here assert—viz—] that all knowledge is arrived at [not by the successive steps of the Sánkhyas, but,] by one single knowing, is declared in Scripture†.

c. That it is not Nature that is denoted by the term 'The Existent' in [the passage of Scripture beginning with] 'The Existent alone, O Saumya!'—is inferrible also from the reason which he states ‡ [in the following Aphorism].

॥ स्वाप्ययात् ॥ ९ ॥

Aph. 9. Because into Himself is the return [of all souls].

It cannot be admitted that the thinking Soul is to be resolved into unthinking Nature.

a. The meaning of the aphorism is this, [that it cannot be *Nature* that is spoken of —see §. 8. *c.*—as the 'Existent'—i. e., the 'Self-existent']—because of Absorption—i. e., because we hear [in Scripture] of the melting away [of previously embodied souls] into *Himself*, who is in question,—the *Soul* that is denoted by the term 'the Existent.' If *Nature* were what is there denoted by the term 'the Existent,' then there

* एकविज्ञानात्सर्वविज्ञानोपक्रमविरोधसमुच्चयार्थश्चशब्दः ॥

† एकविज्ञानात्सर्वविज्ञानोपक्रमश्श्रूयते ॥

‡ सदेव सोम्येति सच्छब्दवाच्यं प्रधानमितो ऽपि न भवती त्याह ॥

would be this [absurd] contradiction that the *intelligent* melts away into the *unintelligent*? Therefore the Cause of the World is that intelligent One, denoted by the term 'the Existent,' into whom is the return of all intelligences.*

b. Moreover†, [the assertion that not Nature but God is meant by 'the Existent,' or the Cause of the world, is proved by the reason stated in the Aphorism here following].

॥ गतिसामान्यात् ॥ १० ॥

Aph. 10. From the sameness of the understanding [of the term 'the Existent' through out the scriptures].

That the Cause of the world is an intelligent God—the only consistent interpretation of Scripture.

a. The meaning is—[that God is meant by the term, and not Nature—to which it might be plausibly referred only in *some* passages–] because of the sameness of the understanding—i. e. of the recognising an *intelligent* Cause [as spoken of] throughout the whole of the theological parts of the *Vedas*; for we nowhere find the contradictory assertion in one sentence of an intelligent Cause and in another one of an unintelligent one—but everywhere an intelligent Cause alone is understood. The texts [for example] about the order of creation, in the *Taitiríya Upanishad,* exhibit Soul alone as the Cause. There-

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* अस्मिन्प्रकृते सच्छब्दवाच्यात्मनि अप्ययश्रवणादिति भावः। तत्र यदि प्रधानमेव सच्छब्दवाच्यं तदा चेतने ऽचेतनमप्येतीति विरुद्धं स्यात्। अतो यस्मिन्नप्ययस्सर्वेषां चेतनानां तच्चेतनं सच्छब्दवाच्यं जगत्कारणमिति ॥

† किञ्च ॥

fore the net result [of the Aphorisms 5—10] is this that, whichever way you view the matter, Nature is *not* what is meant by the term 'The Existent,' nor is it the Cause of the World*.

b. Moreover† [that the Cause of the World is not the unintelligent but the intelligent, may be proved by the reason next to be stated—viz.—]

॥ श्रुतत्वाच्च ॥ ११ ॥

APH. 11. And because it is so revealed [in Scripture].

a. The meaning is as follows:—That, by the term "Himself" [-see §9-], is meant an Omniscient Ruler, the Cause of the World, [is proved] by the fact of its being so declared [in the scripture,—to take an instance-] in the *S'wetás'watara* section of the *Mantra Upanishad,* where we are told "And of Him no one is the parent nor is any one the overruler" &c. Therefore it is a settled point that the Cause of the World is the Omniscient God, not unintelligent Nature or anything else; and here the topic is concluded. ‡

* गतेस्सर्वेषु वेदान्तेषु चेतनकारणावगतेस्समत्वादित्यर्थः । नहि क्वचिदपि विरुद्धमुपलभ्यते कुत्रचिद्वाक्ये चेतनं कारणं कुत्रचिदचेतनमिति किन्तु सर्वत्र चेतनमेव कारणमुपलभ्यते । तैत्तिरीये सृष्टिक्रमे श्रुतय आत्मान एव कारणत्वन्दर्शयन्ति । अतस्सर्वथा प्रधानं सच्छब्दवाच्यं जगत्कारणञ्च न भवतीति परमार्थः ।

† किञ्च ।

‡ स्वशब्देनैव सर्वेश्वरो जगत्कारणमिति । नचास्य कश्चिज्जनिता

CHAPTER II.

SECTION I. OF THE VARIOUS NAMES UNDER WHICH GOD IS SPOKEN OF.

A deity without qualities can be made the subject of reflection only by being first spoken of as if possessing qualities.

b. But then, if thus [—see § 11 *a*—] it be proved, by the Aphorisms § 1—11, that all the theological portions of the Vedas refer to God the Omniscient and Omnipotent,—then what further remains, for the sake of which another Aphorism need be added? If you ask this—it is replied:—since a deity without qualities cannot have his nature described [—for the description of anything is just the enumeration of the qualities of the thing—], you must consent to his being described as qualified by some characteristic* [which does not in reality belong to him;—just as, in seeking to determine the specific gravity, as compared with water, of a substance that is lighter than water, you must attach to it some other substance heavy enough to sink it, and then eliminate the superfluity from the joint result].

A canon of interpretation in respect of passages where the deity is spoken of as having qualities.

c. Some passages therein [i. e. in Scripture] are [intended to enjoin] devotions with a view to gradual emancipation; and some are intended to convey a knowledge of the truth;—and so wherever, in a passage

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नचाधिप इत्यादि श्वेताश्वतराणां मन्त्रोपनिषदि श्रुतत्वादित्यर्थः । तस्मात्सर्वज्ञं ब्रह्म जगत्कारणं नाचेतनं प्रधानमन्यद्वेति सिद्धम् ॥

* नन्वेवमथात इत्यारभ्य श्रुतत्वाच्चेतदन्तैः सूत्रैः सर्वेषां वेदान्तानां सर्वज्ञसर्वशक्तिब्रह्मपरत्वं समर्थितं किमपरमवशिष्टं यदर्थमुत्तरसूत्रसन्दर्भ इति चेदुच्यते । निर्विशेषब्रह्मणः स्वरूपेणोपदेशायोगात् किञ्चिदुपाध्युपहितत्वेनोपदेश इति वक्तव्यम् ॥

where qualities are spoken of, it is really intended to speak of the qualities, there the case in one of some religious observance [which it is intended to enjoin]; but wherever the quality—though mentioned—is not intended to be spoken of, [but is employed as a mere vehicle of the real meaning], there the passage is concerned about God as He is to be *known* [—not as He is to be acted towards]. It is with the view of determining this [i. e. of determining what are the passages in which the deity is spoken of as He is, or as He is to be acted towards, respectively,] that [—notwithstanding the suggestion, in § 11, *b.*, that no more need be said—] the following aphorism is presented.*

॥ आनन्दमयो ऽभ्यासात् ॥ १२ ॥

What is spoken of as consisting of joy, is God.

APH. 12. He [—the deity without qualities—] is "the One that consists of joy"—because it is the practice [of the Veda to speak of Him by that name].

a. But then [some one may object], the term "the one that consists of joy" cannot refer to a deity who is without qualities—for such a one is not *made up of portions* of delight, [—which the term would seem to imply—],—but it refers to the embodied soul, for that *is* spoken of in scripture as being made up of joy:—Well, if any one says this, I reply, it is not thus. The Supreme Soul *may* properly [be said to] consist of joy—why?—because [as sta-

* तत्र कानिचित् क्रममुक्त्यर्थान्युपासनानि कानिचिदभ्युदयार्थानि । एवञ्च यत्र सगुणवाक्ये गुणविवक्षा तत्रोपासना भवति यत्र तु श्रूयमाणो ऽपि गुणो न विवक्षितस्तत्र तद्वाक्यं ज्ञेयब्रह्मपरमिति निर्णयार्थमित्याशयेनोत्तरसूत्रारम्भ इति ॥

ted in the aphorism] "it is the practice;" —that is to say, because it is the practice [of the Veda] very often to apply to God the term "consisting of joy."*

When the deity is asserted to consist of so and so, it is not asserted that He was formed out of so and so.

b. [The next aphorism has reference particularly to the objection that the term discussed in the preceding paragraph must, in accordance with its grammatical form, mean some modification of something else, in which case, of course, it could not signify the Supreme Soul].

॥ विकारशब्दान्नेति चेन्न प्राचुर्यात् ॥ १३ ॥

Aph. 13. If you say that it is not so [—i. e. that the term *ánandamaya*— § 12—does not refer to God—] because it is a word expressing what has undergone a change;—it is not as you say, —for it expresses the quantity [that constitutes, without any reference to there having been any change].

a. But then [—we remark in explanation—some one may still object], that which is "*made up of* joy" cannot be God [who is not made up of anything antecedently existent]—why? —because [—the objector supposes—] the affix *mayaṭ* [with which the word *ánanda-maya* "consisting of joy" is formed] implies a change [from one state or form to another—such as is undergone when curd is made out of milk, or a jar is made out of clay], and it is absurd to suppose that God is in such a way made up of joy:—well, if any one says this, I reply, it is not

* नन्वानन्दमयशब्दो न निर्गुणब्रह्मपरः तस्य प्रियाद्यनवयवत्वात् किन्तु शारीरस्यैवात्मन आनन्दमयत्वश्रवणाज्जीवपर इति चेन्न । आनन्दमयः परमात्मा भवितुमर्हति । कुतः । अभ्यासात् । आनन्दमयशब्दस्य बहुकृत्वो ब्रह्मण्येवाभ्यासादित्यर्थः ।

thus. Why?—"because it is *quantity*" [that is spoken of, and not *change* from one state to another],—that is to say, because here the affix *mayaṭ* is employed with an eye to the *quantity* of joy* [—according to *Páṇini* V. 4. 21.—that *is* God; and not, as you suppose—according to *Páṇini* IV. 3. 143.—that joy out of which something was at any time first made up].

b. He next states another reason why the affix *mayaṭ* [§. 13. *a.*] is employed in the sense of quantity and not of change.†

॥ तद्धेतुव्यपदेशाच्च ॥ १४ ॥

God must have joy in Himself if He be the Cause of joy.

APH. 14. And [God must consist of joy —§ 12—] because He is called [in scripture] the cause thereof.

a. That is to say—because, in scripture, God is named as the cause in respect thereof—i. e. of joy.‡

b. God is spoken of as the cause of joy in such texts as this —viz. "For He alone it is that causeth to rejoice." As those that enrich others must themselves be rich, so it is clear that there must be abundant joy with Him who causeth others to rejoice.§

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* ननु नानन्दमय ब्रह्म । कुतः । विकारार्थमयट्प्रत्ययात् । ब्रह्मणश्चानन्दविकारत्वानुपपत्तिरिति चेन्न । कुतः । प्राचुर्यात् । मयटः प्रकृते ऽानन्दप्राचुर्यवाचकत्वादित्यर्थः ॥

† मयटः प्राचुर्यार्थकत्वे हेत्वन्तरमाह ॥

‡ अतो तमानन्द प्रति ब्रह्मणो हेतुत्वव्यपदेशादित्यर्थः ॥

§ एष ह्येवानन्दयातीति ब्रह्मण आनन्दहेतुत्वं व्यपदिश्यते । येऽन्यान् धनीकुर्वन्ति त एव धनिन इतिवद्यो ऽन्यानानन्दयति स प्रचुरानन्द इति प्रसिद्धम् ॥

c. And he mentions that, for the following reason also, it must be the Supreme Soul that "consists of joy" * [—as asserted in § 12—] viz :—

॥ मान्त्रवर्णिकमेवच गीयते ॥ १५ ॥

The lyrical and the doctrinal parts of the Veda agree in representing God as made up of joy.

APH. 15. And to the same effect [—that the Supreme Soul, § 12, consists of joy—] is sung the comment on the hymn.

a. "Is sung"—that is to say, [by being sung] declares. [The drift of this argument is this]—because both the hymns (*mantra*) and the doctrinal portions of the scripture (*bráhmaṇa*) are unanimous† [in representing the Supreme Soul as consisting of joy].

b. And he states that it must be the Supreme Soul and not any embodied soul that is meant by the term "consisting of joy" [§. 12], for the following reason.‡

॥ नेतरो ऽनुपपत्तेः ॥ १६ ॥

Absurdity of supposing that any other than God is here meant.

APH. 16. It is none other [than God, that is spoken of—see §. 12.—as "consisting of joy,"] because there is an absurdity [in any other supposition].

a. That is to say—it is not any embodied soul—from the Lord downwards [see Vedánta Lecture No. 25]—that is meant by the term "consisting of joy :"—Why ? "Because there is an absurdity."

* इतश्चानन्दमयः परमात्मेत्याह ॥

† गीयते प्रदर्शयतीत्यर्थः । मन्त्रब्राह्मणयोरेकार्थत्वात् ॥

‡ इतश्चानन्दमयः परमात्मा न जीव इत्याह ॥

The meaning of the aphorism is this, that, antecedently to the creation [of the body] of "the Lord," we are told that He [of whom the term "consisting of joy" is correctly predicable] was one that *reflected* [see § 5], One that was Himself His creation, and One that was the cause of the creation [see § 2. and Vedánta Lecture, No. 40]; and all this would be absurd [if predicated of any other than the Supreme Soul]:—that is to say—since knowledge belonging to any inferior soul is dependent on there being a *body*—there could have been no *reflection** [by any *such* soul antecedently to the creation].

b. Moreover† [any inferior soul is not what is meant by "that which consists of joy"—§ 12—for the following reason].

॥ भेदव्यपदेशाच्च ॥ १७ ॥

It is no inferior soul that is spoken of as consisting of joy.

APH. 17. And [the inferior soul is not what consists of joy] because they are spoken of [in Scripture] as distinct.

a. The inferior soul is not what consists of joy;—why? because the inferior soul and that which consists of joy are spoken of as being distinct;—such is the meaning. What is here referred to is this, that, in the passage [for example] of the *Taitiríya* [section of the *Veda*] beginning "Truly that joy &c." the One "that consists of joy" and the inferior soul are spoken of under the respectively different characters of "what is to be obtained" and "the obtainer;"—for the obtainer is not the same as that

* ईश्वरादितरो जीवो नानन्दमयः । कुतः । अनुपपत्तेः । ईश्वरस्य सृष्टेः पूर्वमीक्षितृत्वं सृष्ट्यात्मकत्वं सृष्टिहेतुत्वञ्च श्रूयते तत्सर्वस्यानुपपत्तेरिति सूत्रार्थः । जीवज्ञानस्य शरीरसाध्यत्वादीक्षणानुपपत्तिरिति तात्पर्यम् ॥

† किञ्च ॥

which he is to obtain * [—and the inferior soul is here directed to aspire after "the One that consists of joy"].

b. But then [the followers of the Sánkhya will probably here suggest]—let it be *Nature* that is denoted by the term "consisting of joy" [§ 12]. With reference to this he says as follows†.

। कामाच्च नानुमानापेक्षा । १८ ।

Neither is it unintelligent Nature that is spoken of as consisting of joy.

APH. 18. And by reason of *desire* [which is attributed to that "which consists of joy"] no regard [is to be shown] to the argument [of the Sánkhyas, who attempt to prove that it is their unintelligent *Nature* that is spoken of in scripture as "consisting of joy"].

a. That is to say—we do not regard—i. e. we do not admit that Nature is "what consists of joy", or that it is the cause [of joy—see § 14—]. Why?—"by reason of desire;"—i. e. because we find in Scripture, where the topic is "what consists of joy", that this denotes one that *desires*; and it is impossible that *desire* should belong to that which is unintelligent ‡ [as Nature is held by the Sánkhyas themselves to be].

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* नानन्दमयो जीवः । कुतः । जीवानन्दमययोर्भेदेन व्यपदिश्यमानत्वादित्यर्थः । तैत्तिरीयके रसो वै स इत्यारभ्य आनन्दमयस्य लब्धव्यत्वेन जीवस्य च लब्धृत्वेन भेदव्यपदेशः । न हि लब्धैव लब्धव्यो भवतीत्याशयः ॥

† नन्वानन्दमयशब्देन प्रधानमुच्यतां । तत्राह ॥

‡ आनन्दमयत्वेन कारणत्वेन वा प्रधानस्य नापेक्षा न स्वीकारः । कुतः । कामात् । आनन्दमयाधिकारे कामयितृत्वश्रवणादित्यर्थः । न ह्यचेतने कामसम्भवति ॥

b. [He supports the orthodox view by another argument as follows].

॥ अस्मिन्नस्य च तद्योगं शास्ति ॥ १९ ॥

For, neither of these is what we are directed to aspire after, as we are directed to aspire after what consists of joy.

Aph. 19. And [the one "consisting of joy" cannot be an inferior soul, or Nature, because] the scripture teaches that in this [—which can therefore mean nothing else than the Supreme—] there is the beatification of that [inferior soul which obtains union therewith].

a. That is to say,—for the following reason also the term "consisting of joy" cannot mean either any inferior soul or [unintelligent] Nature, because the scripture teaches that in this—"the one consisting of joy" that we are concerned about—the [Supreme] Soul—there is to take place, in the case of him—i. e. of the enlightened inferior soul, *union therewith*—i. e. union with that [Supreme] Soul—[for such is the meaning of] "union therewith"—the attaining to the state of Him—[in short] emancipation.*

b. Thus has it been settled definitively that [what is spoken of in scripture as] "what consists of joy" is the Supreme Soul † [and nothing else].

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* इतश्च न जीवे प्रधाने वा आनन्दमयशब्दो यस्मादस्मिन्नानन्दमये प्रकृते । आत्मनि । अस्य । प्रबुद्धस्य जीवस्य । तद्योगं तदात्मना योगस्तद्योगस्तद्भावापत्तिर्मुक्तिरित्यर्थः । तं शास्ति शास्त्रं । तस्मादित्यर्थः ॥

† तस्मादानन्दमयः परमात्मेति सिद्धम् ॥

c. [The next point to be established is this, that it is the Supreme Soul that is spoken of in scripture as "the man in the sun" and "the man in the eye"].

॥ अन्तस्तद्धर्मोपदेशात् ॥ २० ॥

It is God that is spoken of as the man within the sun and within the eye.

APH. 20. [God alone is meant when mention is made, in scripture, of that which is] within [the sun and the eye], because there is mention of His characteristics [which can belong to none other.]

a. That is to say—He who is mentioned in scripture as "He that is within the sun" and "He that is within the eye," is the Supreme alone and no one worldly. Why?—"because there is mention of His characteristics"—i. e. because, in these passages, there is mention of characteristics [such as absolute sinlessness] that belong only to Him who is the Supreme.*

b. [At this, as at other points, the commentators enter into details which the fear of prolixity constrains us to pretermit].

c. Moreover † [He that is spoken of as "the man in the sun" is some one else than the *sun's soul*—as is proved by the argument here following].

॥ भेदव्यपदेशाच्चान्यः ॥ २१ ॥

APH. 21. And [it is not the personal soul of the sun—the

* य एषो ऽन्तरादित्ये य एषो ऽन्तरक्षिणीति च श्रूयमाणः परमेश्वर एव न संसारी । कुतः । तद्धर्मोपदेशात् । तस्य परमेश्वरस्य ये धर्मास्तेषामस्मिन्वाक्ये उपदेशादित्यर्थः ॥

† किञ्च ॥

solar congener of the *anima mundi*—that is spoken of as "the man in the sun"—] because mention is made of a distinction [between these two].

a. That is to say—The "man" that is spoken of in scripture as being within the sun and within the eye, is some one other than any inferior soul which has the fancy [—erroneous in the case of any soul that fancies it has a body at all—] that its body is the sun. Why?—"because mention is made of a distinction." [One of the passages cited in regard to this, is the one beginning] "He who, standing in the sun, yet other than the sun" &c.† [conf. § 20. *b*].

b. [The next point to be established is this that it is the Supreme Soul that is spoken of as the Ether in such a passage of scripture, as the one beginning] "'Of this world what is the refuge?' To this he replied—'The Ether' &c".‡

॥ आकाशस्तल्लिङ्गात् ॥ २२ ॥

It is God that is in certain passages spoken of as the Ether.

APH. 22. The Ether, [in certain passages, must be understood to mean God,] by reason of His characteristics [which are, in such passages, attributed to that which is there spoken of as the Ether].

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* आदित्याक्ष्णोरन्तः श्रूयमाणः पुरुष आदित्यशरीराभिमानिनो जीवादन्यः । कुतः । भेदव्यपदेशात् ॥

† य आदित्ये तिष्ठन्नादित्यादन्तरो ऽयमित्यादि ॥

‡ अस्य लोकस्य का गतिरित्याकाश इति होवाच ॥

a. That is to say—It is proper to understand, by the word Ether, God, Why ?—" by reason of his characteristic" :—that is to say, because, in this passage [§ 21 *b.*], we find mentioned such a fact as that of being the creator of the great elements, which character belongs [only] to Him—i. e. to God.*

b. [The " breath of life," in like manner, is held to stand for God, in such a passage as] " 'Who is that deity' ?—To this he replied—' The breath of life.' "†

। अत एव प्राण इति ॥ २३ ॥

It is God that is in certain passages spoken of as the Breath of life.

APH. 23. For just the same reason, " the breath of life" [is to be understood to mean God.]

a. " For just the same reason :"—that is to say, for the reason stated in the preceding aphorism [§ 22] viz, " by reason of His characteristics," [which could not be predicated of the mere " breath of life,"] it is God alone that is meant by the breath of life," [in the passage cited under § 22. *b.*]

b. But then [—some objector may go on to say—] let that pass—that in the passage about the breath of life [§ 22 *b.*]

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* आकाशशब्देन ब्रह्मणो ग्रहणं युक्तं । कुतः । तल्लिङ्गात् । तस्य ब्रह्मणो यल्लिङ्गं महाभूतस्रष्टृत्वादिकं तस्यास्मिन् वाक्ये दृष्टत्वादित्यर्थः ॥

† कतमा सा देवतेति प्राण इति होवाच ॥

‡ अत एव । पूर्व्वोक्ततल्लिङ्गादिति हेतोरेव । प्राणः । प्राणशब्दवाच्यं ब्रह्मैवेत्यर्थः ।

the [disputed] term *does* mean God, since the characteristics of God [—we are willing to admit—] are present [in that instance]; —but [the same argument will not avail you in the following passage, where we object to your assuming that the term "the light" means God]:—"Now the light that shines from beyond that the abode of the celestials &c." The word "light," here can mean only the sun or some other created splendour, for this the word notoriously is employed to denote; but it cannot mean God, who is without limits, because it is here spoken of as *having* a limit, when it is styled "the light *beyond* the abode of the celestials" &c. [well—rejoins the commentator—] this [objection] having presented itself, it is declared* [as follows.]

। ज्योतिश्चरणाभिधानात् ॥ २४ ॥

It is God that is in certain passages spoken of as the the Light.

APH. 24. The "light" [in certain passages means God], because there is mention of *feet* [which no ordinary light can be said to possess.]

a. That is to say—here [i. e. in the passage cited under § 23. *b.*] it is God alone that is meant by the word "light." Why?—"because of the mention of *feet*":—that is to say, because the Elements are spoken of as the feet [of *this* light,— and light, in the ordinary sense of the word, does not mean anything that has feet,—and these feet are spoken of] in such

* ननु प्राणवाक्ये ब्रह्मलिङ्गसत्वाद्भवतु तद्ब्रह्मपरं । अथ यदतः परो दिवो ज्योतिर्दीप्यते इत्यत्र ज्योतिः पद सूर्यादिभौतिकतेजःपरमेव प्रसिद्धत्वात् । परो दिवो ज्योतिरित्यादिना मर्यादाश्रवणाच्च न निर्मर्यादब्रह्मपरमिति प्राप्ते उच्यते ॥

phrases as "The feet thereof are the pervading elements" [—which phrase is employed] in respect of God when regarded as residing in that text [—the most revered of all the texts of Scripture] called the *Gáyatrí*, which is declared to have four feet by the text beginning with "the *Gáyatrí*, indeed, is all this" &c.*

b. Moreover [—the commentator remarks—] although—by the expression "from beyond that" &c. [§ 23. *b.*] the mention is [apparently at least] of what has *limits* &c., yet this is not opposed to its being God; for, [in accordance with the canon of interpretation laid down in § 11 *c.*] the passage in question is intended to enjoin certain religious observances [in regard to the "light"]. Besides—the word "light" is notoriously employed in the theological portions of the Veda to denote God; therefore it is a settled point that here [§ 23. *b.*] the word "light" means God.†

c. [The next aphorism opposes the suggestion that the *feet* spoken of § 24. *a.*, are the feet of the verse called the *Gáyatrí*,

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* अत्र ज्योतिश्शब्दवाच्यं ब्रह्मैव । कुतः । चरणाभिधानात् । गायत्री वा इदं सर्वमित्यादिना प्रतिपादितचतुष्पाद्गायत्र्याख्यच्छन्दोपाधिकब्रह्मणः पादोऽस्य विश्वा‡भूतानि इत्यादिना भूतपादाभिधानादित्यर्थः ॥

† यदतः पर इत्यादिना श्रुतं मर्यादादिकमपि न ब्रह्मणो विरुद्धं तस्योपासनार्थत्वात् । ज्योतिश्शब्दो ब्रह्मण्यपि वेदान्तेषु प्रसिद्धस्तस्माज्ज्योतिश्शब्दोऽत्र ब्रह्मपर एवेति सिद्धम् ॥

‡ The discordance in gender here is a Vaidik licence.

—such verse having four hemistichs, the name for which is the same as that for a foot.]

॥ छन्दो ऽभिधानान्नेति चेन्न तथा चेतो ऽर्पणनिगदात्तथा-हि दर्शनम् ॥ २५ ॥

Why it cannot be the Gáyatrí that is referred to in such a passage.

APH. 25. If you say that it is the *verse* [—see § 24. *c.*—of which it is intended to speak, and not the Deity—see § 24,—] it is not so; because there is the direction to fix one's mind [on God] thus [i. e. through the medium of the *Gáyatrí*]; for of such a way [of directing the mind to the contemplation of the deity] there is a view [of more than one example in scripture.]

a. "Thus:"—that is to say, because there is the direction or mention, of fixing one's mind or concentrating one's thoughts, by means of the verse [the *Gáyatrí*], on the Deity [regarded as] resident therein* [—§ 24. *a.*]

b. "For of such a way there is a view:"—that is to say,—in other passages also, by means of some modification [of God—such as the sun, the ether, &c.,] the worshipping of God [regarded as] resident therein, is *seen* [to be enjoined]. N. B., "there is a view of" means "there is seen." †

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* तथा । छन्दोद्वारेण तद्गते ब्रह्मणि चेतोऽर्पणस्य । चित्त-समाधानस्य । निगदादभिधानादित्यर्थः ॥

† तथाहि दर्शनम् । अन्यत्रापि विकारद्वारेण तद्गतब्रह्मोपा-सनं । दृश्यत इति दर्शनं । दृष्टमित्यर्थः ॥

c. Therefore it is a settled point that in the preceding passage [—see § 23. *b*.] it is God alone that is referred to, and not the verse * [called the *Gáyatrí*—see § 25.]

d. [He subjoins a further reason.]

॥ भूतादिपादव्यपदेशोपपत्तेश्चैवम् ॥ २६ ॥

A further reason why it cannot be the Gáyatrí that is referred to.

APH. 26. And [the fact is] thus [i. e. that the deity and not the verse called the Gáyatrí is referred to in the passage under discussion] because we meet with the mention of the *elements &c.*, as the feet [—see § 24—of that which is referred to in the passage in question.]

a. [That is to say] :— for the following reason also, it is to be understood that, in the passage respecting the *Gáyatrí* [§ 24. *a*.], it is God alone that is referred to :—such is the meaning of the word "thus" [in the aphorism § 26]. Why? :—"because the mention of the elements &c., as the feet can apply, [only to God]" :—that is to say, because the designation "The *Gáyatrí* "with its four feet, [which] are the elements, the earth, the "body, and the heart," can apply to God alone ; for the mention of *feet in the shape of the elements &c.*, can have no reference to the [verse called the] Gáyatrí—a thing consisting of a conglomeration of alphabetical characters.†

b. [The objector next proceeds to argue that what is spoken

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* तस्मात्पूर्ववाक्ये ब्रह्मैव निर्दिष्टं न छन्द इति सिद्धम् ॥

† इतश्च गायत्रीवाक्ये ब्रह्मैव प्रतिपाद्यमित्यभ्युपगन्तव्यमित्येवंशब्दार्थः । कुतः । भूतादिपादव्यपदेशोपपत्तेः । भूतपृथिवीशरीरहृदयचतुष्पद्गायत्रीति व्यपदेशस्य ब्रह्मण्येवोपपत्तेरित्यर्थः । नह्यक्षरसन्निवेशरूपगायत्र्या भूतादिपादव्यपदेशस्सम्भवति ॥

of in one passage as being "*in* the sky," cannot be that which is, in another passage, spoken of as the Light shining "*from beyond* the sky." To this the author, who holds that it is God who is referred to in both passages, replies as follows.]

॥ उपदेशभेदान्नेति चेन्नोभयस्मिन्नप्यविरोधात् ॥ २७ ॥

God may be referred to under different aspects as regards locality.

Aph. 27. If [you say that it is] not [God that is spoken of in a certain passage whilst He *is* spoken of in another] because there is a difference of declaration [in respect of what is spoken of in the one passage and in the other], it is not [as you say], because there is no incompatibility [in His being referred to] even in both.

a. 'If you say that it is not so, because there is a difference of declaration':—[to explain this;—suppose an objector says] but then, as regards the preceding passage [see § 23], the *sky*, in the passage "*In the sky* the immortal triad of feet thereof," is mentioned in the 7th [or locative] case as the *locus in quo* thereof [i. e., as the place *in* which is that which is spoken of—be that what it may:—and, on the other hand,] in the passage "Now the Light that shines thence *from beyond the sky*" [§ 23], the sky is mentioned in the 5th [or ablative] case as the *limit* [from *beyond* which shines whatever Light that may be that is spoken of]:—and so, since this difference of cases involves a difference of declaration [in respect of what is thus declared to be *in*, and what is declared to be *beyond* the sky], it is impossible to recognise, in the passage that speaks of *the Light*, [that which is spoken of in the *other* passage;—so that, granting that the one passage speaks of God, it is clear the other does not]:—well, if any one says all this, it is replied No:—why?—"because there

is no incompatibility [in His being referred to] even in both;"— that is to say, because there is nothing to prevent His being recognised even in two descriptions involving different declensional terminations* [—for what is to prevent our regarding God as existing at once within this "visible diurnal sphere" and beyond it]?

b. Therefore it is a settled point that it is the Supreme Soul alone that is spoken as the *Light* [in the passage cited under § 23] and not any other created light.†

c. But then [some objector will say,] in the Upanishad called the *Kaushítakí Bráhmaṇa,* in the narrative of Indra and [king] Pratardana, we hear [in reply to Pratardana's question respecting the 'summum bonum'], "He [Indra] said—'I am the life, in the "shape of perfect knowledge;—do thou [that seekest to obtain "the summum bonum] worship me, that life immortal.'" In this passage [the objector will say] the word "life" means Indra's vital

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* ननु पूर्वस्मिन् वाक्ये त्रिपादस्यामृतं दिवीति सप्तम्या द्यौराधारत्वेन निर्दिश्यते । अथ यदतः परो दिवो ज्योतिरित्यत्र पञ्चम्यावधित्वेन द्यौर्निर्दिश्यते । तथाच विभक्तिभेदेनोपदेशभेदात् ज्योतिर्वाक्ये प्रत्यभिज्ञा न सम्भवतीति चेत् । न । कुतः । उभयस्मिन्नप्यविरोधात् । विभक्तिभेदेनोपदेशद्वये ऽपि प्रत्यभिज्ञाया अविरोधादित्यर्थः ॥

† तस्मात्परं ब्रह्मैव ज्योतिश्शब्दवाच्यं नान्यद्भौतिकं तेज इति सिद्धम् ॥

spirit, for such is notoriously the sense of the term,—and it does not mean the Supreme Soul. This [objection] having presented itself, it is declared as follows.*—

॥ प्राणस्तथानुगमात् ॥ २८ ॥

That the term Life, in a certain passage, means God, shown from the context.

APH. 28. The Life [—§ 27. *c*.—means God alone] because of the conclusion that it does so, [which conclusion is forced upon us by an examination of the context].

a. That is to say,—there [i. e. in the passage cited under § 27. *c*.] the word 'life' means God alone:—why?—"because of the conclusion that it does so"—i. e. because we must conclude, or admit, that it does so—i. e. that it does mean God.†

b. To explain,—Pratardana, verily, [when he received the reply of Indra, § 27. *c*.,] was enquiring what was the thing most desirable for man. To him, thus desirous of the summum bonum, the injunction to worship the *Life* is given in the passage beginning "I am the Life" &c. And [—since God alone is the summum bonum and the sole proper object of worship—] how can that which is thus indicated as the chief end of man be the vital spirit [of Indra]? Therefore, by looking forwards and backwards [and

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* ननु कौषीतकीब्राह्मणोपनिषदि इन्द्रप्रतर्दनाख्यायिकायां श्रूयते । स होवाच प्राणोऽस्मि प्रज्ञात्मा तं मामायुरमृतमुपास्स्वेति । तत्र प्राणशब्द इन्द्रप्राणवायुपरः प्रसिद्धत्वात् न परमात्मपर इति प्राप्त उच्यते ॥

† तत्र प्राणो ब्रह्मैव । कुतः । तथानुगमात् । तथा । ब्रह्मपरत्वेन । अनुगमात् । अवगमादित्यर्थः ॥

thus bringing the light of the context to bear upon the question] it is settled for certain that the term 'Life' [in § 27. *c.*] means God alone.*

[*c.*—The objector being understood still to contend that Indra cannot mean God by the term 'Life,' when he is speaking of *himself* as the 'Life,' the following aphorism is enunciated].

॥ न वक्तुरात्मोपदेशादिति चेदध्यात्मसम्बन्ध भूमा ह्यस्मिन् ॥ २९ ॥

A change of topic is not to be supposed in the absence of evidence that any change is intended.

Aph. 29.—If [you say that it is] not [God that it meant by the term 'Life' in the passage under § 27 *c.*,] because the speaker is mentioning *himself*—[it is replied that it *is* God]—for in this [section of the Veda where the passage occurs] there is abundance of reference to the Superintending Spirit [—and a change of reference is not to be supposed without some evidence that a change is intended].

a.—[That is to say—we may suppose the objector to continue:] but then what you say—viz., that the term 'Life' [§ 27 *c.*] means God—is *not* right;—such is the meaning of the 'not' [the first word in *Aph.* 29]. Why [is it not right] ? 'Because the

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* तथाहि । प्रतर्दनः खलु हिततमं पुरुषार्थं पृष्टवान् । तस्य परमपुरुषार्थकामस्य प्राण उपास्यत्वेनोपदिश्यते प्राणोऽस्मीत्यादिना । एवञ्च परमपुरुषार्थत्वेनोपदिश्यमानः कथं प्राणवायुः स्यात् । तस्मात् पूर्वापरपर्यालोचनया ब्रह्मपरमेव प्राणपदमिति सिद्धम् ।

speaker is mentioning *himself*"—i.e. because it is of himself that the speaker, viz., Indra, is making mention.*

b.—To explain;—[the objector says that God is not meant] because the speaker, viz. Indra, a certain embodied kind of deity, indicates *himself* to Pratardana in that egotistic speech beginning with "Come—do thou know *me*"—and then going on "*I* am the Life, in the shape of perfect knowledge" &c. Therefore this is a mention of the deity [Indra] himself, [and not of the Supreme Soul]. This [objection] having presented itself, it is declared [§ 29—that it is not so—] "for in this there is abundance of reference to the Superintending Spirit;"—that is to say—for, or because, in this, viz., section [of the *Kaushítakí Bráhmaṇa*—§ 27. *c.*], there is found abundance, or a great deal, of reference to the Superintending Spirit, or of relation to the Supreme Soul. Therefore—i. e. from the abundance of reference to the Supreme Soul [in the section in question, which is almost entirely concerned therewith,]—it is a settled point that it is God, under the aspect of the Life, and not any [embodied] deity, that is here spoken of.†

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* ननु यदुक्तं प्राणो ऽस्मीति तदयुक्तमिति नञर्थः । कुतः । वक्तुरात्मोपदेशात् । वक्तुरिन्द्रस्यात्मत्वेनोपदेशादित्यर्थः ॥

† तथाहि वक्ता हीन्द्रो नाम कश्चिद्विग्रहवान् देवताविशेषः स्वात्मानं प्रतर्दनायोपदिशति मामेव विजानीहीत्युपक्रम्य प्राणो ऽस्मि प्रज्ञात्मेत्येवं अहङ्कारवादेन । तस्मादयं देवतात्मोपदेश इति प्राप्त उच्यते अध्यात्मसम्बन्धभूमा ह्यस्मिन्निति । हि यस्मात् । अस्मिन् । अध्याये । अध्यात्मसम्बन्धस्य । परमात्मसम्बन्धस्य ।

c.—Why then *does* the speaker talk of himself [if it be God that is meant in the passage in which Indra—see § 27. *c.*—says "*I* am the life" &c.] ? This having become a matter of dubitation, he declares as follows.*

॥ शास्त्रदृष्ट्या तूपदेशो वामदेववत् ॥ ३० ॥

The identification of one's self with another accordant with scripture.

APH. 30. But the mention, [by Indra, of *himself* as the Supreme Spirit], was with an eye to the Scripture, [which authorises such a form of expression], as VÁMADEVA [identifies himself, in another place, with Manu and with Súryá].

a.—That is to say—the mention of the speaker, Indra, in the passage "Do thou know *me*" &c." [§ 29. *b.*] is to be understood with an eye to the scripture :—that is to say, he [Indra] was speaking whilst looking upon the matter under that scriptural view which is conveyed in the text "*I* myself [—whoever may "be the speaker—] am the Supreme Soul."†

b. Of this [way of regarding one's self as identified with another] there is an example [cited in the aphorism—in the words] 'as VÁMADEVA';—that is to say—as VÁMADEVA, in accordance with the scriptural view, said "*I* was Manu, and *I* was Súrya."

भूमा । बाहुल्यमुपलभ्यत इत्यर्थः । तस्मादध्यात्मसम्बन्धबाहुल्यात्प्राणात्मकब्रह्मोपदेश एवायं न देवतात्मोपदेश इति सिद्धम् ॥

* कथन्तर्हि वक्तुरात्मोपदेश इत्याशंक्याह ॥

† इन्द्रस्य वक्तुर्मामेव विजानीहीत्युपदेशः शास्त्रदृष्ट्या मन्तव्यः । अहमेव परं ब्रह्मेति शास्त्रदृष्ट्या पश्यन्नेवमुक्तवानित्यर्थः ॥

Therefore it is a settled point that this passage [see § 27. *c.*] refers to God under the aspect of 'the Life.'*

c. [In the next aphorism a compromise in regard to the passage cited under § 27. *c.* is rejected.]

जीवमुख्यप्राणलिङ्गान्नेति चेन्नोपासात्रैविध्यादाश्रितत्वादिह तद्योगात् ॥ ३१ ॥

APH. 31. If [you say that it is] not [God *alone* that is meant by the term 'Life' in the passage under § 27 *c.*] because there is here the mark by which the [embodied] soul and that by which the breath of life is recognised;—[then we reply] Nay,—because [if the case were as you pretend, then] there would be *three* sorts of worshippings [enjoined], and because those [characteristics] are here annexed by reason of which the term must [be seen to] refer [to God alone.]

a. But then [the objector—aiming at a compromise—may say], what you remark [in APH. 29], that the 'Life' does not mean the [embodied] deity [Indra], because there is such abundant reference [in the section where the term occurs] to the Supreme Soul;—this is quite true. Still the passage does not refer *solely* to God, but it refers also to the [embodied] soul, and to the chief spirit [the breath of life]. Why?— 'because there is here the mark by which the [embodied] soul and that by which the breath of life is recognised;'—that is to say, there is the

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* तत्र दृष्टान्तः । वामदेववदिति । यथा वामदेवः शास्त्रदृष्ट्या अहं मनुरभवं सूर्यश्चेत्याह तद्वदित्यर्थः । तस्मात्प्राणात्मकब्रह्मपरमेतद्वाक्यमिति सिद्धम् ॥

mark by which the [embodied] soul is recognised, and the mark by which the breath of life is recognised.*

b. [To pass over the arguments by which the objector attempts to show that three things, and not merely one, are referred to in the passage under discussion,—the commentator, explaining the rejection of any compromise, says]—if you say that it is not God [alone that is meant,—then we say] *No* ;—that is to say—it is not proper [to say as you do]. Why ?—' because there would be a threefold case of devotion, ;—that is to say,—because, if the case were such [as you attempt to make it out to be], we should have [enjoined upon us] a worshipping of three descriptions, viz. (1) a worshipping of the [embodied] soul, (2) a worshipping of the breath of life, and (3) a worshipping of God ;† [for Indra, in the disputed passage, enjoins the worshipping of ' the Life', whilst, of course, none but God can be the proper object of worship.]

c. Since, on the supposition that *God* is meant, the whole, from first to last, is one consistent discourse ; it is improper to suppose that there are different discourses. Therefore, since the word ' Life' is employed elsewhere—viz. in [the passage referred

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* ननु यदुक्तमध्यात्मसम्बन्धबाहुल्यान्न देवतात्मा प्राण इति तत्सत्यं । तथापि न ब्रह्मपरमेवेदं वाक्यं किन्तु जीवमुख्यप्राणवायुपरमपि । कुतः । जीवमुख्यप्राणलिङ्गात् । जीवलिङ्गात् । मुख्यप्राणलिङ्गाच्च ॥

† न ब्रह्मेति चेत् । न । न युक्तमित्यर्थः । कुतः । उपासात्रैविध्यात् । एवं सति त्रिविधमुपासनं प्रसज्येत जीवोपासनं मुख्यप्राणोपासनं ब्रह्मोपासनञ्चेति ॥

to in APH. 23—viz.] the text "For the same reason the Life [means God,"—since—we repeat—the word 'life' is there employed] as referring to God, in virtue of the *characteristic* of God [there recognised—see § 22]; so it is a settled point that here also the mention is solely of God, because of there being annexed [see —§ 28. *b.*—] the mention of characteristics that belong to God alone—such as that of being the summum bonum.*

d. So much for the first quarter of the first lecture, entitled 'The Distinct Definition of the Supreme Soul.'†

Retrospective glance.

e. [Let us here take a restrospective glance at the ground gone over. In the first place it is to be remarked that the aim of this division of the Aphorisms is to determine distinctly what is meant by the term God, and by what other terms in Scripture God is meant. The former of these questions is determined in the first four aphorisms, the latter in the remaining twenty-seven.

f. As the enquiry is conducted with the view of ascertaining the *sense* of Scripture, it will be observed that all the reasonings proceed on the hypothesis (—see the Nyáya Aphorisms, Book I No. 30,—) that the *authority* of Scripture is not disputed.

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* उपक्रमोपसंहाराभ्यां ब्रह्मपरत्वेन एकवाक्यत्वे सम्भवति वाक्यभेदो न युक्तः । अत एव प्राण इत्यत्रान्यत्र ब्रह्मलिङ्गवशात्प्राणशब्दस्य ब्रह्मणि प्रवृत्तेराश्रितत्वात् इहापि हिततमोपन्यासादि ब्रह्मलिङ्गयोगाद्ब्रह्मण एवायमुपदेश इति सिद्धम् ॥

† इति प्रथमाध्यायस्य प्रथमः स्पष्टब्रह्मलिङ्गपादः ॥

g. Of the twenty-seven aphorisms in which it is sought to determine what are the terms by which, in Scripture, it is God that is really meant, Mr. Colebrooke, in his essays Vol. 1. p. 338, gives the following summary :—

" The omnipotent, omniscient, sentient cause of the universe, is " (*ánandamaya*) essentially happy. He is the brilliant golden per- " son, seen *within* (*antar*) the solar orb and the human eye. He " is the *etherial* element (*ákás'a*), from which all things proceed " and to which all return. He is the *breath* (*prána*) in which all " beings merge, into which they all rise. He is the *light* (*jyotish*) " which shines in heaven, and in all places high and low, everywhere " throughout the world, and within the human person. He is the " *breath* (*prána*) and intelligent self, immortal, undecaying " and happy, with which *Indra*, (in a dialogue with *Pratardana*,) " identifies himself."

The reader of this summary must not understand it as containing the Vedántin's *description* of God. The risk of its being so understood might perhaps have been best avoided by *converting* each of the propositions, and making the predicate take the place of the subject. No doubt the Vedántin holds that God is everything, and therefore all these things ; but BÁDARÁYAṆA, in his twenty-seven aphorisms, is not concerned about establishing this, or anything like it. He is bent on declaring, not that God is this that or the other thing, but on determining that this that and the other *term*, which might seem, in certain passages of scripture, to mean something else than God simply, really is employed in the sense of nothing else than God simply.

h. Since a reader not conversant with the topics handled by BÁDARÁYAṆA may be apt to think that needless difficulties are

occasionally started, and needless trouble taken to remove them, we would here refer the reader to our remarks at the conclusion of the first Book of the Nyáya Aphorisms. BÁDARÁYAṆA did not *make* the difficulties, but he *found* them. The objections were extant; and those that had any show of plausibility—whilst the objector conceded the authority of the Vedas—BÁDARÁYAṆA, bent on demonstrating the consistency of the Vedas, did not consider himself at liberty to ignore].

॥ मिरज़ापुर ॥

। यतीमों के छापाखाने में छापी गई ।

॥ सन १८५१ ईस्वी ॥

5.

THE APHORISMS

OF THE

VAIS'ESHIKA PHILOSOPHY,

OF

KAṆA'DA

WITH

ILLUSTRATIVE EXTRACTS FROM THE COMMENTARY

BY

S'ANKARA MIS'RA.

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PREFACE.

The great body of Hindú Philosophy is based upon six sets of very concise Aphorisms. Without a commentary the Aphorisms are scarcely intelligible, they being designed not so much to communicate the doctrine of the particular school, as to aid, by the briefest possible suggestions, the memory of him to whom the doctrine shall have been already communicated. To this end they are admirably adapted; and, this being their end, the obscurity, which must needs attach to them in the eyes of the uninstructed, is not chargeable upon them as a fault.

For various reasons it is desirable that there should be an accurate translation of the Aphorisms, with so much of gloss as may be required to render them intelligible. A class of pandits, in the Benares Sanskrit College, having been induced to learn English, it is contemplated that a version of the Aphorisms, brought out in successive portions, shall be submitted to the criticism of these men, and, through them, of other learned Bráhmans, so that any errors in the version may have the best chance of being discovered and rectified. The employment of such a version as a class-book is designed to subserve further the attempt to determine accurately the aspect of the philosophical terminology of the East as regards that of the West.

J. R. B.

Benares College,
5th January, 1851.

THE

VAIS'ESHIKA DOCTRINE.

INTRODUCTION.

A.—[The commentary, by S'ankara Mis'ra, the "Adornment of the Aphorisms of Kaṇáda," (*Sútropaskára*), commences as follows].

B.—Salutation to the venerable Ganes'a! Victorious is the man-lion [Vishṇu] dear to [the goddess] Lakshmí! Om! I salute Hara [or Siva] in the lap of whose high-wreathed matted locks the river of the gods disports, and whose forehead is resplendent with [the moon] the lover of the night!

C.—My reverence is ever [due] to Kaṇáda and to Bhavanátha—the two through whom I have become thoroughly proficient in the *Vais'eshika* doctrine.

D.—Like [that funambulist] the spider [which runs on a thread —*sútra*—] *my* boldness also in this case will attain success, whilst I proceed, where I have no [other] support, in reliance upon [those threads—*sútra*—] the Aphorisms alone [and not on any commentary*].

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* —श्री गणेशाय नमः ॥ श्री लक्ष्मीनृसिंहो जयति ॥

E.—Certain discriminating persons afflicted by the triad of evils [see—Sánkhya Lecture—No. 80—], investigating the means of the cessation of the triad of evils, discovered, in various Scriptures, law treatises, histories, and sacred poems, that the means thereof is merely the perception of the real nature of Soul. Moreover, wishing to know the path which might be the means of attaining to that, they approached the preeminently benevolent sage KAṆÁDA.

F.—Now KAṆÁDA, moreover, the great saint, possessing a knowledge of the truth, freedom from passion, and superhuman power [—see Sánkhya Lecture—No. 13—], having reflected in his mind—as follows—viz.: "The preeminent way to the "attainment of the perception of the real nature of Soul is the "knowledge of truth [derived] from [the knowledge of] the "[mutual] agreements and disagreements of the Six Catego-"ries [into which the "omne scibile" is distributed];—and this "[knowledge of the mutual relations of the Categories] may be "completed, without toil on the part of these [enquirers] "by means of *duty* [of the kind—to be described elsewhere as] "characterised by *forbearance* [from works either positively evil "or undertaken with a view to the gaining of their transitory "fruits];—therefore I [KAṆÁDA] shall, in the first place, declare "what is *duty*—both as regards its characteristic mark and its

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ओम्। ऊर्ध्वबद्धजटाजूटक्रोडाक्रीडत्सुरापगम्। नमामि यामिनीकान्तकान्तभालस्थलं हरम्॥१॥ याभ्यां वैशेषिके तन्त्रे सम्यग्व्युत्पादितोऽस्म्यहम्। कणादभवनाथाभ्यां ताभ्यां मम नमः सदा॥२॥ सूत्रमात्रावलम्बेन निरालम्बेऽपि गच्छतः। द्योखेलवन्ममाप्यत्र साहसं सिद्धिमेष्यति॥३॥

"generic nature; and, immediately thereafter, I shall declare "the Six Categories by [the regular process— referred to by "Mr. Colebrooke at p. 264 of his Essays vol. 1. viz.,] enunci"ation, definition, and examination:"—having settled this in his mind,—in order to [bespeak] the attention of these [enquirers aforesaid]—he makes an offer * [in the shape of the Aphorism, No. 1, here following].

THE APHORISMS OF THE 1ST DIURNAL SECTION OF THE 1ST LECTURE.

The subject proposed. अथातो धर्मं व्याख्यास्यामः ॥ १ ॥

No. 1. Now, therefore, we shall describe duty.

a.—[The commentator, on this, remarks as follows]—By saying "Now"—he implies [that the enunciation of this Apho-

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* —तापत्रयपराहता विवेकिनस्तापत्रयनिवृत्तिनिदानमनुसन्दधाना नाना श्रुतिस्मृतीतिहासपुराणेभ्य आत्मतत्त्वसाक्षात्कारमेव तदुपायमाकलय्यात्मतत्त्वप्राप्तिहेतुभूतमपि पन्थानं जिज्ञासमानाः परमकारुणिकं कणादमुनिमुपसेदुरथ कणादोऽपि महर्षिस्तत्त्वज्ञानवैराग्यैश्वर्यसम्पन्नः षण्णां पदार्थानां साधर्म्यवैधर्म्याभ्यां तत्त्वज्ञानमेवात्मतत्त्वसाक्षात्कारप्राप्तये परमपन्था इति मनसि कृत्वा तच्च निवृत्तिलक्षणाद्धर्मादेतेषामनायासेन सिद्ध्यतीति लक्षणतः स्वरूपतश्च धर्ममेव प्रथममुपदिशाम्यनन्तरं षडपि पदार्थानुद्देशलक्षणपरीक्षाभिरुपदेक्ष्यामीति हृदि निधाय तेषामवधानाय प्रतिजानीते ॥

rism comes] immediately after [the intimation of] the desire of the disciples [to be informed as to how they may escape from the triad of evils]. By saying "Therefore"—he means—since disciples, apt to hear &c, and free from malice, have come to me.*

b.—[The commentary then goes on to offer an alternative explanation of these words—the remarks having much the same drift as those at the opening of the *Muktávali* (the commentary on the *Bháshá-parichchheda*) on the import of a "benediction" (*mangala*)—which the word *atha* "now" is held to stand for.† After disposing of this matter, the commentator proceeds to say—as follows]—Now he [KAṆÁDA] declares [or defines] the thing which he tabled‡ [in his first Aphorism—viz., *duty*].

The means of emancipation. यतोऽभ्युदयनिःश्रेयससिद्धिः स धर्म्मः ॥ २ ॥

No. 2.—Duty (*dharmma*) is that from which there results 'emancipation' (*nihs'reyasa*) through 'exaltation' (*abhyudaya*).

a.—[In explanation of these terms the commentator tells us that] "exaltation" means [the being exalted by] the "knowledge of reality," and "emancipation" means the "absolutely final cessation of pain;" and "duty" is that from which come both [of these].§

b.—But then [—exclaim the consulters of KAṆÁDA—] the evidence [of your assertion] that the duty [that consists] of

* —अथेति शिष्याकाङ्क्षानन्तर्य्यमाह । अत इति यतः श्रवणादिपटवोऽनसूयकाश्चान्तेवासिन उपसेदुरित्यर्थः ॥

† —यद्वा । अथशब्दो मङ्गलार्थः ॥ (‡)—अथ प्रतिज्ञातमर्थमाह ॥

§ —अभ्युदयस्तत्त्वज्ञानं । निःश्रेयसमात्यन्तिकी दुःखनिवृत्तिस्तदुभयं यतः स धर्म्मः ॥

forbearance [from works either positively evil or undertaken with a view to the gaining of their transitory fruits] is the means of [attaining to] emancipation through the knowledge of truth —[the evidence of this—we say—] is the *Veda*. [Now] we [the present enquirers] deny the authority of the mere *Veda*—for it has the faults of being false, self-destructive, and tautological. That it is false [is proved] by a son's *not* being born even after there has been performed the [ceremony of] *putreshṭi* [or 'sacrifice for the sake of a son'——which ceremony, the *Veda* promised, was to lead to the birth of a son].*

c.—[After citing examples—which we here pretermit—of what they take to be self-contradiction and tautology in the Veda, the objectors go on to say that] neither is there anything that shows that the Veda is an instrument of right knowledge†, [and that, in short] the whole matter is a mass of uncertainty‡.

d.—[By way of reply to all these objections] therefore, [says the commentator] he [KAṆÁDA] declares§ [as follows].

Why the Veda is held to be an authority in the matter. तद्वचनादाम्नायप्रामाण्यम् ॥ ३ ॥

No. 3.—As it is the declaration thereof, there is an authority [or a right to be received as evidence] in the *Veda*.

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* —ननु निवृत्तिलक्षणो धर्मस्तत्त्वज्ञानद्वारा निःश्रेयसहेतुरित्यत्र श्रुतिः प्रमाणम् । श्रुतेरेव प्रमाण्यं वयं विप्रतिपद्यामहे । अनृतव्याघातपुनरुक्तदोषेभ्यः । पुत्रेष्टौ कृतायामपि पुत्रानुत्पादादनृतत्वम् ॥

† —नचाम्नायप्रामाण्यप्रतिपादकं किञ्चिदस्ति ॥

‡ —सर्वमेतदाकुलम् ॥

§ अत आह ।

a.—The word "thereof" refers to *God*—although the name [indicated by the pronominal has not been mentioned before—or] is not standing near —for *He* is understood to be meant, from the notoriety* [of the use of a pronominal—like the English "He" or "Him" with a capital—when speaking of Him though not mentioned, on the occasion, previously].

b.—[And if you think that KAṆÁDA had no right to employ a pronominal where the name of what was thereby implied had not gone close before—then you must extend your censure—which you are not likely to do—to GAUTAMA;—for the word 'God' is here indicated by a pronominal]—just as in the aphorism of GAUTAMA [—the 57th in the 2nd Chapter–viz.,] "The unauthoritativeness "*thereof* [may be inferred] from its faults of untruth, self-contra-"diction, and tautology"—[as, I repeat,—in this aphorism of GAUTAMA—]the *Veda* too, which had not been mentioned near the place, is indicated by the expression "*thereof*."†

c.—And thus [the meaning of the 3d aphorism appears to be this that] the authoritativeness [—i. e., as remarked in the *Vedánta paribháshá*, the being the instrument of correct Knowledge‡—] of the Veda (*ámnáya*) is [derived] from its being "the declaration thereof"—i. e., a revelation by *Him* who is the Lord.§

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* —तदित्यनुपक्रान्तमपि प्रसिद्धिसिद्धतयेश्वरं परामृशति ॥

† —यथा तदप्रामाण्यमनृतव्याघातपुनरुक्तदोषेभ्य इति गौतमीयसूत्रे तच्छब्देनानुपक्रान्तोऽपि वेदः परामृश्यते ॥

‡ —प्रमायाः करणं प्रमाणम् ॥

§—तथाच तद्वचनात्तेनेश्वरेण प्रणयनादाम्नायस्य वेदस्य प्रामाण्यम् ॥

d.—Or [if you do not choose to allow that the pronominal refers to *God,* you may say that] the "thereof" refers to *duty*—which [term] does stand near* [—being mentioned in the preceding aphorism, No. 2].

e.—[Passing over the commentatorial details relative to this alternative view of the import of the pronominal, we go on to where, as the commentator tells us,] having, in pursuance of the wish of the disciples, explained what *duty* is, as regards its nature and its characteristic [i. e. as regards its *genus* and *differentia,*] there is [next presented] an aphorism with a view to explaining the object-matter [of the treatise] and the relation† [between the treatise and that object-matter].

Enunciation of the Categories, the Knowledge of which is to lead to Emancipation.

धर्मविशेषप्रसूताद्द्रव्यगुणकर्मसामान्यविशेषसमवायानां साधर्म्यवैधर्म्याभ्यां तत्त्वज्ञानान्निःश्रेयसम् ॥४॥

No. 4.—Emancipation [is to be attained] through the Knowledge of truth, produced by a particular Kind of duty [—that explained under No. 4. *g*—] which [knowledge of truth] specially relates to the agreements and disagreements of [the Six Categories, referred to at *f.*, which Categories are] Substance, Quality, Action, Community, Distinction, and Concretion.

a.—Such a knowledge of truth is dependent on the Vais'eshika doctrine; therefore [do we assert that] it also [—viz., that

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*—यद्वा तदिति सन्निहितं धर्ममेव परामृशति ॥

†—शिष्याकांक्षानुरोधेन स्वरूपतो लक्षणतश्च धर्मं व्याख्यायाभिधेयसम्बन्धप्रतिपादनाय सूत्रम् ॥

‡—एतादृशं तत्त्वज्ञानं वैशेषिकशास्त्राधीनमिति तस्यापि निःश्रेयसहेतुत्वं दण्डापूपितम् ॥

this doctrine—] is a means of emancipation —just as a staff with cakes‡ [—tied in a bundle to the end of it, to be carried on a journey—may be spoken of as a means of sustenance, for when the staff is brought then the *cakes* are brought].

b.—[In accordance with the established opinion, among Hindú commentators, that it is proper to point out not merely what is the object-matter of the book and what is the motive for attending to the matter, but also what is the *relation* of the book to its object-matter, and who is the person concerned in the enquiry—the commentator informs us that] here it is to be understood that the relation between this doctrine and emancipation is that of cause and effect; between this doctrine and the knowledge of truth, that of an instrument and its operation; between emancipation and the knowledge of truth, that of effect and cause; and between the Categories 'Substance &c.' and the doctrine, that of matter for exposition and expositor *.

A dispute concerning the nature of Emancipation.

c.—[The commentator then enters into a long discussion of the opinions current respecting the nature of 'emancipation'. He denies that this consists in absorption into Brahma —for, he argues,] if you say that 'emancipation' is the absorption of the human soul into the divine soul, then this is absurd—if by 'absorption' you mean the becoming *one*—for *two* never become *one* [of the same kind]. And the opinion of the *Ekadaṇḍins* [—those who, unlike the bearers of the triple staff, carry a

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* —तदत्र शास्त्रनिःश्रेयसयोर्हेतुहेतुमद्भावः । शास्त्रतत्त्वज्ञानयोर्व्यापारिव्यापारभावः । निःश्रेयसतत्त्वज्ञानयोः कार्य्यकारणभावः । द्रव्यादिपदार्थशास्त्रयोः प्रतिपाद्यप्रतिपादकभावः सम्बन्धो ऽवगम्यते ।

single staff as an emblem of their belief in but one reality—viz. Brahma or the Absolute—] is to be rejected—[the opinion viz.—] that "'Absorption' is the departure of the 'subtile body' "and the 'subtile body' is [the aggregate of] the eleven organs "[—see Lecture on the Sánkhya No. 29] and "the departure "[we say] of these and of the [gross] body is absorption,"—[this opinion of the *Ekadaṉdins* is to be rejected] because of the non-existence of any proof that Soul *does* consist of Knowledge and of Joy [as the followers of the Vedánta assert that it does]. And this scripture is no proof of it—viz.—" Brahma is the eternal, knowledge, and joy"—for this [when correctly interpreted] declares His *possession* of knowledge and his *possession* of joy [—not his being made up thereof];—for [—as every one knows—] there is such a feeling as "I know" or "I am happy," but not such a one as "I am knowledge" or "I am joy." *

d.—Moreover it turns out [—if we admit the tenet of the Vedánta that nothing really exists except Brahma—] that there is no difference between one emancipated and one mundane [or

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*—ब्रह्मात्मनि जीवात्मलयो मुक्तिरिति चेत्। लयो यद्येकीभावस्तदा बाधात्। नहि द्वयमेकं भवति। लिङ्गशरीरापगमो लयो लिङ्गञ्चैकादशेन्द्रियाणि तेषां शरीरस्य च विगमो लय इति त्वेकदण्डिमतमपास्तम्। आत्मनो ज्ञानत्वे सुखत्वे च प्रमाणाभावात्। नच नित्यं विज्ञानमानन्दं ब्रह्मेति श्रुतिर्मानम्। तस्या ज्ञानवत्वानन्दवत्वप्रतिपादकत्वात्। भवति हि अहं जाने अहं सुखीति प्रतीतिर्नत्वहं ज्ञानमहं सुखमिति ॥

still in the flesh] because each, [on that view of the case] even now, *is* Brahma. *

e.—[After some other remarks which we omit, the commentator says] the *cessation of pain*, [that cessation being] of the kind that has been described, [viz absolute] is the 'summum bonum.'†

f.—[With reference to the construction of the words in the aphorism—No. 4—he tells us that] in the expression "knowledge of truth" the sixth [or genitive] case has the force of the objective; and in the expression "agreements and disagreements" the third [or instrumental] case has the force of specification ‡ [—the knowledge being of that *kind* which the expression in the third case denotes].

g.—[In the aphorism—No. 4—] the expression "produced by a particular kind of duty" qualifies [or particularises] the expression "knowledge of truth." Here the particular kind of duty is that of *forbearance* § [—see No. 2. *b.*—]

h.—But if [—contrary to the analysis adopted under No. 4.

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*—किञ्च ब्रह्मण इदानीमपि सत्त्वात् मुक्तसंसारिणोरविशेषापत्तिः ॥

†—दुःखनिवृत्तिरेवोक्तरूपा निःश्रेयसमिति ॥

‡—तत्त्वस्य ज्ञानमिति कर्मणि षष्ठी । साधर्म्यवैधर्म्याभ्यामिति प्रकारे तृतीया ॥

§—धर्मविशेषप्रसूतादिति तत्त्वज्ञानादित्यस्य विशेषणम् । तत्र धर्मविशेषो निवृत्तिलक्षणो धर्मः

f.—] it is the *doctrine* that is meant by the expression [which has been rendered] "knowledge of truth"—because "truth is known thereby" [i. e. by means of the doctrine,] then the "particular kind of duty" [of which we have given our own view under No. 4. *g.*] must be interpreted to consist in the ascertainment of and the grace of God—for it is a matter of tradition that "The great saint, KAṆÁDA, having attained to the ascertainment and to the grace of God, revealed his doctrine."*

i.—And here, by "knowledge of truth" we mean to say the beholding of Soul—since thereby alone is it possible for imaginary and false knowledge to be rooted out.†

j.—Now, enunciating the species included in the category of 'Substance,'—the one enounced first [in No. 4.] in consideration of its being what [alone] attains to emancipation [—since thereupon the other categories vanish—] and of its being the substratum of all the other categories, he [KAṆÁDA] goes on to say :‡—

The Category of Substance divided.

पृथिव्यापस्तेजो वायुराकाशं कालो दिगात्मा मन इति द्रव्याणि ॥ ५ ॥

No. 5.—Earth, water, light, air, ether, time, place, soul, mind —such are the Substances.

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*—यदि तु तत्त्वं ज्ञायते अनेनेति तत्त्वज्ञानं शास्त्रमुच्यते तदा धर्मविशेष ईश्वरनियोगप्रसादरूपो वक्तव्यः। श्रूयते हीश्वरनियोगप्रसादावधिगम्य कणादो महर्षिः शास्त्रं प्रणीतवानिति ॥

†—तत्त्वज्ञानमात्मसाक्षात्कार इह विवक्षितस्तस्यैव सवासनमिथ्याज्ञानोन्मूलनक्षमत्वात् ॥

‡—इदानीमपवर्गभागितया सर्वपदार्थाश्रयतया च प्रथमोद्दिष्टस्य द्रव्यपदार्थस्य विशेषोद्देशं कुर्वन्नाह ॥

a.—The expression "such" (*iti*) is intended to make the assertion definite:—therefore the meaning is, that there are just nine Substances and not nine and more.*

b.—But [some one may object that] "*Gold* is not earth because "it is without *odour* [which—see the *Tarka-sangraha* p. 5.—is "held to be the characteristic of earth]—nor is it water because it "is devoid of viscidity and of natural fluidity; nor is it fire "because of its weight—and, for the same reason neither is it air "or ether [both of which are held to be devoid of weight];— "therefore it is different from all the nine [enumerated in No. '5.]"—if [you say this—then I, the commentator, say] No:— your first two reasons are valid [against gold's being earth or being water], but your third is a case of [the fallacy termed] 'unreality of the alleged nature†'—[for the followers of this doctrine hold that gold is not really heavy in *itself*, but appears to be heavy through its admixture with earthy particles—and] the gold itself is composed of fire or light.‡

c.—Qualities—in the shape of some quality or another—[—not all qualities in all cases—] reside in all Substances, they are the

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*—इतिकारोऽवधारणार्थः। तेन नवैव द्रव्याणि नाधिकानि नवेत्यर्थः॥

†—ननु सुवर्णं न तावत् पृथिवी निर्गन्धत्वात्। न जलं स्नेहसांसिद्धिकद्रवत्वशून्यत्वात्। न तेजो गुरुत्वात्। अत एव न वायुर्नवाकाशादि। ततो नवभ्यो भिद्यत इति चेत्। न। आद्ययोरनाभासत्वं तृतीयस्य स्वरूपासिद्धत्वम्॥

‡—सुवर्णस्य तैजसत्वम्॥

characteristics of the Substances, and it is they which render Substances cognizable;—therefore, immediately after the Substances, he enunciates and divides the Qualities* [as follows]:—

The Category of Quality divided.

रूपरसगन्धस्पर्शाः संख्याः परिमाणानि पृथक्त्वं संयोगविभागौ परत्वापरत्वे बुद्धयः सुखदुःखे इच्छाद्वेषौ प्रयत्नाश्च गुणाः ॥ ६ ॥

No. 6.—Colour, Savour, Odour, Tangibility, Numbers, Magnitudes, Severalty, Conjunction and Disjunction, Distance and Proximity, Thoughts, Pleasure and Pain, Desire and Aversion, Efforts and [others] are the Qualities.

a.—By the "and" he adds [to this list] Weight, Fluidity Viscidity, Momentum, Merit and Demerit, and Sound; for these are notoriously known to be Qualities, and therefore he did not mention them by word of mouth.†

b.—And [-next-] Actions are things perceptible, because they owe their existence to Substances and to Qualities, and they inhere in coloured [and therefore perceptible Substances;—therefore, immediately after the naming of the Substances and the Qualities, he enunciates and divides the Category of] Action‡ [as follows]—

* —गुणत्वेन रूपेण गुणानां सर्वद्रव्याश्रितत्वं द्रव्यलिङ्गत्वं द्रव्याभिव्यञ्जकत्वञ्चेति द्रव्यानन्तरं गुणानामुद्देशं विभागञ्चाह ॥

† —चकारेण गुरुत्वद्रवत्वस्नेहसंस्कारधर्माधर्मशब्दान् समुच्चिनोति । ते च प्रसिद्धगुणभावा एवेति कण्ठतो नोक्ताः ॥

‡ —कर्माणि च द्रव्यजन्यत्वात् गुणजन्यत्वाच्च रूपिद्रव्यसमवायाच्च प्रत्यक्षाणीति द्रव्यगुणाभिधानानन्तरं कर्मोद्देशविभागावाह ॥

The Category of Action divided.

उत्क्षेपणमवक्षेपणमाकुञ्चनं प्रसारणं गमनमिति कर्माणि ॥ ७ ॥

No. 7.—Elevation, Depression, Contraction, Dilatation, Motion—such are the Actions.

a.—The "such" [—conf. No. 5. *a.*—] is intended to make the assertion definite;—for *whirling* &c., too are not distinct from *Motion*, [and are not therefore omitted in the enumeration.] And here the kinds [of Action called] Elevation, Depression, Contraction, Dilatation, & Motion, are clearly five species included under Action.*

b.—[This division of 'Action' is objected to by others, on the ground that 'Action' and 'Motion' are convertible terms,—so that the citation of 'Motion' as one member in the division of 'Action' is nothing else than the citation of 'Motion' as one member in a five-fold division of 'Motion' itself. In the commentary before us this objection is treated voluminously. A more concise solution of the difficulty is offered in the *Dinákari*, a commentary on the *Siddhánta-muktávali* which is a commentary on the popular text-book the *Bháshá-parichchheda*. The author of the *Dinákari*, stating the opinion of the objector, says—]—now, since we can obtain 'Elevation', and the rest, from 'Motion' simply, the division [of 'Action'] into 'Elevation &c.' is improper. Nor [can you say that] the fact of their being 'Motion' is not discernible in 'Elevation' and the others,——for, in the case of a clod,

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*—इतिरवधारणार्थः । भ्रमणादेरपि गमनादव्यतिरेकात् । त-थोत्क्षेपणत्वापक्षेपणत्वाकुञ्चनत्वप्रसारणत्वगमनत्वानि कर्मत्वसाक्षाद्व्याप्याः पञ्च जातयः ।

or the like, elevated upwards or depressed downwards, the conviction [—if there be any—] is—that is *goes* upwards, or it *goes* downwards [——so that there is a *going*—or 'Motion'—in either case—];—but if you say this [—resumes the author of the *Dinákri* —] it is not as you say—for one must not [presume to direct a great sanctified sage [like KAṆÁDA] whose will is independent* [and who may divide 'Action' according to his own good pleasure.]

c.—Next after the topic of the enunciation of 'Substance' *&c.*, [—see § 5 &c.—] the topic of the *communities of character* belonging to the three [—viz. to substance, quality, and action,—] begins. Here, since the disciple is on the look out for the 'communities of character' beloning to the three, because these [—see —§ *f.* in the Introduction—] conduce to the 'knowledge of truth [which—see § *e*—leads eventually to emancipation],—even be fore enouncing the [remaining] three categories, beginning wit- 'Sameness' he mentions the communities of character belonging to the [first] three †—as follows.

In what respect Substance Quality and Action do not differ from one another.

सदनित्यं द्रव्यवत्कार्य्यं कारणं सामान्यविशेषवदिति द्रव्यगुणकर्म्मणामविशेषः ॥ ८ ॥

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*—अथैवमुत्क्षेपणादीनामपि गमनादेव लाभे उत्क्षेपणत्वादिभिर्व्विभागोऽनुचितः। नवा उत्क्षेपणादौ गमनत्वं नानुभाविकं·। ऊर्द्ध्वमधश्च प्रक्षिप्तलोष्टादौ ऊर्द्ध्वं गच्छति अधो गच्छतीति प्रत्ययादिति चेन्न स्वतन्त्रेच्छस्य महर्षेर्न्नियन्तुमशक्यत्वादिति ॥

†—द्रव्यादीनामुद्देशप्रकरणानन्तरं त्रयाणां साधर्म्यप्रकरणमारभ्यते। तत्र द्रव्यादीनां त्रयाणां साधर्म्यस्य तत्त्वज्ञानानुकूलतया

No. 8.—The indifference Substances, Qualities, and Actions, is this that they are entities, not eternal, inhering in Substance; effects, causes, and having [—or being the only loci of—] genus & ultimate difference.

a.—The word 'indifference' means merely a 'community of character' [which may exist, &, in the case of the three categories in question, does exist] even where 'difference' also exists.*

b.—'Entities'—i. e. these three alone are the objects in regard to which the belief is entertained that they do exist—[and this belief is entertained] because these are associated with existence.†

c.—'Not eternal'—i. e. the counter-opposite [—and possible victim—] of an emergent non-existence [—in other words something liable to destruction.] Although this character is not common to Atoms or the Ether &c.,—yet what we mean to speak of is the possession of the distinctive character as a category [—this distinctive character being here either that of Substance Quality or Action—] which resides in those things that *are* the 'counter-opposites of an emergent non-existence'—[—and which *may* reside, and does, in some that are not such].‡

प्रथमं शिष्याकाङ्क्षितत्वात् सामान्यादिपदार्थत्रयस्योद्देशात्प्रागेव त्रयाणां साधर्म्यमाह ॥

*—विशेषे सत्यप्ययमविशेषशब्दः साधर्म्यमात्रपरः ॥

†—सदिति सदाकारप्रत्ययव्यपदेशविषयत्वं त्रयाणामेव । सत्तायोगित्वात् ॥

‡—अनित्यमिति ध्वंसप्रतियोगि । तद्यद्यपि न परमाण्वाकाशादिसाधारणं तथापि ध्वंसप्रतियोगिषु त्रिपदार्थविभाजकोपाधिमत्त्वं विवक्षितम् ॥

d.—'Inhering in Substance'—i. e., 'Substance' is the substratum thereof *[—in the absence of which neither a Quality nor an Action could exist— nor an ordinary Substance itself,—seeing that any such given substance as a jar exists only in virtue of the existence of the constituent Substances, e. g. its halves, which furnish its substratum].

e.—[The name of an 'effect' does not apply to such things as the Atoms which KAṆÁDA holds to be eternal; and the redundancy in the definition is explained away like the one in § 8. c.]

f.—Now he states the 'communities of character' belonging to Substance and Quality only † [—excluding Action].

How far Substance and Quality agree, while differing from Action.

द्रव्यगुणयोः सजातीयारम्भकत्वं साधर्म्यम् ॥ ९ ॥

No. 9.—It is the common character of Substance and Quality that each originates its congener.

a.—By the next aphorism he renders clear just the present one. ‡

द्रव्याणि द्रव्यान्तरमारभन्ते गुणाश्च गुणान्तरम् ॥१०॥

No. 10.—Substances originate another Substance, and Qualities another [like] Quality.

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*—द्रव्यवदिति द्रव्यं समवायिकारणतया ऽस्यास्तीति द्रव्यवत् ।

†—इदानीं द्रव्यगुणयोरेव साधर्म्यमाह ।

‡—एतदेव सूत्रान्तरेण स्फुटयति ।

a.—[Thus the two halves of a jar originate, or prodnce, the jar; and the black or red colour of the halves originates the black or red colour of the jar.]

b.—But why then do *Actions* not originate other Actions ?—In reply to this he says* [as follows].

Action not the product of completed Action. } कर्म कर्मसाध्यं न विद्यते ॥ ११ ॥

No. 11.—An Action is not what is established by an Action.

a.—The verb 'to be' [—in the expression 'An Action *is*' &c.—] is here intended for knowledge [—that is to say, it is intended —like the 'logical copula' of European logicians--to make one aware that the subject and predicate stand in such and such a relation to one another];—but it does not connote *existence* †.

b.—The meaning [of the aphorism] is, that there is no evidence of an Action's being completed [or definitively resulting] in an Action, as there is of a Subtance's or a Quality's in its originated congener ‡—[§9]. [Action, or motion, commencing in the destruction of a former conjunction—i. e. in the disjunction of the body from the place which it previously occupied, is regarded as being

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*—ननु कर्माणि कुतो न कर्मान्तरमारभन्त इत्यत आह ॥

†—विदिरयं ज्ञानार्थो नतु सत्ताभिधायी ॥

‡—सजातीयारब्धद्रव्यगुणयोरिव कर्मसाध्ये कर्मणि प्रमाणं नास्तीत्यर्थः ॥

completed in the subsequent conjunction of the body with another locality —see § 14. *a.*].

c.—He [now] states the the *difference* of character in Substance from Quality and Action*—thus.

Wherein Substance differs both from Quality and Action.

न द्रव्यं कार्यं कारणञ्च बधति ॥१२॥

No. 12.—Neither effect nor cause slays Substance.

a.—The meaning is—that its own product does not destroy a Substance, nor does its own cause destroy a Substance, because two substances which stand to each other in the relation of source and product [—e. g. yarn and the web formed thereof—] do not stand to each other in the relation of contradictories† [—opposed and opposing.]

b.—'Slays'—is an 'aphoristic' expression‡ [—and the illustrious propounders of aphorisms have the privilege of employing words in ways more strange than would be tolerated in ordinary cases].

c.—He next states that a Quality [unlike a Substance] is destroyed [both] by its cause and its effect. §

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*—गुणकर्मभ्यां द्रव्यस्य वैधर्म्यमाह ।

†—द्रव्यं न स्वकार्यं हन्ति नवा स्वकारणं हन्ति । कार्यकारणभावापन्नयोर्द्रव्ययोर्बाध्यबाधकभावो नास्तीत्यर्थः ।

‡—बधतीति सौत्रो निर्देशः ।

§—गुणस्य कार्यकारणबध्यत्वमाह ।

उभयथा गुणः । १३ ।

No. 13.—In both ways Quality.

a.—That is to say—it is destroyed by its product and destroyed by its cause. In the case of the first, [second, third,] and following Sounds [generated in succession by the ethereal undulations originated by the sonorous body], and in the case of Notions [succeeding each other in the train of thought], and the like cases, there is an instance of [a Quality's] being destroyed by its own *product* [each successive thought, for instance, being the product and the superseder of the one preceding]. But in the case of the *last* [wave, or the like, which is succeeded by no other], we have an instance of its being destroyed by its *cause*—for [—as our author chooses to view the matter—]the destruction of the *last* [Sound] is due [—since it can be due to nothing else—] to the *penultimate* one* [from which it also took its origin].

b.—[Sound—it must not be forgotten—is here regarded as a *quality* of the Ether, and Knowledge as a *quality* of the Soul].

c.—Having stated that Qualities are opposed by [or cannot co-exist with] their effects and causes both, he next states that an Action is opposed only by its effect.†

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*—कार्यबध्यः कारणबध्यश्चेत्यर्थः। आद्यादिशब्दबुद्धीनां कार्यबध्यत्वं। चरमस्य तु कारणबध्यत्वं। उपान्त्येन शब्देनान्त्यस्य नाशात्।

†—गुणानां कार्यकारणोभयविरोधित्वमुक्त्वा कर्मणः कार्यमात्रविरोधित्वमाह।

कार्य्यविरोधि कर्म ॥ १४ ॥

No. 14.—Action is opposed by its effect.

a.—[The expression *káryyavirodhi*, in the aphorism, is] a *Bahuvríhi* compound signifying 'whereof the effect is the opponent.' [Action is said to be opposed by its effect] because a motion is destroyed by the latter conjunction produced by itself* [—see 11. *b.*]

b.—Having, in accordance with the wishes of the disciples, stated the communities of character belonging to the three [—see § 7], now, commencing the topic of Definition, † [—see Introduction, *f.*—], he says—

The definition of Substance. क्रियागुणवत्समवायिकारणमिति द्रव्यलक्षणम् ॥ १५ ॥

No. 15.—It has Action and Qualities, it is the [sole] intimately united cause [or substratum]—such is the characteristic of Substance.

a.—[The expression, in the aphorism,] *kriyá-gunavat* means that 'in it both Action and Qualities reside.'‡

b.—Here the word 'characteristic' means a *mark*—a species of *exclusive token* which distinguishes things of the same from things

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*—कार्य्यं विरोधि यस्येति बहुव्रीहिः । स्वजन्योत्तरसंयोगनाश्यत्वात् कर्मणः ॥

†—शिष्याकाङ्क्षानुरोधेन साधर्म्यं त्रयाणामभिधायेदानीं लक्षणप्रकरणमारभमाण आह ॥

‡—क्रिया गुणाश्च विद्यन्ते ऽस्मिन्निति क्रियागुणवत् ॥

of another genus.—By its etymology it signifies 'that whereby something is recognised'.*

c.—Likewise, the fact of being an 'intimately united cause' [or substratum] also is a difference of the category of Substance [alone—see § 18. *a.*—] out of the six categories† [—§ 4.].

d.—Since the enunciation of the Qualities came next after [that of] Substance, he now states the definition thereof ‡ [next after the definition of Substance].

The definition of Quality. द्रव्याश्रय्यगुणवान् संयोगविभागेष्वकारणमनपेक्ष इति गुणलक्षणम् ॥१६॥

No. 16.—Inhering in Substance, not having Qualities, not a cause of Conjunction or Disjunction if independent—such is the definition of Quality.

a.—'Inhering in Substance'—i. e. its wont is to reside in a Substance. But this [character] belongs to *Substance* also, [as well as to Quality, for a jar is as dependent on its two halves for its existence as the colour of the jar is dependant on the Substance of the jar]—therefore he says 'not having qualities'.§

b.—But still it [—viz. the definition, even thus narrowed—]

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*—अत्र लक्षणशब्दश्चिह्नवचनः समानासमानजातीयव्यवच्छेदकव्यतिरेकिलिङ्गविशेषवचनः । लक्ष्यते ऽनेनेति व्युत्पत्तिबलात् ॥

†—एवं समवायिकारणत्वमपि षट्पदार्थभेदकमेव द्रव्यपदार्थस्य लक्षणम् ॥

‡—उद्देशक्रमप्राप्तगुणलक्षणमाह ।

§—द्रव्यमाश्रयितं शीलमस्येति द्रव्याश्रयी ॥ एतच्च द्रव्ये ऽपि गतमत आह । अगुणवान् ।

extends [—where the definition of Quality ought not—] to *Action* [—which resides in Substance—see § 15. *a.*—and which is not a substratum of qualities—see § 8. *c.*—]; therefore, he says 'not a cause of conjunction or disjunction*[—which *Action*, or motion, *is*—see § 17].

c.—And [yet again, conjunction, which is a quality, *may* be the cause of conjunction—as the conjunction of the man's hat with his head may be the cause of the hat's, mediate, conjunction with the ground on which the man stands]—therefore he says [where it *is* so, it is not] 'independent [or direct].' Here, after the word 'independent' the word 'quality' is to be supplied [—which accounts for the masculine ending of the word]. The sense then is—'that which, being independent [or unaided by something intermediate], is not a cause of Conjunctions and Disjunctions.'†

d—He next states the definition of 'Action,' which —[see § 4—] was enunciated next after 'Quality.'‡

The definition of Action. एकद्रव्यमगुणं संयोगविभागेषु कारणमनपेक्षमिति कर्मलक्षणम् ॥ १७ ॥

No. 17. Belonging to a single substance, without qualities, a cause of Conjunctions and Disjunctions [and a cause thereof prospectively] independent,—such is the definition of Action.

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*—तथापि कर्मण्यतिव्याप्तिरित्यत आह संयोगविभागेष्वकारणम् ॥

†—अत उक्तं अनपेक्ष इति । अत्रानपेक्ष इत्यनन्तरगुण इति पूरणीयं । संयोगविभागेष्वनपेक्षः सन् कारणं यो न भवतीत्यर्थः ।

‡—गुणानन्तरमुद्दिष्टस्य कर्मणो लक्षणमाह ॥

a.—'Belonging to a single substance'—i. e. that of which [unlike such Qualities as Conjunction and Disjunction] a single substance is the substratum.*

b—'Without qualities'—i. e. there is not in this any quality† [of those in the list given under § 6].

c.—'A cause of Conjunctions and Disjunctions independent':—here the independentness consists in the [Action's] being independent [—not of Substance, for example, apart from which it cannot exist,—but] of any thing arising subsequently to its own production.‡ [Thus, whilst a Quality, such as Conjunction, can be a cause—say of another Conjunction—see § 16. *c.*—only through the intervention of another Conjunction,—or whilst a Quality, such as the Weight, Odour, and the like, in the separate halves that are to form a jar, can be a cause—e. g. of the Weight, the Odour, and the like, of the jar itself—only through the intervention of another Quality—the Conjunction, namely, of the separate halves;—*Action,* on the other hand, is the direct or immediate cause of the Disjunction of the moving body from the place which it quits, and of its subsequent Conjunction with the place which it reaches].

d. He now reverts to the topic of the *communities of charac-*

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*—एकमेव द्रव्यमाश्रयो यस्य तदेकद्रव्यम् ।

†—न विद्यते गुणो ऽस्मिन्नित्यगुणम्

‡—संयोगविभागेषु कारणमनपेक्षमिति स्वोत्पन्नानन्तरोत्पत्तिकभावभूतानपेक्षत्वमनपेक्षत्वम् ॥

ter [belonging to the first three categories], since communities of character serve to establish a distinction [between what possesses and what does not possess these], just as does any definition* [the topic wherewith we are now concerned.]

Substance the substantial or intimate cause of the first three.

द्रव्यगुणकर्मणां द्रव्यं कारणं सामान्यम् ॥ १८ ॥

No. 18.—Of Substances Quality and Action, Substance is the cause ; [—such is] a common character [of the three].

a.—That is to say—it is, singly, quite equally common [to the three]—as [when one says] " She [speaking of some woman—] is the common mother of the two".† The meaning is—that in one single substance, as a substratum (or substantial cause) there (may) reside, as products, Substance, Quality and Action‡—[for example—in the substance of a jar, as a substratum, there may subsist at once the jar itself, the colour of the jar, and the motion of the jar when floating down the Ganges].

b.—He states, as a common character of the three, that their *non-intimate* cause may be a quality.§

Quality the non-intimate cause of the first three.

उभयथा गुणः ॥१९॥

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*—लक्षणस्येतरभेदसाधकत्ववत्साधर्म्यस्यापीति साधर्म्यप्रकरणमुपक्रमते ॥

†—समानमेव सामान्यमेकमित्यर्थः । अनयोः समाना मातेतिवत् ॥

‡—एकस्मिन्नेव द्रव्ये समवायिकारणे द्रव्यगुणकर्माणि कार्याणि वर्त्तन्ते इत्यर्थः ॥

§—गुणासमवायिकारणकत्वं त्रयाणां साधर्म्यमाह ॥

No. 19.—In two ways a Quality [may be a cause of all the three].

a.—[He means to say that] a common character of the three is this, that they possess that generic character which resides in whatever has a Quality as its *non-intimate* [or *in*-substantial] cause.*

b.—Of Substances the non-intimate cause is Conjunction† [—as the conjunction of the threads is the non-intimate cause of the web. Then again—see *Tarka-sangraha* p. 22.—the *colour* of the threads is the non-intimate cause of the colour of the web.‡ And thus a quality may be a cause 'in two ways'—inasmuch as the quality may be one already existing in the *cause*—e. g. the colour,—or it may be one existent only in the *product*—e. g. the conjunction].

c.—That a single action may sometimes produce more effects than one, he thus states§.

A cause may produce divers effects. संयोगविभागवेगानां कर्म ॥ २० ॥

No. 20.—Of Conjunction, Disjunction and Momentum [or the manifestation of *inertia* in what is in motion], Action [—is the common cause].

a.—'Is the common cause'—such is the connection,|| [of this

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*—गुणासमवायिकारणवृत्तिजातिमत्त्वं त्रितयसाधर्म्यम् ॥

†—द्रव्याणां संयोगो ऽसमवायिकारणम् ॥

‡—असमवायिकारणं । यथा तन्तुसंयोगः पटस्य । तन्तुरूपं पटरूपस्य ॥ त० स० ॥

§—एकस्य कर्म्मणः क्वचिदनेककारित्वमाह ॥

||—समान कारणमित्यनुषङ्गः ॥

aphorism, with § 18. in which the words, here omitted elliptically, occur].

॥ न द्रव्याणाम् ॥२१॥

No. 21.—Not of Substances.

a.—That is to say—Action is not the cause of Substances. Why so?—therefore [—since the question may be put—] he tells us.*

॥ व्यतिरेकात् ॥ २२ ॥

No. 22.—Because of its abolition.

a.—' Because of its abolition,'—i. e. because of the cessation [of Action when completed]. When the Action has been put an end to by the ultimate Conjunction [to which it tended—see § 14, *a.*], the [new] substance is produced [—as the jar is produced when the two halves, being moved towards each other, have met, and the motion has ceased—]; hence Action is not a cause of a Substance† [—that is to say not a *permanent* and con-subsisting cause—for it *is* the cause of the Conjunction which is one of the permanent and con-subsisting causes of the jar].

b.—Now he mentions the fact that, in the case of a single product, many may have been the originators.‡

॥ द्रव्याणां द्रव्यकार्यं सामान्यम् ॥२३॥

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*—कर्म न द्रव्याणां कारणमित्यर्थः। कुत एवमत आह ॥

†—व्यतिरेकादिति निवृत्तेरित्यर्थः। उत्तरसंयोगेन कर्मणि निवृत्ते द्रव्यमुत्पद्यत इति न कर्मणो द्रव्यकारणत्वम् ॥

‡—इदानीमेकस्मिन् कार्ये बहूनामारम्भकत्वमाह ॥

No. 23.—A substance which ie a product is the common property [i.e. the common result] of substances [more than one].

a.—By 'substances' [in the plural] we mean either two or more. From two threads, a web of two threads originates; and from many threads, a web [as usually met with];—but no web is seen composed of *one* [straight] thread.*

b.—But then [—the question may occur—] as a substance is the product of substances, and in like manner a quality that of qualities, is an action too the product of actions?—therefore [to prevent such a notion from being adopted] he says:—†

॥ गुणवैधर्म्यान्न कर्मणाम् ॥ २४ ॥

No. 24.—Not of Actions [—more or fewer—see § 23 *a.*—any more than of a single Action—see § 11.], through the difference of their character [in this particular] from that of Qualities—[is Action the product].

a.—'Is Action the product'—such is the remainder‡ [of the sentence given elliptically in the aphorism].

b.—It has been mentioned [at § 9], as a characteristic common to Substance and Quality, that they originate their conge-

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*—द्रव्येच द्रव्याणिच द्रव्याणि । तत्र द्वाभ्यां तन्तुभ्यां द्वितन्तुकः पटो बहुभिरपि तन्तुभिरेक पट आरभ्यते नत्वेकतन्तुकोऽपि पटो दृश्यते ।

†—ननु यथा द्रव्याणां द्रव्यं कार्यं गुणानाञ्च गुणस्तथा किं कर्मणामपि कर्म कार्यमित्यत आह ।

‡—कर्म कार्यमिति शेषः ।

ners. But, with reference to the same point, it was *denied*—by the aphorism [§ 11] viz., " An Action is not what is established by an Action"—that *actions* originate their like. That fact is re-asserted in the present aphorism :—such is the state of the case.*

c.—Now, pointing out that Qualities which reside in the complex [—or in a complex substratum—] have their origin in more substances than one [at a time], he says†—

Of qualities requiring a complex substratum. } द्वित्वप्रभृतयः संख्याः पृथक्त्वं संयोगविभागाः ॥ २५ ॥

No. 25.—Numbers from two upwards, Severalty, Conjunction, and Disjunction [arise from—or require for their production—more substances than one].

a.—' Arise from more substances than one'—such is the remainder‡ [of the sentence given elliptically in the aphorism ;—a retrospective regard being had to § 23].

b. But then, as substances that are made up of parts [—see § 23—], and as the qualities before mentioned [at § 25], reside in

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*—द्रव्यगुणयोः सजातीयारम्भकत्वं साधर्म्यमुक्तम् । तत्र कर्म्म कर्म्मसाध्यं न विद्यत इति सूत्रेण कर्म्मणा कर्म्मजनकत्व प्रतिषिद्धमेव । तदिहानूद्यत इति भावः ॥

†—इदानीं व्यासज्यवृत्तीनां गुणानामनेकद्रव्यारभ्यत्वं दर्शयन्नाह ॥

‡—अनेकद्रव्यारभ्या इति शेषः ॥

what is complex,—why should it not be so with *Actions* also?—[as this may be asked]—therefore he says*—

असमवायात्सामान्यकार्यं कर्म न विद्यते ॥ २६ ॥

No. 26.—Action is not the product of a collection, because it does not inhere [—see § 17—in two or more substances].

a.—'Because it does not inhere'—to this is to be added the words 'in two substances or in more.' So then—one Action [numerically one], does not inhere in two substances; nor does one Action inhere in a plurality of substances; therefore an Action is not the product of [or does not depend for its existence upon] a collection—an aggregate.†

b.—In this aphorism too [—as in § 11—see § 11. *a*] the verb 'to be' is employed for the purpose of *predication*—and does not connote *existence*.‡

c.—Again [—as at § 23—] he mentions one product as that of *several* § [causes].

॥ संयोगानां द्रव्यम् ॥ २७ ॥

No. 27.—Of Conjunctions—a Substance.

a.—That is to say—of many conjunctions [of separate parts or

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*—नन्ववयविद्रव्याणां गुणानाञ्चोक्तानां यथा व्यासज्यवृत्तित्वं तथा कर्मणामपि किन्न स्यादत आह ।

†—असमवायादित्यत्र द्रव्ययोर्द्रव्येष्विति योज्यं । तथाच न द्रव्ययोरेकं कर्म समवैति । नवा द्रव्येष्वेकं कर्म समवैति । तेन सामान्यस्य समुदायस्य कार्यं कर्म न विद्यते ।

‡—अत्रापि विदिर्ज्ञानार्थो न सत्तावचनः ।

§—पुनर्बहूनामेकं कार्यमाह ।

particles] a [given] substance is the result.*

b.—This is to be understood with the exclusion of those Conjunctions which belong to intangible substances [—such as Time in its conjunction for instance with the jar or the web of today or yesterday—], and to ultimate formations [such as a jar, which is a substance formed of its two halves, but which does not go to make a part of any other single substance], and to heterogeneous substances† [—such as the half of a jar and some threads].

c.—Now he mentions a single result as that of many *qualities*.‡

॥ रूपाणां रूपम् ॥ २८ ॥

No. 28.—Of colours [one] colour [is the result].

a.—'One colour *is the result*'—such is the connection § [which the aphorism requires that we should bear in mind].

b.—The word 'colour' in both instances [of its occurrence in the aphorism] is indicatory—and the indicative power here is that of 'a word which does not [—while indicating something else besides—] abandon its own meaning,' ‖ [—so that whilst the word 'colour' here indicates the other qualities in KAṆÁDA's list of qualities, it continues not the less to denote colour also ;—unlike

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*—बहूनां संयोगानां द्रव्यमेकं कार्यमित्यर्थः ।

†—निरवयवानां द्रव्याणामन्त्यावयविनां विजातीयद्रव्याणाञ्च ये संयोगास्तान् विहायेति द्रष्टव्यम् ।

‡—इदानीं बहूनां गुणानामेकं कार्यमाह ।

§—रूपमेकं कार्यमित्यन्वयः ।

‖—रूपपदमुभयमपि लाक्षणिकमजहत्स्वार्था चेयं लक्षणा ।

the word 'lion' employed to indicate a hero, in which case the word 'lion' ceases to denote a quadruped. See *Sáhitya Darpaṇa* § 14. *a.*].

c.—For these [qualities], being present in the cause, originate, in the products, one single quality of the same kind*—[as the weight of the one half of the jar and the weight of the other half produce together the weight of the jar formed of these halves].

d.—He now states that a single Action may be the result of a plurality [of causes].†

॥ गुरुत्वप्रयत्नसंयोगानामुत्क्षेपणम् ॥ २९ ॥

No. 29.—Of gravity, effort, and conjunction, Elevating [may be the result].

a.—That is to say—Elevating may be the single result of these‡ [three—and it is to be observed that you cannot raise what has *no* weight].

b.—Here too [—as in § 28. *b.*] the word 'Elevating' is indicatory of [its kindred terms] 'Depressing' &c.§ [see § 7].

c.—Reminding us merely of [what may have escaped the reader's memory—] the declaration in the aphorism [§ 20]

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*—एते हि कारणे वर्त्तमानाः कार्य्येषु समानजातीयमेकमेव गुणमारभन्ते ॥

†—एकस्य कर्मणो ऽनेककार्य्यत्वमाह ॥

‡—उत्क्षेपणमेककार्य्यममीषामित्यर्थः ॥

§—अत्राप्युत्क्षेपणपदमपक्षेपणादावपि लाक्षणिकम् ॥

that "of Conjunction, Disjunction and Momentum, Action [is the common cause],"—he says—*

What are the results of Actions.

॥ संयोगविभागाश्च कर्म्मणाम् ॥ ३० ॥

30.—Of Actions, Conjunctions and Disjunctions [are the results].

a.—'Are the results'—such is the remainder † [required to supply the ellipsis.]

b.—But then [—some one may object] it was declared before [—at § 21 and § 24] that substances and actions are not the products of Actions;—but it is just Conjunctions and Disjunctions [—see 16. *c.*—] that have for *their* results the Conjunctions and Disjunctions [which you now allege are the results of *Action*]; —and so now your styling Action a *cause* is contradictory [to your previous declarations]. In reply to this, therefore, he says ‡:—

॥ कारणसामान्ये द्रव्यकर्म्मणां कर्म्माकारणमुक्तमिति ॥ ३१ ॥

31.—In [our discussion of] cause in general, it is of Substances and of Actions that Action has been styled no cause.

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*—संयोगविभागवेगानां कर्म्मेति सूत्रोक्तमेव स्मारयन्नाह ॥

†—जन्या इति शेषः ॥

‡—ननु द्रव्यकर्म्मणी न कर्म्मकार्य्ये इति पूर्व्वमुक्तं । संयोगविभागौ तु संयोगविभागकार्य्यावेव । तथाचेदानीं कर्म्मणः कारणत्वाभिधानं विरुद्धमित्यत आह ॥

a.—By the expression ‘causes in general’ he refers to the topic [that he has been engaged upon]. So—when we were on the topic of the mention of causes in general, it was in respect of Substances and Actions that Action was stated not to be a cause;—but it was not intended to be said that Action was not a cause in respect of anything whatever,—because this would destroy [by making nonsense of] the aphorism [§ 30] viz.—“Of Actions, Conjunctions and Disjunctions [are the results”].

b.—So much for the first diurnal portion of the first Lecture in [the commentary entitled] “The Adornment of the Aphorisms of the illustrious and venerable KAṆÁDA.”†

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*—कारणसामान्यपदेन प्रकरणमुपलक्ष्यते । तेन कारणसामान्याभिधानप्रकरणे द्रव्यकर्मणी प्रति कर्मण अकारणत्वमुक्तं । न तु सर्वथाप्यकारणमेव कर्मेति विवक्षितं येन संयोगविभागाश्च कर्मणामिति सूत्रं व्याहन्येतेति भावः ॥

†—इति श्रीमद्भगवत्कणादसूत्रोपस्कारे प्रथमाध्यायस्य प्रथममाह्निकम् ॥

—oo—

॥ मिरज़ापुर ॥

। यतीमों के छापाखाने में छापी गई ।

॥ सन १८५१ ईस्वी ॥

6.

THE APHORISMS

OF THE

MÍMÁNSÁ PHILOSOPHY

BY

JAIMINI.

WITH

EXTRACTS FROM THE COMMENTARIES.

IN SANSKRIT AND ENGLISH.

Printed for the use of the Benares College,
by order of Govt., N. W. P.

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PREFACE.

—ooOoo—

The great body of Hindú Philosophy is based upon six sets of very concise Aphorisms. Without a commentary the Aphorisms are scarcely intelligible, they being designed not so much to communicate the doctrine of the particular school, as to aid, by the briefest possible suggestions, the memory of him to whom the doctrine shall have been already communicated. To this end they are admirably adapted; and, this being their end, the obscurity, which must needs attach to them in the eyes of the uninstructed, is not chargeable upon them as a fault.

For various reasons it is desirable that there should be an accurate translation of the Aphorisms, with so much of gloss as may be required to render them intelligible. A class of pandits, in the Benares Sanskrit College, having been induced to learn English, it is contemplated that a version of the Aphorisms, brought out in successive portions, shall be submitted to the criticism of these men, and, through them, of other learned Bráhmans, so that any errors in the version may have the best chance of being discovered and rectified. The employment of such a version as a class-book is designed to subserve further the attempt to determine accurately the aspect of the philosophical terminology of the East as regards that of the West.

J. R. B.

Benares College,
31*st July*, 1851.

THE MÍMÁNSÁ APHORISMS.

INTRODUCTION.

a. SALUTATION to the feet of the venerable preceptor !*

b. Veneration unceasingly be to *Jaimini,* who removes the defect of vision of the simple by the collyrium-needle of his Institutes which put an end to doubt as to the sense of scripture.†

c. Now a doubt being started as to whether or not *Jaimini* ought to have undertaken this work, which consists of twelve lectures,—and the *primâ facie* solution of the doubt being as follows—viz.—such a work of disquisition ought *not* to be undertaken, because a work of disquisition is of no use when Heaven *(swarga)* is obtained by the mere taking of the letters [of the *Veda* without regard to its sense], Heaven alone being [in this case] to be supposed the fruit, as it is in the case of the sacrifice called *viśwajit* [—mentioned in the 4th canto of the *Raghuvanśa*—], it being to be expected that there is *some* fruit attached

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* श्री गुरुचरणेभ्यो नमः ॥

† वेदार्थसंशयच्छेत्तृशास्त्राञ्जनशलाकया। मूढचक्षुर्गदच्छेत्रे नमो जैमिनयेऽनिशम् ॥

to the perusal enjoined in the direction 'The Veda is to be perused' [—and Heaven being most probably the fruit when no other fruit is specified;—well, this *primâ facie* solution of the doubt having presented itself,] he declares the established tenet* [in regard to the point, as follows].

BOOK I. CHAPTER I.

SECTION I.

OF DUTY.

अथातो धर्मजिज्ञासा ॥ १ ॥

The subject proposed.

Aph. 1.—Next, therefore, [O student that hast attained thus far] a desire to know Duty *(dharma)* [is to be entertained by thee].

a. 'Next':—i. e. after perusing the scriptures whilst residing with the family of a preceptor.†

b. 'Therefore':—i. e. because the fruit of the perusal of the scripture is the knowledge of the sense [of its several passages,

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* अथ द्वादशाध्यायात्मकं शास्त्रमारम्भणीयं नवेति संशये। स्वाध्यायोऽध्येतव्य इति विहिताध्ययनस्य फलाकाङ्क्षायां विश्वजिन्न्यायेन स्वर्ग एव फलं कल्प्यं। तथाचाक्षरग्रहणमात्रेण स्वर्गसिद्धौ विचारशास्त्रस्याकिञ्चित्करत्वात् विचारशास्त्रं नारम्भणीयमिति पूर्वपक्षे सिद्धान्तमाह ॥

† अथेति। अथ गुरुकुलवासपूर्वकवेदाध्ययनानन्तरम्।

without comprehensive apprehension of the import of its teachings—see Lecture on the Vedánta §6]; therefore, in respect of Duty, the definition of which will be stated [in *Aph.* 2.], "a desire to know"—i. e. an investigation originating in a desire of knowledge—is to be made;— such is the remainder* [required to supply the ellipsis in the aphorism].

c. The state of the case is this, that assuredly the work of disquisition *ought* to be undertaken, because such a work of disquisition is just subserved by [or has a foundation laid for it in] that knowledge of the sense [of the several passages of scripture, that may be attained by a perusal thereof], and because it is fit that what is effected by a perusal thereof should be a correct understanding of the sense thereof [—instead of *Heaven's* being attained thereby, as supposed by the speculater in Intro. *c.*] seeing that it is improper to imagine an *unseen* reward [of this or that action] when a *visible* reward is possible;† [—and the understanding of the sense of scripture is a manifest reward of its perusal, whilst the attainment of Heaven by the perusal of scripture is what no one can declare that he has ever found manifested by the senses].

d. As the question will occur—" *What* is the *Duty* spoken of, in the expression 'a desire to know Duty', in the preceding

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* अतः। यतो ऽध्ययनस्य फलमर्थज्ञानं। अतो धर्मस्य वक्ष्यमाणलक्षणस्य जिज्ञासा। ज्ञानेच्छासाध्यो विचारः। कर्त्तव्येति शेषः॥

† अयम्भावः। सम्भवति दृष्टफले अदृष्टफलकल्पनमनुचितमित्यध्ययनेन तदर्थनिश्चयसम्पादनस्योचितत्वादर्थज्ञानस्य विचारशास्त्राधीनत्वादिदं विचारशास्त्रमवश्यमारम्भणीयमिति॥

aphorism?"—in order to acquaint us with the nature of Duty, he mentions its characteristic mark as follows.*

चोदनालक्षणोऽर्थो धर्मः ॥ २ ॥

How Duty is to be recognised.

Aph. 2.—A matter that is a Duty is recognised by the instigatory character [of the passage of scripture in which it is mentioned].

a. 'Instigatory character' [of the passage]:—this means [that the criterion of Duty is] an expression that moves [or instigates] one† [to do so and so].

b. 'Is recognised'—i. e. is known thereby;—as fire is recognised by smoke, so that the smoke is the mark whereby fire [though unseen] is known [to be present where the smoke takes its rise]; in like manner an instigatory form of expression is the mark by which we recognise Duty. So Duty is that, the criterion, or the instrument [in the determination], of which, is an instigatory form of expression.‡

What essentially constitutes Duty.

c. And what constitutes any thing such a matter [i. e. a matter that is fit to be urged in

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* पूर्वसूत्रे धर्मजिज्ञासेत्यत्र को धर्म इति जिज्ञासायां धर्मस्वरूपज्ञानाय लक्षणमाह ॥

† चोदनेति प्रवर्त्तकशब्दनाम ॥

‡ लक्ष्यते ज्ञायते अनेनेति लक्षणं। यथा धूमेनवह्निर्लक्ष्यते इति वह्निज्ञाने लक्षणन्धूमः। तद्वत् धर्मज्ञाने लक्षणं चोदना। इत्थञ्च चोदनैव लक्षणं करणं यस्य ॥

scripture as a Duty] is the fact of its not producing more pain than pleasure* [—i. e. its being calculated to produce more pleasure than pain†].

d. And by this [mention, *Aph.* 2., of the mark whereby Duty is to be recognised], it is moreover suggested that a Duty is not to be apprehended by the senses or by any thing else besides the instigatory character‡ [of a passage in scripture].

e. But now [some one may ask], "Since, according to [the lexicon called] the *Medini Kośa*, 'The word *dharmma* should be masculine when it means merit, but when it means sacrifices, &c., it is held to be neuter,' how is the word *dharmma* masculine in the aphorism where it means the *Agnihotra* sacrifice and others [which are recognised as matters of Duty by the instigating promises attached to their performance] ?"—if you ask this,—then take [and be content with] as the reason thereof the fact that he [JAIMINI] is a great sanctified sage§ [—and therefore entitled to give the word what gender he pleases. Conf. the Vaiśeshika Aphorisms No. 7. *b*].

f. In the foregoing aphorism [§2.] it was intimated that the cause of [our correctly recognising] a Duty was simply an insti-

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* अर्थत्वञ्च सुखाधिकदुःखाजनकत्वम् ॥

† This definition of *dharmma* may be compared with the Benthamite definition of the Useful.

‡ एतेन चोदनातिरिक्तेन्द्रियादिगम्यत्वं धर्मस्य नेत्यपि सूचितम् ॥

§ ननु। अदृष्टे पुंसि धर्मः स्यात् क्लीबे यागादिके मत इति मेदिनीकोशात्। अग्निहोत्रादिवाचकधर्मशब्दस्य सूत्रे पुंस्त्वं कथमिति चेदार्षत्वमेव बीजमिति गृहाण ॥

gation [in the shape of a passage of scripture holding out a reward for its performance], but not any other evidence such as that of the senses, &c. Since it is impossibe that the doubt, as to whether other evidences *do* enter into the case or not, should be removed without examination, he proposes the examination thereof* [as follows].

तस्य निमित्तपरीष्टिः ॥ ३ ॥

The definition of Duty discussed.

Aph. 3.—An examination of the cause of [our recognising] it [—viz. Duty,— is to be made.]

a. 'Of it',—i. e. of a knowledge of the truth—the object [in respect of which that knowledge is wanted] being Duty. 'The cause',—i. e. the means. 'An examination' thereof,—i. e. a disquisition, a discussion, through decisive confutations [of the opposite opinion—see the Nyáya Aphorisms No. 39—] preceded by arguments [in support of the position laid down:—such an examination] is to be made:—such is the remainder† [required to supply the ellipsis in the aphorism].

b. [In the following aphorism] he explains the assertion that he made* [in Aph. 2].

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* धर्मे चोदनैव निमित्तं नतु प्रत्यक्षादीतरप्रमाणानीति पूर्वसूत्रेण ज्ञापितं। इतरप्रमाणानि तत्र प्रसरन्ति नवेति संशयस्य परीक्षामन्तरा निवृत्त्यसम्भवात् तत्परीक्षां प्रतिजानीते॥

† तस्येति। तस्य धर्मविषयकतत्त्वज्ञानस्य। निमित्तं। कारणं। तस्य परीष्टिः। परीक्षा। युक्तिपूर्वकसाधकतर्कैर्विचारः। कर्त्तव्येति शेषः॥

सत्सम्प्रयोगे पुरुषस्येन्द्रियाणां बुद्धिजन्म तत्प्रत्यक्षमनिमित्तं विद्यमानोपलम्भात् ॥ ४ ॥

Duty not an object of sense-perception.

Aph. 4. When a man's organs of sense are rightly applied to something extant, that birth of knowledge [which then takes place] is Perception,—[and this Perception is] *not* the cause [of our recognising Duty—see § 3—] because [the organs of sense are adapted only to] the apprehension of what is [then and there] existent [—which an act of Duty is *not*.]

a. 'When rightly applied to something extant' &c. [That is to say]—when a man's organs of sense are 'rightly applied to', or brought into contact with, 'something extant', i. e. some object [then and there] existing, what 'birth of knowledge', or of intellection, takes place, is [what we call] Perception :—and such Perception is '*not* the cause', i. e. not the producer, of a knowledge of Duty :—that is to say—the organs of sense, which are the means of arriving at the truths of perception, do *not* [of themselves] enable us to arrive at the truth in respect of Duty.†

b. Of this [—viz. that the senses are not the means of our discerning Duty—] he mentions the reason [—when he says—in § 4—] 'because the apprehension of what is existent'; that is to

* प्रतिज्ञातमेवार्थं विशदयति ॥

† सत्सम्प्रयोग इति। पुरुषेन्द्रियाणां। सति। विद्यमाने विषये। सम्प्रयोगे। संयोगे सति। यत् बुध्याः। ज्ञानस्य। जन्म तत्प्रत्यक्षं। ईदृशं प्रत्यक्षं धर्मज्ञान अनिमित्तं। नोत्पादकं। प्रत्यक्षप्रमासाधनीभूतानीन्द्रियाणि धर्मप्रमां न साधयन्तीति भावः ॥

say—because, by means of the organs of sense there is the apprehension of 'what is existent', i. e. of some thing [then and there] present;—and since *Duty* [—in the shape, suppose, of the performance of sacrifice—] is *not* present at the time of our knowing it [to be a Duty to perform the sacrifice,—] it is not adapted to the organs of sense.*

Not being an object of sense-perception, Duty is not to be recognised by inference from such perception.

c. From its being disproved that the *senses* are the cause thereof [i. e. of our discerning Duty—] it is to be understood as also disproved that Inference, or Analogy, or Conjecture [see Wilson's *Sánkhya Káriká* p. 21.—] which owe their birth thereto—having their root in Perception—can be the cause thereof. Therefore it is a settled point that the characteristic of Duty [—or that whereby we are to recognise it—as declared in *Aph.* 2.—] is the instigation† [of the passage in scripture where some act is mentioned as being calculated to lead to such and such consequences].

The doubt whether the evidence in favour of a Duty may not be fallacious as is that of the senses.

d. But then, an objector may urge,] —"after words and meanings have presented themselves, since the connection between the two is one devised by *man*—consisting, as it does, of the conventions which man has devised,—therefore, as sense knowledge wanders away from truth in respect of mother o'

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* तत्र हेतुमाह। विद्यमानोपलम्भात्। विद्यमानस्य। वर्त्तमानस्यैव वस्तुनः। इन्द्रियैरुपलम्भात्। धर्मस्य च ज्ञानकाले असत्त्वेन इन्द्रियायोग्यादिति भावः॥

† इन्द्रियाणान्तन्निमित्तत्वनिरसनेन तज्जन्यप्रत्यक्षमूलकव्याप्तिज्ञानसादृश्यार्थापत्तीनां तन्निमित्तत्वं निरस्तमवगन्तव्यं। अतश्चोदनामात्रगम्यत्वं धर्मलक्षणमिति सिद्धम्॥

pearl or the like [when it mistakes them for silver or the like], so since language, as it is dependent on man inasmuch as it has reference to the knowledge of a connection which was devised by man, is liable to part company with veracity in matters of declaration, the *instigatory nature* [of a passage which, being in words, is liable to be misunderstood,] cannot be the instrument of correct knowledge in respect of Duty":—well, this *primâ facie* view of the matter having presented itself, he declares the established doctrine as follows.*

औत्पत्तिकस्तु शब्दस्यार्थेन सम्बन्धस्तस्य ज्ञानमुपदेशो
ऽव्यतिरेकश्चार्थेऽनुपलब्धे तत्प्रमाणं बादरायणस्यानपे-
क्षत्वात् ॥ ५ ॥

Reply—that this doubt does not affect the evidence of Scripture.

Aph. 5.—But the natural connection of a word with its sense is [the instrument of] the knowledge thereof, [i. e. of Duty], and the intimation [of Scripture which is] unerring though given in respect of something imperceptible. This [according to our opinion as well as that] of Bádaráyaṇa [the author of the Vedánta Aphorisms] is the evidence [by means of which we recognise Duty], for it has no respect [to any other evidence—such as that of sense].

a. 'Of a word,'—i. e. of an expression that is a constituent

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* शब्दार्थयोरुत्पत्त्यनन्तरं पुरुषेण कल्पितसङ्केतात्मकसम्बन्धस्य कल्पितत्वात्पुरुषकल्पितसम्बन्धज्ञानापेक्षत्वाच्छब्दस्य यथा प्रत्यक्षज्ञानं शुक्तिकादौ सत्यत्वं व्यभिचरति तथा पुरुषाधीनत्वेन शाब्देऽपि सत्यत्वव्यभिचारसम्भवान्न धर्मे चोदना प्रमानमिति पूर्वपक्षे सिद्धान्तमाह ॥

part of the everlasting Veda;—such as—"He that desireth Paradise should solemnise the *Agnihotra* sacrifice," &c.*

b. 'With its sense'—i. e. with the meaning which is to be conveyed by this or that† [word].

c. 'Connection'—in the shape of *power*‡ [or of God's will that this or that word should convey this or that meaning].

d. 'Natural'—i. e. inherent,—in short, *eternal.*§

e. Thence [i. e. from the eternal connection of a word with its sense] is the knowledge 'thereof'—i. e. of Duty. Here [i. e. in the word *jnána*] the affix *lyuṭ* conveys the force of the 'instrument',—so that the word signifies the *instrument* of knowledge or of right understanding.‖

An objection, founded on the impossibility of verification in the case overruled.

f. But then [some one may ask]—"since it is notorious in the world that, after hearing the expression 'It [—e. g. a mountain—] is fiery',—having *seen,* with the organ of sense, the fire [asserted to be, e. g., in the mountain], one *then* admits [—what one was not prepared to admit before subjecting the matter, on some occasion or other, to the test of the senses]—that matter of testimony *is* [or *may* be] matter of right knowledge

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* शब्दस्य। नित्यवेदघटकपदस्य। अग्निहोत्रं जुहुयात्स्वर्गकाम इत्यादेः॥

† अर्थेन। तत्तत्प्रतिपाद्यार्थेन॥

‡ सम्बन्धः। शक्तिरूपः॥

§ औत्पत्तिकः। स्वभाविकः। नित्य इति यावत्॥

‖ अतस्तस्य। धर्मस्य। ज्ञानं। अत्र करणे ल्युट्। प्रमेयथार्थज्ञानस्य करणम्॥

[—or, in other words, that Testimony may be relied on, seeing that we have found it corroborated by the evidence of the senses—]; since [we say] what is conveyed by *Words* [or Testimony] has need of *other* evidence, such as the senses, how can it be *this* to which we owe our right knowledge of Duty?"—It is with an eye to this [anticipated objection] that he says, [in the Aphorism, that the testimony is here the evidence] 'in respect of something *imperceptible*', meaning thereby [that Duty is] something not to be apprehended by means of the senses or any other evidence* [apart from that specified in §2].

g. 'Intimation'—i. e. declaration of a fact.†

h. 'Unerring'—i. e. which is not seen to diverge therefrom‡ [i. e. from the fact].

i. 'For it has no respect'—i. e. because it has no reference to sense-perception, &c.§

j. 'This'—i. e. a sentence consisting of an injunction—is the evidence [on which rests our knowledge] of Duty;—such is the consentaneous opinion of BÁDARÁYAṆA.|| The drift [of what we

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* ननु वह्निमानिति शब्दश्रवणानन्तरं प्रत्यक्षेण वह्निं दृष्ट्वा शब्दे प्रमात्वं गृह्णातीति लोके प्रसिद्धेः प्रत्यक्षादीतरप्रमाणसापेक्षत्वाच्छब्दस्य स कथं धर्मे प्रमाणमत आह अनुपलब्ध इति। अनुपलब्धे। प्रत्यक्षादिप्रमाणैरज्ञातेऽर्थे॥

† उपदेशः। अर्थप्रतिपादनम्॥

‡ अव्यतिरेकः। अव्यभिचारी दृश्यते अतः॥

§ अनपेक्षत्वात्। प्रत्यक्षाद्यनपेक्षत्वात्॥

|| The mention of the name of BÁDARÁYAṆA (or VYÁSA) in the Aphorism goes to prove that JAIMINI's work, the *púrvva-mímánsá*, was not antecedent in time to VYÁSA the author of the *uttara-mímánsá*. Mr. Colebrooke's rendering of the terms *púrvva* and *uttara* by 'prior' and 'later' (—see Essays. vol. 1. pp. 227 and 295—) would seem to have led Dr. Ritter to suppose that

have been arguing] is this. The sentence "The mountain is fiery", when employed by a man who is defective [in some of his organs of sense], wanders away from the fact [—for the mountain may *seem* to such a one to be fiery when it really is not—]; therefore we require to make use of our senses to ascertain whether credence is due [to the testimony of fallible man]:—but the injunction "He that desireth Paradise should solemnise the *Agnihotra* sacrifice" never at any time past present or future is liable thus to wander from the truth; therefore is it, independently of any thing else, the clear evidence of a duty.*

SECTION II.

On the Eternity of Sound.

The validity of Scripture implies the eternity of Sound.

k. It was stated in the foregoing Aphorism [No. 5] that the connection between a word and its sense is *eternal* [—see §5 *d.*]; and since this is dependent on the eternity of *Sound* [—seeing that if Sound were not eternal, then words formed of sound could not

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jaimini's system was the earlier in point of *time*. He says, (at p. 376, vol. IV. of his History of Philosophy,—Morrison's version—) that "according to Colebrooke, the adherents of this school may be divided into the earlier and the later",—and then he goes on to speak of "the older and genuine Vedánta":—but in fact the terms 'prior' and 'later' refer to the divisions of the *Veda* which jaimini and vyása respectively expound, the latter confining himself to the *Upanishads*, or theological sections, which stand last in *order*.

* तत्। विधिघटितवाक्यं। धर्मे प्रमाणं बादरायणाचार्यस्य सम्मतं। अयमाशयः। पर्वतो वह्निमानिति दोषवत्पुरुषप्रयुक्तं वाक्यं अर्थं व्यभिचरति। अतः प्रामाण्यनिश्चये प्रत्यक्षादिकमपेक्षते। तथा ऽग्निहोत्रं जुहोतीति वाक्यं कालत्रये ऽप्यर्थं न व्यभिचरति। अत इतरनिरपेक्षं धर्मे प्रमाणमिति॥

be eternal, nor consequently the relation of such to their significations—], he, seeking to demonstrate this, sets forth, in the first place, the primâ facie view of the question in the shape of the opinion of those who assert that Sound is *not* eternal.*

कर्मैके तत्र दर्शनात् ॥ ६ ॥

First objection to the eternity of Sound, that it is a product.

Aph. 6.—Some say that it [viz. Sound] is a product, for in the case of it we *see* [what constitutes it such].

a. 'Some say that it is a product, &c':—'Some'—i. e. the followers of the Nyáya—say that Sound is a 'product',—i. e. something *not* eternal; 'for we see'—i. e. we see an *effort* made; 'in the case of it'—i. e. in the case of Sound; and it is a rule without exception that that is *not* eternal which *effort* is concerned in [the existence of].†

b. Moreover [the Naiyáyikas contend that Sound is not eternal for the following reason]‡.

अस्थानात् ॥ ७ ॥

Second objection, that it is transitory.

Aph. 7.—Because of its transitoriness.

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* पूर्वसूत्रे शब्दार्थयोस्सम्बन्धो नित्य इत्युक्तं। तच्च शब्दनित्यत्वाधीनमिति तत्सिसाधयिषुरादौ शब्दानित्यत्ववादिमतं पूर्वपक्षमुपादयति ॥

† कर्मेति। एके। नैय्यायिकाः। कर्म अनित्यं शब्दं वदन्ति। तत्र। शब्दविषये। दर्शनात्। प्रयत्नदर्शनात्। यद्विषयः प्रयत्नः सोऽनित्य इति व्याप्तेः।

‡ किञ्च ॥

a. 'Because of its transitoriness'—i. e. because it is not permanent;—or in other words, because, beyond a moment, it is no longer perceived.*

b. Moreover† [the Naiyáyikas contend that Sound is not eternal for the following reason].

करोतिशब्दात् ॥ ८ ॥

Third objection, that Sound is stamped as factitious by the usage of language.

Aph. 8.—Because [we employ, when speaking of Sound,] the expression '*making.*'

a. That is to say—because we treat it as something not eternal, inasmuch as we talk of *making* a sound, just as we talk of making a *jar*.‡

b. And for the following reason also, he mentions, they hold it to be not eternal.§

Fourth objection, that the alleged eternity of Sound is incompatible with its undeniable multeity.

सत्त्वान्तरे यौगपद्यात् ॥ ९ ॥

Aph. 9.—From its simultaneousness in another person.

a. [To complete the sentence] it is necessary to supply 'in another place', when we speak of 'another person':—so then, we observe 'simultaneousness', i. e. the fact of belonging to one and the same time,—'in another being'—i. e. in the perception of [Sound by] another living creature occupying a different place.||

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* अस्थानादस्थिरत्वात्। क्षणादूर्ध्वमनुपलब्धेरिति भावः॥

† किञ्च ॥

‡ यथा घटं करोतीति तथा शब्दं करोतीत्यनित्यत्वव्यवहारात् ॥

§ इतो ऽप्यनित्य इत्याह ॥

|| सत्त्वान्तर इति। देशान्तर इत्यपि पूरणीयं। यथा।

b. The scope [of the objection] is this, viz., the *unity* of Sound will follow from the very same argument by which, for shortness, its eternity will be established [by the followers of the Mímánsá, —supposing the argument to be admitted]; and thus *one* [numerically single] thing would be simultaneously perceived by [and hence simultaneously in immediate contact —see Nyáya Aphorisms, No. 4—with the sense-organs of] those both near and far;—and this could not be if it were [numerically] one and eternal;—therefore [the Naiyáyikas conclude] Sound is not eternal and it is plural.*

c. And for the following reason too [according to the Naiyáyikas] it is so [—that Sound is not eternal—], so the author mentions it† :—

प्रकृतिविकृत्योश्च ॥ १० ॥

Fifth objection, that sounds are liable to grammatical inflection.

Aph. 10.—And [the Naiyáyikas infer that Sound is not eternal, from the observation] of the original and altered forms [of sounds].

a. What is meant is this,—because it holds universally that that is not eternal the previous condition of which undergoes a change; and in the example *dadhyatra* [i. e. 'milk—here']

देशान्तरे। अन्यदेशस्थसस्वान्तरे। प्राण्यन्तरप्रत्यक्षे। यौगपद्यमेककालिकत्वं इष्टम्॥

* अयमाशयः। यथा लाघवान्नित्यत्वं तथा तेनैव हेतुना शब्द एकत्वमपि सेत्स्यति। इत्यञ्चैकस्य वस्तुनस्य निकृष्टविप्रकृष्टप्रत्यक्षं युगपद्भवेत्। इदमेकत्वे नित्यत्वेऽनुपपन्नं। अतोऽनित्यः शब्दो नानाचेति॥

† इतोऽपि तथेत्याह॥

where the original form was *dadhi atra,* there is a change in the shape of the letter *y* in the room of the original letter *i.**

Sixth objection, that Sound proves the greater when more are engaged in making it.

वृद्धिश्च कर्तृभूम्नास्य ॥ ११ ॥

Aph. 11.—And, by a multitude of makers, there is an augmentation of it.

a. For *this* reason too, it [viz. Sound] is not eternal, that 'an augmentation', i. e. an increase, 'of it', i. e. of Sound, is observed [to be caused], 'by a multitude of makers', i. e. by the numerousness of those who make it. On the other hand, if you assume that human effort is [not the *maker* but only] the *manifester* of Sound, [—as a lamp is not the maker of a jar but the manifester of it—making cognizable the jar which previously existed unperceived—then we reply, that,] what is *manifested* is not seen to be *made greater* even by a thousand manifesters, as a jar is not made larger by a thousand lamps, [and Sound *is* made greater by a multitude], therefore [say the Naiyáyikas] the alternative supposition of 'manifestation' [instead of production] will not answer :—such is the import.†

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* दध्यत्रेत्यत्र दधि अत्रेति प्रकृतिस्थितौ प्रकृतिभूतेकारस्थाने यकाररूपो विकारो भवति। यस्याः प्रकृतेर्विकारस्सो ऽनित्य इति व्याप्तेरिति भावः॥

† कर्तृभूम्ना। कर्तृबाहुल्येन। अस्य। शब्दस्य। वृद्धिः। महत्त्वं दृश्यते अतो ऽप्यनित्यः। पुरुषप्रयत्नस्य शब्दव्यञ्जकत्वपक्षे व्यञ्जकसहस्रेणापि व्यंग्यस्य वृद्धिर्न दृश्यते। यथा दीपसहस्रेणापि घटस्य। अतो व्यञ्जकत्वपक्षो ऽयुक्त इति भावः॥

The refutation of these objections in undertaken.

b. The several objections thus alleged against the 'manifestation' view [of Sound's coming to be perceived], he proceeds to refute in their order.*

समन्तु तत्र दर्शनम् ॥ १२ ॥

How far both parties agree.

Aph. 12.—But alike [according to both opinions—that of these objectors and of ourselves] is the *perception* thereof—[both agreeing that *this* is only for a moment, whatever difference of opinion there may be as to Sound itself's being so.]

a. 'But alike &c.' There requires to be supplied [to complete the aphorism] 'for a moment' and 'according to both opinions.' According to both opinions,—i. e. according to the opinion that it is *produced* and the opinion that it is *manifested*,—'alike,' i. e. without dispute, 'the perception,' i. e. sensation of Sound, is for a moment, i. e. *only* for a moment.†

b. Though [so far as *this* point is concerned] they are alike, yet which of the views is the best? To this question the reply is that the '*manifestation*' view is the proper one; so he proceeds to say as follows.‡

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* एवं व्यञ्जकत्वपक्षे बहूनि दूषणान्युक्तानि क्रमेण परिहर्तुमुपक्रमते ॥

† सममिति। क्षणमिति मतद्वय इति च पूरणीयं। मतद्वये। उत्पद्यते व्यज्यत इति मतद्वये। क्षणं। क्षणमात्रं। दर्शनं। शब्दप्रत्यक्षं। समं। अविवादम् ॥

‡ समत्वे ऽपि कतमः पक्षो वरिष्ठ इति प्रश्ने व्यज्यत्वपक्षो युक्त इत्याह ॥

सतः परमदर्शनं विषयानागमात् ॥ १३ ॥

How Sound exists even when not manifested.

Aph. 13.—Of this [Sound] while it really exists, the non-perception at another time [than that when the sound is perceived] arises from the non-arrival of the manifester at the object.

a. 'Of this while it really exists' &c. 'While it really exists,' —i. e. which is at all times extant [whether perceived or not];— 'at another time,' i. e. at a time before or after; 'the non-perception,' i. e. the absence of perception, [arises] from non-arrival of the efficient manifester at 'the object,' i. e. at the Sound.*

b. The import is as follows. Sound is eternal, [as we are constrained to admit] by force of the recognition that 'This is that same letter K' [—viz. the same Sound that I heard yesterday or fifty years ago—, and I recognise it as I might recognise a peak of the perennial Himálaya which I do not suppose to cease to exist when I turn away my eyes from it—], and in virtue of *the law of parsimony*† [one of the fundamental laws of philosophizing acknowledged by philosophers both of the East and of the West, and implying that we must never assume more causes of a given effect than are sufficient to account for it‡].

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* सत इति । सतः । सर्वदा विद्यमानस्य । परं । पूर्वोत्तरकाले । अदर्शनं । प्रत्यक्षाभावः । संस्कर्त्तुर्व्यञ्जकस्य विषयं शब्दं प्रत्यनागमात् ।

† अयं भावः । स एवायं ककार इति प्रत्यभिज्ञाबलात् । लाघवाच्च । शब्दो नित्यः ॥

‡ In opposition to the Mímánsakas, the Naiyáyikas contend that the form of expression 'This is that same letter K.' is grounded merely on the fact that the things referred to are of the same *kind*,—just as is the case with the ex-

What prevents its being always perceived.

c. The conjunctions and disjunctions [—or undulations—] of the air issuing from the mouth [of him who speaks or shouts] remove the *still* air* which was the obstacle to the perception of Sound, and thence it becomes perceptible:—such is the reply to the objection [recorded in *Aph.* 7] of its 'transitoriness.†'

d. He next replies to the objection [recorded in *Aph.* 8] that we use the expression '*making*' [in regard to Sound].‡

प्रयोगस्य परम् ॥ १४ ॥

When we say we 'make' a sound, we ought to mean that we 'employ' a sound.

Aph. 14.—This [expression '*making*'] means [merely] *employing*.

a. In regard to Sound, when we speak of '*making*,' the word 'making' means, or imports, '*employing*,' i. e. uttering.§

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pression 'He has taken the same medicine that I did.' See the *Siddhánta Muktávali* p. 103. Compare also the remarks of Whately on the ambiguity of the word 'Same,' quoted at p. 39 of our 'Introduction to the Inductive Philosophy.'

* Europeans hold that Sound is due to vibration. Jaimini admits that it is not perceived when there is *no* vibration; but he argues that the absence of vibration, or the stillness of the air, is what prevents us from perceiving the sound which never ceases to *exist*, whether perceived or not.

† मुखोद्गतवायुसंयोगविभागाः शब्दप्रत्यक्षप्रतिबन्धकीभूतस्तिमितवायुन्दूरीकुर्व्वन्ति। ततः प्रत्यक्षमिति अस्थानादित्यस्योत्तरम्॥

‡ करोतिशब्दादित्यस्योत्तरमाह॥

§ प्रतिशब्दं करोतीत्यत्र करोतिपदं प्रयोगस्य। उच्चारणस्य। परं। तात्पर्यकम्॥

b. He next replies to the objection [recorded in *Aph.* 9] that Sound is heard simultaneously by different individuals.*

आदित्यवद्यौगपद्यम् ॥ १५ ॥

As one sun is seen by many men, so is one sound heard.

Aph. 15.—The simultaneousness is as in the case of the sun.

a. 'As in the case of the sun:'—that is to say,—as the Sun, which is but one, is seen simultaneously by those stationed in different places, so, like the sun, Sound is a great object, not a minute one† [such as cannot come at once under the inspection of persons at any distance from one another.]

b. He next replies to the objection [recorded in *Aph.* 10] respecting the original and altered forms of sounds.‡

वर्णान्तरमविकारः ॥ १६ ॥

Letters are exchanged, not transmuted.

Aph. 16.—This [viz. the letter *y*—referred to in *Aph.* 10.—when it comes in the room of the letter *i*] is another letter, not a modification [of that whose place it takes].

a. 'Another letter' &c,. That is to say,—in the room of the letter *i* is another letter—another sound—a different sound in short. It is not a modification of the letter *i* as a mat is a modification of the straws [out of which it is formed]. If it *were* so, then, as the maker of a mat is under the necessity of providing himself with straw, the man that employs the letter *y* would be under the necessity of taking the letter *i*§ [to make the *y* out

* सत्त्वान्तरे यौगपद्यादित्यस्योत्तरमाह ॥

† आदित्यवदिति। यथा एकः सूर्य्यो नानादेशस्थैर्युगपदीक्ष्यते तथा आदित्यवन्महान् शब्दो न सूक्ष्म इति भावः ॥

‡ प्रकृतिविकृत्योश्चेत्यस्योत्तरमाह ॥

§ वर्णान्तरमिति इकारस्थाने यकारः वर्णान्तरं। शब्दान्तरं

of;—which is not the case, for one can use the letter *y* without any reference to the letter *i*].

b. He next replies to the objection [recorded in *Aph.* 11] that there is an augmentation* [of the sound when the makers of it are numerous].

नादवृद्धिः परा ॥ १७ ॥

Increase of noise not increase of Sound.

Aph. 17.—It is the increase of *noise* [not of *sound*] that is [in that case] augmented.

a. 'It is of noise,' &c. It is an error to say [as in *Aph.* 11] that it is an increase of *sound* that is 'augmented'—i. e. rendered greater.†

b. 'Increase of noise.' From many beaters of drums, or pronouncers of articulate sounds, it is recognised [by the hearers] that 'There is a great sound.' In such a case it is impossible, according to the opinion of our opponents [the Naiyáyikas] to say that portions of Sound, being produced by each of the men [concerned in the making of the noise], produce a great bulk of Sound, like a bulk of cotton [formed out of portions of cotton aggregated], because Sound, according to these opponents, inasmuch as it is a *quality*, has *no* parts‡ [or portions].

अन्यशब्द इति यावत्। न इकारस्य विकारस्तृणानां कट इव। तथा सति कटकर्त्रा नियमेन तृणसम्पादनवत् यकारं प्रयुञ्जन्नियमेनेकारमाददीतेति भावः॥

* वृद्धिश्चेत्यस्योत्तरमाह॥

† नादेति। परा। अतिशयिता। शब्दवृद्धिरिति भ्रमविषया॥

‡ नादवृद्धिः। बहुभिर्भेरीध्नद्भिः वर्णात्मकशब्दमुच्चार-

c. Therefore,—as there is no arriving [at an explanation otherwise],—when the conjunctions and disjunctions [occasioned by the vibration of the air] take place continually without intermission, arriving from all quarters at the entrance to the hollow of the ear, it [the Sound] *seems* to be great, and to be made up of parts. What is meant [in *Aph.* 17] by 'noise' is these conjunctions and disjunctions, and it is just of *these* that an augmentation takes place* [when a multitude of persons is engaged in rendering Sound manifest].

d. Having thus removed the objections offered by others, he proceeds to state what will establish his own theory.†

नित्यस्तु स्याद्दर्शनस्य परार्थत्वात् ॥ १८ ॥

Sound eternal, else it would not avail for communication.

Aph. 18.—But it must be eternal, because its exhibition is [available—which it else would not be—]for the sake of another.

यद्भिर्वा महान् शब्द इत्युपलभ्यते। तत्र परमते प्रतिपुरुषं शब्दावयवा उत्पन्नास्सन्तः तूले महत्त्ववच्छब्दे महत्त्वं सम्पादयन्तीति वक्तुमशक्यं। परमते शब्दस्य गुणत्वेन निरवयवत्वात् ॥

* अतोऽगत्या कर्णशष्कुलीमण्डलस्य सर्वतस्सरणिं व्याप्नुवद्भिः संयोगविभागैर्नैरन्तर्येणासकृद्ग्रहणान्महानिवावयवानिवच प्रतीयते। संयोगविभागा नादपदेन वाच्यास्तेषामेव वृद्धिरिति भावः ॥

† एवं परप्रतिपादितदूषणान्युद्धृत्य स्वमते साधकं वक्तुं प्रक्रमते ॥

a. 'Eternal'—i. e. *sound* must be eternal. Its 'exhibition'—i. e. its utterance—[here denoted by the term] *darśana* [from *dris* 'to see'] because Sound is perceived or becomes manifest thereby [i. e. by means of utterance]. 'Because for the sake of another'—i. e. because it is [available] to the end that another may understand one's meaning. If it were not eternal, then, as it would not continue till the hearer had understood our meaning [—the *perceived* sound ceasing on the instant that it reaches the ear—], the understanding [of what was uttered] would not take place because of the absence of the cause:—such is the import.* [The understanding of what is uttered must *follow*—at however short an interval—the perception of the sound uttered; and if the sound uttered perish on the hearing, then, being no longer in existence, it cannot be the *cause* of any thing. If, on the other hand, it continue to exist, for any period however short, after ceasing to be perceived,—it is impossible to assign any other instant at which there is any evidence of the discontinuance of its existence,—whence its eternity is inferred.]

b. Moreover† [as Sound is prospectively eternal, so was it antecedently—for]:—

सर्वत्र यौगपद्यात् ॥ १९ ॥

Sound is eternal, because hundreds simultaneously recognise a sound, which cannot therefore be a new production.

Aph. 19.—[Sound is proved to be eternal] by there being everywhere simultaneousness [in the recognition of it by ever so many hearers].

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* नित्य इति शब्दो नित्यस्स्यात्। दृश्यते व्यज्यते शब्दो ऽनेनेति दर्शनमुच्चारणं। तस्य परार्थत्वात्। अन्यस्यार्थप्रतिपत्त्यर्थत्वात्। अनित्यत्वे श्रोतुरर्थप्रतिपत्तिपर्यन्तन्न तिष्ठतीति प्रतिपत्तिर्न स्यात् कारणाभावादिति भावः॥

† किञ्च ॥

a. 'Every where:'—say in the word *go,* simply, [—a single example of a word here sufficing as the representative of any or every word—]. 'By there being simultaneousness'—i. e. because there arises simultaneously [in the minds of a hundred or more persons, on hearing the word *go*—"a cow"]—a correct recognition. That "This [letter G, of the word *go,*] is that same letter G [that I have heard on an indefinite number of former occasions,]" is the recognition, simultaneously, of many persons; and a multitude of persons do not simultaneously fall into an error [—this being as unlikely as it is that a hundred arrows discharged simultaneously by a hundred archers should all by *mistake* hit the same object—]; such is the import.*

b. When the word *go* "cow" has been pronounced ten times, one says "The word *go* has been pronounced ten times" but not "Ten words of the form *go* have been pronounced;" and he next declares that Sound is proved to be eternal by *this* fact also.†

संख्याभावात् ॥ २० ॥

Sound is eternal, because each sound is not numerically different from itself repeated.

Aph. 20.—[Sound is proved to be eternal] by the absence of Number.

a. 'Of Number:'—i. e. because Number [which belongs to that which, being transitory, is succeeded by another of the same kind,] does not belong to Sound [—for the word *go,* heard ten

* सर्वत्र । गोशब्दमात्रे । यौगपद्यात् । अबाधितप्रतिज्ञाया युगपदुत्पत्तेः । स एवायं गकार इति युगपदनेकेषां प्रत्यभिज्ञा भवति नह्यनेके युगपद्भ्रान्ता भवन्तीति भावः ॥

† दशकृत्वो गोशब्दस्योच्चारणे दशवारमुच्चरितो गोशब्द इत्येव वदति नतु दश गोशब्दा उच्चारिता इति । अतोऽपि शब्दो नित्य इत्याह ॥

times over, is just the same word *go,*—as remarked under *Aph.* 19. *b.*] This is plain.*

b. And for the following reason too it is eternal, as he states :†—

अनपेक्षत्वात् ॥ २१ ॥

Sound is eternal because indiscerptible.

Aph. 21.—[Sound is proved to be eternal] by there being no ground for anticipation [of its destruction].

a. That is to say, because we do not know any cause that should destroy Sound. To explain :—as, on the mere inspection of a web, for instance, one feels certain that—"This web was produced by the conjunction of threads, and it will be destroyed by the destruction of the conjunction of the threads,"—so, from our having no such certainty as to any cause that should lead to the destruction of *Sound,* we conclude that it is eternal‡ [—on the same principle that the immortality of the Soul has been argued from its indiscerptibility].

b. But then [—some one may say—] "Sound is a modification of the air, since [—as you admit under *Aph.* 17.—] it

* संख्येति। शब्दे संख्याभावात्। स्पष्टम्॥

† इतोऽपि नित्य इत्याह॥

‡ शब्दनाशकारणस्याज्ञातत्वादित्यर्थः। यथा पटादिदर्शनमात्रेण पटोऽयन्तन्तुसंयोगजन्यस्तन्तुसंयोगनाशाद्विनंक्ष्यतीति निश्चिनोति तथा शब्दनाशकारणनिश्चयाभावान्नित्य इति भावः॥

arises from the conjunctions thereof [with the organ of hearing];—and so too the *Sikshá* [—that appendage to the Vedas which treats of pronunciation—] tells us 'Air arrives at the state of being Sound;'—and thus being a product of Air, it is *not* eternal." This doubt having presented itself, he declares* as follows:—

प्रख्याभावाच्च योग्यस्य ॥ २२ ॥

Sound not due to Air, because not tangible.

Aph. 22.—And]the case is not as the doubter under *Aph.* 21. *b.* suggests], because [if it were so] there would be no perception [by the organ of Hearing] of any object appropriate to it.

a. 'Appropriate to it;'—i. e. an object of the sensation that arises from the organ of Hearing—viz., Sound:—'because there would be no perception;'—i. e. by reason of our finding the absence of any perception;—because modifications of the *Air* are not what the organ of Hearing takes cognizance of,—Sound not being something *tangible* [as the Air is held by the Naiyáyikas to be, while Sound they admit has an altogether different substratum,—viz., the Ether—]; such is the import.†

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* ननु शब्दो वायुविकारः। तदीयसंयोगैरुत्पन्नत्वात्। तथाच शिक्षा वायुरापद्यते शब्दतामिति वायुजन्यत्वादनित्य इत्याशङ्कायामाह॥

† योग्यस्य। श्रोत्रेन्द्रियजन्यप्रत्यक्षविषयस्य। शब्दस्य। प्रख्याभावात्। प्रत्यक्षाभावप्रसङ्गात्। वायुविकारस्य श्रोत्रेन्द्रियाग्राह्यत्वात्। शब्दस्याप्यस्पृश्यत्वाच्चेति भावः॥

लिङ्गदर्शनाच्च ॥ २३ ॥

Sound is eternal, for this is implied in Scripture.

Aph. 23.—And [Sound is proved to be eternal] by our seeing a proof, [of this, in a text of the Scripture which will be cited in the commentary here following].

a. That is to say;—because we see a proof that language is eternal, in the following text—viz., "By language, that alters not, eternal,"* &c.

b. And the truth is, that, although this declaration [—viz. the text just quoted—] was intended for another purpose [than to prove the eternity of Sound], still it does declare, incidentally, the eternity of language, and therefore Sound [without which it is impossible that language should be eternal] is eternal.†

c. Here ends the topic of Sound.‡

SECTION III.

On the nature of Sentences, &c.

d. Though thus Sound is eternal, as also the connection between Sound and sense, still, that an instigation in the shape

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* वाचा विरूपनित्ययेति मन्त्रे नित्यया वाचेति लिङ्गदर्शनादित्यर्थः ॥

† यद्यपीदमन्यपरं वाक्यं तथापि वाचो नित्यत्वमनुवदति तस्मान्नित्यश्शब्द इति भावः ॥

‡ शब्दाधिकरणं समाप्तम् ॥

of a sentence is no proof of any thing's being a duty, he states [on behalf of an opponent, and therefore] *ironically* as follows :*—

उत्पत्तौ वा रचनाः स्युरर्थस्यातन्निमित्तत्वात् ॥ २४ ॥

Objection that though Words may be eternally connected with their meanings, still this does not apply to Sentences.

Aph. 24.—This [—viz. the knowledge of the meanings of words—] being by nature, still let these [—viz. the connections between *sentences* and their meanings—] be factitious,—because the cause of [the knowledge of] the meaning [of the whole sentence] is not this [knowledge of the meanings of separate words].

a. 'This being by nature :'—i. e., the fact that knowledge of the meanings of words is natural [and "in short *eternal*"—see *Aph.* 5. *d.*—] being granted ;—still the connections between sentences and the meanings of the sentences are 'factitious,'—i. e. are devised by man ; because of its being 'not *that*,— i. e. [because of its being] something *different* from the knowledge of the meanings of the words, that is the 'cause,' or producer, thereof,—viz. 'of the meaning,' i. e.—of the knowledge of the meaning of the sentence.†

b. For [—to explain—], the sense of a sentence is not barely

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* एवं शब्दस्य शब्दार्थसम्बन्धस्यच नित्यत्वेऽपि वाक्यात्मिका चोदना न धर्मे प्रमाणमित्याक्षिपति ॥

† उत्पत्ताविति। उत्पत्तौ। पदार्थज्ञानोत्पत्तौ सत्यां। वाक्यवाक्यार्थयोस्सम्बन्धाः रचनाः। पुरुषकल्पिताः। स्युः। अर्थस्य। वाक्यार्थज्ञानस्य। अतत्। पदार्थज्ञानभिन्नं। निमित्तं। कारणं। यस्य। तत्त्वात्।

the [aggregate of the separate] senses of its words. There is [—we will admit—] a connection between a word and its sense [—a connection, as remarked under *Aph.* 5. *c.*, in the shape of *power*, or of God's will that this or that word should convey this or that meaning—]; but it is not the fact that the connection between a *collection* of words in the shape of a sentence, and the sense of that sentence, is in like manner that of *power* [—or of God's having pre-arranged that such and such groupes of words should convey such and such a sense]; but the connection is quite a different one, and it is devised by man, and is artificial: —how then can such be our evidence for [—or the cause of an absolutely correct knowledge of] Duty? Such is the import of the aphorism conveying the *primâ facie* view.*

c. He now declares the established view.†

तद्भूतानां क्रियार्थेन समाम्नायो ऽर्थस्य तन्निमित्त-
त्वात् ॥ २५ ॥

Analysis of a Sentence.

Aph. 25.—[In each injunction of Scripture there is seen] the mention, along with a verb, of those [words] that are in it, because it is this [viz., the knowledge of the sense of the words—] that is

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* नहि पदार्थ एव वाक्यार्थः। पदस्य पदार्थेन सह सम्बन्धस्तथा पदसमूहरूपवाक्यस्य वाक्यार्थेन सह न शक्तिसम्बन्धः किन्त्वन्य एव। सच पुरुषकल्पितः कृत्रिमः कथं धर्मे प्रमाणमिति पूर्वपक्षसूत्राभिप्रायः॥

† सिद्धान्तमाह ॥

the producer of [the knowledge of] the meaning [of the sentence].

a. 'Of those that are in it';—i. e. of those several words that are extant in these [sentences]; 'along with what signifies action',—i. e., along with a term that expresses power [—in other words, along with a verb—]; 'the mention', i. e. the reading [or the employment] is observed, in [the texts which enjoin] the *Agnihotra* sacrifice, &c. Hence the knowledge of the sense of a sentence—[knowledge] which we had not before [hearing or reading it]—comes only from a collection of words which involves *a verb*:—'because it is *this* that is the producer',—i. e. because of the fact that 'this'—viz. the knowledge of the meaning of the words, is the producer', or cause, thereof.*

b. To explain:—In the injunction "He that desireth Paradise should celebrate the *Agnihotra* sacrifice" [see *Aph.* 5. *j.*], the knowledge of the meaning of the sentence—viz., that it is by the sacrifice called the *Agnihotra* that one may secure Paradise,—does not take place unless there be present the meaning of the words [—viz., the words *Agnihotra* and *Paradise*—]; but the knowledge of the meaning of the sentence just consists in the knowledge of the mutual relation, *consistently*, of the meanings

* तद्गतानां। तेषु क्लृप्तानां प्रत्येकपदानां। क्रियार्थेन। शक्तिवाचिना पदेन सह। समाम्नायः। पठनं। दृश्यते। अग्निहोत्राद्यर्थेषु। अतः क्रियावाचकपदघटितपदसमूहादेवापूर्वो वाक्यार्थग्रहः। अर्थस्य। वाक्यार्थज्ञानस्य। तन्निमित्तत्वात्। तत्। पदार्थज्ञानं। निमित्तं। कारणं यस्य। तत्त्वात्॥

that arise before us from the *words*:*—[so that if it be agreed that the meaning of the separate *words* is not dependent on man's contrivance, so neither is that of sentences formed out of such words;—and such additional difficulties as may seem to grow out of this view will be grappled with in the sequel].

लोके सन्नियमात्प्रयोगसन्निकर्षः स्यात् ॥ २६ ॥

As in secular matters, so in Scripture, the formation of sentences not capricious.

Aph. 26.—Since, in [the secular language of] the world, there is a regular order,—[so in the Veda also] let there take place the employment [of language according to a fixed system to be learned through traditional instruction].

a. 'In the world';—i. e. in secular speech;—having discerned what is meant by the word,—or, with a previous knowledge of what is meant by the word—, 'since there is a regular order' i. e. since there is an employment [of words according to a fixed system,—men not devising phrases capriciously—so] in the *Veda* also, let there be—founded on knowledge derived from the traditional instruction of teachers,—the 'occurrence'—i. e. the taking place—of an employment of language [according to a fixed system].†

* अग्निहोत्रं जुहुयात्स्वर्गकाम इत्यत्र अग्निहोत्रनामकहोमेन स्वर्गम्भावयेदिति वाक्यार्थज्ञानं न पदार्थोपस्थितिमन्तरा भवति किन्तु पदादुपस्थितानामर्थानां योग्यतया परस्परसम्बन्धज्ञानमेव वाक्यार्थज्ञानमिति भावः।

† लोके। लौकिकशब्दे। पदार्थं दृष्ट्वा पदार्थज्ञानपूर्वकं।

Again he [the author] ironically states that this [the Veda] is no authority in regard to duty, because [forsooth] it is not eternal, and it has been made by men, and men are liable to err.*

वेदांश्चैके सन्निकर्षं पुरुषाख्याः ॥ २७ ॥

Objection to the eternity of the Vedas that they contain the names of men.

Aph. 27.—And the Vedas some declare to be something recent, [because] there are the names of men [in it].

a. 'The Veda,' &c. :—i. e. since there are the names *Káṭhaka,* and *Kauma,* &c., therefore it is 'recent'—a matter of *now*—that is to say *having had a beginning.* 'The Veda'—i. e. the scriptures. 'Some'—i. e. the followers of the Nyáya. These [followers of the Nyáya] have asserted this,—such is the remainder† [which requires to be supplied in order to complete the Aphorism].

सन्नियमात्। प्रयोगात्। वेदेऽपि गुरुपरम्परया ज्ञानपूर्वकः। प्रयोगस्य सन्निकर्षः। उत्पत्तिः। स्यात्॥

* वेदस्यानित्यत्वात् पौरुषेयत्वात् धर्मे न प्रमाणं पुरुषदोषसम्भवादिति पुनराक्षिपति॥

† वेदानिति। यतः पुरुषाख्याः। काठकं कौममिति नामानि। अतः सन्निकर्षं। आधुनिकं। सादीनित्यर्थः। वेदान्। आम्नायान्। एके। नैयायिकाः। आहुरिति शेषः॥

b. And for the following reason also [—if we are to listen to such objectors as the Naiyáyikas—] it [the Veda] is un-eternal —as the author [ironically] states.*

अनित्यदर्शनाच्च ॥ २८ ॥

Objection to the eternity of the Vedas that they make mention of persons who must antecedently have been born.

Aph. 28.—Because of our seeing un-eternal persons [mentioned in the Vedas].

a. 'Un-eternal,' &c. Because, in such scriptures as "Babara, the son of Prahaṇi, desired,"—"Kusurubinda, the son of Uddálaki, desired,"—we see mention of 'un-eternal persons,' i. e. of persons to whom belonged birth and death; and these sentences did not exist before the birth of these persons; so that the un-eternity and the human origin [of the Veda] is established by the fact that it *had* a beginning.†

a. The author now mentions the established tenet in regard to this.‡

उक्तन्तु शब्दपूर्वत्वम् ॥ २९ ॥

The eternity of the Veda re-asserted.

Aph. 29.—But there has been declared [already] the priority of Sound [to any point in time].

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* इतोऽप्यनित्य इत्याह ॥

† अनित्येति । अनित्यानां । जननमरणवतां । बबरः प्राहणिरकामयत कुसुरुबिन्द औद्दालकिरकामयत इत्यादिवेदेषु दर्शनात् । तेषाञ्जननात्प्रागिमानि वाक्यानि नासन्निति सादित्वादनित्यत्वं पौरुषेयत्वञ्च सिद्धम् ॥

‡ सिद्धान्तमाह ॥

a. 'But there has been declared,' &c. To supply the ellipsis,—the priority [to any point in time], i. e. the eternity, of Sound has been established. The eternity of Sound being established, the eternity of the Veda also is declared in the aphorism:—such is the meaning.*

आख्या प्रवचनात् ॥ ३० ॥

How sections of the Vedas come to be named after mortals.

Aph. 30.—The name [—derived from that of some mortal—was given, to this or that section of the Veda,] because of his reading it.

a. 'The name,'—i. e. the name of "the *Káṭhaka* section," [see *Aph.* 27. *a.*], or the like, is suitable 'because of his reading' or studying it,—the '*Káṭhaka* section' being that which was perused by Kaṭha.†

परन्तु श्रुतिसामान्यम् ॥ ३१ ॥

What seem to be names of men, in the Veda, not really such.

Aph. 31.—But the terms in the text [which seem to be names of men] are common [to other objects, and do not there designate men].

Although there is the name "Babara" or "Právahiṇi" [in the Veda,—see *Aph.* 28. *a.*], yet the text—the word 'Právahaṇi' or the like—is '*common*'—, i. e. is expressive also of some other

* उक्तमिति। शब्दे पूर्वत्वं नित्यत्वं साधितं प्रागिति शेषः। शब्दे नित्यत्वे सिद्धे वेदेऽपि नित्यत्वं सूत्रे उक्तमित्यर्थः॥

† आख्या। काठकादिसमाख्या। प्रवचनात्। अध्ययनात्। कठेनाधीतं काठकमित्युपपन्ना॥

thing [than it may appear at first sight to denote]. For example—[in the word *Právahaṇi*—] the prefix *pra* implies 'excess,'—the word *vah* signifies 'motion,'—the final *i* represents the agent; and thus the word signifies the *Wind* which *moves very fast;* and *this* is without beginning; and [moreover] the word "Babara" is a word imitative of the sound of the Wind,—so that there is not even a *smell* of inconsistency.*

Objection that the Vedas contain passages of sheer nonsense.

b. But then how can it be instrumental in producing right knowledge in regard to Duty, when the Veda contains such incoherent prattle as the following—; viz. "Jaradgava, in cloth slippers, standing at the door, is singing benedictions:—of him, a Bráhmaṇ-woman, desirous of a son, enquires,—'O Sir!—what is the meaning of this [which I hear you declaring] about intercourse on days of fasting† ?"—or the following;—viz. "The cows also attend this sacrifice"—? To this he replies as follows‡:—

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* यद्यपि बबरः प्रावहणिरित्यस्ति परन्तु श्रुतिः प्रावहण्यादिशब्दः सामान्यं। अन्यार्थस्यापि वाचकं। तथाहि। प्रेत्यस्य उत्कर्षाश्रयः। वहनशब्दस्य गतिः। इकारः कर्त्ता। तथाचोत्कृष्टगत्याश्रयः। वायुपरस्त्वानादिः। बबर इति वायुशब्दानुकरणमिति नानुपपत्तिगन्धोऽपि॥

† Or, according to another reading, "What *is* the meaning of garlic as regards the goddess *Umá*?"

‡ ननु जरद्गवः कम्बलपादुकाभ्यां द्वारि स्थितो गायति मङ्गलानि तं ब्राह्मणी पृच्छति पुत्रकामा राजन्नमायां लभनस्य कोऽर्थ इति गावो वा एतत्सत्रमासतेत्यादीनामसम्बद्धप्रलापानां वेदे सत्त्वात् कथं स धर्मे प्रमाणमित्यत्राह॥

कृते वा विनियोगः स्यात् कर्म्मणस्सम्बन्धात् ॥ ३२ ॥

Passages at first sight unmeaning, may be found, on examination, to have a meaning.

Aph. 32.—It [—the expression just charged with being incoherent—] *may* have an application to the action, through its really standing in relation to the action [which it serves suggestively to inculcate as a duty].

a. 'To the action,' &c.:—that is to say:—even such an expression as "The cows also attend this sacrifice" [*Aph.* 31. *b.*],—'through its standing in relation'—i. e. through its really involving a mutual reference to—'the action'—i. e. the passage enjoining some action,—has 'an application'—viz. through the praise* [which it suggests as attending the performance of the action].

b. The import of the argument is this, viz.—Did the very brutes—the cows—engage in the sacrifice, or ought wise *men* to engage in its performance?—the hinting of the *doubt* serves to commend† [that duty which even things senseless would engage in if men neglected it;—as we say, "The very stones would cry out" if men were to keep silence when under an imperative obligation to speak out].

c. So much for the first section of the first Book of the commentary on the Aphorisms of Jaimini.‡

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* कृत इति। कर्म्मणः कर्म्मप्रतिपादकवाक्यस्य। सम्बन्धात्। परस्पराकाङ्क्षाघटितत्वात्। गावो वा इत्यादीनामपि। कृते। कर्म्मणि। स्तुतिद्वारा विनियोगः ॥

† अयमाशयः। गवादयो जडा अपि कर्म्मानुष्ठानं चक्रुः किमुत विद्वांसो ऽनुतिष्ठेरन्नित्यत्र संशय इति स्तुतौ तात्पर्य्यं सुबद्धमिति ॥

‡ इति जैमिनिसूत्रवृत्तौ प्रथमाध्यायस्य प्रथमः पादः ॥